�ݺ�ߣshows by User: LucasColley

�ݺ�ߣshows by User: LucasColley / http://www.slideshare.net/images/logo.gif �ݺ�ߣshows by User: LucasColley / Mon, 02 Nov 2015 18:57:33 GMT �ݺ�ߣShare feed for �ݺ�ߣshows by User: LucasColley Clear, hold, build: the evolution of counterinsurgency (COIN) for the British Army in Afghanistan, 2001-2014 /slideshow/online-dissertation-submission/54657133 32823acb-4eef-44d1-a5bc-f0c09bad405b-151102185734-lva1-app6892
Abstract: The British Army has amassed a wealth of operational experience in two theatres of conflict in the last fourteen years. In many ways, the conflicts of Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted the strategic shortcomings of those in charge, and yet highlighted the enduring tactical excellence of those charged with fighting the battles. In terms of organisation and equipment, the British Army has modernised itself, and introduced new tactics, techniques and procedures to deal with the reality of the contemporary operating environment. This work seeks to track the British Army’s developments in counterinsurgency doctrine and practice from the conflict in Afghanistan up to the end of its offensive operations in 2014, and also the ways in which its orientation towards conventional war-fighting and the “corporate philosophy” therein does not lend itself well to waging counterinsurgency successfully as a matter of routine. This work also seeks to highlight how the campaign in Afghanistan has been plagued by the lack of a coherent strategy, and the implications both for the campaign itself and for future military operations.]]>
Abstract: The British Army has amassed a wealth of operational experience in two theatres of conflict in the last fourteen years. In many ways, the conflicts of Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted the strategic shortcomings of those in charge, and yet highlighted the enduring tactical excellence of those charged with fighting the battles. In terms of organisation and equipment, the British Army has modernised itself, and introduced new tactics, techniques and procedures to deal with the reality of the contemporary operating environment. This work seeks to track the British Army’s developments in counterinsurgency doctrine and practice from the conflict in Afghanistan up to the end of its offensive operations in 2014, and also the ways in which its orientation towards conventional war-fighting and the “corporate philosophy” therein does not lend itself well to waging counterinsurgency successfully as a matter of routine. This work also seeks to highlight how the campaign in Afghanistan has been plagued by the lack of a coherent strategy, and the implications both for the campaign itself and for future military operations.]]> Mon, 02 Nov 2015 18:57:33 GMT /slideshow/online-dissertation-submission/54657133 LucasColley@slideshare.net(LucasColley) Clear, hold, build: the evolution of counterinsurgency (COIN) for the British Army in Afghanistan, 2001-2014 LucasColley Abstract: The British Army has amassed a wealth of operational experience in two theatres of conflict in the last fourteen years. In many ways, the conflicts of Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted the strategic shortcomings of those in charge, and yet highlighted the enduring tactical excellence of those charged with fighting the battles. In terms of organisation and equipment, the British Army has modernised itself, and introduced new tactics, techniques and procedures to deal with the reality of the contemporary operating environment. This work seeks to track the British Army’s developments in counterinsurgency doctrine and practice from the conflict in Afghanistan up to the end of its offensive operations in 2014, and also the ways in which its orientation towards conventional war-fighting and the “corporate philosophy” therein does not lend itself well to waging counterinsurgency successfully as a matter of routine. This work also seeks to highlight how the campaign in Afghanistan has been plagued by the lack of a coherent strategy, and the implications both for the campaign itself and for future military operations. <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/32823acb-4eef-44d1-a5bc-f0c09bad405b-151102185734-lva1-app6892-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /><br> Abstract: The British Army has amassed a wealth of operational experience in two theatres of conflict in the last fourteen years. In many ways, the conflicts of Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted the strategic shortcomings of those in charge, and yet highlighted the enduring tactical excellence of those charged with fighting the battles. In terms of organisation and equipment, the British Army has modernised itself, and introduced new tactics, techniques and procedures to deal with the reality of the contemporary operating environment. This work seeks to track the British Army’s developments in counterinsurgency doctrine and practice from the conflict in Afghanistan up to the end of its offensive operations in 2014, and also the ways in which its orientation towards conventional war-fighting and the “corporate philosophy” therein does not lend itself well to waging counterinsurgency successfully as a matter of routine. This work also seeks to highlight how the campaign in Afghanistan has been plagued by the lack of a coherent strategy, and the implications both for the campaign itself and for future military operations.

Clear, hold, build: the evolution of counterinsurgency (COIN) for the British Army in Afghanistan, 2001-2014 from Lucas Colley

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0 https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/profile-photo-LucasColley-48x48.jpg?cb=1523555408 I am a currently serving Army Reserve infantry officer on a full-time attachment to a Regular infantry battalion. I hold a master's degree in War Studies and a bachelor's degree in International Politics and Military History from Aberystwyth University, and my academic area of interest lies primarily in counterinsurgency and the changing character of war, amongst wider war studies and international relations in general. I also hold professional accreditation from both the Chartered Management Institute and the Institute of Leadership and Management.