ºÝºÝߣshows by User: DragosInc / http://www.slideshare.net/images/logo.gif ºÝºÝߣshows by User: DragosInc / Thu, 11 Jun 2020 18:26:41 GMT ºÝºÝߣShare feed for ºÝºÝߣshows by User: DragosInc How to Increase ICS Cybersecurity Return on Investment (ROI) /slideshow/how-to-increase-ics-cybersecurity-return-on-investment-roi/235426136 icsjwg-icscybersecurityroi-200611182641
In Austin's presentation, he will align his 2019 top 5 findings from the Dragos Industrial Penetration Testing team to tactical activities that can be performed to reduce cyberrisk within industrial environments. Return on Investment (ROI) is a broad and subjective term. Even in terms of industrial cyberrisk reduction, the interpretation of ROI can change drastically depending on who you ask. As a member of the Dragos Industrial Penetration Testing team, he sees the world around him in terms of exploitation effort. Exploitation effort is the investment required by an adversary to advance through a network. In his presentation, Austin will detail five ways that will significantly increase the time and energy needed for an adversary while minimizing operational and capital expenditure.]]>
In Austin's presentation, he will align his 2019 top 5 findings from the Dragos Industrial Penetration Testing team to tactical activities that can be performed to reduce cyberrisk within industrial environments. Return on Investment (ROI) is a broad and subjective term. Even in terms of industrial cyberrisk reduction, the interpretation of ROI can change drastically depending on who you ask. As a member of the Dragos Industrial Penetration Testing team, he sees the world around him in terms of exploitation effort. Exploitation effort is the investment required by an adversary to advance through a network. In his presentation, Austin will detail five ways that will significantly increase the time and energy needed for an adversary while minimizing operational and capital expenditure.]]> Thu, 11 Jun 2020 18:26:41 GMT /slideshow/how-to-increase-ics-cybersecurity-return-on-investment-roi/235426136 DragosInc@slideshare.net(DragosInc) How to Increase ICS Cybersecurity Return on Investment (ROI) DragosInc In Austin's presentation, he will align his 2019 top 5 findings from the Dragos Industrial Penetration Testing team to tactical activities that can be performed to reduce cyberrisk within industrial environments. Return on Investment (ROI) is a broad and subjective term. Even in terms of industrial cyberrisk reduction, the interpretation of ROI can change drastically depending on who you ask. As a member of the Dragos Industrial Penetration Testing team, he sees the world around him in terms of exploitation effort. Exploitation effort is the investment required by an adversary to advance through a network. In his presentation, Austin will detail five ways that will significantly increase the time and energy needed for an adversary while minimizing operational and capital expenditure. <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/icsjwg-icscybersecurityroi-200611182641-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&amp;height=120&amp;fit=bounds" /><br> In Austin&#39;s presentation, he will align his 2019 top 5 findings from the Dragos Industrial Penetration Testing team to tactical activities that can be performed to reduce cyberrisk within industrial environments. Return on Investment (ROI) is a broad and subjective term. Even in terms of industrial cyberrisk reduction, the interpretation of ROI can change drastically depending on who you ask. As a member of the Dragos Industrial Penetration Testing team, he sees the world around him in terms of exploitation effort. Exploitation effort is the investment required by an adversary to advance through a network. In his presentation, Austin will detail five ways that will significantly increase the time and energy needed for an adversary while minimizing operational and capital expenditure.
How to Increase ICS Cybersecurity Return on Investment (ROI) from Dragos, Inc.
]]> 2258 0 https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/icsjwg-icscybersecurityroi-200611182641-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds presentation Black http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/post http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/posted 0 Dragos 2019 ICS Year in Review /slideshow/dragos-2019-ics-year-in-review-233301086/233301086 dragos2019icsyearinreview-200506202951
This presentation overviews the key findings and takeaways from Dragos' 2019 ICS Year in Review reports, detailing ICS vulnerability data, global ICS threat activity, and observations from Dragos' professional service engagements--including threat hunts, penetration tests, tabletop exercises, incident response, and more. Go here to read all of the Year in Review reports, view infographics, and watch the webinar: https://dragos.com/year-in-review-2019/]]>
This presentation overviews the key findings and takeaways from Dragos' 2019 ICS Year in Review reports, detailing ICS vulnerability data, global ICS threat activity, and observations from Dragos' professional service engagements--including threat hunts, penetration tests, tabletop exercises, incident response, and more. Go here to read all of the Year in Review reports, view infographics, and watch the webinar: https://dragos.com/year-in-review-2019/]]> Wed, 06 May 2020 20:29:51 GMT /slideshow/dragos-2019-ics-year-in-review-233301086/233301086 DragosInc@slideshare.net(DragosInc) Dragos 2019 ICS Year in Review DragosInc This presentation overviews the key findings and takeaways from Dragos' 2019 ICS Year in Review reports, detailing ICS vulnerability data, global ICS threat activity, and observations from Dragos' professional service engagements--including threat hunts, penetration tests, tabletop exercises, incident response, and more. Go here to read all of the Year in Review reports, view infographics, and watch the webinar: https://dragos.com/year-in-review-2019/ <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/dragos2019icsyearinreview-200506202951-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&amp;height=120&amp;fit=bounds" /><br> This presentation overviews the key findings and takeaways from Dragos&#39; 2019 ICS Year in Review reports, detailing ICS vulnerability data, global ICS threat activity, and observations from Dragos&#39; professional service engagements--including threat hunts, penetration tests, tabletop exercises, incident response, and more. Go here to read all of the Year in Review reports, view infographics, and watch the webinar: https://dragos.com/year-in-review-2019/
Dragos 2019 ICS Year in Review from Dragos, Inc.
]]> 343 0 https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/dragos2019icsyearinreview-200506202951-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds presentation Black http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/post http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/posted 0 Dragos and CyberWire: ICS Ransomware /slideshow/dragos-and-cyberwire-ics-ransomware/231581920 dragosandcyberwirepodcast-icsransomware-200407200936
Jason Christopher, Dragos Principal Cyber Risk Advisor, joins CyberWire for this podcast that discusses the evolution of ICS/OT ransomware, its impacts on the community, and cybersecurity best practices ICS/OT practitioners can implement to combat it. Listen to the full podcast here: https://dragos.com/resource/ransomware-in-an-industrial-world/ ]]>
Jason Christopher, Dragos Principal Cyber Risk Advisor, joins CyberWire for this podcast that discusses the evolution of ICS/OT ransomware, its impacts on the community, and cybersecurity best practices ICS/OT practitioners can implement to combat it. Listen to the full podcast here: https://dragos.com/resource/ransomware-in-an-industrial-world/ ]]> Tue, 07 Apr 2020 20:09:36 GMT /slideshow/dragos-and-cyberwire-ics-ransomware/231581920 DragosInc@slideshare.net(DragosInc) Dragos and CyberWire: ICS Ransomware DragosInc Jason Christopher, Dragos Principal Cyber Risk Advisor, joins CyberWire for this podcast that discusses the evolution of ICS/OT ransomware, its impacts on the community, and cybersecurity best practices ICS/OT practitioners can implement to combat it. Listen to the full podcast here: https://dragos.com/resource/ransomware-in-an-industrial-world/ <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/dragosandcyberwirepodcast-icsransomware-200407200936-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&amp;height=120&amp;fit=bounds" /><br> Jason Christopher, Dragos Principal Cyber Risk Advisor, joins CyberWire for this podcast that discusses the evolution of ICS/OT ransomware, its impacts on the community, and cybersecurity best practices ICS/OT practitioners can implement to combat it. Listen to the full podcast here: https://dragos.com/resource/ransomware-in-an-industrial-world/
Dragos and CyberWire: ICS Ransomware from Dragos, Inc.
