�ݺ�ߣshows by User: catelong

�ݺ�ߣshows by User: catelong / http://www.slideshare.net/images/logo.gif �ݺ�ߣshows by User: catelong / Sat, 18 Sep 2010 16:02:23 GMT �ݺ�ߣShare feed for �ݺ�ߣshows by User: catelong Mad meat! how securitized lending collapsed the financial system /slideshow/mad-meat-how-securitized-lending-collapsed-the-financial-system/5230518 madmeathowsecuritizedlendingcollapsedthefinancialsystem-100918160228-phpapp02
A lovely parable of how standards on securitized products broke down and poisoned the financial system... and created a crisis....]]>
A lovely parable of how standards on securitized products broke down and poisoned the financial system... and created a crisis....]]> Sat, 18 Sep 2010 16:02:23 GMT /slideshow/mad-meat-how-securitized-lending-collapsed-the-financial-system/5230518 catelong@slideshare.net(catelong) Mad meat! how securitized lending collapsed the financial system catelong A lovely parable of how standards on securitized products broke down and poisoned the financial system... and created a crisis.... <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/madmeathowsecuritizedlendingcollapsedthefinancialsystem-100918160228-phpapp02-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> A lovely parable of how standards on securitized products broke down and poisoned the financial system... and created a crisis....

Mad meat! how securitized lending collapsed the financial system from catelong

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0 From measuring production to measuring well-being /slideshow/stiglitz-melbournejuly2010/4920171 stiglitz-melbourne-july-2010-100807082621-phpapp01
What we measure affects what we do; and if our measurements are flawed, decisions may be distorted. Choices between promoting GDP and protecting the environment may be false choices, once environmental degradation is appropriately included in our measurement of economic performance. So too, we often draw inferences about what are good policies by looking at what policies have promoted economic growth; but if our metrics of performance are flawed, so too may be the inferences that we draw.]]>
What we measure affects what we do; and if our measurements are flawed, decisions may be distorted. Choices between promoting GDP and protecting the environment may be false choices, once environmental degradation is appropriately included in our measurement of economic performance. So too, we often draw inferences about what are good policies by looking at what policies have promoted economic growth; but if our metrics of performance are flawed, so too may be the inferences that we draw.]]> Sat, 07 Aug 2010 08:26:15 GMT /slideshow/stiglitz-melbournejuly2010/4920171 catelong@slideshare.net(catelong) From measuring production to measuring well-being catelong What we measure affects what we do; and if our measurements are flawed, decisions may be distorted. Choices between promoting GDP and protecting the environment may be false choices, once environmental degradation is appropriately included in our measurement of economic performance. So too, we often draw inferences about what are good policies by looking at what policies have promoted economic growth; but if our metrics of performance are flawed, so too may be the inferences that we draw. <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/stiglitz-melbourne-july-2010-100807082621-phpapp01-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> What we measure affects what we do; and if our measurements are flawed, decisions may be distorted. Choices between promoting GDP and protecting the environment may be false choices, once environmental degradation is appropriately included in our measurement of economic performance. So too, we often draw inferences about what are good policies by looking at what policies have promoted economic growth; but if our metrics of performance are flawed, so too may be the inferences that we draw.

From measuring production to measuring well-being from catelong

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0 GAO report on the US fiscal situation /catelong/gao-report-on-the-us-fiscal-situation gaousfiscalsituation-100504094826-phpapp01
An April, 2010 report from the GAO on the impending fiscal crisis facing the United States.]]>
An April, 2010 report from the GAO on the impending fiscal crisis facing the United States.]]> Tue, 04 May 2010 09:47:10 GMT /catelong/gao-report-on-the-us-fiscal-situation catelong@slideshare.net(catelong) GAO report on the US fiscal situation catelong An April, 2010 report from the GAO on the impending fiscal crisis facing the United States. <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/gaousfiscalsituation-100504094826-phpapp01-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> An April, 2010 report from the GAO on the impending fiscal crisis facing the United States.

