�ݺ�ߣshows by User: allyslideshare

�ݺ�ߣshows by User: allyslideshare / http://www.slideshare.net/images/logo.gif �ݺ�ߣshows by User: allyslideshare / Wed, 02 Aug 2017 21:49:46 GMT �ݺ�ߣShare feed for �ݺ�ߣshows by User: allyslideshare Something Wicked /slideshow/something-wicked-78511887/78511887 2017-170802214946
Something Wicked: Defensible Social Architecture in the context of Big Data, Behavioral Econ, Bot Hives, and Bad Actors. BSides Las Vegas 2017 keynote presentation from Allison Miller (@selenakyle)]]>
Something Wicked: Defensible Social Architecture in the context of Big Data, Behavioral Econ, Bot Hives, and Bad Actors. BSides Las Vegas 2017 keynote presentation from Allison Miller (@selenakyle)]]> Wed, 02 Aug 2017 21:49:46 GMT /slideshow/something-wicked-78511887/78511887 allyslideshare@slideshare.net(allyslideshare) Something Wicked allyslideshare Something Wicked: Defensible Social Architecture in the context of Big Data, Behavioral Econ, Bot Hives, and Bad Actors. BSides Las Vegas 2017 keynote presentation from Allison Miller (@selenakyle) <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/2017-170802214946-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> Something Wicked: Defensible Social Architecture in the context of Big Data, Behavioral Econ, Bot Hives, and Bad Actors. BSides Las Vegas 2017 keynote presentation from Allison Miller (@selenakyle)

Something Wicked from Allison Miller

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0 Boomtime: Risk as Economics (Allison Miller, SiRAcon15) /slideshow/boomtime-risk-as-economics-allison-miller-siracon15/53740946 2015-151009141715-lva1-app6891
When we talk about Risk, and Information Risk as it applies to InfoSec specifically, we often focus on issues of statistics: data, measurement, and our favorite friend: uncertainty. In this talk we’ll look at models and concepts from economics that can augment our thinking, as we move from positive (i.e. primarily descriptive, “how things are”) to normative (i.e. driving policy , “how things should be”) research within the world of risk.]]>
When we talk about Risk, and Information Risk as it applies to InfoSec specifically, we often focus on issues of statistics: data, measurement, and our favorite friend: uncertainty. In this talk we’ll look at models and concepts from economics that can augment our thinking, as we move from positive (i.e. primarily descriptive, “how things are”) to normative (i.e. driving policy , “how things should be”) research within the world of risk.]]> Fri, 09 Oct 2015 14:17:15 GMT /slideshow/boomtime-risk-as-economics-allison-miller-siracon15/53740946 allyslideshare@slideshare.net(allyslideshare) Boomtime: Risk as Economics (Allison Miller, SiRAcon15) allyslideshare When we talk about Risk, and Information Risk as it applies to InfoSec specifically, we often focus on issues of statistics: data, measurement, and our favorite friend: uncertainty. In this talk we’ll look at models and concepts from economics that can augment our thinking, as we move from positive (i.e. primarily descriptive, “how things are”) to normative (i.e. driving policy , “how things should be”) research within the world of risk. <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/2015-151009141715-lva1-app6891-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> When we talk about Risk, and Information Risk as it applies to InfoSec specifically, we often focus on issues of statistics: data, measurement, and our favorite friend: uncertainty. In this talk we’ll look at models and concepts from economics that can augment our thinking, as we move from positive (i.e. primarily descriptive, “how things are”) to normative (i.e. driving policy , “how things should be”) research within the world of risk.

