�ݺ�ߣshows by User: sandrogauci

�ݺ�ߣshows by User: sandrogauci / http://www.slideshare.net/images/logo.gif �ݺ�ߣshows by User: sandrogauci / Fri, 30 Jun 2023 13:03:35 GMT �ݺ�ߣShare feed for �ݺ�ߣshows by User: sandrogauci CommCon 2023 - WebRTC & Video Delivery application security - what could possibly go wrong? /slideshow/commcon-2023-webrtc-video-delivery-application-security-what-could-possibly-go-wrong/258738860 webrtc-video-delivery-what-could-go-wrong-sandro-gauci-commcon-230630130335-4cf8c2f4
WebRTC is often considered to be secure by default - with most security concerns being around IP address leakage which is more of a privacy issue than anything. Well, I have news for you - the applications and infrastructure that handles WebRTC can be attacked. It may indeed have various types of security vulnerabilities which are often overlooked. This presentation is based on experiences gained through security testing of WebRTC applications with anecdotal stories to illustrate the dangers. We will also take a peek at Video Delivery mechanisms such as RIST and SRT and discuss what could possibly go wrong there too! ]]>
WebRTC is often considered to be secure by default - with most security concerns being around IP address leakage which is more of a privacy issue than anything. Well, I have news for you - the applications and infrastructure that handles WebRTC can be attacked. It may indeed have various types of security vulnerabilities which are often overlooked. This presentation is based on experiences gained through security testing of WebRTC applications with anecdotal stories to illustrate the dangers. We will also take a peek at Video Delivery mechanisms such as RIST and SRT and discuss what could possibly go wrong there too! ]]> Fri, 30 Jun 2023 13:03:35 GMT /slideshow/commcon-2023-webrtc-video-delivery-application-security-what-could-possibly-go-wrong/258738860 sandrogauci@slideshare.net(sandrogauci) CommCon 2023 - WebRTC & Video Delivery application security - what could possibly go wrong? sandrogauci WebRTC is often considered to be secure by default - with most security concerns being around IP address leakage which is more of a privacy issue than anything. Well, I have news for you - the applications and infrastructure that handles WebRTC can be attacked. It may indeed have various types of security vulnerabilities which are often overlooked. This presentation is based on experiences gained through security testing of WebRTC applications with anecdotal stories to illustrate the dangers. We will also take a peek at Video Delivery mechanisms such as RIST and SRT and discuss what could possibly go wrong there too! <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/webrtc-video-delivery-what-could-go-wrong-sandro-gauci-commcon-230630130335-4cf8c2f4-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> WebRTC is often considered to be secure by default - with most security concerns being around IP address leakage which is more of a privacy issue than anything. Well, I have news for you - the applications and infrastructure that handles WebRTC can be attacked. It may indeed have various types of security vulnerabilities which are often overlooked. This presentation is based on experiences gained through security testing of WebRTC applications with anecdotal stories to illustrate the dangers. We will also take a peek at Video Delivery mechanisms such as RIST and SRT and discuss what could possibly go wrong there too!

CommCon 2023 - WebRTC & Video Delivery application security - what could possibly go wrong? from Sandro Gauci

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0 TADSummit 2022 - How to bring your own RTC platform down /slideshow/tadsummit-2022-how-to-bring-your-own-rtc-platform-down/254566827 slides-221129054711-d41b6c16
Running DDoS simulations on your own. Why would you want to do such a thing? Preparing for destruction Running the tests – best practices What happens after the fact Moving forward towards more robust RTC]]>
Running DDoS simulations on your own. Why would you want to do such a thing? Preparing for destruction Running the tests – best practices What happens after the fact Moving forward towards more robust RTC]]> Tue, 29 Nov 2022 05:47:11 GMT /slideshow/tadsummit-2022-how-to-bring-your-own-rtc-platform-down/254566827 sandrogauci@slideshare.net(sandrogauci) TADSummit 2022 - How to bring your own RTC platform down sandrogauci Running DDoS simulations on your own. Why would you want to do such a thing? Preparing for destruction Running the tests – best practices What happens after the fact Moving forward towards more robust RTC <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/slides-221129054711-d41b6c16-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> Running DDoS simulations on your own. Why would you want to do such a thing? Preparing for destruction Running the tests – best practices What happens after the fact Moving forward towards more robust RTC