GAO report on the US fiscal situation from catelong

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0 US Senate Financial Reform Managers Amendment Summary, March 23, 2010 /slideshow/us-senate-financial-reform-managers-amendment-summary-march-23-2010/3536707 davispolk032310managersamendmentsummary-100324064537-phpapp01
The law firm Davis Polk created this Managers Amendment Summary to the March Dodd bill It details changes in the wording of the proposed law from an earlier draft]]>
The law firm Davis Polk created this Managers Amendment Summary to the March Dodd bill It details changes in the wording of the proposed law from an earlier draft]]> Wed, 24 Mar 2010 06:45:33 GMT /slideshow/us-senate-financial-reform-managers-amendment-summary-march-23-2010/3536707 catelong@slideshare.net(catelong) US Senate Financial Reform Managers Amendment Summary, March 23, 2010 catelong The law firm Davis Polk created this Managers Amendment Summary to the March Dodd bill It details changes in the wording of the proposed law from an earlier draft <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/davispolk032310managersamendmentsummary-100324064537-phpapp01-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> The law firm Davis Polk created this Managers Amendment Summary to the March Dodd bill It details changes in the wording of the proposed law from an earlier draft

US Senate Financial Reform Managers Amendment Summary, March 23, 2010 from catelong

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0 Counterparty risk in a post Lehmans World -- January, 2010 /slideshow/counterparty-risk-in-a-post-lehmans-world-january-2010/3017163 1317-counterpartyriskinapostlehmansworldjanuary2010-100128134236-phpapp02
Results from joint Credit/FitchSolutions survey shows most buy-side firms do not hedge counterparty risk. Those surveyed cited hedging as too expensive. The presentation suggest using CDS as early market systems of increasing risk from counterparties.]]>
Results from joint Credit/FitchSolutions survey shows most buy-side firms do not hedge counterparty risk. Those surveyed cited hedging as too expensive. The presentation suggest using CDS as early market systems of increasing risk from counterparties.]]> Thu, 28 Jan 2010 13:42:29 GMT /slideshow/counterparty-risk-in-a-post-lehmans-world-january-2010/3017163 catelong@slideshare.net(catelong) Counterparty risk in a post Lehmans World -- January, 2010 catelong Results from joint Credit/FitchSolutions survey shows most buy-side firms do not hedge counterparty risk. Those surveyed cited hedging as too expensive. The presentation suggest using CDS as early market systems of increasing risk from counterparties. <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/1317-counterpartyriskinapostlehmansworldjanuary2010-100128134236-phpapp02-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> Results from joint Credit/FitchSolutions survey shows most buy-side firms do not hedge counterparty risk. Those surveyed cited hedging as too expensive. The presentation suggest using CDS as early market systems of increasing risk from counterparties.

Counterparty risk in a post Lehmans World -- January, 2010 from catelong

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0 Discussion of “Do Global Banks Spread Global Imbalances?” /slideshow/discussion-of-do-global-banks-spread-global-imbalances/2524395 ashcraft1-091117184401-phpapp01
Discussion by Adam Ashcraft of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York of a paper presented at the Jacques Polak Research Conference -- Financial Frictions and Macroeconomic Adjustment, Washington DC, November 5—6, 2009 http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2009/arc/index.htm]]>
Discussion by Adam Ashcraft of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York of a paper presented at the Jacques Polak Research Conference -- Financial Frictions and Macroeconomic Adjustment, Washington DC, November 5—6, 2009 http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2009/arc/index.htm]]> Tue, 17 Nov 2009 18:43:51 GMT /slideshow/discussion-of-do-global-banks-spread-global-imbalances/2524395 catelong@slideshare.net(catelong) Discussion of “Do Global Banks Spread Global Imbalances?” catelong Discussion by Adam Ashcraft of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York of a paper presented at the Jacques Polak Research Conference -- Financial Frictions and Macroeconomic Adjustment, Washington DC, November 5—6, 2009 http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2009/arc/index.htm <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/ashcraft1-091117184401-phpapp01-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> Discussion by Adam Ashcraft of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York of a paper presented at the Jacques Polak Research Conference -- Financial Frictions and Macroeconomic Adjustment, Washington DC, November 5—6, 2009 http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2009/arc/index.htm

Discussion of “Do Global Banks Spread Global Imbalances?” from catelong

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0 Interest Rate Risk And Management /slideshow/interest-rate-risk-and-management/2499668 interestrateriskandmanagement-091114094629-phpapp01
Interest rate risk management for banks under Basel II, presentation by Christine Brown, Department of Finance , The University of Melbourne, Shanghai, December 8-12, 2008]]>
Interest rate risk management for banks under Basel II, presentation by Christine Brown, Department of Finance , The University of Melbourne, Shanghai, December 8-12, 2008]]> Sat, 14 Nov 2009 09:46:22 GMT /slideshow/interest-rate-risk-and-management/2499668 catelong@slideshare.net(catelong) Interest Rate Risk And Management catelong Interest rate risk management for banks under Basel II, presentation by Christine Brown, Department of Finance , The University of Melbourne, Shanghai, December 8-12, 2008 <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/interestrateriskandmanagement-091114094629-phpapp01-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> Interest rate risk management for banks under Basel II, presentation by Christine Brown, Department of Finance , The University of Melbourne, Shanghai, December 8-12, 2008