]]> 417 0 https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/dragosandcyberwirepodcast-icsransomware-200407200936-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds presentation Black http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/post http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/posted 0 Dragos S4x20: How to Build an OT Security Operations Center /slideshow/dragos-s4x20-how-to-build-an-ot-security-operations-center/226517085 howtobuildanotsecurityoperationscenter-200131190039
Senior Director of Business Development, Matt Cowell's, S4x20 presentation details how to build an effective OT security operations center and the tools and skills needed. ]]>
Senior Director of Business Development, Matt Cowell's, S4x20 presentation details how to build an effective OT security operations center and the tools and skills needed. ]]> Fri, 31 Jan 2020 19:00:39 GMT /slideshow/dragos-s4x20-how-to-build-an-ot-security-operations-center/226517085 DragosInc@slideshare.net(DragosInc) Dragos S4x20: How to Build an OT Security Operations Center DragosInc Senior Director of Business Development, Matt Cowell's, S4x20 presentation details how to build an effective OT security operations center and the tools and skills needed. <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/howtobuildanotsecurityoperationscenter-200131190039-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&amp;height=120&amp;fit=bounds" /><br> Senior Director of Business Development, Matt Cowell&#39;s, S4x20 presentation details how to build an effective OT security operations center and the tools and skills needed.
Dragos S4x20: How to Build an OT Security Operations Center from Dragos, Inc.
]]> 826 0 https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/howtobuildanotsecurityoperationscenter-200131190039-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds presentation Black http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/post http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/posted 0 Dragos S4X20: Mapping ICS Incidents to the MITRE Attack Framework /DragosInc/dragos-s4x20-mapping-ics-incidents-to-the-mitre-attack-framework-226515209 attackforics-200131184642
Principal Industrial Pentester, Austin Scott, presents at S4x20 on how to map ICS incidents to the MITRE ATT&CK Framework. View the webinar here: https://dragos.com/resource/introducing-mitre-attck-for-ics-and-why-it-matters/]]>
Principal Industrial Pentester, Austin Scott, presents at S4x20 on how to map ICS incidents to the MITRE ATT&CK Framework. View the webinar here: https://dragos.com/resource/introducing-mitre-attck-for-ics-and-why-it-matters/]]> Fri, 31 Jan 2020 18:46:42 GMT /DragosInc/dragos-s4x20-mapping-ics-incidents-to-the-mitre-attack-framework-226515209 DragosInc@slideshare.net(DragosInc) Dragos S4X20: Mapping ICS Incidents to the MITRE Attack Framework DragosInc Principal Industrial Pentester, Austin Scott, presents at S4x20 on how to map ICS incidents to the MITRE ATT&CK Framework. View the webinar here: https://dragos.com/resource/introducing-mitre-attck-for-ics-and-why-it-matters/ <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/attackforics-200131184642-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&amp;height=120&amp;fit=bounds" /><br> Principal Industrial Pentester, Austin Scott, presents at S4x20 on how to map ICS incidents to the MITRE ATT&amp;CK Framework. View the webinar here: https://dragos.com/resource/introducing-mitre-attck-for-ics-and-why-it-matters/
Dragos S4X20: Mapping ICS Incidents to the MITRE Attack Framework from Dragos, Inc.
]]> 253 0 https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/attackforics-200131184642-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds presentation Black http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/post http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/posted 0 Reassessing the 2016 CRASHOVERRIDE Cyber Attack /slideshow/reassessing-the-2016-crashoverride-cyber-attack/170266690 reassessingcrashoverride-190909134710
Upon discovery and initial analysis in mid-2017, audiences primarily viewed CRASHOVERRIDE as a disruptive event targeting electric utility operations in Ukraine. Similar to the 2015 attack in the same area, CRASHOVERRIDE interrupted the flow of electricity by manipulating ICS equipment and delayed recovery operations to prolong the impact. However, CRASHOVERRIDE’s immediate effects represent only the precursors for an attempt at a more ambitious attack than what was achieved. In this presentation, Dragos Principal Adversary Hunter Joe Slowik reexamines the CRASHOVERRIDE event and likely attacker intentions, highlighting how CRASHOVERRIDE attempted a different type of attack than 2015. Viewers learn how to begin developing and deploying the required visibility, resilience, and response measures needed to cope with an attack like CRASHOVERRIDE. To view the webinar, go here: https://youtu.be/yX0ZSu_rVc0]]>
Upon discovery and initial analysis in mid-2017, audiences primarily viewed CRASHOVERRIDE as a disruptive event targeting electric utility operations in Ukraine. Similar to the 2015 attack in the same area, CRASHOVERRIDE interrupted the flow of electricity by manipulating ICS equipment and delayed recovery operations to prolong the impact. However, CRASHOVERRIDE’s immediate effects represent only the precursors for an attempt at a more ambitious attack than what was achieved. In this presentation, Dragos Principal Adversary Hunter Joe Slowik reexamines the CRASHOVERRIDE event and likely attacker intentions, highlighting how CRASHOVERRIDE attempted a different type of attack than 2015. Viewers learn how to begin developing and deploying the required visibility, resilience, and response measures needed to cope with an attack like CRASHOVERRIDE. To view the webinar, go here: https://youtu.be/yX0ZSu_rVc0]]> Mon, 09 Sep 2019 13:47:10 GMT /slideshow/reassessing-the-2016-crashoverride-cyber-attack/170266690 DragosInc@slideshare.net(DragosInc) Reassessing the 2016 CRASHOVERRIDE Cyber Attack DragosInc Upon discovery and initial analysis in mid-2017, audiences primarily viewed CRASHOVERRIDE as a disruptive event targeting electric utility operations in Ukraine. Similar to the 2015 attack in the same area, CRASHOVERRIDE interrupted the flow of electricity by manipulating ICS equipment and delayed recovery operations to prolong the impact. However, CRASHOVERRIDE’s immediate effects represent only the precursors for an attempt at a more ambitious attack than what was achieved. In this presentation, Dragos Principal Adversary Hunter Joe Slowik reexamines the CRASHOVERRIDE event and likely attacker intentions, highlighting how CRASHOVERRIDE attempted a different type of attack than 2015. Viewers learn how to begin developing and deploying the required visibility, resilience, and response measures needed to cope with an attack like CRASHOVERRIDE. To view the webinar, go here: https://youtu.be/yX0ZSu_rVc0 <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/reassessingcrashoverride-190909134710-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&amp;height=120&amp;fit=bounds" /><br> Upon discovery and initial analysis in mid-2017, audiences primarily viewed CRASHOVERRIDE as a disruptive event targeting electric utility operations in Ukraine. Similar to the 2015 attack in the same area, CRASHOVERRIDE interrupted the flow of electricity by manipulating ICS equipment and delayed recovery operations to prolong the impact. However, CRASHOVERRIDE’s immediate effects represent only the precursors for an attempt at a more ambitious attack than what was achieved. In this presentation, Dragos Principal Adversary Hunter Joe Slowik reexamines the CRASHOVERRIDE event and likely attacker intentions, highlighting how CRASHOVERRIDE attempted a different type of attack than 2015. Viewers learn how to begin developing and deploying the required visibility, resilience, and response measures needed to cope with an attack like CRASHOVERRIDE. To view the webinar, go here: https://youtu.be/yX0ZSu_rVc0
Reassessing the 2016 CRASHOVERRIDE Cyber Attack from Dragos, Inc.
