ºÝºÝߣshows by User: RobertoBalmer / http://www.slideshare.net/images/logo.gif ºÝºÝߣshows by User: RobertoBalmer / Thu, 10 Nov 2016 23:22:46 GMT ºÝºÝߣShare feed for ºÝºÝߣshows by User: RobertoBalmer Die Cloud als Wegbereiter für globalen Wohlstand: Vertrauen – Verantwortung – Teilhabe (Schweiz) https://de.slideshare.net/slideshow/die-cloud-als-wegbereiter-fr-globalen-wohlstand-vertrauen-verantwortung-teilhabe-schweiz/68613387 acloudforglobalgoodswi-161110232246
Dieses Dokument soll politischen Entscheidungsträgern als Denkschrift bei der vollen Erschließung der Vorteile dienen, die sich aus der Umstellung auf die Cloud ergeben. Wir liefern dazu insgesamt 78 Empfehlungen in 15 Politikfeldern. Sie sollen als Grundlage für ein Regulierungsumfeld dienen, das eine von Vertrauen, Verantwortung und Teilhabe geprägte Cloud ermöglicht. Darüber hinaus zeigen wir anhand einiger Beispiele, wie die Cloud bereits jetzt dazu beiträgt, dass Regierungen und Behörden die Bürgerinnen und Bürger besser erreichen, dass Unternehmen produktiver arbeiten und dass gemeinnützige Organisationen effektiver tätig sein können.]]>
Dieses Dokument soll politischen Entscheidungsträgern als Denkschrift bei der vollen Erschließung der Vorteile dienen, die sich aus der Umstellung auf die Cloud ergeben. Wir liefern dazu insgesamt 78 Empfehlungen in 15 Politikfeldern. Sie sollen als Grundlage für ein Regulierungsumfeld dienen, das eine von Vertrauen, Verantwortung und Teilhabe geprägte Cloud ermöglicht. Darüber hinaus zeigen wir anhand einiger Beispiele, wie die Cloud bereits jetzt dazu beiträgt, dass Regierungen und Behörden die Bürgerinnen und Bürger besser erreichen, dass Unternehmen produktiver arbeiten und dass gemeinnützige Organisationen effektiver tätig sein können.]]> Thu, 10 Nov 2016 23:22:46 GMT https://de.slideshare.net/slideshow/die-cloud-als-wegbereiter-fr-globalen-wohlstand-vertrauen-verantwortung-teilhabe-schweiz/68613387 RobertoBalmer@slideshare.net(RobertoBalmer) Die Cloud als Wegbereiter für globalen Wohlstand: Vertrauen – Verantwortung – Teilhabe (Schweiz) RobertoBalmer Dieses Dokument soll politischen Entscheidungsträgern als Denkschrift bei der vollen Erschließung der Vorteile dienen, die sich aus der Umstellung auf die Cloud ergeben. Wir liefern dazu insgesamt 78 Empfehlungen in 15 Politikfeldern. Sie sollen als Grundlage für ein Regulierungsumfeld dienen, das eine von Vertrauen, Verantwortung und Teilhabe geprägte Cloud ermöglicht. Darüber hinaus zeigen wir anhand einiger Beispiele, wie die Cloud bereits jetzt dazu beiträgt, dass Regierungen und Behörden die Bürgerinnen und Bürger besser erreichen, dass Unternehmen produktiver arbeiten und dass gemeinnützige Organisationen effektiver tätig sein können. <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/acloudforglobalgoodswi-161110232246-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&amp;height=120&amp;fit=bounds" /><br> Dieses Dokument soll politischen Entscheidungsträgern als Denkschrift bei der vollen Erschließung der Vorteile dienen, die sich aus der Umstellung auf die Cloud ergeben. Wir liefern dazu insgesamt 78 Empfehlungen in 15 Politikfeldern. Sie sollen als Grundlage für ein Regulierungsumfeld dienen, das eine von Vertrauen, Verantwortung und Teilhabe geprägte Cloud ermöglicht. Darüber hinaus zeigen wir anhand einiger Beispiele, wie die Cloud bereits jetzt dazu beiträgt, dass Regierungen und Behörden die Bürgerinnen und Bürger besser erreichen, dass Unternehmen produktiver arbeiten und dass gemeinnützige Organisationen effektiver tätig sein können.
