�ݺ�ߣshows by User: droitetcroissance

�ݺ�ߣshows by User: droitetcroissance / http://www.slideshare.net/images/logo.gif �ݺ�ߣshows by User: droitetcroissance / Fri, 04 Oct 2019 14:15:04 GMT �ݺ�ߣShare feed for �ݺ�ߣshows by User: droitetcroissance V 1.08 presentation short selling and fraud in bull markets /droitetcroissance/v-108-presentation-short-selling-and-fraud-in-bull-markets v1-191004141504
Understanding the gap between the US/UK approach re short selling versus France and Germany]]>
Understanding the gap between the US/UK approach re short selling versus France and Germany]]> Fri, 04 Oct 2019 14:15:04 GMT /droitetcroissance/v-108-presentation-short-selling-and-fraud-in-bull-markets droitetcroissance@slideshare.net(droitetcroissance) V 1.08 presentation short selling and fraud in bull markets droitetcroissance Understanding the gap between the US/UK approach re short selling versus France and Germany <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/v1-191004141504-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> Understanding the gap between the US/UK approach re short selling versus France and Germany

V 1.08 presentation short selling and fraud in bull markets from Vermeille & Co

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0 Présentation de Sophie Vermeille à Harvard law school /slideshow/prsentation-de-sophie-vermeille-harvard-law-school-82759856/82759856 harvardlawschool-171126104220
Présentation sur le lien entre qualité des institutions et la capacité d'un pays à innover et donc à poursuivre sa croissance 25 octobre 2017]]>
Présentation sur le lien entre qualité des institutions et la capacité d'un pays à innover et donc à poursuivre sa croissance 25 octobre 2017]]> Sun, 26 Nov 2017 10:42:20 GMT /slideshow/prsentation-de-sophie-vermeille-harvard-law-school-82759856/82759856 droitetcroissance@slideshare.net(droitetcroissance) Présentation de Sophie Vermeille à Harvard law school droitetcroissance Présentation sur le lien entre qualité des institutions et la capacité d'un pays à innover et donc à poursuivre sa croissance 25 octobre 2017 <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/harvardlawschool-171126104220-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> Présentation sur le lien entre qualité des institutions et la capacité d'un pays à innover et donc à poursuivre sa croissance 25 octobre 2017

Présentation de Sophie Vermeille à Harvard law school from Vermeille & Co

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0 Le test amélioré de l'absence de justification économique : étude à travers l'innovation prédatrice https://fr.slideshare.net/slideshow/le-test-ameliore-de-labsence-de-justification-economique-etude-a-travers-linnovation-predatrice/82458760 slidesaixdc-171121154600
Plusieurs tests ont été imaginés au fil des années afin de juger de la légalité des pratiques au regard du droit de la concurrence. Aucun ne permet toutefois d'appréhender les pratiques non-tarifaires sans créer de nombreuses erreurs judiciaire. Cette présentation donnée par Thibault Schrepel expose un nouveau « test amélioré de l'absence de justification économique » qui permet l'amélioration des règles concurrentielles à court, moyen et long terme.]]>
Plusieurs tests ont été imaginés au fil des années afin de juger de la légalité des pratiques au regard du droit de la concurrence. Aucun ne permet toutefois d'appréhender les pratiques non-tarifaires sans créer de nombreuses erreurs judiciaire. Cette présentation donnée par Thibault Schrepel expose un nouveau « test amélioré de l'absence de justification économique » qui permet l'amélioration des règles concurrentielles à court, moyen et long terme.]]> Tue, 21 Nov 2017 15:46:00 GMT https://fr.slideshare.net/slideshow/le-test-ameliore-de-labsence-de-justification-economique-etude-a-travers-linnovation-predatrice/82458760 droitetcroissance@slideshare.net(droitetcroissance) Le test amélioré de l'absence de justification économique : étude à travers l'innovation prédatrice droitetcroissance Plusieurs tests ont été imaginés au fil des années afin de juger de la légalité des pratiques au regard du droit de la concurrence. Aucun ne permet toutefois d'appréhender les pratiques non-tarifaires sans créer de nombreuses erreurs judiciaire. Cette présentation donnée par Thibault Schrepel expose un nouveau « test amélioré de l'absence de justification économique » qui permet l'amélioration des règles concurrentielles à court, moyen et long terme. <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/slidesaixdc-171121154600-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> Plusieurs tests ont été imaginés au fil des années afin de juger de la légalité des pratiques au regard du droit de la concurrence. Aucun ne permet toutefois d'appréhender les pratiques non-tarifaires sans créer de nombreuses erreurs judiciaire. Cette présentation donnée par Thibault Schrepel expose un nouveau « test amélioré de l'absence de justification économique » qui permet l'amélioration des règles concurrentielles à court, moyen et long terme.