TADSummit 2022 - How to bring your own RTC platform down from Sandro Gauci

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0 The OpenSIPS security audit - OpenSIPS Summit - Sandro Gauci /sandrogauci/the-opensips-security-audit-opensips-summit-sandro-gauci the-opensips-audit-presentation-sandro-gauci-210907111851
If you have been following news from the OpenSIPS community, you probably heard of the OpenSIPS security audit. Why is this a useful exercise and how will it be done? In this talk, Sandro will try to answer these questions, give some background and details on what will be tested and his team's penetration testing methodology as it applies to the OpenSIPS project.]]>
If you have been following news from the OpenSIPS community, you probably heard of the OpenSIPS security audit. Why is this a useful exercise and how will it be done? In this talk, Sandro will try to answer these questions, give some background and details on what will be tested and his team's penetration testing methodology as it applies to the OpenSIPS project.]]> Tue, 07 Sep 2021 11:18:51 GMT /sandrogauci/the-opensips-security-audit-opensips-summit-sandro-gauci sandrogauci@slideshare.net(sandrogauci) The OpenSIPS security audit - OpenSIPS Summit - Sandro Gauci sandrogauci If you have been following news from the OpenSIPS community, you probably heard of the OpenSIPS security audit. Why is this a useful exercise and how will it be done? In this talk, Sandro will try to answer these questions, give some background and details on what will be tested and his team's penetration testing methodology as it applies to the OpenSIPS project. <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/the-opensips-audit-presentation-sandro-gauci-210907111851-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> If you have been following news from the OpenSIPS community, you probably heard of the OpenSIPS security audit. Why is this a useful exercise and how will it be done? In this talk, Sandro will try to answer these questions, give some background and details on what will be tested and his team's penetration testing methodology as it applies to the OpenSIPS project.

The OpenSIPS security audit - OpenSIPS Summit - Sandro Gauci from Sandro Gauci

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0 Tools for offensive RTC Security: introducing SIPVicious PRO and the demo server /slideshow/tools-for-offensive-rtc-security-introducing-sipvicious-pro-and-the-demo-server/248291871 toolsforoffensivertcsecurity-210511142922
In his previous talk for TADSummit, Sandro spoke about why it is critical to take an offensive approach when dealing with SIP security. In this one, he shows how tools can help in testing RTC security as well as in learning more about offensive security for RTC. After a general overview of the landscape, he will focus on the work that his team has done on SIPVicious PRO and the target demo server that helps learn and show vulnerabilities in a lab environment.]]>
In his previous talk for TADSummit, Sandro spoke about why it is critical to take an offensive approach when dealing with SIP security. In this one, he shows how tools can help in testing RTC security as well as in learning more about offensive security for RTC. After a general overview of the landscape, he will focus on the work that his team has done on SIPVicious PRO and the target demo server that helps learn and show vulnerabilities in a lab environment.]]> Tue, 11 May 2021 14:29:21 GMT /slideshow/tools-for-offensive-rtc-security-introducing-sipvicious-pro-and-the-demo-server/248291871 sandrogauci@slideshare.net(sandrogauci) Tools for offensive RTC Security: introducing SIPVicious PRO and the demo server sandrogauci In his previous talk for TADSummit, Sandro spoke about why it is critical to take an offensive approach when dealing with SIP security. In this one, he shows how tools can help in testing RTC security as well as in learning more about offensive security for RTC. After a general overview of the landscape, he will focus on the work that his team has done on SIPVicious PRO and the target demo server that helps learn and show vulnerabilities in a lab environment. <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/toolsforoffensivertcsecurity-210511142922-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> In his previous talk for TADSummit, Sandro spoke about why it is critical to take an offensive approach when dealing with SIP security. In this one, he shows how tools can help in testing RTC security as well as in learning more about offensive security for RTC. After a general overview of the landscape, he will focus on the work that his team has done on SIPVicious PRO and the target demo server that helps learn and show vulnerabilities in a lab environment.