Interest Rate Risk And Management from catelong

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0 Capital Adequacy Standards and Bank Capital /slideshow/capital-adequacy-standards-and-bank-capital/2499290 capitaladequacystandardsandbankcapital-091114082350-phpapp02
For banks these questions are answered: *What is capital, what role does it play? *How is capital measured? *How much capital is desirable? *How does capital influence bank behaviour? Presented at the Enhancing Risk Management and Governance in the Region’s Banking System to Implement Basel, II and to Meet Contemporary Risks and Challenges Arising from the Global Banking System, APEC, 8th December - 12th December, 2008]]>
For banks these questions are answered: *What is capital, what role does it play? *How is capital measured? *How much capital is desirable? *How does capital influence bank behaviour? Presented at the Enhancing Risk Management and Governance in the Region’s Banking System to Implement Basel, II and to Meet Contemporary Risks and Challenges Arising from the Global Banking System, APEC, 8th December - 12th December, 2008]]> Sat, 14 Nov 2009 08:23:45 GMT /slideshow/capital-adequacy-standards-and-bank-capital/2499290 catelong@slideshare.net(catelong) Capital Adequacy Standards and Bank Capital catelong For banks these questions are answered: *What is capital, what role does it play? *How is capital measured? *How much capital is desirable? *How does capital influence bank behaviour? Presented at the Enhancing Risk Management and Governance in the Region’s Banking System to Implement Basel, II and to Meet Contemporary Risks and Challenges Arising from the Global Banking System, APEC, 8th December - 12th December, 2008 <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/capitaladequacystandardsandbankcapital-091114082350-phpapp02-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> For banks these questions are answered: *What is capital, what role does it play? *How is capital measured? *How much capital is desirable? *How does capital influence bank behaviour? Presented at the Enhancing Risk Management and Governance in the Region’s Banking System to Implement Basel, II and to Meet Contemporary Risks and Challenges Arising from the Global Banking System, APEC, 8th December - 12th December, 2008