from Roberto Balmer
]]> 663 7 https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/acloudforglobalgoodswi-161110232246-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds presentation Black http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/post http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/posted 0 Geographic regulation of next generation broadband networks - ITS 2015 /slideshow/geographic-regulation-ofnext-generation-broadband-networks-its2015-final-presentation/49923996 geographicregulationofnextgenerationbroadbandnetworks-its2015finalpresentation-150628105425-lva1-app6891
Geographic regulation of next generation broadband networks]]>
Geographic regulation of next generation broadband networks]]> Sun, 28 Jun 2015 10:54:25 GMT /slideshow/geographic-regulation-ofnext-generation-broadband-networks-its2015-final-presentation/49923996 RobertoBalmer@slideshare.net(RobertoBalmer) Geographic regulation of next generation broadband networks - ITS 2015 RobertoBalmer Geographic regulation of next generation broadband networks <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/geographicregulationofnextgenerationbroadbandnetworks-its2015finalpresentation-150628105425-lva1-app6891-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&amp;height=120&amp;fit=bounds" /><br> Geographic regulation of next generation broadband networks
Geographic regulation of next generation broadband networks - ITS 2015 from Roberto Balmer
]]> 391 3 https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/geographicregulationofnextgenerationbroadbandnetworks-its2015finalpresentation-150628105425-lva1-app6891-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds presentation Black http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/post http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/posted 0 Cooperative investment in next generation broadband networks - ITS 2015 /slideshow/cooperative-investment-innext-generation-broadband-networks-its2015-final-presentation/49923995 cooperativeinvestmentinnextgenerationbroadbandnetworks-its2015finalpresentation-150628105425-lva1-app6891
Cooperative investment in next generation broadband networks]]>
Cooperative investment in next generation broadband networks]]> Sun, 28 Jun 2015 10:54:25 GMT /slideshow/cooperative-investment-innext-generation-broadband-networks-its2015-final-presentation/49923995 RobertoBalmer@slideshare.net(RobertoBalmer) Cooperative investment in next generation broadband networks - ITS 2015 RobertoBalmer Cooperative investment in next generation broadband networks <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/cooperativeinvestmentinnextgenerationbroadbandnetworks-its2015finalpresentation-150628105425-lva1-app6891-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&amp;height=120&amp;fit=bounds" /><br> Cooperative investment in next generation broadband networks
Cooperative investment in next generation broadband networks - ITS 2015 from Roberto Balmer
]]> 377 2 https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/cooperativeinvestmentinnextgenerationbroadbandnetworks-its2015finalpresentation-150628105425-lva1-app6891-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds presentation Black http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/post http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/posted 0 Competition and market strategies in the Swiss fixed telephony market - ITS 2015 /slideshow/competition-and-market-strategies-in-the-swiss-fixed-telephony-market-its2015-final-presentation/49923994 competitionandmarketstrategiesintheswissfixedtelephonymarket-its2015finalpresentation-150628105423-lva1-app6892
Competition and market strategies in the Swiss fixed telephony market]]>
Competition and market strategies in the Swiss fixed telephony market]]> Sun, 28 Jun 2015 10:54:23 GMT /slideshow/competition-and-market-strategies-in-the-swiss-fixed-telephony-market-its2015-final-presentation/49923994 RobertoBalmer@slideshare.net(RobertoBalmer) Competition and market strategies in the Swiss fixed telephony market - ITS 2015 RobertoBalmer Competition and market strategies in the Swiss fixed telephony market <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/competitionandmarketstrategiesintheswissfixedtelephonymarket-its2015finalpresentation-150628105423-lva1-app6892-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&amp;height=120&amp;fit=bounds" /><br> Competition and market strategies in the Swiss fixed telephony market
Competition and market strategies in the Swiss fixed telephony market - ITS 2015 from Roberto Balmer
]]> 346 4 https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/competitionandmarketstrategiesintheswissfixedtelephonymarket-its2015finalpresentation-150628105423-lva1-app6892-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds presentation Black http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/post http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/posted 0 The Telecommunications Business in Switzerland - Liberalization and Regulation /slideshow/280415bar-final/47649711 280415barfinal-150501095510-conversion-gate02
