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OperationalSafetyinOil&Gas
WarrenFothergillCMIOSH
TrainingAssessmentManager
KnowledgeGrid
CommittingtoProcessSafety
UnderstandingtheHazards&Risks
ManagingRisk
Learningfromexperience
SafetyManagementinContext
CommitmenttoProcessSafetyinOil&Gas
ProcessSafety
Culture
CompliancewithStandards
ProcessSafetyCompetency
Workforceinvolvement
StakeholderOutreach
CommitmenttoProcessSafetyinOil&Gas
WhoImpactsonProcessSafety
Operators
ShiftManagers
Engineers
SeniorLeaders,Managers
PrinciplesofProcessSafetyinOil&Gas
LeadershipPrinciplesinProcessSafety
Clearandpositiveprocesssafetyleadership
Processsafetyleadershiprequiresboardlevelinvolvement
andcompetence.
Goodprocesssafetymanagementrequiresconstantactive
engagement;
Boardlevelvisibilityandpromotionofprocesssafety
leadershipisessentialto;
Engagementoftheworkforceisneeded;
Monitorprocesssafetyperformance;
Publicationof;and
Sharebestpracticeacrosssectors
ArrangementsforProcessSafetyinOil&Gas
Organisation&Resourcing
Accountabilitiesdefined
MemberofBoardtobefullyconversantinProcessSafety
Management
Appropriateresourcesmadeavailable
DevelopmentofprogrammeofpromotionofProcessSafety
Systemsandarrangementsestablished
PeriodicreviewsofProcessSafetyrisks
Settingofleading&laggingindicators
Engagementoforganisationswithinsectorgroups
Systemofretentionintermsofcorporateknowledge
FailingProcessSafetyinOil&Gas
TheBlindSpots
ProjectExecution
SafetyAssessment
Technology
HumanFactors
Organisation
Operations&Maintenance
RiskAcceptance
AccidentInvestigations
Management&Leadership
UnderstandingHazards&RisksinOil&Gas
UnderstandHazards&Risks
ProcessKnowledgeManagement
HazardIdentificationandRiskAnalysis
Qualitativevs.QuantitativeRiskAssessment
Usingqualitativemethodstodeterminefrequencyandseverity
Qualitative(Q)
Wherefrequencyandseverityareapproximatelyquantifiedwithin
ranges
Semi-qualitative(SQ)
Wherefullquantificationisdemonstrated
Quantifiedriskassessment(QRA)
AssessingtheRisksinOil&Gas
Semi-Quantitative(SQ)
Usethisifitisadequatefordecidingonappropriatecontrols.
Recordfindingsandrecommendations.
Ifnotadequate,firstincreasethedepthofmodellingoftheriskassessmentandseeifitnowmeets
requirements.
Ifitdoes,recordthefindingsandrecommendations.
DeterminingtheRightMethodofRiskAssessment
Qualitative(Q)
Usethismethodifitisadequatefordecidingonappropriatecontrols.
Recordthefindingsandrecommendations.
Ifnotadequate,thenuse
(Continued)
AssessingtheRisksinOil&Gas
QuantifiedRiskAssessment(QRA)
Ifadequate,useQRA.
Ifnot,increasedepthoftheriskassessmentmodeluntilitanswersallquestions.
Recordfindingsandrecommendations
IntheirOffshoreInformationSheetNo3/2006,theUKHSEgivemore
industryspecificguidanceonhowtodeterminewhichriskassessment
methodisappropriate.
Ifnotadequate,thenuse
AssessingtheRisksinOil&Gas
HAZOP
Purpose-toidentifyanydeviationsfromdesignintent,
theircausesandconsequences.
Usefulatdesignstageofhazardousinstallations/
processes.
Multi-disciplinaryteamandbrainstorming
Usesguidewordstoidentifydeviationse.g.MORE,LESS
Deviseactionstoreduceriskdowntoacceptablelevel.
MethodologyAssessingtheRisksinOil&Gas
HAZID
Purpose-toidentifyallhazardsforlaterriskassessment
Usesbrainstorming,aidedbykeywords.
Usefulwhenconsideringchangestoexistingplantlayout.
MethodologyforAssessingtheRisksinOil&
Gas
FMEA
Howcaneachcomponentfail?
Cause?
Effectsonsystemasawhole?
Howserious?
Canthefailurebedetectedbeforeeffectsbecome
serious?
MethodologyforAssessingtheRisksinOil&
Gas
TheConceptofRiskControlBarrierModelsbow-tie
MethodologyforAssessingtheRisksinOil&
Gas
HazardsinOil&Gas
Hydrocarbons
GasesincludingHydrogenSulphide,Methane,Nitrogen
Noise
Silica
ParticulateMatter(Diesel)
Chemicals
Biocides
NaturallyOccurringRadioactiveMaterials
TemperatureExtremes
Pressure
Fatigue
HazardsinOil&Gas
ManageRiskinOil&Gas
ManageRisk
OperatingProcedures
SafeWorkingProcedures
AssetIntegrity&Reliability
ContractorManagement
TrainingandQualityAssurance
ManagementofChange
OperationalReadiness
ConductofOperations
EmergencyManagement
Risk
Management
Knowyourrisksandwhatyou
shouldbedoingaboutthem
Plan,prioritise,implementriskcontrols
Makesureriskcontrolsremaineffective
Reviewandlearn
ManageRiskinOil&Gas
ManageRiskinOil&Gas
SourcesofWritten,RecognisedGoodPracticeinclude:
(UK)HSEGuidanceandACoPs
Nationalorlocalgovernmentguidance
Internationalornationalstandards(BS,CEN,CENELEC,ISO,
IEC,etc.)
