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DNS ?Security
DNS SECURITY
John ?F. ?McClure, ?KimberSystems, ?LLC
john@kimbersystems.com
DNS ?Security
Topics
? What ?is ?DNS?
? Why ?is ?DNS ?important
? How ?does ?DNS ?work?
? Corrupting ?DNS ?responses
? What ?happens ?when ?DNS ?goes ?bad?
? Introduction ?to ?DNSSEC
? Why ?doesn¡¯t ?everyone ?use ?DNSSEC?
? Deploying ?and ?maintaining ?DNSSEC
? Using ?the ?GSA ?DNSSEC ?Cloud ?Signing ?Service
? Questions ?& ?Answers
2
DNS ?Security
What ?is ?DNS?
? Provides ?www ?address ?to ?IP ?translation. ? ?Sample:
3
DNS ?Security
How ?does ?DNS ?work?
User: ?
123.example.com
ISP
ROOT
.
.com
dns.example.com: ?
123.example.com
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1. A ?user ?types ?in ?123.example.com ? (this ?information ? isn¡¯t ?in ?a ?
local ?host ?file).
2. The ?ISP ?doesn¡¯t ?have ?the ?answer ?so ?asks ?root ?. ?for ?the ?
answer. ?
3. Root ?doesn¡¯t ?have ?the ?answer ?but ?knows ?who ?owns ?.com.
4. The ?ISP ?now ?knows ?to ?ask ?.comfor the ?answer.
5. .com ?doesn¡¯t ?know ?the ?answer ?but ?knows ?who ?has ?name ?
services ?for ?example.
6. The ?ISP ?now ?knows ?to ?ask ?dns.example.com for ?the ?answer.
7. dns.example.com responds ?with ?the ?answer ?to ?the ?ISP.
8. The ?ISP ?delivers ?the ?IP ?address ?to ?the ?user ?who ?can ?now ?go ?to ?
the ?website.
4
DNS ?Security
Corrupting ?DNS ?responses
User: ?
123.example.com
ISP
ROOT
.
.com
dns.example.com: ?
123.example.com
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Corruption
Corruption
Corruption
Impersonation
Impersonation
Impersonation
There ?are ?A ?LOT ?of ?place ?to ?corrupt ?a ?
DNS ?response ?to ?a ?user. ? ?DNS ?
response ?corruption ?can ?occur ?through ?
data ?corruption ?or ?impersonation.
5
DNS ?Security
What ?happens ?when ?DNS ?goes ?bad?
? A ?user ?may ?not ?be ?able ?to ?browse/view ?network ?locations.
? Facebook, ?Twitter, ?Cloud ?services, ?etc.
? Business ?applications, ?calendars, ?email, ?time ?card ?system, ?etc.
? A ?user ?may ?be ?directed ?to ?an ?unintended ?location.
? Possible ?transmission ?of ?sensitive ?data ?or ?PII
? Inability ?to ?conduct ?business ?operations
? A ?user ?may ?be ?intentionally ?directed ?to ?a ?malicious ?site.
? Possible ?infection ?of ?malicious ?software/virus
? Possible ?transmission ?of ?sensitive ?data ?or ?PII
? Inability ?to ?conduct ?business ?operations
6
DNS ?Security
Introduction ?to ?DNSSEC
? DNSSEC ?was ?introduced ?to ?address ?security ?challenges ?
of ?traditional ?DNS
? DNS ?was ?built ?to ?be ?open ?with ?little ?concern ?for ?security
? DNS ?did ?not ?have ?mechanisms ?to ?detect ?forged ?information
? DNS ?did ?not ?have ?the ?ability ?to ?digitally ?sign ?information
? DNS ?announces ?extensive ?information ?about ?your ?architecture
? DNSSEC
? Addresses ?all ?of ?the ?above ?and¡­
? Provides ?authentication ?that ?your ?DNS ?information ?came ?from ?who ?
it ?should ?have
? Provides ?upstream ?protection
7
DNS ?Security
Why ?is ?DNSSEC ?important?
? DNSSEC ?addresses ?real ?world ?cyber-?threats ?to ?US ?
Government ?data ?and ?networks.
? DNSSEC ?is ?mandated ?by ?OMB ?Memo ?08-?23. ? ?All ?
Government ?agencies ?were ?mandated ?to ?deploy ?DNSSEC ?
by ?December ?2009.
? DNSSEC ?addresses ?numerous ?FISMA ?security ?controls.
? DNSSEC ?makes ?you ?more ?compliant ?and ?secure!
8
DNS ?Security
Why ?doesn¡¯t ?everyone ?use ?DNSSEC?
? Why ?doesn¡¯t ?everyone ?use ?DNSSEC?
? Organizations ?don¡¯t ?understand ?DNS ?vulnerabilities ?and ?threats.