from Vermeille & Co

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0 Bond workouts - Distressed equity offering - State Interventionism /slideshow/bond-workouts-distressed-equity-offering-state-interventionism/82162405 16-171116133452
Between 2009 and 2017, 82 capital increases were carried out by companies in difficulty listed on the Euronext exchange following cash contributions by their existing shareholders. Out of these 82 transac- tions 30 were carried out by companies seeking to raise more than 50 million euros during this same period. The French State played a role in more than one-third of these major transactions. Except in those cases where creditors agree to major concessions in the form of debt waivers entailing, as the case may be, a significant dilution of shareholders’ rights, such recapitalizations result in a massive transfer of wealth from subscribers to creditors, who are thus distanced from the risk of corporate default. An analysis of the stock market performance of those shares issued in connection with the 30 most signif- icant transactions confirms that this type of transaction often constitutes a risky gamble for their subscribers and sometimes unnecessarily delays in-depth restructuring of the company’s debt. The risk that these distressed equity offerings prove to be ruinous for shareholders and, in the end, con- trary to the interest of the companies, is even greater when their balance sheet is complex and their debt is dispersed over financial markets. Such situation renders obtaining concessions from creditors in ex- change for a contribution of fresh money more difficult. In this respect, it is symptomatic that no company listed in France has ever carried out a public offer for the exchange of bonds for shares, which, aside from insolvency proceedings, is the only means of realizing a significant waiver of bond debt. In a context which is propitious for the development of European bond markets and the optimization of the financial structure of companies, the risk of a future multiplication of ruinous distressed equity offer- ings as well as costly insolvency proceedings is very high.]]>
Between 2009 and 2017, 82 capital increases were carried out by companies in difficulty listed on the Euronext exchange following cash contributions by their existing shareholders. Out of these 82 transac- tions 30 were carried out by companies seeking to raise more than 50 million euros during this same period. The French State played a role in more than one-third of these major transactions. Except in those cases where creditors agree to major concessions in the form of debt waivers entailing, as the case may be, a significant dilution of shareholders’ rights, such recapitalizations result in a massive transfer of wealth from subscribers to creditors, who are thus distanced from the risk of corporate default. An analysis of the stock market performance of those shares issued in connection with the 30 most signif- icant transactions confirms that this type of transaction often constitutes a risky gamble for their subscribers and sometimes unnecessarily delays in-depth restructuring of the company’s debt. The risk that these distressed equity offerings prove to be ruinous for shareholders and, in the end, con- trary to the interest of the companies, is even greater when their balance sheet is complex and their debt is dispersed over financial markets. Such situation renders obtaining concessions from creditors in ex- change for a contribution of fresh money more difficult. In this respect, it is symptomatic that no company listed in France has ever carried out a public offer for the exchange of bonds for shares, which, aside from insolvency proceedings, is the only means of realizing a significant waiver of bond debt. In a context which is propitious for the development of European bond markets and the optimization of the financial structure of companies, the risk of a future multiplication of ruinous distressed equity offer- ings as well as costly insolvency proceedings is very high.]]> Thu, 16 Nov 2017 13:34:52 GMT /slideshow/bond-workouts-distressed-equity-offering-state-interventionism/82162405 droitetcroissance@slideshare.net(droitetcroissance) Bond workouts - Distressed equity offering - State Interventionism droitetcroissance Between 2009 and 2017, 82 capital increases were carried out by companies in difficulty listed on the Euronext exchange following cash contributions by their existing shareholders. Out of these 82 transac- tions 30 were carried out by companies seeking to raise more than 50 million euros during this same period. The French State played a role in more than one-third of these major transactions. Except in those cases where creditors agree to major concessions in the form of debt waivers entailing, as the case may be, a significant dilution of shareholders’ rights, such recapitalizations result in a massive transfer of wealth from subscribers to creditors, who are thus distanced from the risk of corporate default. An analysis of the stock market performance of those shares issued in connection with the 30 most signif- icant transactions confirms that this type of transaction often constitutes a risky gamble for their subscribers and sometimes unnecessarily delays in-depth restructuring of the company’s debt. The risk that these distressed equity offerings prove to be ruinous for shareholders and, in the end, con- trary to the interest of the companies, is even greater when their balance sheet is complex and their debt is dispersed over financial markets. Such situation renders obtaining concessions from creditors in ex- change for a contribution of fresh money more difficult. In this respect, it is symptomatic that no company listed in France has ever carried out a public offer for the exchange of bonds for shares, which, aside from insolvency proceedings, is the only means of realizing a significant waiver of bond debt. In a context which is propitious for the development of European bond markets and the optimization of the financial structure of companies, the risk of a future multiplication of ruinous distressed equity offer- ings as well as costly insolvency proceedings is very high. <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/16-171116133452-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> Between 2009 and 2017, 82 capital increases were carried out by companies in difficulty listed on the Euronext exchange following cash contributions by their existing shareholders. Out of these 82 transac- tions 30 were carried out by companies seeking to raise more than 50 million euros during this same period. The French State played a role in more than one-third of these major transactions. Except in those cases where creditors agree to major concessions in the form of debt waivers entailing, as the case may be, a significant dilution of shareholders’ rights, such recapitalizations result in a massive transfer of wealth from subscribers to creditors, who are thus distanced from the risk of corporate default. An analysis of the stock market performance of those shares issued in connection with the 30 most signif- icant transactions confirms that this type of transaction often constitutes a risky gamble for their subscribers and sometimes unnecessarily delays in-depth restructuring of the company’s debt. The risk that these distressed equity offerings prove to be ruinous for shareholders and, in the end, con- trary to the interest of the companies, is even greater when their balance sheet is complex and their debt is dispersed over financial markets. Such situation renders obtaining concessions from creditors in ex- change for a contribution of fresh money more difficult. In this respect, it is symptomatic that no company listed in France has ever carried out a public offer for the exchange of bonds for shares, which, aside from insolvency proceedings, is the only means of realizing a significant waiver of bond debt. In a context which is propitious for the development of European bond markets and the optimization of the financial structure of companies, the risk of a future multiplication of ruinous distressed equity offer- ings as well as costly insolvency proceedings is very high.

