�ݺ�ߣshows by User: ChrisJohnRiley

�ݺ�ߣshows by User: ChrisJohnRiley / http://www.slideshare.net/images/logo.gif �ݺ�ߣshows by User: ChrisJohnRiley / Wed, 22 Oct 2014 14:13:54 GMT �ݺ�ߣShare feed for �ݺ�ߣshows by User: ChrisJohnRiley Mobile Fail: Cracking Open "secure" Android Containers [SecTorCA] /slideshow/mobile-fail-cracking-open-secure-android-containers-sectorca/40607438 sectorc22-androidsecurecontainers-141022141354-conversion-gate02
SecTor.ca 22nd October 2014 We've known for some time that physical access to a device means game over. In response, we've begun to rely more and more on "secure" container applications to keep our private and company data secured. Whether you use LastPass to secure your passwords, or GOOD for Enterprise to make sure your company emails are locked up tight, this presentation will demonstrate that more often than not, the container isn't as secure as you think. In this presentation I will discuss specific design flaws in the security of "secure" Applications that promise to keep your data/passwords and even company email safe and sound should the device fall into the wrong hands.]]>
SecTor.ca 22nd October 2014 We've known for some time that physical access to a device means game over. In response, we've begun to rely more and more on "secure" container applications to keep our private and company data secured. Whether you use LastPass to secure your passwords, or GOOD for Enterprise to make sure your company emails are locked up tight, this presentation will demonstrate that more often than not, the container isn't as secure as you think. In this presentation I will discuss specific design flaws in the security of "secure" Applications that promise to keep your data/passwords and even company email safe and sound should the device fall into the wrong hands.]]> Wed, 22 Oct 2014 14:13:54 GMT /slideshow/mobile-fail-cracking-open-secure-android-containers-sectorca/40607438 ChrisJohnRiley@slideshare.net(ChrisJohnRiley) Mobile Fail: Cracking Open "secure" Android Containers [SecTorCA] ChrisJohnRiley SecTor.ca 22nd October 2014 We've known for some time that physical access to a device means game over. In response, we've begun to rely more and more on "secure" container applications to keep our private and company data secured. Whether you use LastPass to secure your passwords, or GOOD for Enterprise to make sure your company emails are locked up tight, this presentation will demonstrate that more often than not, the container isn't as secure as you think. In this presentation I will discuss specific design flaws in the security of "secure" Applications that promise to keep your data/passwords and even company email safe and sound should the device fall into the wrong hands. <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/sectorc22-androidsecurecontainers-141022141354-conversion-gate02-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> SecTor.ca 22nd October 2014 We've known for some time that physical access to a device means game over. In response, we've begun to rely more and more on "secure" container applications to keep our private and company data secured. Whether you use LastPass to secure your passwords, or GOOD for Enterprise to make sure your company emails are locked up tight, this presentation will demonstrate that more often than not, the container isn't as secure as you think. In this presentation I will discuss specific design flaws in the security of "secure" Applications that promise to keep your data/passwords and even company email safe and sound should the device fall into the wrong hands.

Mobile Fail: Cracking Open "secure" Android Containers [SecTorCA] from Chris John Riley

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0 How DJing works /slideshow/how-djing-works/40082774 howdjswork-141009140557-conversion-gate02
A short presentation I put together for RIOT Games when I visited LA...]]>
A short presentation I put together for RIOT Games when I visited LA...]]> Thu, 09 Oct 2014 14:05:57 GMT /slideshow/how-djing-works/40082774 ChrisJohnRiley@slideshare.net(ChrisJohnRiley) How DJing works ChrisJohnRiley A short presentation I put together for RIOT Games when I visited LA... <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/howdjswork-141009140557-conversion-gate02-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> A short presentation I put together for RIOT Games when I visited LA...