Capital Adequacy Standards and Bank Capital from catelong

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0 A Fistful of Dollars: Lobbying and the Financial Crisis† /slideshow/a-fistful-of-dollars-lobbying-and-the-financial-crisis/2440196 igan-091106114018-phpapp01
Has lobbying by financial institutions contributed to the financial crisis? This paper uses detailed information on financial institutions’ lobbying and their mortgage lending activities to answer this question. We find that, during 2000-07, lenders lobbying more intensively on specific issues related to mortgage lending (such as consumer protection laws) and securitization (i) originated mortgages with higher loan-to-income ratios, (ii) securitized a faster growing proportion of their loans, and (iii) had faster growing loan portfolios. Ex-post, delinquency rates are higher in areas where lobbying lenders’ mortgage lending grew faster. These lenders also experienced negative abnormal stock returns during key events of the crisis. The findings are robust to (i) falsification tests using information on lobbying activities on financial sector issues unrelated to mortgage lending, (ii) instrumental variables strategies, and (iii) a difference-in-difference approach based on state-level lending laws. These results suggest that lobbying may be linked to lenders expecting special treatments from policymakers, allowing them to engage in riskier lending behavior. Deniz Igan, Prachi Mishra, and Thierry Tressel, Research Department, IMF‡ October 14, 2009]]>
Has lobbying by financial institutions contributed to the financial crisis? This paper uses detailed information on financial institutions’ lobbying and their mortgage lending activities to answer this question. We find that, during 2000-07, lenders lobbying more intensively on specific issues related to mortgage lending (such as consumer protection laws) and securitization (i) originated mortgages with higher loan-to-income ratios, (ii) securitized a faster growing proportion of their loans, and (iii) had faster growing loan portfolios. Ex-post, delinquency rates are higher in areas where lobbying lenders’ mortgage lending grew faster. These lenders also experienced negative abnormal stock returns during key events of the crisis. The findings are robust to (i) falsification tests using information on lobbying activities on financial sector issues unrelated to mortgage lending, (ii) instrumental variables strategies, and (iii) a difference-in-difference approach based on state-level lending laws. These results suggest that lobbying may be linked to lenders expecting special treatments from policymakers, allowing them to engage in riskier lending behavior. Deniz Igan, Prachi Mishra, and Thierry Tressel, Research Department, IMF‡ October 14, 2009]]> Fri, 06 Nov 2009 11:40:15 GMT /slideshow/a-fistful-of-dollars-lobbying-and-the-financial-crisis/2440196 catelong@slideshare.net(catelong) A Fistful of Dollars: Lobbying and the Financial Crisis† catelong Has lobbying by financial institutions contributed to the financial crisis? This paper uses detailed information on financial institutions’ lobbying and their mortgage lending activities to answer this question. We find that, during 2000-07, lenders lobbying more intensively on specific issues related to mortgage lending (such as consumer protection laws) and securitization (i) originated mortgages with higher loan-to-income ratios, (ii) securitized a faster growing proportion of their loans, and (iii) had faster growing loan portfolios. Ex-post, delinquency rates are higher in areas where lobbying lenders’ mortgage lending grew faster. These lenders also experienced negative abnormal stock returns during key events of the crisis. The findings are robust to (i) falsification tests using information on lobbying activities on financial sector issues unrelated to mortgage lending, (ii) instrumental variables strategies, and (iii) a difference-in-difference approach based on state-level lending laws. These results suggest that lobbying may be linked to lenders expecting special treatments from policymakers, allowing them to engage in riskier lending behavior. Deniz Igan, Prachi Mishra, and Thierry Tressel, Research Department, IMF‡ October 14, 2009 <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/igan-091106114018-phpapp01-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> Has lobbying by financial institutions contributed to the financial crisis? This paper uses detailed information on financial institutions’ lobbying and their mortgage lending activities to answer this question. We find that, during 2000-07, lenders lobbying more intensively on specific issues related to mortgage lending (such as consumer protection laws) and securitization (i) originated mortgages with higher loan-to-income ratios, (ii) securitized a faster growing proportion of their loans, and (iii) had faster growing loan portfolios. Ex-post, delinquency rates are higher in areas where lobbying lenders’ mortgage lending grew faster. These lenders also experienced negative abnormal stock returns during key events of the crisis. The findings are robust to (i) falsification tests using information on lobbying activities on financial sector issues unrelated to mortgage lending, (ii) instrumental variables strategies, and (iii) a difference-in-difference approach based on state-level lending laws. These results suggest that lobbying may be linked to lenders expecting special treatments from policymakers, allowing them to engage in riskier lending behavior. Deniz Igan, Prachi Mishra, and Thierry Tressel, Research Department, IMF‡ October 14, 2009