This presentation describes the fundamental challenges for a policy maker to design the telecoms industry: Privatization, Liberalization and Regulation. The presentation focuses on how economic policy has been applied in Switzerland and to Swisscom.]]>
This presentation describes the fundamental challenges for a policy maker to design the telecoms industry: Privatization, Liberalization and Regulation. The presentation focuses on how economic policy has been applied in Switzerland and to Swisscom.]]> Fri, 01 May 2015 09:55:10 GMT /slideshow/280415bar-final/47649711 RobertoBalmer@slideshare.net(RobertoBalmer) The Telecommunications Business in Switzerland - Liberalization and Regulation RobertoBalmer This presentation describes the fundamental challenges for a policy maker to design the telecoms industry: Privatization, Liberalization and Regulation. The presentation focuses on how economic policy has been applied in Switzerland and to Swisscom. <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/280415barfinal-150501095510-conversion-gate02-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&amp;height=120&amp;fit=bounds" /><br> This presentation describes the fundamental challenges for a policy maker to design the telecoms industry: Privatization, Liberalization and Regulation. The presentation focuses on how economic policy has been applied in Switzerland and to Swisscom.
The Telecommunications Business in Switzerland - Liberalization and Regulation from Roberto Balmer
]]> 1381 7 https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/280415barfinal-150501095510-conversion-gate02-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds presentation Black http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/post http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/posted 0 Geographic regulation and cooperative investment in next generation broadband networks /slideshow/geographic-regulation-and-cooperative-investment-in-next-generation-broadband-networks/43103098 geographicregulationandcooperativeinvestmentinnextgenerationbroadbandnetworks-141230152042-conversion-gate01
Alternative telecommunications operators have continuously invested in their own infrastructure in recent years. After more than a decade since liberalization, competitive conditions have substantially changed, especially in urban areas. European regulatory authorities have acknowledged this development by starting regional deregulation. Additionally, different forms of cooperative investments in next generation broadband have appeared on the market. The effects of such schemes on competition, investment and welfare crucially depend on the fine details of implementation. For instance, in the case of joint ventures, it matters how investment costs are shared and how internal and external access prices are determined. In the case of long-term access agreements, it is essential to consider how access tariffs are structured, whether they can adapt to market developments ex-post and whether contracts are signed before or after the investment takes place. Generally, many of these agreements allow some extent of risk sharing, offering the possibility to increase investment incentives when firms are not risk neutral. This article reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on geographic regulation and co-investments in next generation broadband. It is suggested that regulators consider introducing regulated co-investment agreements complementing current regulation or in some cases even substituting for it, in addition to considering geographically segmented access prices.]]>
Alternative telecommunications operators have continuously invested in their own infrastructure in recent years. After more than a decade since liberalization, competitive conditions have substantially changed, especially in urban areas. European regulatory authorities have acknowledged this development by starting regional deregulation. Additionally, different forms of cooperative investments in next generation broadband have appeared on the market. The effects of such schemes on competition, investment and welfare crucially depend on the fine details of implementation. For instance, in the case of joint ventures, it matters how investment costs are shared and how internal and external access prices are determined. In the case of long-term access agreements, it is essential to consider how access tariffs are structured, whether they can adapt to market developments ex-post and whether contracts are signed before or after the investment takes place. Generally, many of these agreements allow some extent of risk sharing, offering the possibility to increase investment incentives when firms are not risk neutral. This article reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on geographic regulation and co-investments in next generation broadband. It is suggested that regulators consider introducing regulated co-investment agreements complementing current regulation or in some cases even substituting for it, in addition to considering geographically segmented access prices.]]