Boomtime: Risk as Economics (Allison Miller, SiRAcon15) from Allison Miller

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0 When Algorithms Are Our Co-Pilots /slideshow/when-algorithms-are-our-copilots/40283365 201410algorithmsv2-141015003046-conversion-gate01
Effective risk management in large, user-facing systems (like platforms) requires strategic and effective use of data. Typically we discuss data in the context of behavioral analysis within the systems, where it is used to better profile threats and vulnerabilities. In this talk we will discuss how data-driven controls are incorporated into the systems themselves, and typical areas where risk managers will need to focus their attention and algorithms in the future: defenses, dev/ops, & devices. We will explore what this means for risk control designers working on closed systems versus open systems, and also review proper care and feeding of algorithms.]]>
Effective risk management in large, user-facing systems (like platforms) requires strategic and effective use of data. Typically we discuss data in the context of behavioral analysis within the systems, where it is used to better profile threats and vulnerabilities. In this talk we will discuss how data-driven controls are incorporated into the systems themselves, and typical areas where risk managers will need to focus their attention and algorithms in the future: defenses, dev/ops, & devices. We will explore what this means for risk control designers working on closed systems versus open systems, and also review proper care and feeding of algorithms.]]> Wed, 15 Oct 2014 00:30:46 GMT /slideshow/when-algorithms-are-our-copilots/40283365 allyslideshare@slideshare.net(allyslideshare) When Algorithms Are Our Co-Pilots allyslideshare Effective risk management in large, user-facing systems (like platforms) requires strategic and effective use of data. Typically we discuss data in the context of behavioral analysis within the systems, where it is used to better profile threats and vulnerabilities. In this talk we will discuss how data-driven controls are incorporated into the systems themselves, and typical areas where risk managers will need to focus their attention and algorithms in the future: defenses, dev/ops, & devices. We will explore what this means for risk control designers working on closed systems versus open systems, and also review proper care and feeding of algorithms. <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/201410algorithmsv2-141015003046-conversion-gate01-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> Effective risk management in large, user-facing systems (like platforms) requires strategic and effective use of data. Typically we discuss data in the context of behavioral analysis within the systems, where it is used to better profile threats and vulnerabilities. In this talk we will discuss how data-driven controls are incorporated into the systems themselves, and typical areas where risk managers will need to focus their attention and algorithms in the future: defenses, dev/ops, & devices. We will explore what this means for risk control designers working on closed systems versus open systems, and also review proper care and feeding of algorithms.

When Algorithms Are Our Co-Pilots from Allison Miller

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0 2010.08 Applied Threat Modeling: Live (Hutton/Miller) /slideshow/201008-applied-threat-modeling/38395674 2010-140827000601-phpapp01
Alex Hutton & Allison Miller review their research and application of threat modeling. This version was presented at SOURCE Barcelona (2010), a previous version was presented at Black Hat.]]>
Alex Hutton & Allison Miller review their research and application of threat modeling. This version was presented at SOURCE Barcelona (2010), a previous version was presented at Black Hat.]]> Wed, 27 Aug 2014 00:06:01 GMT /slideshow/201008-applied-threat-modeling/38395674 allyslideshare@slideshare.net(allyslideshare) 2010.08 Applied Threat Modeling: Live (Hutton/Miller) allyslideshare Alex Hutton & Allison Miller review their research and application of threat modeling. This version was presented at SOURCE Barcelona (2010), a previous version was presented at Black Hat. <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/2010-140827000601-phpapp01-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> Alex Hutton & Allison Miller review their research and application of threat modeling. This version was presented at SOURCE Barcelona (2010), a previous version was presented at Black Hat.

2010.08 Applied Threat Modeling: Live (Hutton/Miller) from Allison Miller

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0 2013.05 Games We Play: Payoffs & Chaos Monkeys /slideshow/201305-games-weplayv3key/38078548 2013-140818000120-phpapp02
Expansion on application of game theory & behavioral analytics to information security and risk management. New concepts include some ideas from coalitional game theory, i.e. not just individual actors but teams.]]>
Expansion on application of game theory & behavioral analytics to information security and risk management. New concepts include some ideas from coalitional game theory, i.e. not just individual actors but teams.]]> Mon, 18 Aug 2014 00:01:20 GMT /slideshow/201305-games-weplayv3key/38078548 allyslideshare@slideshare.net(allyslideshare) 2013.05 Games We Play: Payoffs & Chaos Monkeys allyslideshare Expansion on application of game theory & behavioral analytics to information security and risk management. New concepts include some ideas from coalitional game theory, i.e. not just individual actors but teams. <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/2013-140818000120-phpapp02-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> Expansion on application of game theory & behavioral analytics to information security and risk management. New concepts include some ideas from coalitional game theory, i.e. not just individual actors but teams.