A Fistful of Dollars: Lobbying and the Financial Crisis† from catelong

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0 Do Global Banks Spread Global Imbalances? The Case of Asset-Backed Commercial Paper During the Financial Crisis of 2007–09 /slideshow/do-global-banks-spread-global-imbalances-the-case-of-assetbacked-commercial-paper-during-the-financial-crisis-of-200709/2438490 acharya-091106083428-phpapp01
The global imbalance explanation of the financial crisis of 2007-09 argues that the demand for riskless assets from countries with current account surpluses created fragility in the US financial sector. We examine this explanation by analyzing the geography of asset-backed commercial paper conduits set up by large commercial banks. We show that both banks located in surplus countries and banks located in deficit countries manufactured riskless assets of $1.2 trillion by selling short-term asset-backed commercial paper to risk-averse investors, predominantly US money market funds, and investing the proceeds primarily in long term US assets. As negative information about US assets became apparent in August 2007, banks in both surplus and deficit countries experienced difficulties rolling over asset-backed commercial paper and as a result suffered significant losses. We conclude that it was global banking flows, and not just global imbalances, that determined the geography of the financial crisis. Viral Acharya, New York University, NBER, and CEPR and Philipp Schnabl, New York University]]>
The global imbalance explanation of the financial crisis of 2007-09 argues that the demand for riskless assets from countries with current account surpluses created fragility in the US financial sector. We examine this explanation by analyzing the geography of asset-backed commercial paper conduits set up by large commercial banks. We show that both banks located in surplus countries and banks located in deficit countries manufactured riskless assets of $1.2 trillion by selling short-term asset-backed commercial paper to risk-averse investors, predominantly US money market funds, and investing the proceeds primarily in long term US assets. As negative information about US assets became apparent in August 2007, banks in both surplus and deficit countries experienced difficulties rolling over asset-backed commercial paper and as a result suffered significant losses. We conclude that it was global banking flows, and not just global imbalances, that determined the geography of the financial crisis. Viral Acharya, New York University, NBER, and CEPR and Philipp Schnabl, New York University]]> Fri, 06 Nov 2009 08:34:22 GMT /slideshow/do-global-banks-spread-global-imbalances-the-case-of-assetbacked-commercial-paper-during-the-financial-crisis-of-200709/2438490 catelong@slideshare.net(catelong) Do Global Banks Spread Global Imbalances? The Case of Asset-Backed Commercial Paper During the Financial Crisis of 2007–09 catelong The global imbalance explanation of the financial crisis of 2007-09 argues that the demand for riskless assets from countries with current account surpluses created fragility in the US financial sector. We examine this explanation by analyzing the geography of asset-backed commercial paper conduits set up by large commercial banks. We show that both banks located in surplus countries and banks located in deficit countries manufactured riskless assets of $1.2 trillion by selling short-term asset-backed commercial paper to risk-averse investors, predominantly US money market funds, and investing the proceeds primarily in long term US assets. As negative information about US assets became apparent in August 2007, banks in both surplus and deficit countries experienced difficulties rolling over asset-backed commercial paper and as a result suffered significant losses. We conclude that it was global banking flows, and not just global imbalances, that determined the geography of the financial crisis. Viral Acharya, New York University, NBER, and CEPR and Philipp Schnabl, New York University <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/acharya-091106083428-phpapp01-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> The global imbalance explanation of the financial crisis of 2007-09 argues that the demand for riskless assets from countries with current account surpluses created fragility in the US financial sector. We examine this explanation by analyzing the geography of asset-backed commercial paper conduits set up by large commercial banks. We show that both banks located in surplus countries and banks located in deficit countries manufactured riskless assets of $1.2 trillion by selling short-term asset-backed commercial paper to risk-averse investors, predominantly US money market funds, and investing the proceeds primarily in long term US assets. As negative information about US assets became apparent in August 2007, banks in both surplus and deficit countries experienced difficulties rolling over asset-backed commercial paper and as a result suffered significant losses. We conclude that it was global banking flows, and not just global imbalances, that determined the geography of the financial crisis. Viral Acharya, New York University, NBER, and CEPR and Philipp Schnabl, New York University

Do Global Banks Spread Global Imbalances? The Case of Asset-Backed Commercial Paper During the Financial Crisis of 2007–09 from catelong

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0 Macro Risk Premium and Intermediary Balance Sheet Quantities /slideshow/macro-risk-premium-and-intermediary-balance-sheet-quantities/2431336 adrian-091105114516-phpapp01
The macro risk premium measures the threshold return for real activity that receives funding from savers. Financial intermediaries’ balance sheet conditions provide a window on the macro risk premium. The tightness of intermediaries’ balance sheet constraints determines their “risk appetite”. Risk appetite, in turn, determines the set of real projects that receive funding, and hence determine the supply of credit. Monetary policy affects the risk appetite of intermediaries in two ways: via interest rate policy, and via quantity policies. We estimate time varying risk appetite of financial intermediaries for the U.S., Germany, the U.K., and Japan, and study the joint dynamics of risk appetite with macroeconomic aggregates and monetary policy instruments for the U.S. We argue that risk appetite is an important indicator for monetary conditions.]]>
The macro risk premium measures the threshold return for real activity that receives funding from savers. Financial intermediaries’ balance sheet conditions provide a window on the macro risk premium. The tightness of intermediaries’ balance sheet constraints determines their “risk appetite”. Risk appetite, in turn, determines the set of real projects that receive funding, and hence determine the supply of credit. Monetary policy affects the risk appetite of intermediaries in two ways: via interest rate policy, and via quantity policies. We estimate time varying risk appetite of financial intermediaries for the U.S., Germany, the U.K., and Japan, and study the joint dynamics of risk appetite with macroeconomic aggregates and monetary policy instruments for the U.S. We argue that risk appetite is an important indicator for monetary conditions.]]> Thu, 05 Nov 2009 11:45:13 GMT /slideshow/macro-risk-premium-and-intermediary-balance-sheet-quantities/2431336 catelong@slideshare.net(catelong) Macro Risk Premium and Intermediary Balance Sheet Quantities catelong The macro risk premium measures the threshold return for real activity that receives funding from savers. Financial intermediaries’ balance sheet conditions provide a window on the macro risk premium. The tightness of intermediaries’ balance sheet constraints determines their “risk appetite”. Risk appetite, in turn, determines the set of real projects that receive funding, and hence determine the supply of credit. Monetary policy affects the risk appetite of intermediaries in two ways: via interest rate policy, and via quantity policies. We estimate time varying risk appetite of financial intermediaries for the U.S., Germany, the U.K., and Japan, and study the joint dynamics of risk appetite with macroeconomic aggregates and monetary policy instruments for the U.S. We argue that risk appetite is an important indicator for monetary conditions. <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/adrian-091105114516-phpapp01-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> The macro risk premium measures the threshold return for real activity that receives funding from savers. Financial intermediaries’ balance sheet conditions provide a window on the macro risk premium. The tightness of intermediaries’ balance sheet constraints determines their “risk appetite”. Risk appetite, in turn, determines the set of real projects that receive funding, and hence determine the supply of credit. Monetary policy affects the risk appetite of intermediaries in two ways: via interest rate policy, and via quantity policies. We estimate time varying risk appetite of financial intermediaries for the U.S., Germany, the U.K., and Japan, and study the joint dynamics of risk appetite with macroeconomic aggregates and monetary policy instruments for the U.S. We argue that risk appetite is an important indicator for monetary conditions.