> Tue, 30 Dec 2014 15:20:42 GMT /slideshow/geographic-regulation-and-cooperative-investment-in-next-generation-broadband-networks/43103098 RobertoBalmer@slideshare.net(RobertoBalmer) Geographic regulation and cooperative investment in next generation broadband networks RobertoBalmer Alternative telecommunications operators have continuously invested in their own infrastructure in recent years. After more than a decade since liberalization, competitive conditions have substantially changed, especially in urban areas. European regulatory authorities have acknowledged this development by starting regional deregulation. Additionally, different forms of cooperative investments in next generation broadband have appeared on the market. The effects of such schemes on competition, investment and welfare crucially depend on the fine details of implementation. For instance, in the case of joint ventures, it matters how investment costs are shared and how internal and external access prices are determined. In the case of long-term access agreements, it is essential to consider how access tariffs are structured, whether they can adapt to market developments ex-post and whether contracts are signed before or after the investment takes place. Generally, many of these agreements allow some extent of risk sharing, offering the possibility to increase investment incentives when firms are not risk neutral. This article reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on geographic regulation and co-investments in next generation broadband. It is suggested that regulators consider introducing regulated co-investment agreements complementing current regulation or in some cases even substituting for it, in addition to considering geographically segmented access prices. <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/geographicregulationandcooperativeinvestmentinnextgenerationbroadbandnetworks-141230152042-conversion-gate01-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&amp;height=120&amp;fit=bounds" /><br> Alternative telecommunications operators have continuously invested in their own infrastructure in recent years. After more than a decade since liberalization, competitive conditions have substantially changed, especially in urban areas. European regulatory authorities have acknowledged this development by starting regional deregulation. Additionally, different forms of cooperative investments in next generation broadband have appeared on the market. The effects of such schemes on competition, investment and welfare crucially depend on the fine details of implementation. For instance, in the case of joint ventures, it matters how investment costs are shared and how internal and external access prices are determined. In the case of long-term access agreements, it is essential to consider how access tariffs are structured, whether they can adapt to market developments ex-post and whether contracts are signed before or after the investment takes place. Generally, many of these agreements allow some extent of risk sharing, offering the possibility to increase investment incentives when firms are not risk neutral. This article reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on geographic regulation and co-investments in next generation broadband. It is suggested that regulators consider introducing regulated co-investment agreements complementing current regulation or in some cases even substituting for it, in addition to considering geographically segmented access prices.
Geographic regulation and cooperative investment in next generation broadband networks from Roberto Balmer
]]> 390 2 https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/geographicregulationandcooperativeinvestmentinnextgenerationbroadbandnetworks-141230152042-conversion-gate01-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds presentation Black http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/post http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/posted 0 Competition and market strategies in the swiss fixed telephony market /RobertoBalmer/competition-and-market-strategies-in-the-swiss-fixed-telephony-market competitionandmarketstrategiesintheswissfixedtelephonymarket-141230151757-conversion-gate02
Fixed telephony has long been a fundamentally important market for European telecommunications operators. The liberalisation and the introduction of regulation in the end of the 1990s, however, allowed new entrants to compete with incumbents at the retail level. A rapid price decline and a decline in revenues followed. Increased retail competition eventually led a number of national regulators to deregulate this market. In 2013, however, many European countries (including Switzerland) continued to have partially binding retail price regulation in this market. More than a decade after liberalisation and the introduction of wholesale and retail price regulation, sufficient data is available to empirically measure the success of regulation and assess its continued necessity. This paper develops a market model based on a generalised version of the traditional dominant firm – competitive fringe model allowing for the incumbent a more competitive conduct than