Bond workouts - Distressed equity offering - State Interventionism from Vermeille & Co

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0 Bail ins and bank resolution in europe /slideshow/bail-ins-and-bank-resolution-in-europe/78000224 bail-insandbankresolutionineurope-170718133549
L'objectif du "bail-in" est de forcer, en l'espace d'un week-end, les créanciers et actionnaires de l'établissement financier défaillant à absorber les pertes, ce avant toute intervention publique. Ce rapport donne un compte-rendu critique de l'avancée de l'Union Bancaire Européenne (tant sur le volet supervision, que sur le volet résolution) en prenant comme point de comparaison la réglementation américaine (Partie 1). Ce compte-rendu est ensuite complété par des études de cas (Partie 2) et une série de recommandations (Partie 3). L’application du pouvoir de bail-in en matière de résolution bancaire est particulièrement d’actualité depuis le début de la crise des banques italiennes en 2017. En juin 2017, le pouvoir de bail-in a été appliqué à Banco Popular et a conduit à l’éviction des actionnaires et des créanciers juniors, dans le cadre de l’application de la nouvelle directive européenne relative à la résolution bancaire. En revanche, l’Etat italien a engagé 17 milliards d’euros pour sauver deux banques régionales vénitiennes, Veneto Banca et Banco populare di Vicenza fin juin 2017, ce pour des considérations d’ordre essentiellement politique. Un tel sauvetage, qui représente une exception notable à l’application du pouvoir de bail-in, a été rendu possible par l’interprétation large du mécanisme d’aide d’Etat prévu par la directive et constitue une remise en cause de la crédibilité du volet résolution de l’Union Bancaire Européenne sur le plan international.]]>
L'objectif du "bail-in" est de forcer, en l'espace d'un week-end, les créanciers et actionnaires de l'établissement financier défaillant à absorber les pertes, ce avant toute intervention publique. Ce rapport donne un compte-rendu critique de l'avancée de l'Union Bancaire Européenne (tant sur le volet supervision, que sur le volet résolution) en prenant comme point de comparaison la réglementation américaine (Partie 1). Ce compte-rendu est ensuite complété par des études de cas (Partie 2) et une série de recommandations (Partie 3). L’application du pouvoir de bail-in en matière de résolution bancaire est particulièrement d’actualité depuis le début de la crise des banques italiennes en 2017. En juin 2017, le pouvoir de bail-in a été appliqué à Banco Popular et a conduit à l’éviction des actionnaires et des créanciers juniors, dans le cadre de l’application de la nouvelle directive européenne relative à la résolution bancaire. En revanche, l’Etat italien a engagé 17 milliards d’euros pour sauver deux banques régionales vénitiennes, Veneto Banca et Banco populare di Vicenza fin juin 2017, ce pour des considérations d’ordre essentiellement politique. Un tel sauvetage, qui représente une exception notable à l’application du pouvoir de bail-in, a été rendu possible par l’interprétation large du mécanisme d’aide d’Etat prévu par la directive et constitue une remise en cause de la crédibilité du volet résolution de l’Union Bancaire Européenne sur le plan international.]]> Tue, 18 Jul 2017 13:35:49 GMT /slideshow/bail-ins-and-bank-resolution-in-europe/78000224 droitetcroissance@slideshare.net(droitetcroissance) Bail ins and bank resolution in europe droitetcroissance L'objectif du "bail-in" est de forcer, en l'espace d'un week-end, les créanciers et actionnaires de l'établissement financier défaillant à absorber les pertes, ce avant toute intervention publique. Ce rapport donne un compte-rendu critique de l'avancée de l'Union Bancaire Européenne (tant sur le volet supervision, que sur le volet résolution) en prenant comme point de comparaison la réglementation américaine (Partie 1). Ce compte-rendu est ensuite complété par des études de cas (Partie 2) et une série de recommandations (Partie 3). L’application du pouvoir de bail-in en matière de résolution bancaire est particulièrement d’actualité depuis le début de la crise des banques italiennes en 2017. En juin 2017, le pouvoir de bail-in a été appliqué à Banco Popular et a conduit à l’éviction des actionnaires et des créanciers juniors, dans le cadre de l’application de la nouvelle directive européenne relative à la résolution bancaire. En revanche, l’Etat italien a engagé 17 milliards d’euros pour sauver deux banques régionales vénitiennes, Veneto Banca et Banco populare di Vicenza fin juin 2017, ce pour des considérations d’ordre essentiellement politique. Un tel sauvetage, qui représente une exception notable à l’application du pouvoir de bail-in, a été rendu possible par l’interprétation large du mécanisme d’aide d’Etat prévu par la directive et constitue une remise en cause de la crédibilité du volet résolution de l’Union Bancaire Européenne sur le plan international. <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/bail-insandbankresolutionineurope-170718133549-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> L'objectif du "bail-in" est de forcer, en l'espace d'un week-end, les créanciers et actionnaires de l'établissement financier défaillant à absorber les pertes, ce avant toute intervention publique. Ce rapport donne un compte-rendu critique de l'avancée de l'Union Bancaire Européenne (tant sur le volet supervision, que sur le volet résolution) en prenant comme point de comparaison la réglementation américaine (Partie 1). Ce compte-rendu est ensuite complété par des études de cas (Partie 2) et une série de recommandations (Partie 3). L’application du pouvoir de bail-in en matière de résolution bancaire est particulièrement d’actualité depuis le début de la crise des banques italiennes en 2017. En juin 2017, le pouvoir de bail-in a été appliqué à Banco Popular et a conduit à l’éviction des actionnaires et des créanciers juniors, dans le cadre de l’application de la nouvelle directive européenne relative à la résolution bancaire. En revanche, l’Etat italien a engagé 17 milliards d’euros pour sauver deux banques régionales vénitiennes, Veneto Banca et Banco populare di Vicenza fin juin 2017, ce pour des considérations d’ordre essentiellement politique. Un tel sauvetage, qui représente une exception notable à l’application du pouvoir de bail-in, a été rendu possible par l’interprétation large du mécanisme d’aide d’Etat prévu par la directive et constitue une remise en cause de la crédibilité du volet résolution de l’Union Bancaire Européenne sur le plan international.

