�ݺ�ߣshows by User: Gsbanker

�ݺ�ߣshows by User: Gsbanker / http://www.slideshare.net/images/logo.gif �ݺ�ߣshows by User: Gsbanker / Wed, 13 Dec 2017 19:21:45 GMT �ݺ�ߣShare feed for �ݺ�ߣshows by User: Gsbanker Columbia Business School | Columbia Law School Research: Shareholder Activism and Predictive Analytics /slideshow/columbia-business-school-columbia-law-school-research-shareholder-activism-and-predictive-analytics/84023046 columbiapresentationfinal-171213192145
Comprehensive research report with respect to shareholder activism that I just completed as a Senior Fellow and Project Director at the Richman Center for Business, Law and Public Policy at Columbia University, a research institute established by Columbia Business School and Columbia Law School. The two-year project, commissioned by The Center for Global Enterprise, resulted in the development of proprietary predictive analytic models and algorithms, including our Stewardship Investor Vulnerability Index™ to predict shareholder activism two (2) years in advance of an intervention.]]>
Comprehensive research report with respect to shareholder activism that I just completed as a Senior Fellow and Project Director at the Richman Center for Business, Law and Public Policy at Columbia University, a research institute established by Columbia Business School and Columbia Law School. The two-year project, commissioned by The Center for Global Enterprise, resulted in the development of proprietary predictive analytic models and algorithms, including our Stewardship Investor Vulnerability Index™ to predict shareholder activism two (2) years in advance of an intervention.]]> Wed, 13 Dec 2017 19:21:45 GMT /slideshow/columbia-business-school-columbia-law-school-research-shareholder-activism-and-predictive-analytics/84023046 Gsbanker@slideshare.net(Gsbanker) Columbia Business School | Columbia Law School Research: Shareholder Activism and Predictive Analytics Gsbanker Comprehensive research report with respect to shareholder activism that I just completed as a Senior Fellow and Project Director at the Richman Center for Business, Law and Public Policy at Columbia University, a research institute established by Columbia Business School and Columbia Law School. The two-year project, commissioned by The Center for Global Enterprise, resulted in the development of proprietary predictive analytic models and algorithms, including our Stewardship Investor Vulnerability Index™ to predict shareholder activism two (2) years in advance of an intervention. <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/columbiapresentationfinal-171213192145-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> Comprehensive research report with respect to shareholder activism that I just completed as a Senior Fellow and Project Director at the Richman Center for Business, Law and Public Policy at Columbia University, a research institute established by Columbia Business School and Columbia Law School. The two-year project, commissioned by The Center for Global Enterprise, resulted in the development of proprietary predictive analytic models and algorithms, including our Stewardship Investor Vulnerability Index™ to predict shareholder activism two (2) years in advance of an intervention.

Columbia Business School | Columbia Law School Research: Shareholder Activism and Predictive Analytics from Shane Goodwin