that of a dominant firm. A system of simultaneous equations is developed and direct estimation of the incumbent’s residual demand function is performed by instrumenting the market price by incumbent-specific cost shifting variables as well as other variables. Unlike earlier papers that assess market power in this market, this paper also adjusts the market model to ensure a sufficient level of cointegration and avoid spurious regression results. This necessitates the introduction of intertemporal effects. While the incumbent’s conduct cannot be directly estimated using this framework, the concrete estimates show that its residual demand is inelastic (long run price elasticity of residual demand of -0.12). Such a level of elasticity is shown to be only compatible with a profit maximising incumbent in the case of largely competitive conduct (conduct parameter below 0.12 and therefore close to zero). It is consequently found that the Swiss incumbent acted rather competitively in the fixed telephony retail market in the period under review (2004-2012) and that the (partial) retail price caps in place can no longer be justified on the basis of a lack of competition.]]>
Fixed telephony has long been a fundamentally important market for European telecommunications operators. The liberalisation and the introduction of regulation in the end of the 1990s, however, allowed new entrants to compete with incumbents at the retail level. A rapid price decline and a decline in revenues followed. Increased retail competition eventually led a number of national regulators to deregulate this market. In 2013, however, many European countries (including Switzerland) continued to have partially binding retail price regulation in this market. More than a decade after liberalisation and the introduction of wholesale and retail price regulation, sufficient data is available to empirically measure the success of regulation and assess its continued necessity. This paper develops a market model based on a generalised version of the traditional dominant firm – competitive fringe model allowing for the incumbent a more competitive conduct than that of a dominant firm. A system of simultaneous equations is developed and direct estimation of the incumbent’s residual demand function is performed by instrumenting the market price by incumbent-specific cost shifting variables as well as other variables. Unlike earlier papers that assess market power in this market, this paper also adjusts the market model to ensure a sufficient level of cointegration and avoid spurious regression results. This necessitates the introduction of intertemporal effects. While the incumbent’s conduct cannot be directly estimated using this framework, the concrete estimates show that its residual demand is inelastic (long run price elasticity of residual demand of -0.12). Such a level of elasticity is shown to be only compatible with a profit maximising incumbent in the case of largely competitive conduct (conduct parameter below 0.12 and therefore close to zero). It is consequently found that the Swiss incumbent acted rather competitively in the fixed telephony retail market in the period under review (2004-2012) and that the (partial) retail price caps in place can no longer be justified on the basis of a lack of competition.]]> Tue, 30 Dec 2014 15:17:57 GMT /RobertoBalmer/competition-and-market-strategies-in-the-swiss-fixed-telephony-market RobertoBalmer@slideshare.net(RobertoBalmer) Competition and market strategies in the swiss fixed telephony market RobertoBalmer Fixed telephony has long been a fundamentally important market for European telecommunications operators. The liberalisation and the introduction of regulation in the end of the 1990s, however, allowed new entrants to compete with incumbents at the retail level. A rapid price decline and a decline in revenues followed. Increased retail competition eventually led a number of national regulators to deregulate this market. In 2013, however, many European countries (including Switzerland) continued to have partially binding retail price regulation in this market. More than a decade after liberalisation and the introduction of wholesale and retail price regulation, sufficient data is available to empirically measure the success of regulation and assess its continued necessity. This paper develops a market model based on a generalised version of the traditional dominant firm – competitive fringe model allowing for the incumbent a more competitive conduct than that of a dominant firm. A system of simultaneous equations is developed and direct estimation of the incumbent’s residual demand function is performed by instrumenting the market price by incumbent-specific cost shifting variables as well as other variables. Unlike earlier papers that assess market power in this market, this paper also adjusts the market model to ensure a sufficient level of cointegration and avoid spurious regression results. This necessitates the introduction of intertemporal effects. While the incumbent’s conduct cannot be directly estimated using this framework, the concrete estimates show that its residual