Bail ins and bank resolution in europe from Vermeille & Co

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0 Proposal for a directive on insolvency, restructuring and second chance potential on np ls and the « no creditor worst off » principle /slideshow/proposal-for-a-directive-on-insolvency-restructuring-and-second-chance-potential-on-np-ls-and-the-no-creditor-worst-off-principle/77999400 proposalforadirectiveoninsolvencyrestructuringandsecondchancepotentialonnplsandthenocreditorworstoff-170718131045
The severity of the financial crisis has made it necessary to adopt measures to facilitate the conversion of debt into equity]]>
The severity of the financial crisis has made it necessary to adopt measures to facilitate the conversion of debt into equity]]> Tue, 18 Jul 2017 13:10:45 GMT /slideshow/proposal-for-a-directive-on-insolvency-restructuring-and-second-chance-potential-on-np-ls-and-the-no-creditor-worst-off-principle/77999400 droitetcroissance@slideshare.net(droitetcroissance) Proposal for a directive on insolvency, restructuring and second chance potential on np ls and the « no creditor worst off » principle droitetcroissance The severity of the financial crisis has made it necessary to adopt measures to facilitate the conversion of debt into equity <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/proposalforadirectiveoninsolvencyrestructuringandsecondchancepotentialonnplsandthenocreditorworstoff-170718131045-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> The severity of the financial crisis has made it necessary to adopt measures to facilitate the conversion of debt into equity

Proposal for a directive on insolvency, restructuring and second chance potential on np ls and the 束 no creditor worst off 損 principle from Vermeille & Co