How DJing works from Chris John Riley

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0 Defense by numbers: Making Problems for Script Kiddies and Scanner Monkeys /slideshow/chris-johnriley-defensebynumbersdc21/24958281 chrisjohnriley-defensebynumbers-dc21-130805195639-phpapp02
Defense by numbers: Making Problems for Script Kiddies and Scanner Monkeys DEF CON 21 (2013) On the surface most common browsers look the same, function the same, and deliver web content to the user in a relatively uniformed fashion. Under the shiny surface however, the way specific user agents handle traffic varies in a number of interesting and unique ways. This variation allows for defenders to play games with attackers and scripted attacks in a way that most normal users will never even see. This talk will attempt to show that differences in how different user agents handle web server responses (specifically status codes) can be used to improve the defensive posture of modern web applications while causing headaches for the average script kiddy or scanner monkey!]]>
Defense by numbers: Making Problems for Script Kiddies and Scanner Monkeys DEF CON 21 (2013) On the surface most common browsers look the same, function the same, and deliver web content to the user in a relatively uniformed fashion. Under the shiny surface however, the way specific user agents handle traffic varies in a number of interesting and unique ways. This variation allows for defenders to play games with attackers and scripted attacks in a way that most normal users will never even see. This talk will attempt to show that differences in how different user agents handle web server responses (specifically status codes) can be used to improve the defensive posture of modern web applications while causing headaches for the average script kiddy or scanner monkey!]]> Mon, 05 Aug 2013 19:56:39 GMT /slideshow/chris-johnriley-defensebynumbersdc21/24958281 ChrisJohnRiley@slideshare.net(ChrisJohnRiley) Defense by numbers: Making Problems for Script Kiddies and Scanner Monkeys ChrisJohnRiley Defense by numbers: Making Problems for Script Kiddies and Scanner Monkeys DEF CON 21 (2013) On the surface most common browsers look the same, function the same, and deliver web content to the user in a relatively uniformed fashion. Under the shiny surface however, the way specific user agents handle traffic varies in a number of interesting and unique ways. This variation allows for defenders to play games with attackers and scripted attacks in a way that most normal users will never even see. This talk will attempt to show that differences in how different user agents handle web server responses (specifically status codes) can be used to improve the defensive posture of modern web applications while causing headaches for the average script kiddy or scanner monkey! <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/chrisjohnriley-defensebynumbers-dc21-130805195639-phpapp02-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> Defense by numbers: Making Problems for Script Kiddies and Scanner Monkeys DEF CON 21 (2013) On the surface most common browsers look the same, function the same, and deliver web content to the user in a relatively uniformed fashion. Under the shiny surface however, the way specific user agents handle traffic varies in a number of interesting and unique ways. This variation allows for defenders to play games with attackers and scripted attacks in a way that most normal users will never even see. This talk will attempt to show that differences in how different user agents handle web server responses (specifically status codes) can be used to improve the defensive posture of modern web applications while causing headaches for the average script kiddy or scanner monkey!

Defense by numbers: Making Problems for Script Kiddies and Scanner Monkeys from Chris John Riley

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0 Defense by numbers: Making problems for script kiddies /slideshow/defense-by-numbers-making-problems-for-script-kiddies/19813133 defensebynumbers-130423172555-phpapp02
On the surface most common browsers (user agents) all look the same, function the same, and deliver web content to the user in a relatively uniformed fashion. Under the surface however, the way specific user agents handle traffic varies in a number of interesting ways. This variation allows for intelligent and skilled defenders to play with attackers and scripted attacks in a way that most normal users will never even see. This talk will attempt to show that differences in how user agents handle web server responses can be used to improve the defensive posture of a website. Further examples will be given that show specially crafted responses can disrupt common automated attack methods and cause issues for casual attackers and wide scale scanning of websites.]]>
On the surface most common browsers (user agents) all look the same, function the same, and deliver web content to the user in a relatively uniformed fashion. Under the surface however, the way specific user agents handle traffic varies in a number of interesting ways. This variation allows for intelligent and skilled defenders to play with attackers and scripted attacks in a way that most normal users will never even see. This talk will attempt to show that differences in how user agents handle web server responses can be used to improve the defensive posture of a website. Further examples will be given that show specially crafted responses can disrupt common automated attack methods and cause issues for casual attackers and wide scale scanning of websites.]]> Tue, 23 Apr 2013 17:25:55 GMT /slideshow/defense-by-numbers-making-problems-for-script-kiddies/19813133 ChrisJohnRiley@slideshare.net(ChrisJohnRiley) Defense by numbers: Making problems for script kiddies ChrisJohnRiley On the surface most common browsers (user agents) all look the same, function the same, and deliver web content to the user in a relatively uniformed fashion. Under the surface however, the way specific user agents handle traffic varies in a number of interesting ways. This variation allows for intelligent and skilled defenders to play with attackers and scripted attacks in a way that most normal users will never even see. This talk will attempt to show that differences in how user agents handle web server responses can be used to improve the defensive posture of a website. Further examples will be given that show specially crafted responses can disrupt common automated attack methods and cause issues for casual attackers and wide scale scanning of websites. <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/defensebynumbers-130423172555-phpapp02-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> On the surface most common browsers (user agents) all look the same, function the same, and deliver web content to the user in a relatively uniformed fashion. Under the surface however, the way specific user agents handle traffic varies in a number of interesting ways. This variation allows for intelligent and skilled defenders to play with attackers and scripted attacks in a way that most normal users will never even see. This talk will attempt to show that differences in how user agents handle web server responses can be used to improve the defensive posture of a website. Further examples will be given that show specially crafted responses can disrupt common automated attack methods and cause issues for casual attackers and wide scale scanning of websites.