]]> 463 2 https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/reassessingcrashoverride-190909134710-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds presentation Black http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/post http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/posted 0 Solving ICS Cybersecurity Challenges in the Electric Industry /slideshow/solving-ics-cybersecurity-challenges-in-the-electric-industry/167813241 energysec2019dragosv1public-190830180416
Electric utilities are an integral component of critical infrastructure, and as such, are unique targets for adversaries who aim to disrupt their operations and the day-to-day lives of people who depend on them. This presentation outlines the experiences of a medium sized US electric utility and how Dragos helped various teams overcome some of their specific OT cyber security challenges. ]]>
Electric utilities are an integral component of critical infrastructure, and as such, are unique targets for adversaries who aim to disrupt their operations and the day-to-day lives of people who depend on them. This presentation outlines the experiences of a medium sized US electric utility and how Dragos helped various teams overcome some of their specific OT cyber security challenges. ]]> Fri, 30 Aug 2019 18:04:16 GMT /slideshow/solving-ics-cybersecurity-challenges-in-the-electric-industry/167813241 DragosInc@slideshare.net(DragosInc) Solving ICS Cybersecurity Challenges in the Electric Industry DragosInc Electric utilities are an integral component of critical infrastructure, and as such, are unique targets for adversaries who aim to disrupt their operations and the day-to-day lives of people who depend on them. This presentation outlines the experiences of a medium sized US electric utility and how Dragos helped various teams overcome some of their specific OT cyber security challenges. <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/energysec2019dragosv1public-190830180416-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&amp;height=120&amp;fit=bounds" /><br> Electric utilities are an integral component of critical infrastructure, and as such, are unique targets for adversaries who aim to disrupt their operations and the day-to-day lives of people who depend on them. This presentation outlines the experiences of a medium sized US electric utility and how Dragos helped various teams overcome some of their specific OT cyber security challenges.
Solving ICS Cybersecurity Challenges in the Electric Industry from Dragos, Inc.
]]> 423 2 https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/energysec2019dragosv1public-190830180416-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds presentation Black http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/post http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/posted 0 Purple Teaming ICS Networks /slideshow/purple-teaming-ics-networks/165223061 austinscott-purpleteamingicsnetworks-190820181158
Austin Scott, Principal ICS Security Analyst, presents the role of purple teaming in ICS environments at DEFCON 2019. ]]>
Austin Scott, Principal ICS Security Analyst, presents the role of purple teaming in ICS environments at DEFCON 2019. ]]> Tue, 20 Aug 2019 18:11:58 GMT /slideshow/purple-teaming-ics-networks/165223061 DragosInc@slideshare.net(DragosInc) Purple Teaming ICS Networks DragosInc Austin Scott, Principal ICS Security Analyst, presents the role of purple teaming in ICS environments at DEFCON 2019. <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/austinscott-purpleteamingicsnetworks-190820181158-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&amp;height=120&amp;fit=bounds" /><br> Austin Scott, Principal ICS Security Analyst, presents the role of purple teaming in ICS environments at DEFCON 2019.
Purple Teaming ICS Networks from Dragos, Inc.
]]> 3652 6 https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/austinscott-purpleteamingicsnetworks-190820181158-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds presentation Black http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/post http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/posted 0 Securing Electric Utility Infrastructure /slideshow/securing-electric-utility-infrastructure-164383761/164383761 dragos-sel190816securingelectricutility-190816215203
A Case Study on Asset Baselining, Threat Detection, and Response - presented by Tim Watkins, Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, and Matt Cowell, Dragos. The webinar – now available on-demand at https://selinc.com/events/on-demand-webinar/126340/ – provides insights on baselining your operation, building cyber defense, and streamlining ongoing management. SEL and Dragos also shared a case study based on a recent joint effort to address key cybersecurity challenges at a mid-sized US electric utility. Learn more about Dragos at https://dragos.com or follow us at https://twitter.com/dragosinc Learn more about SEL cybersecurity at https://selinc.com/solutions/security-for-critical-infrastructure/ or follow us at https://twitter.com/SEL_news]]>
A Case Study on Asset Baselining, Threat Detection, and Response - presented by Tim Watkins, Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, and Matt Cowell, Dragos. The webinar – now available on-demand at https://selinc.com/events/on-demand-webinar/126340/ – provides insights on baselining your operation, building cyber defense, and streamlining ongoing management. SEL and Dragos also shared a case study based on a recent joint effort to address key cybersecurity challenges at a mid-sized US electric utility. Learn more about Dragos at https://dragos.com or follow us at https://twitter.com/dragosinc Learn more about SEL cybersecurity at https://selinc.com/solutions/security-for-critical-infrastructure/ or follow us at https://twitter.com/SEL_news]]> Fri, 16 Aug 2019 21:52:03 GMT /slideshow/securing-electric-utility-infrastructure-164383761/164383761 DragosInc@slideshare.net(DragosInc) Securing Electric Utility Infrastructure DragosInc A Case Study on Asset Baselining, Threat Detection, and Response - presented by Tim Watkins, Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, and Matt Cowell, Dragos. The webinar – now available on-demand at https://selinc.com/events/on-demand-webinar/126340/ – provides insights on baselining your operation, building cyber defense, and streamlining ongoing management. SEL and Dragos also shared a case study based on a recent joint effort to address key cybersecurity challenges at a mid-sized US electric utility. Learn more about Dragos at https://dragos.com or follow us at https://twitter.com/dragosinc Learn more about SEL cybersecurity at https://selinc.com/solutions/security-for-critical-infrastructure/ or follow us at https://twitter.com/SEL_news <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/dragos-sel190816securingelectricutility-190816215203-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&amp;height=120&amp;fit=bounds" /><br> A Case Study on Asset Baselining, Threat Detection, and Response - presented by Tim Watkins, Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, and Matt Cowell, Dragos. The webinar – now available on-demand at https://selinc.com/events/on-demand-webinar/126340/ – provides insights on baselining your operation, building cyber defense, and streamlining ongoing management. SEL and Dragos also shared a case study based on a recent joint effort to address key cybersecurity challenges at a mid-sized US electric utility. Learn more about Dragos at https://dragos.com or follow us at https://twitter.com/dragosinc Learn more about SEL cybersecurity at https://selinc.com/solutions/security-for-critical-infrastructure/ or follow us at https://twitter.com/SEL_news
Securing Electric Utility Infrastructure from Dragos, Inc.