Tools for offensive RTC Security: introducing SIPVicious PRO and the demo server from Sandro Gauci

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0 Bounty bout 0x01 - WebRTC edition /slideshow/bounty-bout-0x01-webrtc-edition/235754757 technicalreport-200617045816
A report following security findings submitted to bug bounties and vulnerability disclosure programs featuring WebRTC infrastructure security.]]>
A report following security findings submitted to bug bounties and vulnerability disclosure programs featuring WebRTC infrastructure security.]]> Wed, 17 Jun 2020 04:58:15 GMT /slideshow/bounty-bout-0x01-webrtc-edition/235754757 sandrogauci@slideshare.net(sandrogauci) Bounty bout 0x01 - WebRTC edition sandrogauci A report following security findings submitted to bug bounties and vulnerability disclosure programs featuring WebRTC infrastructure security. <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/technicalreport-200617045816-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> A report following security findings submitted to bug bounties and vulnerability disclosure programs featuring WebRTC infrastructure security.

Bounty bout 0x01 - WebRTC edition from Sandro Gauci

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0 The various ways your RTC may be crushed /sandrogauci/the-various-ways-your-rtc-may-be-crushed thevariouswaysyourrtcmaybecrushed-190524102521
A presentation about Denial of Service on Real-time Communications systems. This presentation covers the following: The presentation, in parts: - DoS on Signalling, including SIP Flood, TCP and TLS Flooding, TLS certificate flooding and a WebRTC proprietary signalling protocol attacked via malformed message - DoS on the Media, including RTP Bleed and Invalid DTLS certificate - DoS on RTC monitoring tools including DoS on Recording systems, on PCAP monitoring and Flooding the firewall - DoS on callbacks including random input and Slowloris attack - DoS on security protection including IP spoofing to block trusted peers and flooding the intrusion prevention system - Tips on evasion of security protection, on rate limiting, distributing attacks and slowing down attacks - Discussion on solutions and mitigation, on rate limiting again, increasing resources, and various other techniques If you'd rather watch this presentation: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLfoovPTqAipVGa__xPSatN9qKC22nTKl7]]>
A presentation about Denial of Service on Real-time Communications systems. This presentation covers the following: The presentation, in parts: - DoS on Signalling, including SIP Flood, TCP and TLS Flooding, TLS certificate flooding and a WebRTC proprietary signalling protocol attacked via malformed message - DoS on the Media, including RTP Bleed and Invalid DTLS certificate - DoS on RTC monitoring tools including DoS on Recording systems, on PCAP monitoring and Flooding the firewall - DoS on callbacks including random input and Slowloris attack - DoS on security protection including IP spoofing to block trusted peers and flooding the intrusion prevention system - Tips on evasion of security protection, on rate limiting, distributing attacks and slowing down attacks - Discussion on solutions and mitigation, on rate limiting again, increasing resources, and various other techniques If you'd rather watch this presentation: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLfoovPTqAipVGa__xPSatN9qKC22nTKl7]]> Fri, 24 May 2019 10:25:21 GMT /sandrogauci/the-various-ways-your-rtc-may-be-crushed sandrogauci@slideshare.net(sandrogauci) The various ways your RTC may be crushed sandrogauci A presentation about Denial of Service on Real-time Communications systems. This presentation covers the following: The presentation, in parts: - DoS on Signalling, including SIP Flood, TCP and TLS Flooding, TLS certificate flooding and a WebRTC proprietary signalling protocol attacked via malformed message - DoS on the Media, including RTP Bleed and Invalid DTLS certificate - DoS on RTC monitoring tools including DoS on Recording systems, on PCAP monitoring and Flooding the firewall - DoS on callbacks including random input and Slowloris attack - DoS on security protection including IP spoofing to block trusted peers and flooding the intrusion prevention system - Tips on evasion of security protection, on rate limiting, distributing attacks and slowing down attacks - Discussion on solutions and mitigation, on rate limiting again, increasing resources, and various other techniques If you'd rather watch this presentation: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLfoovPTqAipVGa__xPSatN9qKC22nTKl7 <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/thevariouswaysyourrtcmaybecrushed-190524102521-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> A presentation about Denial of Service on Real-time Communications systems. This presentation covers the following: The presentation, in parts: - DoS on Signalling, including SIP Flood, TCP and TLS Flooding, TLS certificate flooding and a WebRTC proprietary signalling protocol attacked via malformed message - DoS on the Media, including RTP Bleed and Invalid DTLS certificate - DoS on RTC monitoring tools including DoS on Recording systems, on PCAP monitoring and Flooding the firewall - DoS on callbacks including random input and Slowloris attack - DoS on security protection including IP spoofing to block trusted peers and flooding the intrusion prevention system - Tips on evasion of security protection, on rate limiting, distributing attacks and slowing down attacks - Discussion on solutions and mitigation, on rate limiting again, increasing resources, and various other techniques If you'd rather watch this presentation: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLfoovPTqAipVGa__xPSatN9qKC22nTKl7