Defense by numbers: Making problems for script kiddies from Chris John Riley

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0 Cutting accounts down to scythe /slideshow/cutting-accounts-down-to-scythe/14502732 cuttingaccountsdowntoscythe-120928080226-phpapp01
BruCON 2012 (Lightning Talk) Ghent, Belgium (27th Sept. 2012) Cutting accounts down to scythe! ---------- Abstract: ---------- Scythe is a framework for user/account enumeration. It is designed to allow users to easily extend and add new modules as required for POC attacks during penetration tests. The framework offers the ability to check a list of user accounts/email addresses against a given website to see which accounts are valid. Advanced features include cookie and CSRF token support, as well as error detection and timeout/retry functions. Currently in beta, available from gi]]>
BruCON 2012 (Lightning Talk) Ghent, Belgium (27th Sept. 2012) Cutting accounts down to scythe! ---------- Abstract: ---------- Scythe is a framework for user/account enumeration. It is designed to allow users to easily extend and add new modules as required for POC attacks during penetration tests. The framework offers the ability to check a list of user accounts/email addresses against a given website to see which accounts are valid. Advanced features include cookie and CSRF token support, as well as error detection and timeout/retry functions. Currently in beta, available from gi]]> Fri, 28 Sep 2012 08:02:24 GMT /slideshow/cutting-accounts-down-to-scythe/14502732 ChrisJohnRiley@slideshare.net(ChrisJohnRiley) Cutting accounts down to scythe ChrisJohnRiley BruCON 2012 (Lightning Talk) Ghent, Belgium (27th Sept. 2012) Cutting accounts down to scythe! ---------- Abstract: ---------- Scythe is a framework for user/account enumeration. It is designed to allow users to easily extend and add new modules as required for POC attacks during penetration tests. The framework offers the ability to check a list of user accounts/email addresses against a given website to see which accounts are valid. Advanced features include cookie and CSRF token support, as well as error detection and timeout/retry functions. Currently in beta, available from gi <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/cuttingaccountsdowntoscythe-120928080226-phpapp01-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> BruCON 2012 (Lightning Talk) Ghent, Belgium (27th Sept. 2012) Cutting accounts down to scythe! ---------- Abstract: ---------- Scythe is a framework for user/account enumeration. It is designed to allow users to easily extend and add new modules as required for POC attacks during penetration tests. The framework offers the ability to check a list of user accounts/email addresses against a given website to see which accounts are valid. Advanced features include cookie and CSRF token support, as well as error detection and timeout/retry functions. Currently in beta, available from gi