]]> 787 4 https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/dragos-sel190816securingelectricutility-190816215203-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds presentation Black http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/post http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/posted 0 Rising Cyber Escalation US Iran Russia ICS Threats and Response /slideshow/rising-cyber-escalation-us-iran-russia-ics-threats-and-response/151846358 risingcyberescalationusiranrussiaicsthreatsandresponse-dragos-190625204647
Dragos discusses the quickly rising tensions between the US, Russia, and Iran, threat intelligence on malicious activity surrounding these tensions, and recommended responses to defend industrial control systems and critical infrastructure worldwide. Presentations included from Dragos Threat Intelligence following these threats and the Dragos Threat Operations Center currently responding and defending against these threats. Visit www.dragos.com for more info about industrial cybersecurity]]>
Dragos discusses the quickly rising tensions between the US, Russia, and Iran, threat intelligence on malicious activity surrounding these tensions, and recommended responses to defend industrial control systems and critical infrastructure worldwide. Presentations included from Dragos Threat Intelligence following these threats and the Dragos Threat Operations Center currently responding and defending against these threats. Visit www.dragos.com for more info about industrial cybersecurity]]> Tue, 25 Jun 2019 20:46:47 GMT /slideshow/rising-cyber-escalation-us-iran-russia-ics-threats-and-response/151846358 DragosInc@slideshare.net(DragosInc) Rising Cyber Escalation US Iran Russia ICS Threats and Response DragosInc Dragos discusses the quickly rising tensions between the US, Russia, and Iran, threat intelligence on malicious activity surrounding these tensions, and recommended responses to defend industrial control systems and critical infrastructure worldwide. Presentations included from Dragos Threat Intelligence following these threats and the Dragos Threat Operations Center currently responding and defending against these threats. Visit www.dragos.com for more info about industrial cybersecurity <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/risingcyberescalationusiranrussiaicsthreatsandresponse-dragos-190625204647-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&amp;height=120&amp;fit=bounds" /><br> Dragos discusses the quickly rising tensions between the US, Russia, and Iran, threat intelligence on malicious activity surrounding these tensions, and recommended responses to defend industrial control systems and critical infrastructure worldwide. Presentations included from Dragos Threat Intelligence following these threats and the Dragos Threat Operations Center currently responding and defending against these threats. Visit www.dragos.com for more info about industrial cybersecurity
Rising Cyber Escalation US Iran Russia ICS Threats and Response from Dragos, Inc.
]]> 1986 3 https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/risingcyberescalationusiranrussiaicsthreatsandresponse-dragos-190625204647-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds presentation Black http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/post http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/posted 0 Neighborhood Keeper - Introduction /DragosInc/neighborhood-keeper-introduction nkprogramupdateappa-190611211600
In this presentation, Matt Bodman, Director of Special Programs at Dragos, demonstrates the basics of Neighborhood Keeper. Neighborhood Keeper is a collaborative threat detection and intelligence program, led by Dragos in partnership with the DOE, that makes ICS threat analytics and data accessible to the greater ICS community. Its initial participants include: Dragos, Ameren, First Energy, Department of Energy’s Idaho National Labs, North American Electric Reliability Corporation’s Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center, and Southern Company. Neighborhood Keeper will serve smaller providers who lack sufficient resources to buy and manage advanced security technologies, giving them access to collaborative ICS data at near-real-time and providing them immediate insight into the ICS threat landscape without revealing sensitive data. For more information, please visit https://dragos.com/neighborhood-keeper/]]>
In this presentation, Matt Bodman, Director of Special Programs at Dragos, demonstrates the basics of Neighborhood Keeper. Neighborhood Keeper is a collaborative threat detection and intelligence program, led by Dragos in partnership with the DOE, that makes ICS threat analytics and data accessible to the greater ICS community. Its initial participants include: Dragos, Ameren, First Energy, Department of Energy’s Idaho National Labs, North American Electric Reliability Corporation’s Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center, and Southern Company. Neighborhood Keeper will serve smaller providers who lack sufficient resources to buy and manage advanced security technologies, giving them access to collaborative ICS data at near-real-time and providing them immediate insight into the ICS threat landscape without revealing sensitive data. For more information, please visit https://dragos.com/neighborhood-keeper/]]> Tue, 11 Jun 2019 21:16:00 GMT /DragosInc/neighborhood-keeper-introduction DragosInc@slideshare.net(DragosInc) Neighborhood Keeper - Introduction DragosInc In this presentation, Matt Bodman, Director of Special Programs at Dragos, demonstrates the basics of Neighborhood Keeper. Neighborhood Keeper is a collaborative threat detection and intelligence program, led by Dragos in partnership with the DOE, that makes ICS threat analytics and data accessible to the greater ICS community. Its initial participants include: Dragos, Ameren, First Energy, Department of Energy’s Idaho National Labs, North American Electric Reliability Corporation’s Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center, and Southern Company. Neighborhood Keeper will serve smaller providers who lack sufficient resources to buy and manage advanced security technologies, giving them access to collaborative ICS data at near-real-time and providing them immediate insight into the ICS threat landscape without revealing sensitive data. For more information, please visit https://dragos.com/neighborhood-keeper/ <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/nkprogramupdateappa-190611211600-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&amp;height=120&amp;fit=bounds" /><br> In this presentation, Matt Bodman, Director of Special Programs at Dragos, demonstrates the basics of Neighborhood Keeper. Neighborhood Keeper is a collaborative threat detection and intelligence program, led by Dragos in partnership with the DOE, that makes ICS threat analytics and data accessible to the greater ICS community. Its initial participants include: Dragos, Ameren, First Energy, Department of Energy’s Idaho National Labs, North American Electric Reliability Corporation’s Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center, and Southern Company. Neighborhood Keeper will serve smaller providers who lack sufficient resources to buy and manage advanced security technologies, giving them access to collaborative ICS data at near-real-time and providing them immediate insight into the ICS threat landscape without revealing sensitive data. For more information, please visit https://dragos.com/neighborhood-keeper/
Neighborhood Keeper - Introduction from Dragos, Inc.