2013.05 Games We Play: Payoffs & Chaos Monkeys from Allison Miller

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0 2012.09 A Million Mousetraps: Using Big Data and Little Loops to Build Better Defenses /slideshow/201209-a-million-mousetraps-using-big-data-and-little-loops-to-build-better-defenses/38077964 2012-140817232614-phpapp02
An examination of how behavioral analytics can be leveraged to design better defenses in complex user-facing platforms.]]>
An examination of how behavioral analytics can be leveraged to design better defenses in complex user-facing platforms.]]> Sun, 17 Aug 2014 23:26:14 GMT /slideshow/201209-a-million-mousetraps-using-big-data-and-little-loops-to-build-better-defenses/38077964 allyslideshare@slideshare.net(allyslideshare) 2012.09 A Million Mousetraps: Using Big Data and Little Loops to Build Better Defenses allyslideshare An examination of how behavioral analytics can be leveraged to design better defenses in complex user-facing platforms. <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/2012-140817232614-phpapp02-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> An examination of how behavioral analytics can be leveraged to design better defenses in complex user-facing platforms.

2012.09 A Million Mousetraps: Using Big Data and Little Loops to Build Better Defenses from Allison Miller

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0 2014.06 Defending Debit /allyslideshare/201406-weis2014-millerdefdebfinal-copy 2014-140817230638-phpapp01
Defending Debit: A Historical Study of the Indirect Effects of the Durbin Amendment on Investment in Debit Card Security. More specifically, the bserved effects of interchange (revenue) price caps on (branded) Debit card issuer risk/fraud/loss tolerances and cost sensitivity. Brief slides in support of the paper as presented to WEIS (Workshop on the Economics of Information Security), held at Penn State in June 2014. (http://weis2014.econinfosec.org/papers/Miller-WEIS2014.pdf)]]>
Defending Debit: A Historical Study of the Indirect Effects of the Durbin Amendment on Investment in Debit Card Security. More specifically, the bserved effects of interchange (revenue) price caps on (branded) Debit card issuer risk/fraud/loss tolerances and cost sensitivity. Brief slides in support of the paper as presented to WEIS (Workshop on the Economics of Information Security), held at Penn State in June 2014. (http://weis2014.econinfosec.org/papers/Miller-WEIS2014.pdf)]]> Sun, 17 Aug 2014 23:06:37 GMT /allyslideshare/201406-weis2014-millerdefdebfinal-copy allyslideshare@slideshare.net(allyslideshare) 2014.06 Defending Debit allyslideshare Defending Debit: A Historical Study of the Indirect Effects of the Durbin Amendment on Investment in Debit Card Security. More specifically, the bserved effects of interchange (revenue) price caps on (branded) Debit card issuer risk/fraud/loss tolerances and cost sensitivity. Brief slides in support of the paper as presented to WEIS (Workshop on the Economics of Information Security), held at Penn State in June 2014. (http://weis2014.econinfosec.org/papers/Miller-WEIS2014.pdf) <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/2014-140817230638-phpapp01-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> Defending Debit: A Historical Study of the Indirect Effects of the Durbin Amendment on Investment in Debit Card Security. More specifically, the bserved effects of interchange (revenue) price caps on (branded) Debit card issuer risk/fraud/loss tolerances and cost sensitivity. Brief slides in support of the paper as presented to WEIS (Workshop on the Economics of Information Security), held at Penn State in June 2014. (http://weis2014.econinfosec.org/papers/Miller-WEIS2014.pdf)

2014.06 Defending Debit from Allison Miller

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0 2014.04 Bit, Bit, Coin /slideshow/201404-bbc-srcbosv3nokaraoke-copy/38077618 2014-140817230637-phpapp01
Oh what a tangled web we weave, when in commerce and banking, open solutions intercede. Crypto currencies, woo!]]>
Oh what a tangled web we weave, when in commerce and banking, open solutions intercede. Crypto currencies, woo!]]> Sun, 17 Aug 2014 23:06:37 GMT /slideshow/201404-bbc-srcbosv3nokaraoke-copy/38077618 allyslideshare@slideshare.net(allyslideshare) 2014.04 Bit, Bit, Coin allyslideshare Oh what a tangled web we weave, when in commerce and banking, open solutions intercede. Crypto currencies, woo! <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/2014-140817230637-phpapp01-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> Oh what a tangled web we weave, when in commerce and banking, open solutions intercede. Crypto currencies, woo!