Macro Risk Premium and Intermediary Balance Sheet Quantities from catelong

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0 Balance Sheet Adjustment /slideshow/balance-sheet-adjustment/2430052 arvind-091105094423-phpapp02
We measure how securitized assets, including mortgage-backed securities and other asset-backed securities, have shifted across financial institutions over this crisis and how the availability of financing has accommodated such shifts. Sectors dependent on repo financing – in particular, the hedge fund and broker-dealer sector – have reduced asset holdings, while the commercial banking sector, which has had access to more stable funding sources, has increased asset holdings. These findings are important to understand the role played by the government during the crisis as well as to understand the factors determining asset prices and liquidity during the crisis. Zhiguo He (University of Chicago), In Gu Khang (Northwestern University) and Arvind Krishnamurthy (Northwestern University and NBER)]]>
We measure how securitized assets, including mortgage-backed securities and other asset-backed securities, have shifted across financial institutions over this crisis and how the availability of financing has accommodated such shifts. Sectors dependent on repo financing – in particular, the hedge fund and broker-dealer sector – have reduced asset holdings, while the commercial banking sector, which has had access to more stable funding sources, has increased asset holdings. These findings are important to understand the role played by the government during the crisis as well as to understand the factors determining asset prices and liquidity during the crisis. Zhiguo He (University of Chicago), In Gu Khang (Northwestern University) and Arvind Krishnamurthy (Northwestern University and NBER)]]> Thu, 05 Nov 2009 09:44:01 GMT /slideshow/balance-sheet-adjustment/2430052 catelong@slideshare.net(catelong) Balance Sheet Adjustment catelong We measure how securitized assets, including mortgage-backed securities and other asset-backed securities, have shifted across financial institutions over this crisis and how the availability of financing has accommodated such shifts. Sectors dependent on repo financing – in particular, the hedge fund and broker-dealer sector – have reduced asset holdings, while the commercial banking sector, which has had access to more stable funding sources, has increased asset holdings. These findings are important to understand the role played by the government during the crisis as well as to understand the factors determining asset prices and liquidity during the crisis. Zhiguo He (University of Chicago), In Gu Khang (Northwestern University) and Arvind Krishnamurthy (Northwestern University and NBER) <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/arvind-091105094423-phpapp02-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> We measure how securitized assets, including mortgage-backed securities and other asset-backed securities, have shifted across financial institutions over this crisis and how the availability of financing has accommodated such shifts. Sectors dependent on repo financing – in particular, the hedge fund and broker-dealer sector – have reduced asset holdings, while the commercial banking sector, which has had access to more stable funding sources, has increased asset holdings. These findings are important to understand the role played by the government during the crisis as well as to understand the factors determining asset prices and liquidity during the crisis. Zhiguo He (University of Chicago), In Gu Khang (Northwestern University) and Arvind Krishnamurthy (Northwestern University and NBER)