]]> 717 2 https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/nkprogramupdateappa-190611211600-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds presentation Black http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/post http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/posted 0 Dressing up the ICS Kill Chain /slideshow/dressing-up-the-ics-kill-chain/148458106 killchaindmspsc-190531172828
In this presentation Daniel Michaud-Soucy, Principal Threat Analyst at Dragos, will demonstrate three separate models in order to identify gaps in ICS security posture. First, threat modeling serves as an inward look as an ICS network defender in order to properly understand the environment, the threat actors, the impacts, the risks and the crown jewels pertaining to an industrial process. Second, the ICS cyber kill chain serves as an outward look at the steps an adversary needs to take in order to achieve their objectives. Third, the bowtie model allows a graphical representation of the threats to the environment as well as the protection, detection, and response controls that help secure it. In the end, the asset owner creates a holistic picture of the security controls in their network, pertaining to the threat actors they care about and allows identification of gaps in their strategy. Visit www.dragos.com to learn more about the Dragos industrial cybersecurity platform for increased visibility of assets, threats and guided responses. ]]>
In this presentation Daniel Michaud-Soucy, Principal Threat Analyst at Dragos, will demonstrate three separate models in order to identify gaps in ICS security posture. First, threat modeling serves as an inward look as an ICS network defender in order to properly understand the environment, the threat actors, the impacts, the risks and the crown jewels pertaining to an industrial process. Second, the ICS cyber kill chain serves as an outward look at the steps an adversary needs to take in order to achieve their objectives. Third, the bowtie model allows a graphical representation of the threats to the environment as well as the protection, detection, and response controls that help secure it. In the end, the asset owner creates a holistic picture of the security controls in their network, pertaining to the threat actors they care about and allows identification of gaps in their strategy. Visit www.dragos.com to learn more about the Dragos industrial cybersecurity platform for increased visibility of assets, threats and guided responses. ]]> Fri, 31 May 2019 17:28:28 GMT /slideshow/dressing-up-the-ics-kill-chain/148458106 DragosInc@slideshare.net(DragosInc) Dressing up the ICS Kill Chain DragosInc In this presentation Daniel Michaud-Soucy, Principal Threat Analyst at Dragos, will demonstrate three separate models in order to identify gaps in ICS security posture. First, threat modeling serves as an inward look as an ICS network defender in order to properly understand the environment, the threat actors, the impacts, the risks and the crown jewels pertaining to an industrial process. Second, the ICS cyber kill chain serves as an outward look at the steps an adversary needs to take in order to achieve their objectives. Third, the bowtie model allows a graphical representation of the threats to the environment as well as the protection, detection, and response controls that help secure it. In the end, the asset owner creates a holistic picture of the security controls in their network, pertaining to the threat actors they care about and allows identification of gaps in their strategy. Visit www.dragos.com to learn more about the Dragos industrial cybersecurity platform for increased visibility of assets, threats and guided responses. <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/killchaindmspsc-190531172828-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&amp;height=120&amp;fit=bounds" /><br> In this presentation Daniel Michaud-Soucy, Principal Threat Analyst at Dragos, will demonstrate three separate models in order to identify gaps in ICS security posture. First, threat modeling serves as an inward look as an ICS network defender in order to properly understand the environment, the threat actors, the impacts, the risks and the crown jewels pertaining to an industrial process. Second, the ICS cyber kill chain serves as an outward look at the steps an adversary needs to take in order to achieve their objectives. Third, the bowtie model allows a graphical representation of the threats to the environment as well as the protection, detection, and response controls that help secure it. In the end, the asset owner creates a holistic picture of the security controls in their network, pertaining to the threat actors they care about and allows identification of gaps in their strategy. Visit www.dragos.com to learn more about the Dragos industrial cybersecurity platform for increased visibility of assets, threats and guided responses.
Dressing up the ICS Kill Chain from Dragos, Inc.
]]> 2868 3 https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/killchaindmspsc-190531172828-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds presentation Black http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/post http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/posted 0 Consequence Informed Cyber Security /DragosInc/consequence-informed-cyber-security traincybersecurityconferenceescopy-190506192152
The advent of complex communication networks has revolutionized operational architecture in industrial environments over the last 20-30 years. The availability of real-time operational data has proven to effectively compress decision cycles, increase productivity, and has freed organizations of many resource constraints in their operational environments. However, the fact remains that the reliance on real-time operational data and asset connectivity and communication within industrial environments has also opened the way for attackers to potentially compromise asset functions through the very communication networks that are now depended upon for control of physical processes and safety. Additionally, the steady worldwide increase of industrial cyber-attacks has motivated security professionals to develop a plethora of assessment frameworks to help identify weak points in network defense and lower risk.]]>
The advent of complex communication networks has revolutionized operational architecture in industrial environments over the last 20-30 years. The availability of real-time operational data has proven to effectively compress decision cycles, increase productivity, and has freed organizations of many resource constraints in their operational environments. However, the fact remains that the reliance on real-time operational data and asset connectivity and communication within industrial environments has also opened the way for attackers to potentially compromise asset functions through the very communication networks that are now depended upon for control of physical processes and safety. Additionally, the steady worldwide increase of industrial cyber-attacks has motivated security professionals to develop a plethora of assessment frameworks to help identify weak points in network defense and lower risk.]]> Mon, 06 May 2019 19:21:52 GMT /DragosInc/consequence-informed-cyber-security DragosInc@slideshare.net(DragosInc) Consequence Informed Cyber Security DragosInc The advent of complex communication networks has revolutionized operational architecture in industrial environments over the last 20-30 years. The availability of real-time operational data has proven to effectively compress decision cycles, increase productivity, and has freed organizations of many resource constraints in their operational environments. However, the fact remains that the reliance on real-time operational data and asset connectivity and communication within industrial environments has also opened the way for attackers to potentially compromise asset functions through the very communication networks that are now depended upon for control of physical processes and safety. Additionally, the steady worldwide increase of industrial cyber-attacks has motivated security professionals to develop a plethora of assessment frameworks to help identify weak points in network defense and lower risk. <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/traincybersecurityconferenceescopy-190506192152-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&amp;height=120&amp;fit=bounds" /><br> The advent of complex communication networks has revolutionized operational architecture in industrial environments over the last 20-30 years. The availability of real-time operational data has proven to effectively compress decision cycles, increase productivity, and has freed organizations of many resource constraints in their operational environments. However, the fact remains that the reliance on real-time operational data and asset connectivity and communication within industrial environments has also opened the way for attackers to potentially compromise asset functions through the very communication networks that are now depended upon for control of physical processes and safety. Additionally, the steady worldwide increase of industrial cyber-attacks has motivated security professionals to develop a plethora of assessment frameworks to help identify weak points in network defense and lower risk.
Consequence Informed Cyber Security from Dragos, Inc.
]]> 423 4 https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/traincybersecurityconferenceescopy-190506192152-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds presentation Black http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/post http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/posted 0 Dragos year in review (yir) 2018 /slideshow/dragos-year-in-review-yir-2018/141952330 dragosyearinreviewyir2018-190424150919
Dragos’ Year in Review 2018 report provides insights and lessons learned from our team’s first-hand experience hunting and responding to industrial control systems (ICS) adversaries throughout the year, so we can offer recommendations for stronger defenses for industrial organizations and help drive change in the ICS cybersecurity community.]]>
Dragos’ Year in Review 2018 report provides insights and lessons learned from our team’s first-hand experience hunting and responding to industrial control systems (ICS) adversaries throughout the year, so we can offer recommendations for stronger defenses for industrial organizations and help drive change in the ICS cybersecurity community.]]> Wed, 24 Apr 2019 15:09:19 GMT /slideshow/dragos-year-in-review-yir-2018/141952330 DragosInc@slideshare.net(DragosInc) Dragos year in review (yir) 2018 DragosInc Dragos’ Year in Review 2018 report provides insights and lessons learned from our team’s first-hand experience hunting and responding to industrial control systems (ICS) adversaries throughout the year, so we can offer recommendations for stronger defenses for industrial organizations and help drive change in the ICS cybersecurity community. <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/dragosyearinreviewyir2018-190424150919-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&amp;height=120&amp;fit=bounds" /><br> Dragos’ Year in Review 2018 report provides insights and lessons learned from our team’s first-hand experience hunting and responding to industrial control systems (ICS) adversaries throughout the year, so we can offer recommendations for stronger defenses for industrial organizations and help drive change in the ICS cybersecurity community.