? Organizations ?don¡¯t ?understand ?the ?benefits ?of ?DNSSEC.
? Deploying ?and ?maintaining ?DNSSEC ?is ?more ?complex ?than ?
traditional ?DNS.
? DNSSEC ?requires ?actions ?every ?time ?a ?zone ?is ?changed ?(e.g. ?a ?
new ?website ?name ?is ?added).
? Failure ?to ?deploy ?and ?maintain ?DNSSEC ?properly ?can ?lead ?to ?
inaccessibility ?of ?a ?domain.
9
DNS ?Security
Deploying ?and ?maintaining ?DNSSEC
? There ?are ?a ?number ?of ?options ?for ?deploying ?and ?
maintaining ?a ?DNSSEC ?solution
? Run ?DNSSEC ?within ?your ?own ?infrastructure ?and ?utilizing ?your ?own ?
staff ?(high ?resource ?requirement)
? Complete ?outsourcing ?of ?DNS ?services, ?to ?include ?DNSSEC, ?to ?a ?
commercial ?provider ?(high ?cost)
? Outsource ?DNSSEC ?services ?to ?the ?GSA ?(in ?the ?case ?of ?USG)
10
DNS ?Security
Using ?the ?GSA ?DNSSEC ?CSS
? The ?GSA ?offers ?a ?DNSSEC ?Cloud ?Signing ?Service ?(CSS) ?
offering ?to ?all ?domains ?in ?.gov
? This ?service ?is ?provided ?at ?no ?charge ?to ?.gov domains.
? You ?can ?subscribe ?to ?the ?service ?when ?registering ?a ?domain ?name ?
(dotgov.gov).
? The ?DNSSEC ?CSS ?takes ?the ?complexities ?out ?of ?DNSSEC
? You ?still ?control ?your ?DNS
? CSS ?handles ?zone ?signing
? CSS ?handles ?ZSK ?and ?KSK ?roll-?overs
? CSS ?detects ?changes ?in ?your ?zone ?files ?and ?resigns ?zones
? Additional ?information, ?FAQs, ?and ?contact ?information ?is ?available ?
at ?www.dotgov.gov.
? Using ?this ?service ?makes ?you ?more ?compliant ?and ?secure.
11
DNS ?Security
Questions ?& ?Answers
John ?F. ?McClure
john@kimbersystems.com
(202) ?630-?0726
12

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DNS Security

  • 1. DNS ?Security DNS SECURITY John ?F. ?McClure, ?KimberSystems, ?LLC john@kimbersystems.com
  • 2. DNS ?Security Topics ? What ?is ?DNS? ? Why ?is ?DNS ?important ? How ?does ?DNS ?work? ? Corrupting ?DNS ?responses ? What ?happens ?when ?DNS ?goes ?bad? ? Introduction ?to ?DNSSEC ? Why ?doesn¡¯t ?everyone ?use ?DNSSEC? ? Deploying ?and ?maintaining ?DNSSEC ? Using ?the ?GSA ?DNSSEC ?Cloud ?Signing ?Service ? Questions ?& ?Answers 2
  • 3. DNS ?Security What ?is ?DNS? ? Provides ?www ?address ?to ?IP ?translation. ? ?Sample: 3
  • 4. DNS ?Security How ?does ?DNS ?work? User: ? 123.example.com ISP ROOT . .com dns.example.com: ? 123.example.com 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1. A ?user ?types ?in ?123.example.com ? (this ?information ? isn¡¯t ?in ?a ? local ?host ?file). 2. The ?ISP ?doesn¡¯t ?have ?the ?answer ?so ?asks ?root ?. ?for ?the ? answer. ? 3. Root ?doesn¡¯t ?have ?the ?answer ?but ?knows ?who ?owns ?.com. 4. The ?ISP ?now ?knows ?to ?ask ?.comfor the ?answer. 5. .com ?doesn¡¯t ?know ?the ?answer ?but ?knows ?who ?has ?name ? services ?for ?example. 6. The ?ISP ?now ?knows ?to ?ask ?dns.example.com for ?the ?answer. 7. dns.example.com responds ?with ?the ?answer ?to ?the ?ISP. 8. The ?ISP ?delivers ?the ?IP ?address ?to ?the ?user ?who ?can ?now ?go ?to ? the ?website. 4
  • 5. DNS ?Security Corrupting ?DNS ?responses User: ? 123.example.com ISP ROOT . .com dns.example.com: ? 123.example.com 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Corruption Corruption Corruption Impersonation Impersonation Impersonation There ?are ?A ?LOT ?of ?place ?to ?corrupt ?a ? DNS ?response ?to ?a ?user. ? ?DNS ? response ?corruption ?can ?occur ?through ? data ?corruption ?or ?impersonation. 5