Balance Sheet Adjustment from catelong

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0 XBRL and Credit Ratings /slideshow/xbrl-and-credit-ratings/2148701 xbrlcreditratings-091006221405-phpapp02
A short presentation about XBRL and credit ratings made at the Workshop on Improving Access to Financial Data on the Web, 5-6 October 2009, Co-organized by W3C and XBRL International, Inc, and hosted by FDIC, Arlington, Virginia USA http://www.w3.org/2009/03/xbrl/program.html]]>
A short presentation about XBRL and credit ratings made at the Workshop on Improving Access to Financial Data on the Web, 5-6 October 2009, Co-organized by W3C and XBRL International, Inc, and hosted by FDIC, Arlington, Virginia USA http://www.w3.org/2009/03/xbrl/program.html]]> Tue, 06 Oct 2009 22:13:57 GMT /slideshow/xbrl-and-credit-ratings/2148701 catelong@slideshare.net(catelong) XBRL and Credit Ratings catelong A short presentation about XBRL and credit ratings made at the Workshop on Improving Access to Financial Data on the Web, 5-6 October 2009, Co-organized by W3C and XBRL International, Inc, and hosted by FDIC, Arlington, Virginia USA http://www.w3.org/2009/03/xbrl/program.html <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/xbrlcreditratings-091006221405-phpapp02-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> A short presentation about XBRL and credit ratings made at the Workshop on Improving Access to Financial Data on the Web, 5-6 October 2009, Co-organized by W3C and XBRL International, Inc, and hosted by FDIC, Arlington, Virginia USA http://www.w3.org/2009/03/xbrl/program.html

XBRL and Credit Ratings from catelong

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0 Regulating Credit Default Swaps Preview For Press /slideshow/regulating-credit-default-swaps-preview-for-press/1562577 regulatingcreditdefaultswaps-previewforpress-090610111826-phpapp01
Presentation of Mr. Gary Kopff for the PRMIA Conference on Reforming Markets for Credit Default Swaps & Collateralized Debt Obligations held in Washington, DC. June 10th, 2009.]]>
Presentation of Mr. Gary Kopff for the PRMIA Conference on Reforming Markets for Credit Default Swaps & Collateralized Debt Obligations held in Washington, DC. June 10th, 2009.]]> Wed, 10 Jun 2009 11:18:24 GMT /slideshow/regulating-credit-default-swaps-preview-for-press/1562577 catelong@slideshare.net(catelong) Regulating Credit Default Swaps Preview For Press catelong Presentation of Mr. Gary Kopff for the PRMIA Conference on Reforming Markets for Credit Default Swaps & Collateralized Debt Obligations held in Washington, DC. June 10th, 2009. <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/regulatingcreditdefaultswaps-previewforpress-090610111826-phpapp01-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> Presentation of Mr. Gary Kopff for the PRMIA Conference on Reforming Markets for Credit Default Swaps & Collateralized Debt Obligations held in Washington, DC. June 10th, 2009.

Regulating Credit Default Swaps Preview For Press from catelong

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0 Creating stability in the financial system -- Narrow Banks /slideshow/creating-stability-in-the-financial-system-narrow-banks/1509831 narrowbanks-090530074141-phpapp01
Kevin James discusses the concept of "narrow banking". This is banks which are constrained in the investing and lending activity. It is an alternative to the giant too-big-too-fail banks which have nearly brought down the global financial system.]]>
Kevin James discusses the concept of "narrow banking". This is banks which are constrained in the investing and lending activity. It is an alternative to the giant too-big-too-fail banks which have nearly brought down the global financial system.]]> Sat, 30 May 2009 07:41:33 GMT /slideshow/creating-stability-in-the-financial-system-narrow-banks/1509831 catelong@slideshare.net(catelong) Creating stability in the financial system -- Narrow Banks catelong Kevin James discusses the concept of "narrow banking". This is banks which are constrained in the investing and lending activity. It is an alternative to the giant too-big-too-fail banks which have nearly brought down the global financial system. <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/narrowbanks-090530074141-phpapp01-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> Kevin James discusses the concept of "narrow banking". This is banks which are constrained in the investing and lending activity. It is an alternative to the giant too-big-too-fail banks which have nearly brought down the global financial system.