Dragos year in review (yir) 2018 from Dragos, Inc.
]]> 406 7 https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/dragosyearinreviewyir2018-190424150919-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds presentation Black http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/post http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/posted 0 Dragos & SRP, PI World 2019: Utilizing Operations Data for Enhanced Cyber Threat Detection /slideshow/dragos-srp-pi-world-2019-utilizing-operations-data-for-enhanced-cyber-threat-detection/141215790 uc19na-srp-johnson-barbier-utilizing-operations-data-for-enhancedcyber-final-190418172039
Adversary groups and activities targeting industrial control systems are on the rise. Security teams are now tasked with defending increasingly complex and critical control systems without interrupting operations. This presentation highlights plans and progress of a large public electric utility to extend threat detection capability using PI system data sets. Integration with a threat detection platform improves situational awareness and adds value in three ways. It first provides confidence for quickly eliminating threat activity as a root cause of operational upsets. The second benefit is improved likelihood of detecting malicious tradecraft targeting control systems. Finally, the integrated approach provides data in support of control system incident response and forensic activities. Video for presentation here: https://youtu.be/Inn6FPaXN1w Learn more www.dragos.com]]>
Adversary groups and activities targeting industrial control systems are on the rise. Security teams are now tasked with defending increasingly complex and critical control systems without interrupting operations. This presentation highlights plans and progress of a large public electric utility to extend threat detection capability using PI system data sets. Integration with a threat detection platform improves situational awareness and adds value in three ways. It first provides confidence for quickly eliminating threat activity as a root cause of operational upsets. The second benefit is improved likelihood of detecting malicious tradecraft targeting control systems. Finally, the integrated approach provides data in support of control system incident response and forensic activities. Video for presentation here: https://youtu.be/Inn6FPaXN1w Learn more www.dragos.com]]> Thu, 18 Apr 2019 17:20:39 GMT /slideshow/dragos-srp-pi-world-2019-utilizing-operations-data-for-enhanced-cyber-threat-detection/141215790 DragosInc@slideshare.net(DragosInc) Dragos & SRP, PI World 2019: Utilizing Operations Data for Enhanced Cyber Threat Detection DragosInc Adversary groups and activities targeting industrial control systems are on the rise. Security teams are now tasked with defending increasingly complex and critical control systems without interrupting operations. This presentation highlights plans and progress of a large public electric utility to extend threat detection capability using PI system data sets. Integration with a threat detection platform improves situational awareness and adds value in three ways. It first provides confidence for quickly eliminating threat activity as a root cause of operational upsets. The second benefit is improved likelihood of detecting malicious tradecraft targeting control systems. Finally, the integrated approach provides data in support of control system incident response and forensic activities. Video for presentation here: https://youtu.be/Inn6FPaXN1w Learn more www.dragos.com <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/uc19na-srp-johnson-barbier-utilizing-operations-data-for-enhancedcyber-final-190418172039-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&amp;height=120&amp;fit=bounds" /><br> Adversary groups and activities targeting industrial control systems are on the rise. Security teams are now tasked with defending increasingly complex and critical control systems without interrupting operations. This presentation highlights plans and progress of a large public electric utility to extend threat detection capability using PI system data sets. Integration with a threat detection platform improves situational awareness and adds value in three ways. It first provides confidence for quickly eliminating threat activity as a root cause of operational upsets. The second benefit is improved likelihood of detecting malicious tradecraft targeting control systems. Finally, the integrated approach provides data in support of control system incident response and forensic activities. Video for presentation here: https://youtu.be/Inn6FPaXN1w Learn more www.dragos.com
Dragos & SRP, PI World 2019: Utilizing Operations Data for Enhanced Cyber Threat Detection from Dragos, Inc.
]]> 745 3 https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/uc19na-srp-johnson-barbier-utilizing-operations-data-for-enhancedcyber-final-190418172039-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds presentation Black http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/post http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/posted 0 2018 Year in Review- ICS Threat Activity Groups /slideshow/2018-year-in-review-ics-threat-activity-groups/139448072 2018-yir-ags-threats1-190403190916
Intelligence Analyst Selena Larson, Sr. Adversary Hunter Joe Slowik, and Sr. Adversary Hunter Amy Bejtlich overview the 2018 Year in Review report detailing the eight ICS threat activity groups Dragos' Intelligence team tracks and the changing threat landscape. ]]>
Intelligence Analyst Selena Larson, Sr. Adversary Hunter Joe Slowik, and Sr. Adversary Hunter Amy Bejtlich overview the 2018 Year in Review report detailing the eight ICS threat activity groups Dragos' Intelligence team tracks and the changing threat landscape. ]]> Wed, 03 Apr 2019 19:09:16 GMT /slideshow/2018-year-in-review-ics-threat-activity-groups/139448072 DragosInc@slideshare.net(DragosInc) 2018 Year in Review- ICS Threat Activity Groups DragosInc Intelligence Analyst Selena Larson, Sr. Adversary Hunter Joe Slowik, and Sr. Adversary Hunter Amy Bejtlich overview the 2018 Year in Review report detailing the eight ICS threat activity groups Dragos' Intelligence team tracks and the changing threat landscape. <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/2018-yir-ags-threats1-190403190916-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&amp;height=120&amp;fit=bounds" /><br> Intelligence Analyst Selena Larson, Sr. Adversary Hunter Joe Slowik, and Sr. Adversary Hunter Amy Bejtlich overview the 2018 Year in Review report detailing the eight ICS threat activity groups Dragos&#39; Intelligence team tracks and the changing threat landscape.