The various ways your RTC may be crushed from Sandro Gauci

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0 A tale of two RTC fuzzing approaches /slideshow/a-tale-of-two-rtc-fuzzing-approaches/97496094 ataleoftwortcfuzzingapproaches-180518133915
A presentation describing two different approaches that we took when making use of fuzzing to discover vulnerabilities in VoIP or Real-time communications software and libraries. We describe our failures and also our successful findings when using AFL and also our custom fuzzer, gasoline against Asterisk, Kamailio, PJSIP, RTP proxy and other solutions. Presentation can be found at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CuxKD5zljVI]]>
A presentation describing two different approaches that we took when making use of fuzzing to discover vulnerabilities in VoIP or Real-time communications software and libraries. We describe our failures and also our successful findings when using AFL and also our custom fuzzer, gasoline against Asterisk, Kamailio, PJSIP, RTP proxy and other solutions. Presentation can be found at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CuxKD5zljVI]]> Fri, 18 May 2018 13:39:15 GMT /slideshow/a-tale-of-two-rtc-fuzzing-approaches/97496094 sandrogauci@slideshare.net(sandrogauci) A tale of two RTC fuzzing approaches sandrogauci A presentation describing two different approaches that we took when making use of fuzzing to discover vulnerabilities in VoIP or Real-time communications software and libraries. We describe our failures and also our successful findings when using AFL and also our custom fuzzer, gasoline against Asterisk, Kamailio, PJSIP, RTP proxy and other solutions. Presentation can be found at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CuxKD5zljVI <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/ataleoftwortcfuzzingapproaches-180518133915-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> A presentation describing two different approaches that we took when making use of fuzzing to discover vulnerabilities in VoIP or Real-time communications software and libraries. We describe our failures and also our successful findings when using AFL and also our custom fuzzer, gasoline against Asterisk, Kamailio, PJSIP, RTP proxy and other solutions. Presentation can be found at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CuxKD5zljVI

A tale of two RTC fuzzing approaches from Sandro Gauci

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0 Web Application Firewalls Detection, Bypassing And Exploitation /slideshow/web-application-firewalls-detection-bypassing-and-exploitation/2649123 webapplicationfirewalls-detectionbypassingandexploitation-091204075025-phpapp01
A presentation and demonstration of issues that apply to Web application firewalls. Talks about how easy it is to fingerprint some web application firewalls, how bypassing them is possible. Finally it talks about how they can be used against your organization if they get compromised.]]>
A presentation and demonstration of issues that apply to Web application firewalls. Talks about how easy it is to fingerprint some web application firewalls, how bypassing them is possible. Finally it talks about how they can be used against your organization if they get compromised.]]> Fri, 04 Dec 2009 07:48:28 GMT /slideshow/web-application-firewalls-detection-bypassing-and-exploitation/2649123 sandrogauci@slideshare.net(sandrogauci) Web Application Firewalls Detection, Bypassing And Exploitation sandrogauci A presentation and demonstration of issues that apply to Web application firewalls. Talks about how easy it is to fingerprint some web application firewalls, how bypassing them is possible. Finally it talks about how they can be used against your organization if they get compromised. <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/webapplicationfirewalls-detectionbypassingandexploitation-091204075025-phpapp01-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> A presentation and demonstration of issues that apply to Web application firewalls. Talks about how easy it is to fingerprint some web application firewalls, how bypassing them is possible. Finally it talks about how they can be used against your organization if they get compromised.