demand is inelastic (long run price elasticity of residual demand of -0.12). Such a level of elasticity is shown to be only compatible with a profit maximising incumbent in the case of largely competitive conduct (conduct parameter below 0.12 and therefore close to zero). It is consequently found that the Swiss incumbent acted rather competitively in the fixed telephony retail market in the period under review (2004-2012) and that the (partial) retail price caps in place can no longer be justified on the basis of a lack of competition. <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/competitionandmarketstrategiesintheswissfixedtelephonymarket-141230151757-conversion-gate02-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&amp;height=120&amp;fit=bounds" /><br> Fixed telephony has long been a fundamentally important market for European telecommunications operators. The liberalisation and the introduction of regulation in the end of the 1990s, however, allowed new entrants to compete with incumbents at the retail level. A rapid price decline and a decline in revenues followed. Increased retail competition eventually led a number of national regulators to deregulate this market. In 2013, however, many European countries (including Switzerland) continued to have partially binding retail price regulation in this market. More than a decade after liberalisation and the introduction of wholesale and retail price regulation, sufficient data is available to empirically measure the success of regulation and assess its continued necessity. This paper develops a market model based on a generalised version of the traditional dominant firm – competitive fringe model allowing for the incumbent a more competitive conduct than that of a dominant firm. A system of simultaneous equations is developed and direct estimation of the incumbent’s residual demand function is performed by instrumenting the market price by incumbent-specific cost shifting variables as well as other variables. Unlike earlier papers that assess market power in this market, this paper also adjusts the market model to ensure a sufficient level of cointegration and avoid spurious regression results. This necessitates the introduction of intertemporal effects. While the incumbent’s conduct cannot be directly estimated using this framework, the concrete estimates show that its residual demand is inelastic (long run price elasticity of residual demand of -0.12). Such a level of elasticity is shown to be only compatible with a profit maximising incumbent in the case of largely competitive conduct (conduct parameter below 0.12 and therefore close to zero). It is consequently found that the Swiss incumbent acted rather competitively in the fixed telephony retail market in the period under review (2004-2012) and that the (partial) retail price caps in place can no longer be justified on the basis of a lack of competition.
Competition and market strategies in the swiss fixed telephony market from Roberto Balmer
]]> 586 3 https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/competitionandmarketstrategiesintheswissfixedtelephonymarket-141230151757-conversion-gate02-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds presentation Black http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/post http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/posted 0 Entry and Competition in local Newspaper Retail Markets - Swiss IO Day - 13 June 2014 /slideshow/prsentation-io-day-final5/35863861 prsentationiodayfinal5-140614042655-phpapp02
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]]> Sat, 14 Jun 2014 04:26:55 GMT /slideshow/prsentation-io-day-final5/35863861 RobertoBalmer@slideshare.net(RobertoBalmer) Entry and Competition in local Newspaper Retail Markets - Swiss IO Day - 13 June 2014 RobertoBalmer <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/prsentationiodayfinal5-140614042655-phpapp02-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&amp;height=120&amp;fit=bounds" /><br>
Entry and Competition in local Newspaper Retail Markets - Swiss IO Day - 13 June 2014 from Roberto Balmer
]]> 807 3 https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/prsentationiodayfinal5-140614042655-phpapp02-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds presentation White http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/post http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/posted 0 BEREC report on NGA co-investments and competition /slideshow/berec-report-on/33655807 ngaco-investmentsandcompetition-balmer-140417131013-phpapp01
This is a short presentation of the above BEREC report. Roberto Balmer has co-chaired the BEREC drafting team to develop this report ]]>
This is a short presentation of the above BEREC report. Roberto Balmer has co-chaired the BEREC drafting team to develop this report ]]> Thu, 17 Apr 2014 13:10:13 GMT /slideshow/berec-report-on/33655807 RobertoBalmer@slideshare.net(RobertoBalmer) BEREC report on NGA co-investments and competition RobertoBalmer This is a short presentation of the above BEREC report. Roberto Balmer has co-chaired the BEREC drafting team to develop this report <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/ngaco-investmentsandcompetition-balmer-140417131013-phpapp01-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&amp;height=120&amp;fit=bounds" /><br> This is a short presentation of the above BEREC report. Roberto Balmer has co-chaired the BEREC drafting team to develop this report