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0 The Long-term Efficacy of Activist Directors /slideshow/the-longterm-efficacy-of-activist-directors/58734907 theefficacyofactivistdirectors2-25-2016-160226003528
Over the past two decades, hedge fund activism has emerged as a new mechanism of corporate governance that brings about operational, financial and governance reforms to a corporation. Many prominent business executives and legal scholars are convinced that the entire American economy will suffer unless hedge fund activism with its perceived short-termism agenda is significantly restricted. Shareholder activists and their proponents claim they function as a disciplinary mechanism to monitor management and are instrumental in mitigating the agency conflict between managers and shareholders. My expansive, hand-collected dataset and unique empirical research design methodology with respect to board representation fills an important void in the literature regarding the long-term efficacy of hedge fund activists serving as a disciplinary mechanism on Target Firms by actively seeking board representation to monitor management and reduce agency cost. Moreover, my findings have important policy implications related to the ongoing debate on corporate governance and the rights and roles of shareholders. I find statistically meaningful empirical evidence to suggest that hedge fund activism generates substantial long-term value for Target Firms and its long-term shareholders when they function as a shareholder advocate to monitor management through active board engagement. Furthermore, contrary to conventional wisdom and extant literature, hedge fund activists that seek board representation are focused on long-term corporate initiatives to increase shareholder value rather than a perceived short-term agenda. It is very common for hedge fund activists to seek replacement of the incumbent management team to accomplish the activist’s strategic plan as opposed to forcing a "sale of the company" ex post the board seat grant date.]]>
Over the past two decades, hedge fund activism has emerged as a new mechanism of corporate governance that brings about operational, financial and governance reforms to a corporation. Many prominent business executives and legal scholars are convinced that the entire American economy will suffer unless hedge fund activism with its perceived short-termism agenda is significantly restricted. Shareholder activists and their proponents claim they function as a disciplinary mechanism to monitor management and are instrumental in mitigating the agency conflict between managers and shareholders. My expansive, hand-collected dataset and unique empirical research design methodology with respect to board representation fills an important void in the literature regarding the long-term efficacy of hedge fund activists serving as a disciplinary mechanism on Target Firms by actively seeking board representation to monitor management and reduce agency cost. Moreover, my findings have important policy implications related to the ongoing debate on corporate governance and the rights and roles of shareholders. I find statistically meaningful empirical evidence to suggest that hedge fund activism generates substantial long-term value for Target Firms and its long-term shareholders when they function as a shareholder advocate to monitor management through active board engagement. Furthermore, contrary to conventional wisdom and extant literature, hedge fund activists that seek board representation are focused on long-term corporate initiatives to increase shareholder value rather than a perceived short-term agenda. It is very common for hedge fund activists to seek replacement of the incumbent management team to accomplish the activist’s strategic plan as opposed to forcing a "sale of the company" ex post the board seat grant date.]]> Fri, 26 Feb 2016 00:35:28 GMT /slideshow/the-longterm-efficacy-of-activist-directors/58734907 Gsbanker@slideshare.net(Gsbanker) The Long-term Efficacy of Activist Directors Gsbanker Over the past two decades, hedge fund activism has emerged as a new mechanism of corporate governance that brings about operational, financial and governance reforms to a corporation. Many prominent business executives and legal scholars are convinced that the entire American economy will suffer unless hedge fund activism with its perceived short-termism agenda is significantly restricted. Shareholder activists and their proponents claim they function as a disciplinary mechanism to monitor management and are instrumental in mitigating the agency conflict between managers and shareholders. My expansive, hand-collected dataset and unique empirical research design methodology with respect to board representation fills an important void in the literature regarding the long-term efficacy of hedge fund activists serving as a disciplinary mechanism on Target Firms by actively seeking board representation to monitor management and reduce agency cost. Moreover, my findings have important policy implications related to the ongoing debate on corporate governance and the rights and roles of shareholders. I find statistically meaningful empirical evidence to suggest that hedge fund activism generates substantial long-term value for Target Firms and its long-term shareholders when they function as a shareholder advocate to monitor management through active board engagement. Furthermore, contrary to conventional wisdom and extant literature, hedge fund activists that seek board representation are focused on long-term corporate initiatives to increase shareholder value rather than a perceived short-term agenda. It is very common for hedge fund activists to seek replacement of the incumbent management team to accomplish the activist’s strategic plan as opposed to forcing a "sale of the company" ex post the board seat grant date. <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/theefficacyofactivistdirectors2-25-2016-160226003528-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> Over the past two decades, hedge fund activism has emerged as a new mechanism of corporate governance that brings about operational, financial and governance reforms to a corporation. Many prominent business executives and legal scholars are convinced that the entire American economy will suffer unless hedge fund activism with its perceived short-termism agenda is significantly restricted. Shareholder activists and their proponents claim they function as a disciplinary mechanism to monitor management and are instrumental in mitigating the agency conflict between managers and shareholders. My expansive, hand-collected dataset and unique empirical research design methodology with respect to board representation fills an important void in the literature regarding the long-term efficacy of hedge fund activists serving as a disciplinary mechanism on Target Firms by actively seeking board representation to monitor management and reduce agency cost. Moreover, my findings have important policy implications related to the ongoing debate on corporate governance and the rights and roles of shareholders. I find statistically meaningful empirical evidence to suggest that hedge fund activism generates substantial long-term value for Target Firms and its long-term shareholders when they function as a shareholder advocate to monitor management through active board engagement. Furthermore, contrary to conventional wisdom and extant literature, hedge fund activists that seek board representation are focused on long-term corporate initiatives to increase shareholder value rather than a perceived short-term agenda. It is very common for hedge fund activists to seek replacement of the incumbent management team to accomplish the activist’s strategic plan as opposed to forcing a "sale of the company" ex post the board seat grant date.