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0 Bond workouts, distressed equity offering, state bailouts /slideshow/bond-workouts-distressed-equity-offering-state-bailouts/75491285 25-170428060425
In summary, we highlight the shortcomings of French corporate insolvency law that prevent large French issuers to launch exchange offers (out of court) with the view to downsize the amount of their bond debt by way of converting bonds into new shares. We show that it is therefore very difficult to restructure the balance sheets of large French listed companies quickly, especially when their bonds are issued on the financial markets and held by a large number of creditors. This difficulty is due to the fact that listed companies do not think than filling for formal insolvency proceedings is a genuine alternative to negotiating out of court in France. Under French law, it is not possible to cram down shareholders nor creditors unless the debtor defaults on its debt and sells its assets to a third party (which is not one of its creditors). Therefore issues do not have any leverage to convince their bondholders to exchange their bonds for new shares. Issuers requires therefore a mere extension of the maturity of the bonds which is a solution which tends to be less and less sufficient to allow a full recovery. This situation has several perverse effects: - distressed equity offerings are carried out with a view to reducing the level of debt of the issuers, whereas such equity offerings are unlikely to create sufficient value for shareholders, this is the main focus of our paper. - many fire sales to use the proceeds of the sale to reduce the level of debt - sale of the whole company to a third party - bail-out of the French State in its capacity as shareholder of last resort.]]>
In summary, we highlight the shortcomings of French corporate insolvency law that prevent large French issuers to launch exchange offers (out of court) with the view to downsize the amount of their bond debt by way of converting bonds into new shares. We show that it is therefore very difficult to restructure the balance sheets of large French listed companies quickly, especially when their bonds are issued on the financial markets and held by a large number of creditors. This difficulty is due to the fact that listed companies do not think than filling for formal insolvency proceedings is a genuine alternative to negotiating out of court in France. Under French law, it is not possible to cram down shareholders nor creditors unless the debtor defaults on its debt and sells its assets to a third party (which is not one of its creditors). Therefore issues do not have any leverage to convince their bondholders to exchange their bonds for new shares. Issuers requires therefore a mere extension of the maturity of the bonds which is a solution which tends to be less and less sufficient to allow a full recovery. This situation has several perverse effects: - distressed equity offerings are carried out with a view to reducing the level of debt of the issuers, whereas such equity offerings are unlikely to create sufficient value for shareholders, this is the main focus of our paper. - many fire sales to use the proceeds of the sale to reduce the level of debt - sale of the whole company to a third party - bail-out of the French State in its capacity as shareholder of last resort.]]> Fri, 28 Apr 2017 06:04:25 GMT /slideshow/bond-workouts-distressed-equity-offering-state-bailouts/75491285 droitetcroissance@slideshare.net(droitetcroissance) Bond workouts, distressed equity offering, state bailouts droitetcroissance In summary, we highlight the shortcomings of French corporate insolvency law that prevent large French issuers to launch exchange offers (out of court) with the view to downsize the amount of their bond debt by way of converting bonds into new shares. We show that it is therefore very difficult to restructure the balance sheets of large French listed companies quickly, especially when their bonds are issued on the financial markets and held by a large number of creditors. This difficulty is due to the fact that listed companies do not think than filling for formal insolvency proceedings is a genuine alternative to negotiating out of court in France. Under French law, it is not possible to cram down shareholders nor creditors unless the debtor defaults on its debt and sells its assets to a third party (which is not one of its creditors). Therefore issues do not have any leverage to convince their bondholders to exchange their bonds for new shares. Issuers requires therefore a mere extension of the maturity of the bonds which is a solution which tends to be less and less sufficient to allow a full recovery. This situation has several perverse effects: - distressed equity offerings are carried out with a view to reducing the level of debt of the issuers, whereas such equity offerings are unlikely to create sufficient value for shareholders, this is the main focus of our paper. - many fire sales to use the proceeds of the sale to reduce the level of debt - sale of the whole company to a third party - bail-out of the French State in its capacity as shareholder of last resort. <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/25-170428060425-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> In summary, we highlight the shortcomings of French corporate insolvency law that prevent large French issuers to launch exchange offers (out of court) with the view to downsize the amount of their bond debt by way of converting bonds into new shares. We show that it is therefore very difficult to restructure the balance sheets of large French listed companies quickly, especially when their bonds are issued on the financial markets and held by a large number of creditors. This difficulty is due to the fact that listed companies do not think than filling for formal insolvency proceedings is a genuine alternative to negotiating out of court in France. Under French law, it is not possible to cram down shareholders nor creditors unless the debtor defaults on its debt and sells its assets to a third party (which is not one of its creditors). Therefore issues do not have any leverage to convince their bondholders to exchange their bonds for new shares. Issuers requires therefore a mere extension of the maturity of the bonds which is a solution which tends to be less and less sufficient to allow a full recovery. This situation has several perverse effects: - distressed equity offerings are carried out with a view to reducing the level of debt of the issuers, whereas such equity offerings are unlikely to create sufficient value for shareholders, this is the main focus of our paper. - many fire sales to use the proceeds of the sale to reduce the level of debt - sale of the whole company to a third party - bail-out of the French State in its capacity as shareholder of last resort.