2014.04 Bit, Bit, Coin from Allison Miller

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0 2013.10 Operating * by the Numbers /slideshow/201319-operating-starv9/38077617 2013-140817230634-phpapp01
Discusses how new approaches to managing business risk and software services (like Dev Ops and Platform Engineering/Management) can draw from their forefather concepts: Operations Management and Decision Science. ]]>
Discusses how new approaches to managing business risk and software services (like Dev Ops and Platform Engineering/Management) can draw from their forefather concepts: Operations Management and Decision Science. ]]> Sun, 17 Aug 2014 23:06:34 GMT /slideshow/201319-operating-starv9/38077617 allyslideshare@slideshare.net(allyslideshare) 2013.10 Operating * by the Numbers allyslideshare Discusses how new approaches to managing business risk and software services (like Dev Ops and Platform Engineering/Management) can draw from their forefather concepts: Operations Management and Decision Science. <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/2013-140817230634-phpapp01-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> Discusses how new approaches to managing business risk and software services (like Dev Ops and Platform Engineering/Management) can draw from their forefather concepts: Operations Management and Decision Science.

2013.10 Operating * by the Numbers from Allison Miller

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0 2012.12 Games We Play: Defenses & Disincentives /slideshow/201212-games-weplay/38077611 2012-140817230606-phpapp01
Applying concepts from Game Theory & Behavioral Economics to designing defense and control systems.]]>
Applying concepts from Game Theory & Behavioral Economics to designing defense and control systems.]]> Sun, 17 Aug 2014 23:06:06 GMT /slideshow/201212-games-weplay/38077611 allyslideshare@slideshare.net(allyslideshare) 2012.12 Games We Play: Defenses & Disincentives allyslideshare Applying concepts from Game Theory & Behavioral Economics to designing defense and control systems. <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/2012-140817230606-phpapp01-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> Applying concepts from Game Theory & Behavioral Economics to designing defense and control systems.

2012.12 Games We Play: Defenses & Disincentives from Allison Miller

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0 2011.04 How to Isotope Tag a Ghost /slideshow/201104-how-to-isotope-tag-a-ghost/38077555 2011-140817230231-phpapp02
Instrumenting and measuring indirect threats: lessons from economics applied to the underground.]]>
Instrumenting and measuring indirect threats: lessons from economics applied to the underground.]]> Sun, 17 Aug 2014 23:02:31 GMT /slideshow/201104-how-to-isotope-tag-a-ghost/38077555 allyslideshare@slideshare.net(allyslideshare) 2011.04 How to Isotope Tag a Ghost allyslideshare Instrumenting and measuring indirect threats: lessons from economics applied to the underground. <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/2011-140817230231-phpapp02-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> Instrumenting and measuring indirect threats: lessons from economics applied to the underground.

2011.04 How to Isotope Tag a Ghost from Allison Miller

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0 https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/profile-photo-allyslideshare-48x48.jpg?cb=1706308878 I protect consumers and platforms from online threats. Leader with track-record of delivering measurable results in risk, security, payments, & business strategy at internet-scale technology companies. Security & Risk Strategy, Product Management, Payment & Economic Systems, Fraud Prevention & Detection, Business Operations, Predictive Analytics, Data Protection, System Design & Implementation, Account Risk & Security, Authentication & Identity, Risk Modeling, Security Research, Public Speaking http://www.paypal.com https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/2017-170802214946-thumbnail.jpg?width=320&height=320&fit=bounds slideshow/something-wicked-78511887/78511887 Something Wicked https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/2015-151009141715-lva1-app6891-thumbnail.jpg?width=320&height=320&fit=bounds slideshow/boomtime-risk-as-economics-allison-miller-siracon15/53740946 Boomtime: Risk as Econ... https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/201410algorithmsv2-141015003046-conversion-gate01-thumbnail.jpg?width=320&height=320&fit=bounds slideshow/when-algorithms-are-our-copilots/40283365 When Algorithms Are Ou...