The Long-term Efficacy of Activist Directors from Shane Goodwin

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0 Corporate governance and hedge fund activism /slideshow/corporate-governance-and-hedge-fund-activism-53944027/53944027 corporategovernanceandhedgefundactivism-151014201453-lva1-app6892
Over the past two decades, hedge fund activism has emerged as a new mechanism of corporate governance that brings about operational, financial and governance reforms to a corporation. Many prominent business executives and legal scholars are convinced that the entire American economy will suffer unless hedge fund activism with its perceived short-termism agenda is significantly restricted. Shareholder activists and their proponents claim they function as a disciplinary mechanism to monitor management and are instrumental in mitigating the agency conflict between managers and shareholders. I find statistically meaningful empirical evidence to reject the anecdotal conventional wisdom that hedge fund activism is detrimental to the long term interests of companies and their long term shareholders. Moreover, my findings suggest that hedge funds generate substantial long term value for target firms and its long term shareholders when they function as a shareholder advocate to monitor management through active board engagement to reduce agency cost.]]>
Over the past two decades, hedge fund activism has emerged as a new mechanism of corporate governance that brings about operational, financial and governance reforms to a corporation. Many prominent business executives and legal scholars are convinced that the entire American economy will suffer unless hedge fund activism with its perceived short-termism agenda is significantly restricted. Shareholder activists and their proponents claim they function as a disciplinary mechanism to monitor management and are instrumental in mitigating the agency conflict between managers and shareholders. I find statistically meaningful empirical evidence to reject the anecdotal conventional wisdom that hedge fund activism is detrimental to the long term interests of companies and their long term shareholders. Moreover, my findings suggest that hedge funds generate substantial long term value for target firms and its long term shareholders when they function as a shareholder advocate to monitor management through active board engagement to reduce agency cost.]]> Wed, 14 Oct 2015 20:14:53 GMT /slideshow/corporate-governance-and-hedge-fund-activism-53944027/53944027 Gsbanker@slideshare.net(Gsbanker) Corporate governance and hedge fund activism Gsbanker Over the past two decades, hedge fund activism has emerged as a new mechanism of corporate governance that brings about operational, financial and governance reforms to a corporation. Many prominent business executives and legal scholars are convinced that the entire American economy will suffer unless hedge fund activism with its perceived short-termism agenda is significantly restricted. Shareholder activists and their proponents claim they function as a disciplinary mechanism to monitor management and are instrumental in mitigating the agency conflict between managers and shareholders. I find statistically meaningful empirical evidence to reject the anecdotal conventional wisdom that hedge fund activism is detrimental to the long term interests of companies and their long term shareholders. Moreover, my findings suggest that hedge funds generate substantial long term value for target firms and its long term shareholders when they function as a shareholder advocate to monitor management through active board engagement to reduce agency cost. <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/corporategovernanceandhedgefundactivism-151014201453-lva1-app6892-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> Over the past two decades, hedge fund activism has emerged as a new mechanism of corporate governance that brings about operational, financial and governance reforms to a corporation. Many prominent business executives and legal scholars are convinced that the entire American economy will suffer unless hedge fund activism with its perceived short-termism agenda is significantly restricted. Shareholder activists and their proponents claim they function as a disciplinary mechanism to monitor management and are instrumental in mitigating the agency conflict between managers and shareholders. I find statistically meaningful empirical evidence to reject the anecdotal conventional wisdom that hedge fund activism is detrimental to the long term interests of companies and their long term shareholders. Moreover, my findings suggest that hedge funds generate substantial long term value for target firms and its long term shareholders when they function as a shareholder advocate to monitor management through active board engagement to reduce agency cost.