Bond workouts, distressed equity offering, state bailouts from Vermeille & Co

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0 V2 D&C - restructuration obligataire et recapitalisation https://fr.slideshare.net/slideshow/v2-droit-croissance-restructuration-et-recapitalisation/75319101 23-170423102500
Mise à jour depuis la V1 - - impact de l'absence de loan to own sur la discipline des dirigeants - nouveau cas PSA pour comprendre les raisons pour lesquelles l'Etat français a pu gagner de l'argent en sauvant le groupe - nouvelle recommendation - disclosure des positions de dérivés pour les garants d'émissions d'actionnaires nouvelles]]>
Mise à jour depuis la V1 - - impact de l'absence de loan to own sur la discipline des dirigeants - nouveau cas PSA pour comprendre les raisons pour lesquelles l'Etat français a pu gagner de l'argent en sauvant le groupe - nouvelle recommendation - disclosure des positions de dérivés pour les garants d'émissions d'actionnaires nouvelles]]> Sun, 23 Apr 2017 10:25:00 GMT https://fr.slideshare.net/slideshow/v2-droit-croissance-restructuration-et-recapitalisation/75319101 droitetcroissance@slideshare.net(droitetcroissance) V2 D&C - restructuration obligataire et recapitalisation droitetcroissance Mise à jour depuis la V1 - - impact de l'absence de loan to own sur la discipline des dirigeants - nouveau cas PSA pour comprendre les raisons pour lesquelles l'Etat français a pu gagner de l'argent en sauvant le groupe - nouvelle recommendation - disclosure des positions de dérivés pour les garants d'émissions d'actionnaires nouvelles <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/23-170423102500-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> Mise à jour depuis la V1 - - impact de l'absence de loan to own sur la discipline des dirigeants - nouveau cas PSA pour comprendre les raisons pour lesquelles l'Etat français a pu gagner de l'argent en sauvant le groupe - nouvelle recommendation - disclosure des positions de dérivés pour les garants d'émissions d'actionnaires nouvelles

from Vermeille & Co

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0 Interlocking Directorates and Anti-Competitive Risks ? An Enforcement Gap in Europe ? /slideshow/interlocking-directorates-and-anticompetitive-risks-an-enforcement-gap-in-europe/64031657 florencethepotpresentation-160714160911
Interlocking Directorates and Anti-Competitive Risks ? An Enforcement Gap in Europe ? de Florence Thépot, Florian Hugon et Mathieu Luinaud. Souvent occultée par les situations de prises de participations minoritaires, la pratique des cumuls de mandats d’administrateur entre concurrents n’est pas sans susciter un risque d’effets anticoncurrentiels.]]>
Interlocking Directorates and Anti-Competitive Risks ? An Enforcement Gap in Europe ? de Florence Thépot, Florian Hugon et Mathieu Luinaud. Souvent occultée par les situations de prises de participations minoritaires, la pratique des cumuls de mandats d’administrateur entre concurrents n’est pas sans susciter un risque d’effets anticoncurrentiels.]]> Thu, 14 Jul 2016 16:09:11 GMT /slideshow/interlocking-directorates-and-anticompetitive-risks-an-enforcement-gap-in-europe/64031657 droitetcroissance@slideshare.net(droitetcroissance) Interlocking Directorates and Anti-Competitive Risks ? An Enforcement Gap in Europe ? droitetcroissance Interlocking Directorates and Anti-Competitive Risks ? An Enforcement Gap in Europe ? de Florence Thépot, Florian Hugon et Mathieu Luinaud. Souvent occultée par les situations de prises de participations minoritaires, la pratique des cumuls de mandats d’administrateur entre concurrents n’est pas sans susciter un risque d’effets anticoncurrentiels. <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/florencethepotpresentation-160714160911-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> Interlocking Directorates and Anti-Competitive Risks ? An Enforcement Gap in Europe ? de Florence Thépot, Florian Hugon et Mathieu Luinaud. Souvent occultée par les situations de prises de participations minoritaires, la pratique des cumuls de mandats d’administrateur entre concurrents n’est pas sans susciter un risque d’effets anticoncurrentiels.

Interlocking Directorates and Anti-Competitive Risks ? An Enforcement Gap in Europe ? from Vermeille & Co

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0 Droit croissance order of priority and valuation /slideshow/droit-croissance-order-of-priority-and-valuation/63898984 droitcroissance-orderofpriorityandvaluation-160711064421
D&C]]>
D&C]]> Mon, 11 Jul 2016 06:44:21 GMT /slideshow/droit-croissance-order-of-priority-and-valuation/63898984 droitetcroissance@slideshare.net(droitetcroissance) Droit croissance order of priority and valuation droitetcroissance D&C <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/droitcroissance-orderofpriorityandvaluation-160711064421-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> D&C