Creating stability in the financial system -- Narrow Banks from catelong

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0 What to do /slideshow/what-to-do/1276586 whattodo-090411201537-phpapp01
Don't worry... be happy...]]>
Don't worry... be happy...]]> Sat, 11 Apr 2009 20:12:55 GMT /slideshow/what-to-do/1276586 catelong@slideshare.net(catelong) What to do catelong Don't worry... be happy... <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/whattodo-090411201537-phpapp01-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> Don't worry... be happy...

What to do from catelong

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0 Moderninizing bank supervision and regulation /catelong/moderninizing-bank-supervision-and-regulation cwhalensenatebankingcommittee032409-090324090914-phpapp02
This is the testimony of Chris Whalen to the Senate Banking Committee on March 24, 2009 about bank and financial institution regulation and supervision.]]>
This is the testimony of Chris Whalen to the Senate Banking Committee on March 24, 2009 about bank and financial institution regulation and supervision.]]> Tue, 24 Mar 2009 09:08:46 GMT /catelong/moderninizing-bank-supervision-and-regulation catelong@slideshare.net(catelong) Moderninizing bank supervision and regulation catelong This is the testimony of Chris Whalen to the Senate Banking Committee on March 24, 2009 about bank and financial institution regulation and supervision. <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/cwhalensenatebankingcommittee032409-090324090914-phpapp02-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> This is the testimony of Chris Whalen to the Senate Banking Committee on March 24, 2009 about bank and financial institution regulation and supervision.

Moderninizing bank supervision and regulation from catelong

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0 TARP for Dummies /slideshow/tarp-for-dummies/1080190 tarppictorialexplanation-090227150558-phpapp01
A visualization of the efforts of the US Treasury to "save" the US financial system and the "too big to fail" firms like Citi, AIG and Bank of America.]]>
A visualization of the efforts of the US Treasury to "save" the US financial system and the "too big to fail" firms like Citi, AIG and Bank of America.]]> Fri, 27 Feb 2009 15:05:46 GMT /slideshow/tarp-for-dummies/1080190 catelong@slideshare.net(catelong) TARP for Dummies catelong A visualization of the efforts of the US Treasury to "save" the US financial system and the "too big to fail" firms like Citi, AIG and Bank of America. <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/tarppictorialexplanation-090227150558-phpapp01-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> A visualization of the efforts of the US Treasury to "save" the US financial system and the "too big to fail" firms like Citi, AIG and Bank of America.

TARP for Dummies from catelong

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0 GSE Nation /slideshow/gse-nation-presentation/783721 gsenation-1227545650422481-8
Banking regulation, CDS, financial firms, Government sponsored entities]]>
Banking regulation, CDS, financial firms, Government sponsored entities]]> Mon, 24 Nov 2008 08:55:49 GMT /slideshow/gse-nation-presentation/783721 catelong@slideshare.net(catelong) GSE Nation catelong Banking regulation, CDS, financial firms, Government sponsored entities <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/gsenation-1227545650422481-8-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> Banking regulation, CDS, financial firms, Government sponsored entities

GSE Nation from catelong

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0 A Bond Salesman /slideshow/a-bond-salesman-presentation/736055 a-bond-salesman-1226259189252391-8
Principles for bond salesmen from the 1920's...]]>
Principles for bond salesmen from the 1920's...]]> Sun, 09 Nov 2008 11:34:05 GMT /slideshow/a-bond-salesman-presentation/736055 catelong@slideshare.net(catelong) A Bond Salesman catelong Principles for bond salesmen from the 1920's... <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/a-bond-salesman-1226259189252391-8-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> Principles for bond salesmen from the 1920's...

A Bond Salesman from catelong

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0 https://public.slidesharecdn.com/v2/images/profile-picture.png https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/madmeathowsecuritizedlendingcollapsedthefinancialsystem-100918160228-phpapp02-thumbnail.jpg?width=320&height=320&fit=bounds slideshow/mad-meat-how-securitized-lending-collapsed-the-financial-system/5230518 Mad meat! how securi... https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/stiglitz-melbourne-july-2010-100807082621-phpapp01-thumbnail.jpg?width=320&height=320&fit=bounds slideshow/stiglitz-melbournejuly2010/4920171 From measuring product... https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/gaousfiscalsituation-100504094826-phpapp01-thumbnail.jpg?width=320&height=320&fit=bounds catelong/gao-report-on-the-us-fiscal-situation GAO report on the US f...