Web Application Firewalls Detection, Bypassing And Exploitation from Sandro Gauci

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0 Scanning The Intertubes For Voip /slideshow/scanning-the-intertubes-for-voip/1538045 scanningtheintertubesforvoip-124420999853-phpapp02
Most research and publications talk about layer 2 issues when it comes to VoIP. Over here we talk about VoIP security flaws that can be exploited without having physical access to the target network, i.e. attacks that can be, and are being launched through the Internet.]]>
Most research and publications talk about layer 2 issues when it comes to VoIP. Over here we talk about VoIP security flaws that can be exploited without having physical access to the target network, i.e. attacks that can be, and are being launched through the Internet.]]> Fri, 05 Jun 2009 08:56:03 GMT /slideshow/scanning-the-intertubes-for-voip/1538045 sandrogauci@slideshare.net(sandrogauci) Scanning The Intertubes For Voip sandrogauci Most research and publications talk about layer 2 issues when it comes to VoIP. Over here we talk about VoIP security flaws that can be exploited without having physical access to the target network, i.e. attacks that can be, and are being launched through the Internet. <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/scanningtheintertubesforvoip-124420999853-phpapp02-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> Most research and publications talk about layer 2 issues when it comes to VoIP. Over here we talk about VoIP security flaws that can be exploited without having physical access to the target network, i.e. attacks that can be, and are being launched through the Internet.

Scanning The Intertubes For Voip from Sandro Gauci

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0 Troopers09: The Truth about Web Application Firewalls: What the vendors do NOT want you to know /slideshow/troopers09-the-truth-about-web-application-firewalls-what-the-vendors-do-not-want-troopers-09-munich-april-2009-you-to-know/1344590 wendel-sandro-troopers09-1-090426151524-phpapp02
A presentation given at Troopers09 / Munich on 23rd April 2009 which talks about weaknesses in Web Application Firewall technologies. ]]>
A presentation given at Troopers09 / Munich on 23rd April 2009 which talks about weaknesses in Web Application Firewall technologies. ]]> Sun, 26 Apr 2009 15:15:19 GMT /slideshow/troopers09-the-truth-about-web-application-firewalls-what-the-vendors-do-not-want-troopers-09-munich-april-2009-you-to-know/1344590 sandrogauci@slideshare.net(sandrogauci) Troopers09: The Truth about Web Application Firewalls: What the vendors do NOT want you to know sandrogauci A presentation given at Troopers09 / Munich on 23rd April 2009 which talks about weaknesses in Web Application Firewall technologies. <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/wendel-sandro-troopers09-1-090426151524-phpapp02-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> A presentation given at Troopers09 / Munich on 23rd April 2009 which talks about weaknesses in Web Application Firewall technologies.

Troopers09: The Truth about Web Application Firewalls: What the vendors do NOT want you to know from Sandro Gauci

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0 https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/profile-photo-sandrogauci-48x48.jpg?cb=1689695175 RTC security testing, offensive security tools, consultancy and training to identify vulnerabilities that matter to Real-Time Communications www.enablesecurity.com https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/webrtc-video-delivery-what-could-go-wrong-sandro-gauci-commcon-230630130335-4cf8c2f4-thumbnail.jpg?width=320&height=320&fit=bounds slideshow/commcon-2023-webrtc-video-delivery-application-security-what-could-possibly-go-wrong/258738860 CommCon 2023 - WebRTC ... https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/slides-221129054711-d41b6c16-thumbnail.jpg?width=320&height=320&fit=bounds slideshow/tadsummit-2022-how-to-bring-your-own-rtc-platform-down/254566827 TADSummit 2022 - How t... https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/the-opensips-audit-presentation-sandro-gauci-210907111851-thumbnail.jpg?width=320&height=320&fit=bounds sandrogauci/the-opensips-security-audit-opensips-summit-sandro-gauci The OpenSIPS security ...