Droit croissance order of priority and valuation from Vermeille & Co

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0 Améliorer le traitement des Non Performing Loans en Europe - 07/06/2016 https://fr.slideshare.net/slideshow/un-droit-du-crdit-efficace-en-europe-pour-amliorer-le-traitement-des-non-performing-loans-sophie-vermeille-droit-croissance-30052016/62787152 30-052016svpresentationdroitetcroissance-160606214335
Un droit du crédit efficace en Europe pour améliorer le traitement des Non Performing Loans]]>
Un droit du crédit efficace en Europe pour améliorer le traitement des Non Performing Loans]]> Mon, 06 Jun 2016 21:43:35 GMT https://fr.slideshare.net/slideshow/un-droit-du-crdit-efficace-en-europe-pour-amliorer-le-traitement-des-non-performing-loans-sophie-vermeille-droit-croissance-30052016/62787152 droitetcroissance@slideshare.net(droitetcroissance) Améliorer le traitement des Non Performing Loans en Europe - 07/06/2016 droitetcroissance Un droit du crédit efficace en Europe pour améliorer le traitement des Non Performing Loans <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/30-052016svpresentationdroitetcroissance-160606214335-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> Un droit du crédit efficace en Europe pour améliorer le traitement des Non Performing Loans

from Vermeille & Co

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0 29 03 - EU insolvency law - Lessons from France /slideshow/29-03-eu-insolvency-law-lessons-from-france-60134807/60134807 29-03-cover-svcorporateinsolvencylaw-160328223626
Focus on pre-insolvency proceedings can be country productive Market for distressed entices cannot emerge without effective valuation methodology and cramdown procedure European banking supervision needs a pan-European insolvency law]]>
Focus on pre-insolvency proceedings can be country productive Market for distressed entices cannot emerge without effective valuation methodology and cramdown procedure European banking supervision needs a pan-European insolvency law]]> Mon, 28 Mar 2016 22:36:26 GMT /slideshow/29-03-eu-insolvency-law-lessons-from-france-60134807/60134807 droitetcroissance@slideshare.net(droitetcroissance) 29 03 - EU insolvency law - Lessons from France droitetcroissance Focus on pre-insolvency proceedings can be country productive Market for distressed entices cannot emerge without effective valuation methodology and cramdown procedure European banking supervision needs a pan-European insolvency law <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/29-03-cover-svcorporateinsolvencylaw-160328223626-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> Focus on pre-insolvency proceedings can be country productive Market for distressed entices cannot emerge without effective valuation methodology and cramdown procedure European banking supervision needs a pan-European insolvency law

29 03 - EU insolvency law - Lessons from France from Vermeille & Co

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0 Pre-Insolvency Proceedings /slideshow/pre-insolvency-proceedings-french-perspective-v32/49725913 pre-insolvencyproceedingsfrenchperspectivev3-2-150623093840-lva1-app6891
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]]> Tue, 23 Jun 2015 09:38:40 GMT /slideshow/pre-insolvency-proceedings-french-perspective-v32/49725913 droitetcroissance@slideshare.net(droitetcroissance) Pre-Insolvency Proceedings droitetcroissance <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/pre-insolvencyproceedingsfrenchperspectivev3-2-150623093840-lva1-app6891-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" />

Pre-Insolvency Proceedings from Vermeille & Co

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0 Droit et innovations radicales - présentation du 25 mai 2015 https://fr.slideshare.net/slideshow/2015-05-27-droit-et-innovations-radicales/48812572 20150527-droitetinnovationsradicales-150531174202-lva1-app6891
L'impact des institutions sur le développement économique]]>
L'impact des institutions sur le développement économique]]> Sun, 31 May 2015 17:42:02 GMT https://fr.slideshare.net/slideshow/2015-05-27-droit-et-innovations-radicales/48812572 droitetcroissance@slideshare.net(droitetcroissance) Droit et innovations radicales - présentation du 25 mai 2015 droitetcroissance L'impact des institutions sur le développement économique <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/20150527-droitetinnovationsradicales-150531174202-lva1-app6891-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> L'impact des institutions sur le développement économique

from Vermeille & Co

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0 La bourse conférence du 9 avril 2015 https://fr.slideshare.net/slideshow/la-bourse-confrence-du-9-avril-2015/48518950 labourse-conf-150523165333-lva1-app6891
La bourse conférence du 9 avril 2015]]>
La bourse conférence du 9 avril 2015]]> Sat, 23 May 2015 16:53:33 GMT https://fr.slideshare.net/slideshow/la-bourse-confrence-du-9-avril-2015/48518950 droitetcroissance@slideshare.net(droitetcroissance) La bourse conférence du 9 avril 2015 droitetcroissance La bourse conférence du 9 avril 2015 <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/labourse-conf-150523165333-lva1-app6891-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> La bourse conférence du 9 avril 2015

from Vermeille & Co

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0 How french insolvency law has failed /slideshow/how-french-insolvency-law-has-failed/48518892 howfrenchinsolvencylawhasfailed-slideshare3-150523165117-lva1-app6892
How french insolvency law has failed]]>
How french insolvency law has failed]]> Sat, 23 May 2015 16:51:17 GMT /slideshow/how-french-insolvency-law-has-failed/48518892 droitetcroissance@slideshare.net(droitetcroissance) How french insolvency law has failed droitetcroissance How french insolvency law has failed <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/howfrenchinsolvencylawhasfailed-slideshare3-150523165117-lva1-app6892-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> How french insolvency law has failed