Industryspecificorsectorguidancefromtradefederations,
professionalinstitutions,etc.
UsingStandardstoManageRiskinOil&Gas
TypicalLegalRequirements/GoodPractice:
Regulatorsrequiresafetycase/safetyreportsubmissionfor
eachinstallationtype.
InstallationcannotoperateuntilSC/SRacceptedbyregulator
(regulatorwillinspectinstallation)
Notificationrequiredtoregulatoratdesignstage(orwhen
movedorchangeofuse).
TypicalExamples:SafetyCase(offshore),SafetyReport
(Onshore)
UsingStandardstoManageRiskinOil&Gas
ThePurposeofDocumentedEvidencesuchasSafetyCases
andSafetyReports
Toensurethatdutyholdersdesign/operatetheirfacilities
safely.i.e.Measuresinplacetoidentifypotentialfor,prevent
andmitigatemajoraccidents.
UsingStandardstoManageRiskinOil&Gas
TheTypicalContentofSafetyCasesandSafetyReports
Identifymajoraccidenthazardsuseriskassessments,bow-tiediagrams,
designcalculationsetc.
1Eachhazardscenario
2
threatstosafetyandtheircauses
3
barrierstopreventthosethreats
4consequencesofeachthreatwereittoberealised
5
recoverymeasuresrequired
6
factorsthatcouldescalatethehazardoritsconsequences
UsingStandardstoManageRiskinOil&Gas
Evaluatemajoraccidentrisksandmeasurestaken(ortobe
taken).
1
Identifyeachhazard/incidentscenario
2
Assessfrequencycriteria
3
Assessconsequencecriteria
4
AssessEERfacilitiesandrequirements
5
IdentifyandassessriskcontrolmeasuresagainstALARP
UsingStandardstoManageRiskinOil&Gas
Arrangementsforauditsandauditreports
AdequateSMSinplace
Majoraccidentpreventionpolicies(inthecaseofsafety
reports)
Identifysafetycriticalelementsinplacetomanagemajor
accidenthazards
Detailsoftheemergencyplan.
UsingStandardstoManageRiskinOil&Gas
ManagementofChangeinOil&Gas
ManagementofChangeProceduresSHOULDidentify
thescopeofthechanges(whatneedstochange)
therolesandresponsibilitiesofthosemanagingand
makingthechanges
howriskanalysisistobeundertaken
methodsusedtocommunicatethechanges
trainingofpersonnelinvolved
LearningfromExperienceinOil&Gas
ManagementofChangecontrolwillbeneededwhen,
e.g.
equipmentisreplacedwithnon-identicalparts
newitemsorequipmentisaddedtothesystem
changesaremadetotheoperatingprocedures(ifoutside
establisheddesignbasisandsafeoperatingenvelope).
LearningfromExperienceinOil&Gas
LearningfromExperience
IncidentInvestigation
Measurement&Metrics
Auditing
ManagementReviews&ContinuousImprovement
ReasonsWhyWeDONTLearn?
Ifitisntaregulatoryrequirement,wearenotgoingtodo
it!
ManagementSystemsareoveremphasisedwhilethe
technicalaspectsofprocesssafety,whichactuallycontrol
thehazardsandmanagerisk,areneglected
Auditingcostsarehighandtheyfocusonsymptomsand
notthecauses
Managementdoesnotunderstand
Verbalsupportforimplementationisinconsistentwith
fiscalsupport
LearningfromIncidents
InvestigationtoLearning
Thefailuretocomplywithsystemsofworkandcontrols
Focusonrealcauses
Viewtheincidentas"theconsequenceofafailureor
inadequacyinthesafetymanagementsystem"
Identifyfailuresinthemanagementsystem
LearningfromIncidents
LearningfromIncidents
Causal
Factor(s)
EventConsequence
LearningfromIncidents
CausalFactor.v.RootCause
Causal:Anybehaviour,omission,
ordeficiencythatifcorrected,
eliminated,oravoidedprobably
wouldhavepreventedthe
incident
Root:Underlyingdeficienciesin
thepolicies,procedures,training,
expectationsandcommunications
thatallowedtheCausalFactorto
exist
LearningfromIncidents
DeepwaterHorizonExplosionGulfofMexico2010
Theteamdidnotidentifyanysingleactionorinactionthat
causedthisincident.Rather,acomplexandinterlinkedseriesof
mechanicalfailures,humanjudgments,engineeringdesign,
operationalimplementation,environmentalconditionsand
teaminterfacescametogethertoallowtheinitiationand
escalationoftheaccident.
ExcerptfromthereportpreparedbyBPpostincident
LearningfromIncidents
LearningfromIncidentsCausationModel
LOSS
Harm
Damage
Substandard
quality
product/
service
Liability,etc.
INCIDENT
Potential
Loss
Producing
Event
IMMEDIATE
CAUSES
ROOT
CAUSES
INADEQUATE
SYSTEMS
CONTROL
INADEQUATE
RISK
ASSESSMENT
Inadequate:
Baseline
IssueBased
Continuous
Human
Factors
Workplace
Factors
IncidentCausationModel
ProblemSolvingModel
Substandard
Acts
Substandard
Conditions
Inadequate:
Systems
Standards
Compliance
Pre-contactContactPost-Contact
Thresholdlimit
MeasurementofControlMeasurementofCauseMeasurementofConsequence
E.I.DuPontdeNemours&CoInc.
Buffalo,NewYork
FlammableVapourExplosion
WeldingonTankContainingVinylFluoride(1Killed,1injured)
November9,2010
IdentifytheCRITITCALFACTORSandanalyseONEofthem
(45mins)
LearningfromIncidentsCaseStudy
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Questions

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