ºÝºÝߣshows by User: stasbaranski / http://www.slideshare.net/images/logo.gif ºÝºÝߣshows by User: stasbaranski / Mon, 11 Apr 2022 13:32:47 GMT ºÝºÝߣShare feed for ºÝºÝߣshows by User: stasbaranski Blockchain the solution to internet voting /slideshow/blockchain-the-solution-to-internet-voting-251563010/251563010 kaskpresentation2-220411133248
Voting is one of the most important elements of democracy. Despite the rapid development of e-government services, voting still has not been widely digitized. Besides voting service in Estonia and Switzerland, internet voting (i-voting) is still not ubiquitous. There are many reasons for the slow progress of introducing e-government services. One of them is a lack of trust in technology, and another one is a need for trust in the authorities controlling the voting process. Many researchers and experts in the field discourage internet voting due to software unreliability[@park2021going, @Whyblock10:online, @Noblockc8:online, @Blockcha27:online, @OnBlockc0:online]. However, in the context of recent improvements on the security of IT systems, the denial of internet voting seems to be too pessimistic foresee on the future. Similar problems have not prevented electronic money from becoming widely used; therefore, the solutions for electronic money should also help solve the i-voting problem. Particularly, blockchain technology enabled creating secure systems without a central authority. Blockchains guarantee integrity and censorship resistance; however, voting process is more demanding. There are two more properties that blockchains do not provide natively; namely, privacy and cohersion resistance. Privacy guarantees that no one can tell which candidate the voters voted for, or even if they voted at all—preventing preliminary results and guaranteeing freedom of choice without any repercussions. Cohesion resistance guarantees that voters can not prove to anyone how they voted even if they want to—preventing selling votes as there is no way of verifying vote details. Although both proprties are not trivial to achieve, the privacy is apprently the easier of these two. Common solution is to encrypt the vote using election authorities' public key, and use mixnets to prevent side-channel timing attack. However, it does not prevent authorities—who own the correponding private key—from decrypting each vote and learning each voter option. Cohersion resistance stays in conflict with blockchain's intrinsic property—correctness and verifability; therefore, most blockchain-based protocols ignore it. One solution [@juels2010coercion] is to introduce bulleting Even if blockchain is not the final piece of the whole puzzle, we argue that internet voting is inevitable and therefore researching the missing pieces is worthwhile. ]]>
Voting is one of the most important elements of democracy. Despite the rapid development of e-government services, voting still has not been widely digitized. Besides voting service in Estonia and Switzerland, internet voting (i-voting) is still not ubiquitous. There are many reasons for the slow progress of introducing e-government services. One of them is a lack of trust in technology, and another one is a need for trust in the authorities controlling the voting process. Many researchers and experts in the field discourage internet voting due to software unreliability[@park2021going, @Whyblock10:online, @Noblockc8:online, @Blockcha27:online, @OnBlockc0:online]. However, in the context of recent improvements on the security of IT systems, the denial of internet voting seems to be too pessimistic foresee on the future. Similar problems have not prevented electronic money from becoming widely used; therefore, the solutions for electronic money should also help solve the i-voting problem. Particularly, blockchain technology enabled creating secure systems without a central authority. Blockchains guarantee integrity and censorship resistance; however, voting process is more demanding. There are two more properties that blockchains do not provide natively; namely, privacy and cohersion resistance. Privacy guarantees that no one can tell which candidate the voters voted for, or even if they voted at all—preventing preliminary results and guaranteeing freedom of choice without any repercussions. Cohesion resistance guarantees that voters can not prove to anyone how they voted even if they want to—preventing selling votes as there is no way of verifying vote details. Although both proprties are not trivial to achieve, the privacy is apprently the easier of these two. Common solution is to encrypt the vote using election authorities' public key, and use mixnets to prevent side-channel timing attack. However, it does not prevent authorities—who own the correponding private key—from decrypting each vote and learning each voter option. Cohersion resistance stays in conflict with blockchain's intrinsic property—correctness and verifability; therefore, most blockchain-based protocols ignore it. One solution [@juels2010coercion] is to introduce bulleting Even if blockchain is not the final piece of the whole puzzle, we argue that internet voting is inevitable and therefore researching the missing pieces is worthwhile. ]]> Mon, 11 Apr 2022 13:32:47 GMT /slideshow/blockchain-the-solution-to-internet-voting-251563010/251563010 stasbaranski@slideshare.net(stasbaranski) Blockchain the solution to internet voting stasbaranski Voting is one of the most important elements of democracy. Despite the rapid development of e-government services, voting still has not been widely digitized. Besides voting service in Estonia and Switzerland, internet voting (i-voting) is still not ubiquitous. There are many reasons for the slow progress of introducing e-government services. One of them is a lack of trust in technology, and another one is a need for trust in the authorities controlling the voting process. Many researchers and experts in the field discourage internet voting due to software unreliability[@park2021going, @Whyblock10:online, @Noblockc8:online, @Blockcha27:online, @OnBlockc0:online]. However, in the context of recent improvements on the security of IT systems, the denial of internet voting seems to be too pessimistic foresee on the future. Similar problems have not prevented electronic money from becoming widely used; therefore, the solutions for electronic money should also help solve the i-voting problem. Particularly, blockchain technology enabled creating secure systems without a central authority. Blockchains guarantee integrity and censorship resistance; however, voting process is more demanding. There are two more properties that blockchains do not provide natively; namely, privacy and cohersion resistance. Privacy guarantees that no one can tell which candidate the voters voted for, or even if they voted at all—preventing preliminary results and guaranteeing freedom of choice without any repercussions. Cohesion resistance guarantees that voters