2018 Year in Review- ICS Threat Activity Groups from Dragos, Inc.
]]> 944 5 https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/2018-yir-ags-threats1-190403190916-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds presentation Black http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/post http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/posted 0 Insights To Building An Effective Industrial Cybersecurity Strategy For Your Organization /slideshow/insights-to-building-an-effective-industrial-cybersecurity-strategy-for-your-organization/138603686 dragosexecyearinreviewindustrialcybersecuritystrategyslideshare-190329051826
Key Considerations for Executives from Dragos Executive Year In Review on Industrial Cybersecurity Strategy by Robert M Lee Addresses questions of : - How do we know if we’re underspending or overspending on ICS/industrial cybersecurity? - What is the best thing we can do to get started that will help move us forward in OT security? - If a major attack happens, what is the role of the government? More Info here: https://dragos.com/resource/insights-to-build-an-effective-industrial-cybersecurity-strategy-for-your-organization/ https://www.linkedin.com/company/dragos-inc./ Twitter: https://twitter.com/dragosinc ]]>
Key Considerations for Executives from Dragos Executive Year In Review on Industrial Cybersecurity Strategy by Robert M Lee Addresses questions of : - How do we know if we’re underspending or overspending on ICS/industrial cybersecurity? - What is the best thing we can do to get started that will help move us forward in OT security? - If a major attack happens, what is the role of the government? More Info here: https://dragos.com/resource/insights-to-build-an-effective-industrial-cybersecurity-strategy-for-your-organization/ https://www.linkedin.com/company/dragos-inc./ Twitter: https://twitter.com/dragosinc ]]> Fri, 29 Mar 2019 05:18:26 GMT /slideshow/insights-to-building-an-effective-industrial-cybersecurity-strategy-for-your-organization/138603686 DragosInc@slideshare.net(DragosInc) Insights To Building An Effective Industrial Cybersecurity Strategy For Your Organization DragosInc Key Considerations for Executives from Dragos Executive Year In Review on Industrial Cybersecurity Strategy by Robert M Lee Addresses questions of : - How do we know if we’re underspending or overspending on ICS/industrial cybersecurity? - What is the best thing we can do to get started that will help move us forward in OT security? - If a major attack happens, what is the role of the government? More Info here: https://dragos.com/resource/insights-to-build-an-effective-industrial-cybersecurity-strategy-for-your-organization/ https://www.linkedin.com/company/dragos-inc./ Twitter: https://twitter.com/dragosinc <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/dragosexecyearinreviewindustrialcybersecuritystrategyslideshare-190329051826-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&amp;height=120&amp;fit=bounds" /><br> Key Considerations for Executives from Dragos Executive Year In Review on Industrial Cybersecurity Strategy by Robert M Lee Addresses questions of : - How do we know if we’re underspending or overspending on ICS/industrial cybersecurity? - What is the best thing we can do to get started that will help move us forward in OT security? - If a major attack happens, what is the role of the government? More Info here: https://dragos.com/resource/insights-to-build-an-effective-industrial-cybersecurity-strategy-for-your-organization/ https://www.linkedin.com/company/dragos-inc./ Twitter: https://twitter.com/dragosinc
Insights To Building An Effective Industrial Cybersecurity Strategy For Your Organization from Dragos, Inc.
]]> 540 1 https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/dragosexecyearinreviewindustrialcybersecuritystrategyslideshare-190329051826-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds presentation Black http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/post http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/posted 0 The Current ICS Threat Landscape /slideshow/the-current-ics-threat-landscape/138454724 dragosicsthreatlandscape-190327154703
Presentation from Cyber Security for Critical Assets conference (CS4CA ) in Houston, March 26-28 2019 presented by Sergio Caltagirone, Vice President of Threat Intelligence. Covers: - overview of the OT threat landscape - new OT threats Dragos has uncovered through its industrial cybersecurity technology platform, array of services, and industrial threat intelligence. - details on major industrial threat activity groups and root causes of many recent OT compromises Learn more here: https://dragos.com/year-in-review/ More info: www.dragos.com Follow us on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/dragos-inc./ Follow us on Twitter: https://twitter.com/dragosinc ]]>
Presentation from Cyber Security for Critical Assets conference (CS4CA ) in Houston, March 26-28 2019 presented by Sergio Caltagirone, Vice President of Threat Intelligence. Covers: - overview of the OT threat landscape - new OT threats Dragos has uncovered through its industrial cybersecurity technology platform, array of services, and industrial threat intelligence. - details on major industrial threat activity groups and root causes of many recent OT compromises Learn more here: https://dragos.com/year-in-review/ More info: www.dragos.com Follow us on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/dragos-inc./ Follow us on Twitter: https://twitter.com/dragosinc ]]> Wed, 27 Mar 2019 15:47:03 GMT /slideshow/the-current-ics-threat-landscape/138454724 DragosInc@slideshare.net(DragosInc) The Current ICS Threat Landscape DragosInc Presentation from Cyber Security for Critical Assets conference (CS4CA ) in Houston, March 26-28 2019 presented by Sergio Caltagirone, Vice President of Threat Intelligence. Covers: - overview of the OT threat landscape - new OT threats Dragos has uncovered through its industrial cybersecurity technology platform, array of services, and industrial threat intelligence. - details on major industrial threat activity groups and root causes of many recent OT compromises Learn more here: https://dragos.com/year-in-review/ More info: www.dragos.com Follow us on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/dragos-inc./ Follow us on Twitter: https://twitter.com/dragosinc <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/dragosicsthreatlandscape-190327154703-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&amp;height=120&amp;fit=bounds" /><br> Presentation from Cyber Security for Critical Assets conference (CS4CA ) in Houston, March 26-28 2019 presented by Sergio Caltagirone, Vice President of Threat Intelligence. Covers: - overview of the OT threat landscape - new OT threats Dragos has uncovered through its industrial cybersecurity technology platform, array of services, and industrial threat intelligence. - details on major industrial threat activity groups and root causes of many recent OT compromises Learn more here: https://dragos.com/year-in-review/ More info: www.dragos.com Follow us on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/dragos-inc./ Follow us on Twitter: https://twitter.com/dragosinc
The Current ICS Threat Landscape from Dragos, Inc.
