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Making Strong
Security Easier
With FOSS Scanners
or: Building Secure Bridges
Fen Labalme, CivicActions, Inc.
 2013-12 Target - 70 million customers affected (Names, mailing addresses, email
addresses, phone numbers, credit/debit card information) via third party vendor with
authorized access (external javascript libraries, anyone?)
 2014-11 Home Depot - 56 million credit cards numbers, 53 million email addresses via
stolen third party username/password (two-factor authentication would have prevented)
 2014-11 Sony - Current and former employees & executives via Targeted attack by
Guardians of Peace group, purported to be from North Korea (dont be stupid)
 2015-02 Anthem Blue Cross - 80 million current and former customers, as well as
employees (Social Security numbers, birth dates, addresses, emails, employment
information, income data) via Targeted attacks to steal network credentials of a few
employees with highlevel system access (again, two-factor authentication)
 2015-06 US Office of Personnel Management (OPM) - 4.2 million current and former
employees; 19.7 million individuals whom a Federal background investigation; 1.8 million
referenced spouses and relatives (SSN and full background history) via China?
Recent Major Security Breaches
Explaining FISMA
Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002
Some Acronyms
There will be no test
FISMA Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
RMF Risk Management Framework
FedRAMP Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program
PCI DSS Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard
STIG Security Technical Implementation Guide
SCAP Security Content Automation Protocol
CI Continuous Integration
NIST Risk Mgt Framework Takes Months
NIST 800-53 Controls Hurt Your Brain
Time to add
compliance!
Software Supply Chain Can Aid Security
$ risk -a server.agency.gov
$ make artifact=system-security-plan -f doc
FISMA for Happy Developers
Scanning as Part of CI
Developers reaction to security scans
Problem
Tip #1: Use the Families
Tip #2: Give Control Families Tickets
Tip #3: Use SCAP
SCAP == Shared
Unit Testing for
Vulnerabilities
Vulnerabilities
 Poor configuration
 Known exploits
Tip #4: Use OpenSCAP + GovReady
Community created portfolio
of tools and content to make
attestations about known
vulnerabilities
https://github.com/OpenSCAP
Open source tool that to
make OpenSCAP scanning
friendlier to developers
https://github.com/GovReady/govready
OpenSCAP
$ oscap xccdf eval --remediate 
--profile stig-rhel6-server-upstream 
--report /root/scan-report.html 
/usr/share/xml/scap/content.xml
GovReady
$ govready scan
$ govready fix
$ govready compare
Next steps
 Include more operating systems (Ubuntu, Debian)
 Add more tests (bash & drush based)
 Create and contribute towards an application baseline:
 Drupal
 Apache/Nginx
 MySQL/Mariadb
Making Strong Security Easier
Making Strong Security Easier
HOW TO ENGAGE
OpenSCAP GitHub:
https://github.com/OpenSCAP
OpenSCAP References & Docs:
https://github.com/OpenSCAP/scap-security-guide/wiki/Collateral-and-References
SCAP Content Mailing List:
https://fedorahosted.org/mailman/listinfo/scap-security-guide
GovReady user-friendly front-end:
https://github.com/GovReady/govready
Ansible-SCAP demo. See how it all works on the drupal branch - painlessly:
https://github.com/openprivacy/ansible-scap
NIST SCAP Website:
https://scap.nist.gov
CONTACT INFO
Fen Labalme
fen@civicactions.com
412-996-4113
Shameless plug:
Were hiring !

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Making Strong Security Easier