BEREC report on NGA co-investments and competition from Roberto Balmer
]]> 785 4 https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/ngaco-investmentsandcompetition-balmer-140417131013-phpapp01-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds presentation Black http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/post http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/posted 0 NGA roll-out and broadband in rural areas in Switzerland - Bellinzona /slideshow/ufcom-presentazione-bellinzona-250413/21936686 ufcompresentazionebellinzona250413-130526061310-phpapp01
NGA roll-out and broadband in rural areas in Switzerland, Ufficio Federale delle Comunicazioni UFCOM]]>
NGA roll-out and broadband in rural areas in Switzerland, Ufficio Federale delle Comunicazioni UFCOM]]> Sun, 26 May 2013 06:13:10 GMT /slideshow/ufcom-presentazione-bellinzona-250413/21936686 RobertoBalmer@slideshare.net(RobertoBalmer) NGA roll-out and broadband in rural areas in Switzerland - Bellinzona RobertoBalmer NGA roll-out and broadband in rural areas in Switzerland, Ufficio Federale delle Comunicazioni UFCOM <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/ufcompresentazionebellinzona250413-130526061310-phpapp01-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&amp;height=120&amp;fit=bounds" /><br> NGA roll-out and broadband in rural areas in Switzerland, Ufficio Federale delle Comunicazioni UFCOM
NGA roll-out and broadband in rural areas in Switzerland - Bellinzona from Roberto Balmer
]]> 424 64 https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/ufcompresentazionebellinzona250413-130526061310-phpapp01-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds presentation White http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/post http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/posted 0 Regulation and Competition law in Swiss Telecoms Markets https://de.slideshare.net/RobertoBalmer/blockseminar-hsg-2013-170513-bakom blockseminarhsg2013170513bakom-130523115019-phpapp01
Regulation and Competition law in Swiss Telecoms Markets]]>
Regulation and Competition law in Swiss Telecoms Markets]]> Thu, 23 May 2013 11:50:19 GMT https://de.slideshare.net/RobertoBalmer/blockseminar-hsg-2013-170513-bakom RobertoBalmer@slideshare.net(RobertoBalmer) Regulation and Competition law in Swiss Telecoms Markets RobertoBalmer Regulation and Competition law in Swiss Telecoms Markets <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/blockseminarhsg2013170513bakom-130523115019-phpapp01-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&amp;height=120&amp;fit=bounds" /><br> Regulation and Competition law in Swiss Telecoms Markets
from Roberto Balmer
]]> 1681 438 https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/blockseminarhsg2013170513bakom-130523115019-phpapp01-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds presentation White http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/post http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/posted 0 https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/profile-photo-RobertoBalmer-48x48.jpg?cb=1526248031 Roberto Balmer is an applied economist focused on industrial organization, regulation and competition policy. He works as a public policy and government affairs professional for Microsoft and has previously advised the Swiss Federal Office of Communications (BAKOM) as well as other European regulatory and antitrust authorities and the industry. Dr. Balmer holds Master’s degrees in Economics from the University of Lausanne and the London School of Economics, as well as a Ph.D. from the University of Rome 1. He has published the book Competition and Investment in Telecommunications and Media Markets (Createspace, 2014). Current subjects of interest: privacy, cybersecurity, data protection,... de.slideshare.net/RobertoBalmer https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/acloudforglobalgoodswi-161110232246-thumbnail.jpg?width=320&height=320&fit=bounds slideshow/die-cloud-als-wegbereiter-fr-globalen-wohlstand-vertrauen-verantwortung-teilhabe-schweiz/68613387 Die Cloud als Wegberei... https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/geographicregulationofnextgenerationbroadbandnetworks-its2015finalpresentation-150628105425-lva1-app6891-thumbnail.jpg?width=320&height=320&fit=bounds slideshow/geographic-regulation-ofnext-generation-broadband-networks-its2015-final-presentation/49923996 Geographic regulation ... https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/cooperativeinvestmentinnextgenerationbroadbandnetworks-its2015finalpresentation-150628105425-lva1-app6891-thumbnail.jpg?width=320&height=320&fit=bounds slideshow/cooperative-investment-innext-generation-broadband-networks-its2015-final-presentation/49923995 Cooperative investment...