Corporate governance and hedge fund activism from Shane Goodwin

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0 Corporate Governance and Hedge Fund Activism /slideshow/corporate-governance-and-hedge-fund-activism-51788572/51788572 corporategovernanceandhedgefundactivism-150819003140-lva1-app6891
Over the past 25 years, hedge fund activism has emerged as new form of corporate governance mechanism that brings about operational, financial and governance reforms to a corporation. Many prominent business executives and legal scholars are convinced that the entire American economy will suffer unless hedge fund activism with its perceived short-termism agenda is significantly restricted. Shareholder activists and their proponents claim they function as a disciplinary mechanism to monitor management and are instrumental in mitigating the agency conflict between managers and shareholders. I find statistically meaningful empirical evidence to reject the anecdotal conventional wisdom that hedge fund activism is detrimental to the long term interests of companies and their long term shareholders. Moreover, my findings suggest that hedge funds generate substantial long term value for target firms and its long term shareholders when they function as a shareholder advocate to monitor management through active board engagement to reduce agency cost.]]>
Over the past 25 years, hedge fund activism has emerged as new form of corporate governance mechanism that brings about operational, financial and governance reforms to a corporation. Many prominent business executives and legal scholars are convinced that the entire American economy will suffer unless hedge fund activism with its perceived short-termism agenda is significantly restricted. Shareholder activists and their proponents claim they function as a disciplinary mechanism to monitor management and are instrumental in mitigating the agency conflict between managers and shareholders. I find statistically meaningful empirical evidence to reject the anecdotal conventional wisdom that hedge fund activism is detrimental to the long term interests of companies and their long term shareholders. Moreover, my findings suggest that hedge funds generate substantial long term value for target firms and its long term shareholders when they function as a shareholder advocate to monitor management through active board engagement to reduce agency cost.]]> Wed, 19 Aug 2015 00:31:40 GMT /slideshow/corporate-governance-and-hedge-fund-activism-51788572/51788572 Gsbanker@slideshare.net(Gsbanker) Corporate Governance and Hedge Fund Activism Gsbanker Over the past 25 years, hedge fund activism has emerged as new form of corporate governance mechanism that brings about operational, financial and governance reforms to a corporation. Many prominent business executives and legal scholars are convinced that the entire American economy will suffer unless hedge fund activism with its perceived short-termism agenda is significantly restricted. Shareholder activists and their proponents claim they function as a disciplinary mechanism to monitor management and are instrumental in mitigating the agency conflict between managers and shareholders. I find statistically meaningful empirical evidence to reject the anecdotal conventional wisdom that hedge fund activism is detrimental to the long term interests of companies and their long term shareholders. Moreover, my findings suggest that hedge funds generate substantial long term value for target firms and its long term shareholders when they function as a shareholder advocate to monitor management through active board engagement to reduce agency cost. <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/corporategovernanceandhedgefundactivism-150819003140-lva1-app6891-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> Over the past 25 years, hedge fund activism has emerged as new form of corporate governance mechanism that brings about operational, financial and governance reforms to a corporation. Many prominent business executives and legal scholars are convinced that the entire American economy will suffer unless hedge fund activism with its perceived short-termism agenda is significantly restricted. Shareholder activists and their proponents claim they function as a disciplinary mechanism to monitor management and are instrumental in mitigating the agency conflict between managers and shareholders. I find statistically meaningful empirical evidence to reject the anecdotal conventional wisdom that hedge fund activism is detrimental to the long term interests of companies and their long term shareholders. Moreover, my findings suggest that hedge funds generate substantial long term value for target firms and its long term shareholders when they function as a shareholder advocate to monitor management through active board engagement to reduce agency cost.