  • 6. DNS ?Security What ?happens ?when ?DNS ?goes ?bad? ? A ?user ?may ?not ?be ?able ?to ?browse/view ?network ?locations. ? Facebook, ?Twitter, ?Cloud ?services, ?etc. ? Business ?applications, ?calendars, ?email, ?time ?card ?system, ?etc. ? A ?user ?may ?be ?directed ?to ?an ?unintended ?location. ? Possible ?transmission ?of ?sensitive ?data ?or ?PII ? Inability ?to ?conduct ?business ?operations ? A ?user ?may ?be ?intentionally ?directed ?to ?a ?malicious ?site. ? Possible ?infection ?of ?malicious ?software/virus ? Possible ?transmission ?of ?sensitive ?data ?or ?PII ? Inability ?to ?conduct ?business ?operations 6
  • 7. DNS ?Security Introduction ?to ?DNSSEC ? DNSSEC ?was ?introduced ?to ?address ?security ?challenges ? of ?traditional ?DNS ? DNS ?was ?built ?to ?be ?open ?with ?little ?concern ?for ?security ? DNS ?did ?not ?have ?mechanisms ?to ?detect ?forged ?information ? DNS ?did ?not ?have ?the ?ability ?to ?digitally ?sign ?information ? DNS ?announces ?extensive ?information ?about ?your ?architecture ? DNSSEC ? Addresses ?all ?of ?the ?above ?and¡­ ? Provides ?authentication ?that ?your ?DNS ?information ?came ?from ?who ? it ?should ?have ? Provides ?upstream ?protection 7
  • 8. DNS ?Security Why ?is ?DNSSEC ?important? ? DNSSEC ?addresses ?real ?world ?cyber-?threats ?to ?US ? Government ?data ?and ?networks. ? DNSSEC ?is ?mandated ?by ?OMB ?Memo ?08-?23. ? ?All ? Government ?agencies ?were ?mandated ?to ?deploy ?DNSSEC ? by ?December ?2009. ? DNSSEC ?addresses ?numerous ?FISMA ?security ?controls. ? DNSSEC ?makes ?you ?more ?compliant ?and ?secure! 8
  • 9. DNS ?Security Why ?doesn¡¯t ?everyone ?use ?DNSSEC? ? Why ?doesn¡¯t ?everyone ?use ?DNSSEC? ? Organizations ?don¡¯t ?understand ?DNS ?vulnerabilities ?and ?threats. ? Organizations ?don¡¯t ?understand ?the ?benefits ?of ?DNSSEC. ? Deploying ?and ?maintaining ?DNSSEC ?is ?more ?complex ?than ? traditional ?DNS. ? DNSSEC ?requires ?actions ?every ?time ?a ?zone ?is ?changed ?(e.g. ?a ? new ?website ?name ?is ?added). ? Failure ?to ?deploy ?and ?maintain ?DNSSEC ?properly ?can ?lead ?to ? inaccessibility ?of ?a ?domain. 9
  • 10. DNS ?Security Deploying ?and ?maintaining ?DNSSEC ? There ?are ?a ?number ?of ?options ?for ?deploying ?and ? maintaining ?a ?DNSSEC ?solution ? Run ?DNSSEC ?within ?your ?own ?infrastructure ?and ?utilizing ?your ?own ? staff ?(high ?resource ?requirement) ? Complete ?outsourcing ?of ?DNS ?services, ?to ?include ?DNSSEC, ?to ?a ? commercial ?provider ?(high ?cost) ? Outsource ?DNSSEC ?services ?to ?the ?GSA ?(in ?the ?case ?of ?USG) 10
  • 11. DNS ?Security Using ?the ?GSA ?DNSSEC ?CSS ? The ?GSA ?offers ?a ?DNSSEC ?Cloud ?Signing ?Service ?(CSS) ? offering ?to ?all ?domains ?in ?.gov ? This ?service ?is ?provided ?at ?no ?charge ?to ?.gov domains. ? You ?can ?subscribe ?to ?the ?service ?when ?registering ?a ?domain ?name ? (dotgov.gov). ? The ?DNSSEC ?CSS ?takes ?the ?complexities ?out ?of ?DNSSEC ? You ?still ?control ?your ?DNS ? CSS ?handles ?zone ?signing ? CSS ?handles ?ZSK ?and ?KSK ?roll-?overs ? CSS ?detects ?changes ?in ?your ?zone ?files ?and ?resigns ?zones ? Additional ?information, ?FAQs, ?and ?contact ?information ?is ?available ? at ?www.dotgov.gov. ? Using ?this ?service ?makes ?you ?more ?compliant ?and ?secure. 11
  • 12. DNS ?Security Questions ?& ?Answers John ?F. ?McClure john@kimbersystems.com (202) ?630-?0726 12