How french insolvency law has failed from Vermeille & Co

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0 Conférence 18 décembre - Harmonisation du droit des faillites https://fr.slideshare.net/slideshow/sv-presentation-droit-et-croissance-18-12-2014-modifab/42785108 svpresentationdroitetcroissance18122014modif-141217014928-conversion-gate02
Harmoniser le droit des faillites et des sûretés dans l'intérêt de l'Union bancaire et de l'Union des marchés de capitaux]]>
Harmoniser le droit des faillites et des sûretés dans l'intérêt de l'Union bancaire et de l'Union des marchés de capitaux]]> Wed, 17 Dec 2014 01:49:28 GMT https://fr.slideshare.net/slideshow/sv-presentation-droit-et-croissance-18-12-2014-modifab/42785108 droitetcroissance@slideshare.net(droitetcroissance) Conférence 18 décembre - Harmonisation du droit des faillites droitetcroissance Harmoniser le droit des faillites et des sûretés dans l'intérêt de l'Union bancaire et de l'Union des marchés de capitaux <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/svpresentationdroitetcroissance18122014modif-141217014928-conversion-gate02-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> Harmoniser le droit des faillites et des sûretés dans l'intérêt de l'Union bancaire et de l'Union des marchés de capitaux

from Vermeille & Co

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0 What can we learn from the various insolvency law processes in Europe? /slideshow/pres-40459924/40459924 sophievermeillesslides-141019140733-conversion-gate02
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]]> Sun, 19 Oct 2014 14:07:33 GMT /slideshow/pres-40459924/40459924 droitetcroissance@slideshare.net(droitetcroissance) What can we learn from the various insolvency law processes in Europe? droitetcroissance <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/sophievermeillesslides-141019140733-conversion-gate02-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" />

What can we learn from the various insolvency law processes in Europe? from Vermeille & Co

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0 D&C's conference on 2 April - French Bankruptcy law an impediment to innovation https://fr.slideshare.net/slideshow/prsentation-n-colin-2-avril-2014/32925696 prsentationncolin2avril2014-140331014032-phpapp01
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]]> Mon, 31 Mar 2014 01:40:32 GMT https://fr.slideshare.net/slideshow/prsentation-n-colin-2-avril-2014/32925696 droitetcroissance@slideshare.net(droitetcroissance) D&C's conference on 2 April - French Bankruptcy law an impediment to innovation droitetcroissance <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/prsentationncolin2avril2014-140331014032-phpapp01-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" />

from Vermeille & Co

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0 Conférence Droit & Croissance 2 Avril - Key Note Speech https://fr.slideshare.net/slideshow/confrence-droit-croissance-2-avril-key-note-speech/32851953 prsentationsvermeille2avril2014-140328082038-phpapp01
Les changements sur le marché du distressed aux Etats-Unis et en Europe]]>
Les changements sur le marché du distressed aux Etats-Unis et en Europe]]> Fri, 28 Mar 2014 08:20:38 GMT https://fr.slideshare.net/slideshow/confrence-droit-croissance-2-avril-key-note-speech/32851953 droitetcroissance@slideshare.net(droitetcroissance) Conférence Droit & Croissance 2 Avril - Key Note Speech droitetcroissance Les changements sur le marché du distressed aux Etats-Unis et en Europe <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/prsentationsvermeille2avril2014-140328082038-phpapp01-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> Les changements sur le marché du distressed aux Etats-Unis et en Europe

from Vermeille & Co

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0 https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/profile-photo-droitetcroissance-48x48.jpg?cb=1607347076 I am a French lawyer and an independant research in Law & Economics. I advise debtor companies, credit institutions and distressed investors on out-of-court refinancings and restructurings, as well as on in-court insolvency proceedings, both domestic or cross-border. I also advise advise investors and shareholder advocacy groups on corporate governance, proxy contests etc. I founded “Droit & Croissance” “Rules for Growth”, an open independent non-partisan think tank, which takes part in public debates, assists policymakers and influences legislators. https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/v1-191004141504-thumbnail.jpg?width=320&height=320&fit=bounds droitetcroissance/v-108-presentation-short-selling-and-fraud-in-bull-markets V 1.08 presentation sh... https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/harvardlawschool-171126104220-thumbnail.jpg?width=320&height=320&fit=bounds slideshow/prsentation-de-sophie-vermeille-harvard-law-school-82759856/82759856 Présentation de Sophie... https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/slidesaixdc-171121154600-thumbnail.jpg?width=320&height=320&fit=bounds slideshow/le-test-ameliore-de-labsence-de-justification-economique-etude-a-travers-linnovation-predatrice/82458760 Le test amélioré de ...