Corporate Governance and Hedge Fund Activism from Shane Goodwin

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0 Corporate Governance and Hedge Fund Activism /slideshow/corporate-governance-and-hedge-fund-activism/51787468 5feec59f-c946-4373-9551-ed6d0641beac-150818233726-lva1-app6891
Over the past two decades, hedge fund activism has emerged as a new mechanism of corporate governance that brings about operational, financial and governance reforms to a corporation. Many prominent business executives and legal scholars are convinced that the entire American economy will suffer unless hedge fund activism with its perceived short-termism agenda is significantly restricted. Shareholder activists and their proponents claim they function as a disciplinary mechanism to monitor management and are instrumental in mitigating the agency conflict between managers and shareholders. I find statistically meaningful empirical evidence to reject the anecdotal conventional wisdom that hedge fund activism is detrimental to the long term interests of companies and their long term shareholders. Moreover, my findings suggest that hedge funds generate substantial long term value for target firms and its long term shareholders when they function as a shareholder advocate to monitor management through active board engagement to reduce agency cost]]>
Over the past two decades, hedge fund activism has emerged as a new mechanism of corporate governance that brings about operational, financial and governance reforms to a corporation. Many prominent business executives and legal scholars are convinced that the entire American economy will suffer unless hedge fund activism with its perceived short-termism agenda is significantly restricted. Shareholder activists and their proponents claim they function as a disciplinary mechanism to monitor management and are instrumental in mitigating the agency conflict between managers and shareholders. I find statistically meaningful empirical evidence to reject the anecdotal conventional wisdom that hedge fund activism is detrimental to the long term interests of companies and their long term shareholders. Moreover, my findings suggest that hedge funds generate substantial long term value for target firms and its long term shareholders when they function as a shareholder advocate to monitor management through active board engagement to reduce agency cost]]> Tue, 18 Aug 2015 23:37:26 GMT /slideshow/corporate-governance-and-hedge-fund-activism/51787468 Gsbanker@slideshare.net(Gsbanker) Corporate Governance and Hedge Fund Activism Gsbanker Over the past two decades, hedge fund activism has emerged as a new mechanism of corporate governance that brings about operational, financial and governance reforms to a corporation. Many prominent business executives and legal scholars are convinced that the entire American economy will suffer unless hedge fund activism with its perceived short-termism agenda is significantly restricted. Shareholder activists and their proponents claim they function as a disciplinary mechanism to monitor management and are instrumental in mitigating the agency conflict between managers and shareholders. I find statistically meaningful empirical evidence to reject the anecdotal conventional wisdom that hedge fund activism is detrimental to the long term interests of companies and their long term shareholders. Moreover, my findings suggest that hedge funds generate substantial long term value for target firms and its long term shareholders when they function as a shareholder advocate to monitor management through active board engagement to reduce agency cost <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/5feec59f-c946-4373-9551-ed6d0641beac-150818233726-lva1-app6891-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> Over the past two decades, hedge fund activism has emerged as a new mechanism of corporate governance that brings about operational, financial and governance reforms to a corporation. Many prominent business executives and legal scholars are convinced that the entire American economy will suffer unless hedge fund activism with its perceived short-termism agenda is significantly restricted. Shareholder activists and their proponents claim they function as a disciplinary mechanism to monitor management and are instrumental in mitigating the agency conflict between managers and shareholders. I find statistically meaningful empirical evidence to reject the anecdotal conventional wisdom that hedge fund activism is detrimental to the long term interests of companies and their long term shareholders. Moreover, my findings suggest that hedge funds generate substantial long term value for target firms and its long term shareholders when they function as a shareholder advocate to monitor management through active board engagement to reduce agency cost

Corporate Governance and Hedge Fund Activism from Shane Goodwin

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0 https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/profile-photo-Gsbanker-48x48.jpg?cb=1667938405 Shane Goodwin is a Senior Fellow at the Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation. Additionally, Dr. Goodwin serves as a Senior Fellow at the Richman Center for Business, Law and Public Policy at Columbia University. Most recently, he served as a Fellow of Business Economics at Harvard Business School. His research is focused on mergers and acquisitions, corporate governance and shareholder activism. Dr. Goodwin serves on the Harvard University Extension School faculty, where he teaches Global Mergers and Acquisitions and Corporate Governance. Dr. Goodwin has 25 years of M&A, corporate finance and principal investing experience on Wall Street. https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/columbiapresentationfinal-171213192145-thumbnail.jpg?width=320&height=320&fit=bounds slideshow/columbia-business-school-columbia-law-school-research-shareholder-activism-and-predictive-analytics/84023046 Columbia Business Scho... https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/theefficacyofactivistdirectors2-25-2016-160226003528-thumbnail.jpg?width=320&height=320&fit=bounds slideshow/the-longterm-efficacy-of-activist-directors/58734907 The Long-term Efficacy... https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/corporategovernanceandhedgefundactivism-151014201453-lva1-app6892-thumbnail.jpg?width=320&height=320&fit=bounds slideshow/corporate-governance-and-hedge-fund-activism-53944027/53944027 Corporate governance a...