]]> 2115 3 https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/dragosicsthreatlandscape-190327154703-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds presentation Black http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/post http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/posted 0 Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Technology Selection /slideshow/industrial-control-systems-cybersecurity-technology-selection/138332873 icscybersecuritytechnologyselection-190326215739
Selection criteria for today’s ICS cybersecurity technology presented at S4 2019. Includes: - Recommendations for best practices before evaluating an industrial cybersecurity solution in OT environments - Outline of different ICS cybersecurity technologies such as the differences between active and passive scanning, anomaly detection, threat behavior analytics - What’s important in an industrial control systems cybersecurity platform - Practical guide to pilots and bake-offs To learn more read the whitepaper Key Considerations For Selecting An Industrial Cybersecurity Solution for Asset Identification, Threat Detection, and Response https://dragos.com/resource/key-considerations-for-selecting-an-industrial-cybersecurity-solution-for-asset-identification-threat-detection-and-response/ For more about Dragos and the 2019 S4 Detection challenge, read the blog and watch the video here: https://dragos.com/blog/industry-news/dragos-results-of-s4-industrial-cybersecurity-detection-challenge-contest/ More info: www.dragos.com Follow us on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/dragos-inc./ Follow us on Twitter: https://twitter.com/dragosinc ]]>
Selection criteria for today’s ICS cybersecurity technology presented at S4 2019. Includes: - Recommendations for best practices before evaluating an industrial cybersecurity solution in OT environments - Outline of different ICS cybersecurity technologies such as the differences between active and passive scanning, anomaly detection, threat behavior analytics - What’s important in an industrial control systems cybersecurity platform - Practical guide to pilots and bake-offs To learn more read the whitepaper Key Considerations For Selecting An Industrial Cybersecurity Solution for Asset Identification, Threat Detection, and Response https://dragos.com/resource/key-considerations-for-selecting-an-industrial-cybersecurity-solution-for-asset-identification-threat-detection-and-response/ For more about Dragos and the 2019 S4 Detection challenge, read the blog and watch the video here: https://dragos.com/blog/industry-news/dragos-results-of-s4-industrial-cybersecurity-detection-challenge-contest/ More info: www.dragos.com Follow us on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/dragos-inc./ Follow us on Twitter: https://twitter.com/dragosinc ]]> Tue, 26 Mar 2019 21:57:39 GMT /slideshow/industrial-control-systems-cybersecurity-technology-selection/138332873 DragosInc@slideshare.net(DragosInc) Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Technology Selection DragosInc Selection criteria for today’s ICS cybersecurity technology presented at S4 2019. Includes: - Recommendations for best practices before evaluating an industrial cybersecurity solution in OT environments - Outline of different ICS cybersecurity technologies such as the differences between active and passive scanning, anomaly detection, threat behavior analytics - What’s important in an industrial control systems cybersecurity platform - Practical guide to pilots and bake-offs To learn more read the whitepaper Key Considerations For Selecting An Industrial Cybersecurity Solution for Asset Identification, Threat Detection, and Response https://dragos.com/resource/key-considerations-for-selecting-an-industrial-cybersecurity-solution-for-asset-identification-threat-detection-and-response/ For more about Dragos and the 2019 S4 Detection challenge, read the blog and watch the video here: https://dragos.com/blog/industry-news/dragos-results-of-s4-industrial-cybersecurity-detection-challenge-contest/ More info: www.dragos.com Follow us on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/dragos-inc./ Follow us on Twitter: https://twitter.com/dragosinc <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/icscybersecuritytechnologyselection-190326215739-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&amp;height=120&amp;fit=bounds" /><br> Selection criteria for today’s ICS cybersecurity technology presented at S4 2019. Includes: - Recommendations for best practices before evaluating an industrial cybersecurity solution in OT environments - Outline of different ICS cybersecurity technologies such as the differences between active and passive scanning, anomaly detection, threat behavior analytics - What’s important in an industrial control systems cybersecurity platform - Practical guide to pilots and bake-offs To learn more read the whitepaper Key Considerations For Selecting An Industrial Cybersecurity Solution for Asset Identification, Threat Detection, and Response https://dragos.com/resource/key-considerations-for-selecting-an-industrial-cybersecurity-solution-for-asset-identification-threat-detection-and-response/ For more about Dragos and the 2019 S4 Detection challenge, read the blog and watch the video here: https://dragos.com/blog/industry-news/dragos-results-of-s4-industrial-cybersecurity-detection-challenge-contest/ More info: www.dragos.com Follow us on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/dragos-inc./ Follow us on Twitter: https://twitter.com/dragosinc
Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Technology Selection from Dragos, Inc.
]]> 981 5 https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/icscybersecuritytechnologyselection-190326215739-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds presentation Black http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/post http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/posted 0 Intelligence-Driven Industrial Security with Case Studies in ICS Attacks /slideshow/intelligencedriven-industrial-security-with-case-studies-in-ics-attacks/135718758 tech-f02-lee-190311201226
Robert M. Lee's, Dragos CEO, presentation from RSA 2019. Description: Most industrial security best practices are essentially enterprise security best practices copy/pasted into industrial networks. Yet that is not an effective way to reduce risk against industrial-specific threats. Instead, we can learn from ICS attacks that have occurred. In this presentation, Robert M, Lee, CEO and co-founder of Dragos will provide first-hand insights into industrial threats and the lessons learned for industrial security. More information here: https://dragos.com/rsa-2019/ More info: www.dragos.com Follow us on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/drag.... Follow us on Twitter: https://twitter.com/dragosinc ]]>
Robert M. Lee's, Dragos CEO, presentation from RSA 2019. Description: Most industrial security best practices are essentially enterprise security best practices copy/pasted into industrial networks. Yet that is not an effective way to reduce risk against industrial-specific threats. Instead, we can learn from ICS attacks that have occurred. In this presentation, Robert M, Lee, CEO and co-founder of Dragos will provide first-hand insights into industrial threats and the lessons learned for industrial security. More information here: https://dragos.com/rsa-2019/ More info: www.dragos.com Follow us on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/drag.... Follow us on Twitter: https://twitter.com/dragosinc ]]> Mon, 11 Mar 2019 20:12:26 GMT /slideshow/intelligencedriven-industrial-security-with-case-studies-in-ics-attacks/135718758 DragosInc@slideshare.net(DragosInc) Intelligence-Driven Industrial Security with Case Studies in ICS Attacks DragosInc Robert M. Lee's, Dragos CEO, presentation from RSA 2019. Description: Most industrial security best practices are essentially enterprise security best practices copy/pasted into industrial networks. Yet that is not an effective way to reduce risk against industrial-specific threats. Instead, we can learn from ICS attacks that have occurred. In this presentation, Robert M, Lee, CEO and co-founder of Dragos will provide first-hand insights into industrial threats and the lessons learned for industrial security. More information here: https://dragos.com/rsa-2019/ More info: www.dragos.com Follow us on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/drag.... Follow us on Twitter: https://twitter.com/dragosinc <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/tech-f02-lee-190311201226-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&amp;height=120&amp;fit=bounds" /><br> Robert M. Lee&#39;s, Dragos CEO, presentation from RSA 2019. Description: Most industrial security best practices are essentially enterprise security best practices copy/pasted into industrial networks. Yet that is not an effective way to reduce risk against industrial-specific threats. Instead, we can learn from ICS attacks that have occurred. In this presentation, Robert M, Lee, CEO and co-founder of Dragos will provide first-hand insights into industrial threats and the lessons learned for industrial security. More information here: https://dragos.com/rsa-2019/ More info: www.dragos.com Follow us on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/drag.... Follow us on Twitter: https://twitter.com/dragosinc
Intelligence-Driven Industrial Security with Case Studies in ICS Attacks from Dragos, Inc.
]]> 1134 6 https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/tech-f02-lee-190311201226-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds presentation Black http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/post http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/posted 0 https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/profile-photo-DragosInc-48x48.jpg?cb=1695097745 Dragos exists to safeguard civilization. Our cybersecurity technology, services, & intelligence are focused on helping you secure industrial networks (ICS/IIoT) www.dragos.com https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/icsjwg-icscybersecurityroi-200611182641-thumbnail.jpg?width=320&height=320&fit=bounds slideshow/how-to-increase-ics-cybersecurity-return-on-investment-roi/235426136 How to Increase ICS Cy... https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/dragos2019icsyearinreview-200506202951-thumbnail.jpg?width=320&height=320&fit=bounds slideshow/dragos-2019-ics-year-in-review-233301086/233301086 Dragos 2019 ICS Year i... https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/dragosandcyberwirepodcast-icsransomware-200407200936-thumbnail.jpg?width=320&height=320&fit=bounds slideshow/dragos-and-cyberwire-ics-ransomware/231581920 Dragos and CyberWire: ...