  • 1. Making Strong Security Easier With FOSS Scanners or: Building Secure Bridges Fen Labalme, CivicActions, Inc.
  • 2. 2013-12 Target - 70 million customers affected (Names, mailing addresses, email addresses, phone numbers, credit/debit card information) via third party vendor with authorized access (external javascript libraries, anyone?) 2014-11 Home Depot - 56 million credit cards numbers, 53 million email addresses via stolen third party username/password (two-factor authentication would have prevented) 2014-11 Sony - Current and former employees & executives via Targeted attack by Guardians of Peace group, purported to be from North Korea (dont be stupid) 2015-02 Anthem Blue Cross - 80 million current and former customers, as well as employees (Social Security numbers, birth dates, addresses, emails, employment information, income data) via Targeted attacks to steal network credentials of a few employees with highlevel system access (again, two-factor authentication) 2015-06 US Office of Personnel Management (OPM) - 4.2 million current and former employees; 19.7 million individuals whom a Federal background investigation; 1.8 million referenced spouses and relatives (SSN and full background history) via China? Recent Major Security Breaches
  • 3. Explaining FISMA Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002
  • 4. Some Acronyms There will be no test FISMA Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology RMF Risk Management Framework FedRAMP Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program PCI DSS Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard STIG Security Technical Implementation Guide SCAP Security Content Automation Protocol CI Continuous Integration
  • 5. NIST Risk Mgt Framework Takes Months
  • 6. NIST 800-53 Controls Hurt Your Brain
  • 7. Time to add compliance! Software Supply Chain Can Aid Security
  • 8. $ risk -a server.agency.gov $ make artifact=system-security-plan -f doc FISMA for Happy Developers
  • 10. Developers reaction to security scans Problem
  • 11. Tip #1: Use the Families
  • 12. Tip #2: Give Control Families Tickets
  • 13. Tip #3: Use SCAP SCAP == Shared Unit Testing for Vulnerabilities Vulnerabilities Poor configuration Known exploits
  • 14. Tip #4: Use OpenSCAP + GovReady Community created portfolio of tools and content to make attestations about known vulnerabilities https://github.com/OpenSCAP Open source tool that to make OpenSCAP scanning friendlier to developers https://github.com/GovReady/govready
  • 15. OpenSCAP $ oscap xccdf eval --remediate --profile stig-rhel6-server-upstream --report /root/scan-report.html /usr/share/xml/scap/content.xml GovReady $ govready scan $ govready fix $ govready compare
  • 16. Next steps Include more operating systems (Ubuntu, Debian) Add more tests (bash & drush based) Create and contribute towards an application baseline: Drupal Apache/Nginx MySQL/Mariadb
  • 19. HOW TO ENGAGE OpenSCAP GitHub: https://github.com/OpenSCAP OpenSCAP References & Docs: https://github.com/OpenSCAP/scap-security-guide/wiki/Collateral-and-References SCAP Content Mailing List: https://fedorahosted.org/mailman/listinfo/scap-security-guide GovReady user-friendly front-end: https://github.com/GovReady/govready Ansible-SCAP demo. See how it all works on the drupal branch - painlessly: https://github.com/openprivacy/ansible-scap NIST SCAP Website: https://scap.nist.gov

Editor's Notes

  • #2: Ive been online for 40 years (started on the ARPAnet). With CivicActions - a 100% virtual company - the last decade. Been working for socially responsible non-profits for most of that time, recently began building sites for Federal, State & Local governments. Our goal is to Transform Government (if theres time at the end, you can ask me how thats going.)
  • #3: Why? (Ive been personally affected by four of these - not The Interview)
  • #4: Has anyone here heard of FISMA? If youre talking FISMA, FedRAMP (Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program), DoD STIG (Security Technical Implementation Guide), or PCI DCC (Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard), security is feels as procedural encumbrance. ITs document based in digital world.
  • #6: Note that even after this, your system may not be secure, as Compliance does not mean Security - and vice versa) NIST: National Institute of Standards and Technology // RMF: Rick Management Framework
  • #8: Why do you want automation? 1. Put security into the SDLC; 2. Catch issues before someone else does.
  • #9: Goal: we want a condensed command line output so we created a quick reports filter on the scan results.
  • #10: Im building ansible provisioning scripts that will run openscap and govready automatically
  • #11: If youre talking FISMA, FedRamp, DoD STIG, or PCI, security is feels as procedural encumbrance. ITs document based in digital world.
  • #16: I wanted condensed command line output so I created a quick reports filter on the scan results.
  • #17: Historically, getting the ATO for an online product required contracting with a security company to draft a custom security baseline for the product. Being closed source and generally inflexible, such rules would be brittle and often simply disabled (rather than updated) as the application or the environment in which it ran changed over time. Free and open source security scanning tools can change all this.
  • #18: The goal is to take tests that can be automatically run and create SCAP content so that they can be shared with - and improved by - the FOSS community
  • #19: An example run of a security check
  • #20: Wed love to see you on the mailing lists.
  • #21: Wed love to see you on the mailing lists.