Cutting accounts down to scythe from Chris John Riley

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0 SecZone 2011: Scrubbing SAP clean with SOAP /slideshow/seczone-2011-scrubbing-sap-clean-with-soap/10551264 securityzone2011-scrubbingsapcleanwithsoap-111211114830-phpapp02
SecZone 2011 - Cali, Colombia (29th Nov. 2011) SAP (in)security: Scrubbing SAP clean with SOAP ------ Note ------ This is a slightly updated version of my Hashdays 2011 talk. ---------- Abstract: ---------- At the heart of any large enterprise, lies a platform misunderstood and feared by all but the bravest systems administrators. Home to a wealth of information, and key to infinite wisdom. This platform is SAP. For years this system has been amongst the many "red pen" items on penetration tests and audits alike... but no more! We will no longer accept the cries of "Business critical, out-of-scope". The time for SAP has come, the cross-hairs of attackers are firmly focused on the soft underbelly that is ERM, and it's our duty to follow suit. Join me as we take the first steps into exploring SAP, extracting information and popping shells. Leave your Nessus license at the door! It's time to scrub this SAP system clean with SOAP! ----------]]>
SecZone 2011 - Cali, Colombia (29th Nov. 2011) SAP (in)security: Scrubbing SAP clean with SOAP ------ Note ------ This is a slightly updated version of my Hashdays 2011 talk. ---------- Abstract: ---------- At the heart of any large enterprise, lies a platform misunderstood and feared by all but the bravest systems administrators. Home to a wealth of information, and key to infinite wisdom. This platform is SAP. For years this system has been amongst the many "red pen" items on penetration tests and audits alike... but no more! We will no longer accept the cries of "Business critical, out-of-scope". The time for SAP has come, the cross-hairs of attackers are firmly focused on the soft underbelly that is ERM, and it's our duty to follow suit. Join me as we take the first steps into exploring SAP, extracting information and popping shells. Leave your Nessus license at the door! It's time to scrub this SAP system clean with SOAP! ----------]]> Sun, 11 Dec 2011 11:48:26 GMT /slideshow/seczone-2011-scrubbing-sap-clean-with-soap/10551264 ChrisJohnRiley@slideshare.net(ChrisJohnRiley) SecZone 2011: Scrubbing SAP clean with SOAP ChrisJohnRiley SecZone 2011 - Cali, Colombia (29th Nov. 2011) SAP (in)security: Scrubbing SAP clean with SOAP ------ Note ------ This is a slightly updated version of my Hashdays 2011 talk. ---------- Abstract: ---------- At the heart of any large enterprise, lies a platform misunderstood and feared by all but the bravest systems administrators. Home to a wealth of information, and key to infinite wisdom. This platform is SAP. For years this system has been amongst the many "red pen" items on penetration tests and audits alike... but no more! We will no longer accept the cries of "Business critical, out-of-scope". The time for SAP has come, the cross-hairs of attackers are firmly focused on the soft underbelly that is ERM, and it's our duty to follow suit. Join me as we take the first steps into exploring SAP, extracting information and popping shells. Leave your Nessus license at the door! It's time to scrub this SAP system clean with SOAP! ---------- <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/securityzone2011-scrubbingsapcleanwithsoap-111211114830-phpapp02-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> SecZone 2011 - Cali, Colombia (29th Nov. 2011) SAP (in)security: Scrubbing SAP clean with SOAP ------ Note ------ This is a slightly updated version of my Hashdays 2011 talk. ---------- Abstract: ---------- At the heart of any large enterprise, lies a platform misunderstood and feared by all but the bravest systems administrators. Home to a wealth of information, and key to infinite wisdom. This platform is SAP. For years this system has been amongst the many "red pen" items on penetration tests and audits alike... but no more! We will no longer accept the cries of "Business critical, out-of-scope". The time for SAP has come, the cross-hairs of attackers are firmly focused on the soft underbelly that is ERM, and it's our duty to follow suit. Join me as we take the first steps into exploring SAP, extracting information and popping shells. Leave your Nessus license at the door! It's time to scrub this SAP system clean with SOAP! ----------

