Ep lab2019
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The document outlines Alessandro Pizzorno's theory on the rationality of democratic choice. It presents a series of assumptions that lead people to prefer democracy over other forms of government, including that each individual acts in their own self-interest and is the best judge of their interests. It also argues that the democratic system is the most efficient at satisfying people's interests. However, it acknowledges criticisms of this view, such as that people are not always the best judges of their long-term interests and voters do not fully control the politicians they elect. The document examines different perspectives on rational political action and representation.
Ep lab2019
- 1. ON THE RATIONALITY OF DEMOCRATIC CHOICE by Alessandro Pizzorno EPLab Reading Group 6/2/19Giovanni Damele giovanni.damele@fcsh.unl.pt
- 2. Series of assumptions that lead people to prefer democracy over other forms of government Each individual acts according to his own interests He is the best judge of these (economic or political) interests Democratic (representative, multi-party) system is the most efficient one possible for satisfying peoples interests Pizzorno on the rationality of democracy EPLab Reading Group 6/2/19 2 Giovanni Damele giovanni.damele@fcsh.unl.pt
- 3. Predictive / descriptive goal The theory is realistic because it recognizes individual egoism Normative prescriptive ambitions The theory legitimates democracy, because it recognizes the achievability of the common good, thanks to its decision-making procedure Pizzorno on the rationality of democracy EPLab Reading Group 6/2/19 3 Giovanni Damele giovanni.damele@fcsh.unl.pt
- 4. economic theory of democracy Since one person's utility will differ from another's and there is no basis for comparing them, a maximum, collective satisfaction is not logically conceivable; hence, such concepts as "common good," "welfare," "collective utility," and so on, have only rhetorical value. Since, in a democracy, governments are obligated to present themselves periodically to the electorate and since the voters have uninformed and fickle opinions, a long-term, organic, consistent political plan is not possible. It isn't true that everyone is the best judge of his own interests. He may be, for his immediate interests, but he lacks the knowledge he needs to be a good judge for his long-term interests. Pizzorno on the rationality of democracy EPLab Reading Group 6/2/19 4 Giovanni Damele giovanni.damele@fcsh.unl.pt
- 5. economic theory of democracy Since even experts normally are divided in their judgments about the effects a given policy will have, it is illusory to think that citizens will choose among different policies knowing what their consequences will be. Political choices that are made democratically only because a majority wants them are not necessarily good or rational. In other words, the democratic process does not necessarily make the result desirable or just. Democracy is distinguished from other types of government simply because decisions are made by politicians who hold office only after winning competitions in which the judges are the electorate. The voters, however, only install politicians; they do not control them. Pizzorno on the rationality of democracy EPLab Reading Group 6/2/19 5 Giovanni Damele giovanni.damele@fcsh.unl.pt
- 6. If the voter is a rational agent, why does he do such an irrational thing as vote? Costs can be low, but can also increase, depending on the circumstances Cost of information - people who have spent hundreds of hours informing themselves perform an act that has the same consequences as one performed by someone who has invested only a few hours or minutes Voting is an investment which has a disparate utility Pizzorno on the rationality of democracy EPLab Reading Group 6/2/19 6 Giovanni Damele giovanni.damele@fcsh.unl.pt
- 7. Is it tenable to analyze political action in cost-benefit terms? Vote on the issue (calculation of expected utility) Retrospective vote (reward or punishment for past actions) Party identification (not justifiable by the rational calculation of the utility) Initial bias (explains hereditary vote) Pizzorno on the rationality of democracy EPLab Reading Group 6/2/19 7 Giovanni Damele giovanni.damele@fcsh.unl.pt
- 8. Symbolic theories of politics Solidarity: political choice would be determined by the voters social affiliation, not by the utility Rituality Pizzorno on the rationality of democracy EPLab Reading Group 6/2/19 8 Giovanni Damele giovanni.damele@fcsh.unl.pt
- 9. Three types of problems. The rationality of individual choice The nature of the different roles in politics those of citizens and those of politicians and their connection, that is, the process of representation. Finally, there is the problem of the distinctions, and the conflicts, between political parties. Pizzorno on the rationality of democracy EPLab Reading Group 6/2/19 9 Giovanni Damele giovanni.damele@fcsh.unl.pt
- 10. Three types of problems. The rationality of individual choice The nature of the different roles in politics those of citizens and those of politicians and their connection, that is, the process of representation. Finally, there is the problem of the distinctions, and the conflicts, between political parties. Pizzorno on the rationality of democracy EPLab Reading Group 6/2/19 9 Giovanni Damele giovanni.damele@fcsh.unl.pt