can not prove to anyone how they voted even if they want to—preventing selling votes as there is no way of verifying vote details. Although both proprties are not trivial to achieve, the privacy is apprently the easier of these two. Common solution is to encrypt the vote using election authorities' public key, and use mixnets to prevent side-channel timing attack. However, it does not prevent authorities—who own the correponding private key—from decrypting each vote and learning each voter option. Cohersion resistance stays in conflict with blockchain's intrinsic property—correctness and verifability; therefore, most blockchain-based protocols ignore it. One solution [@juels2010coercion] is to introduce bulleting Even if blockchain is not the final piece of the whole puzzle, we argue that internet voting is inevitable and therefore researching the missing pieces is worthwhile. <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/kaskpresentation2-220411133248-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&amp;height=120&amp;fit=bounds" /><br> Voting is one of the most important elements of democracy. Despite the rapid development of e-government services, voting still has not been widely digitized. Besides voting service in Estonia and Switzerland, internet voting (i-voting) is still not ubiquitous. There are many reasons for the slow progress of introducing e-government services. One of them is a lack of trust in technology, and another one is a need for trust in the authorities controlling the voting process. Many researchers and experts in the field discourage internet voting due to software unreliability[@park2021going, @Whyblock10:online, @Noblockc8:online, @Blockcha27:online, @OnBlockc0:online]. However, in the context of recent improvements on the security of IT systems, the denial of internet voting seems to be too pessimistic foresee on the future. Similar problems have not prevented electronic money from becoming widely used; therefore, the solutions for electronic money should also help solve the i-voting problem. Particularly, blockchain technology enabled creating secure systems without a central authority. Blockchains guarantee integrity and censorship resistance; however, voting process is more demanding. There are two more properties that blockchains do not provide natively; namely, privacy and cohersion resistance. Privacy guarantees that no one can tell which candidate the voters voted for, or even if they voted at all—preventing preliminary results and guaranteeing freedom of choice without any repercussions. Cohesion resistance guarantees that voters can not prove to anyone how they voted even if they want to—preventing selling votes as there is no way of verifying vote details. Although both proprties are not trivial to achieve, the privacy is apprently the easier of these two. Common solution is to encrypt the vote using election authorities&#39; public key, and use mixnets to prevent side-channel timing attack. However, it does not prevent authorities—who own the correponding private key—from decrypting each vote and learning each voter option. Cohersion resistance stays in conflict with blockchain&#39;s intrinsic property—correctness and verifability; therefore, most blockchain-based protocols ignore it. One solution [@juels2010coercion] is to introduce bulleting Even if blockchain is not the final piece of the whole puzzle, we argue that internet voting is inevitable and therefore researching the missing pieces is worthwhile.
Blockchain the solution to internet voting from Stanislaw Baranski
]]> 139 0 https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/kaskpresentation2-220411133248-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds presentation Black http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/post http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/posted 0 Microeconomic mechanisms in Bitcoin network /slideshow/microeconomic-mechanisms-in-bitcoin-network/143745611 microeconomicmechanismsinbitcoinnetwork-190505130926
Game Theory, Minner Dillema, Microeconomics, Bitcoin network]]>
Game Theory, Minner Dillema, Microeconomics, Bitcoin network]]> Sun, 05 May 2019 13:09:26 GMT /slideshow/microeconomic-mechanisms-in-bitcoin-network/143745611 stasbaranski@slideshare.net(stasbaranski) Microeconomic mechanisms in Bitcoin network stasbaranski Game Theory, Minner Dillema, Microeconomics, Bitcoin network <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/microeconomicmechanismsinbitcoinnetwork-190505130926-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&amp;height=120&amp;fit=bounds" /><br> Game Theory, Minner Dillema, Microeconomics, Bitcoin network
Microeconomic mechanisms in Bitcoin network from Stanislaw Baranski
]]> 131 4 https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/microeconomicmechanismsinbitcoinnetwork-190505130926-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds presentation Black http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/post http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/posted 0 Android Architecture /slideshow/android-architecture-102730164/102730164 stachupresentation-180620175602
What is Android ? Android Architecture Layers Android Runtime Walkthrough ]]>
What is Android ? Android Architecture Layers Android Runtime Walkthrough ]]> Wed, 20 Jun 2018 17:56:02 GMT /slideshow/android-architecture-102730164/102730164 stasbaranski@slideshare.net(stasbaranski) Android Architecture stasbaranski What is Android ? Android Architecture Layers Android Runtime Walkthrough <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/stachupresentation-180620175602-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&amp;height=120&amp;fit=bounds" /><br> What is Android ? Android Architecture Layers Android Runtime Walkthrough
Android Architecture from Stanislaw Baranski
]]> 191 2 https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/stachupresentation-180620175602-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds presentation Black http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/post http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/posted 0 https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/profile-photo-stasbaranski-48x48.jpg?cb=1675770344 stan.bar https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/kaskpresentation2-220411133248-thumbnail.jpg?width=320&height=320&fit=bounds slideshow/blockchain-the-solution-to-internet-voting-251563010/251563010 Blockchain the solutio... https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/microeconomicmechanismsinbitcoinnetwork-190505130926-thumbnail.jpg?width=320&height=320&fit=bounds slideshow/microeconomic-mechanisms-in-bitcoin-network/143745611 Microeconomic mechanis... https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/stachupresentation-180620175602-thumbnail.jpg?width=320&height=320&fit=bounds slideshow/android-architecture-102730164/102730164 Android Architecture