際際滷shows by User: gmbara / http://www.slideshare.net/images/logo.gif 際際滷shows by User: gmbara / Mon, 01 Aug 2016 14:40:57 GMT 際際滷Share feed for 際際滷shows by User: gmbara Getting things right: optimal tax policy with labor market duality /slideshow/getting-things-right-optimal-tax-policy-with-labor-market-duality-64583236/64583236 presentation-160801144057
We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model in which firms evade the employer contribution component of social security taxes by offering some workers non-formal contracts. When calibrated, the model yields estimates of dual labor market participation consistent with empirical evidence for the EU14 countries and the US. We investigate the optimal mix of the avoidable and unavoidable components of labor taxes and analyze the fiscal and macroeconomics effects of bringing the composition to the welfare optimum. We find that partial labor tax evasion makes tax revenues more elastic, but full tax compliance is not necessarily a welfare enhancing policy mix. ]]>
We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model in which firms evade the employer contribution component of social security taxes by offering some workers non-formal contracts. When calibrated, the model yields estimates of dual labor market participation consistent with empirical evidence for the EU14 countries and the US. We investigate the optimal mix of the avoidable and unavoidable components of labor taxes and analyze the fiscal and macroeconomics effects of bringing the composition to the welfare optimum. We find that partial labor tax evasion makes tax revenues more elastic, but full tax compliance is not necessarily a welfare enhancing policy mix. ]]> Mon, 01 Aug 2016 14:40:57 GMT /slideshow/getting-things-right-optimal-tax-policy-with-labor-market-duality-64583236/64583236 gmbara@slideshare.net(gmbara) Getting things right: optimal tax policy with labor market duality gmbara We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model in which firms evade the employer contribution component of social security taxes by offering some workers non-formal contracts. When calibrated, the model yields estimates of dual labor market participation consistent with empirical evidence for the EU14 countries and the US. We investigate the optimal mix of the avoidable and unavoidable components of labor taxes and analyze the fiscal and macroeconomics effects of bringing the composition to the welfare optimum. We find that partial labor tax evasion makes tax revenues more elastic, but full tax compliance is not necessarily a welfare enhancing policy mix. <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/presentation-160801144057-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&amp;height=120&amp;fit=bounds" /><br> We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model in which firms evade the employer contribution component of social security taxes by offering some workers non-formal contracts. When calibrated, the model yields estimates of dual labor market participation consistent with empirical evidence for the EU14 countries and the US. We investigate the optimal mix of the avoidable and unavoidable components of labor taxes and analyze the fiscal and macroeconomics effects of bringing the composition to the welfare optimum. We find that partial labor tax evasion makes tax revenues more elastic, but full tax compliance is not necessarily a welfare enhancing policy mix.
Getting things right: optimal tax policy with labor market duality from Gilbert Mbara
]]> 262 4 https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/presentation-160801144057-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds presentation Black http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/post http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/posted 0 https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/profile-photo-gmbara-48x48.jpg?cb=1523342520