SecZone 2011: Scrubbing SAP clean with SOAP from Chris John Riley

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0 SAP (in)security: Scrubbing SAP clean with SOAP /slideshow/sap-insecurity-scrubbing-sap-clean-with-soap/9951290 scrubbingsapcleanwithsoapcompressed-111030145927-phpapp01
Hashdays Conference (29th Oct. 2011) SAP (in)security: Scrubbing SAP clean with SOAP ---------- Abstract: ---------- At the heart of any large enterprise, lies a platform misunderstood and feared by all but the bravest systems administrators. Home to a wealth of information, and key to infinite wisdom. This platform is SAP. For years this system has been amongst the many "red pen" items on penetration tests and audits alike... but no more! We will no longer accept the cries of "Business critical, out-of-scope". The time for SAP has come, the cross-hairs of attackers are firmly focused on the soft underbelly that is ERM, and it's our duty to follow suit. Join me as we take the first steps into exploring SAP, extracting information and popping shells. Leave your Nessus license at the door! It's time to scrub this SAP system clean with SOAP! ----------]]>
Hashdays Conference (29th Oct. 2011) SAP (in)security: Scrubbing SAP clean with SOAP ---------- Abstract: ---------- At the heart of any large enterprise, lies a platform misunderstood and feared by all but the bravest systems administrators. Home to a wealth of information, and key to infinite wisdom. This platform is SAP. For years this system has been amongst the many "red pen" items on penetration tests and audits alike... but no more! We will no longer accept the cries of "Business critical, out-of-scope". The time for SAP has come, the cross-hairs of attackers are firmly focused on the soft underbelly that is ERM, and it's our duty to follow suit. Join me as we take the first steps into exploring SAP, extracting information and popping shells. Leave your Nessus license at the door! It's time to scrub this SAP system clean with SOAP! ----------]]> Sun, 30 Oct 2011 14:59:26 GMT /slideshow/sap-insecurity-scrubbing-sap-clean-with-soap/9951290 ChrisJohnRiley@slideshare.net(ChrisJohnRiley) SAP (in)security: Scrubbing SAP clean with SOAP ChrisJohnRiley Hashdays Conference (29th Oct. 2011) SAP (in)security: Scrubbing SAP clean with SOAP ---------- Abstract: ---------- At the heart of any large enterprise, lies a platform misunderstood and feared by all but the bravest systems administrators. Home to a wealth of information, and key to infinite wisdom. This platform is SAP. For years this system has been amongst the many "red pen" items on penetration tests and audits alike... but no more! We will no longer accept the cries of "Business critical, out-of-scope". The time for SAP has come, the cross-hairs of attackers are firmly focused on the soft underbelly that is ERM, and it's our duty to follow suit. Join me as we take the first steps into exploring SAP, extracting information and popping shells. Leave your Nessus license at the door! It's time to scrub this SAP system clean with SOAP! ---------- <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/scrubbingsapcleanwithsoapcompressed-111030145927-phpapp01-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> Hashdays Conference (29th Oct. 2011) SAP (in)security: Scrubbing SAP clean with SOAP ---------- Abstract: ---------- At the heart of any large enterprise, lies a platform misunderstood and feared by all but the bravest systems administrators. Home to a wealth of information, and key to infinite wisdom. This platform is SAP. For years this system has been amongst the many "red pen" items on penetration tests and audits alike... but no more! We will no longer accept the cries of "Business critical, out-of-scope". The time for SAP has come, the cross-hairs of attackers are firmly focused on the soft underbelly that is ERM, and it's our duty to follow suit. Join me as we take the first steps into exploring SAP, extracting information and popping shells. Leave your Nessus license at the door! It's time to scrub this SAP system clean with SOAP! ----------

SAP (in)security: Scrubbing SAP clean with SOAP from Chris John Riley

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0 SSL Impersonation in 5 minutes or less! /ChrisJohnRiley/ssl-certificate-impersonation-for-shits-andgiggles impersonatessl-110920134812-phpapp02
SSL certificate impersonation… for shits and giggles! A quick 5 minute talk about SSL impersonation and why self-signed certs aren't a valid solution for your enterprise! BruCON 2011 Lightning Talk]]>
SSL certificate impersonation… for shits and giggles! A quick 5 minute talk about SSL impersonation and why self-signed certs aren't a valid solution for your enterprise! BruCON 2011 Lightning Talk]]> Tue, 20 Sep 2011 13:48:09 GMT /ChrisJohnRiley/ssl-certificate-impersonation-for-shits-andgiggles ChrisJohnRiley@slideshare.net(ChrisJohnRiley) SSL Impersonation in 5 minutes or less! ChrisJohnRiley SSL certificate impersonation… for shits and giggles! A quick 5 minute talk about SSL impersonation and why self-signed certs aren't a valid solution for your enterprise! BruCON 2011 Lightning Talk <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/impersonatessl-110920134812-phpapp02-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> SSL certificate impersonation… for shits and giggles! A quick 5 minute talk about SSL impersonation and why self-signed certs aren't a valid solution for your enterprise! BruCON 2011 Lightning Talk

SSL Impersonation in 5 minutes or less! from Chris John Riley

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0 A quick rant about Web App crypto /slideshow/a-quick-rant-about-web-app-crypto/9323594 typo3sa2009001-110919100319-phpapp02
A quick rant about Web App crypto BruCON 2011 Lightning talk (5 minutes) http://c22.cc]]>
A quick rant about Web App crypto BruCON 2011 Lightning talk (5 minutes) http://c22.cc]]> Mon, 19 Sep 2011 10:03:17 GMT /slideshow/a-quick-rant-about-web-app-crypto/9323594 ChrisJohnRiley@slideshare.net(ChrisJohnRiley) A quick rant about Web App crypto ChrisJohnRiley A quick rant about Web App crypto BruCON 2011 Lightning talk (5 minutes) http://c22.cc <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/typo3sa2009001-110919100319-phpapp02-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds" /> A quick rant about Web App crypto BruCON 2011 Lightning talk (5 minutes) http://c22.cc

A quick rant about Web App crypto from Chris John Riley

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0 https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/profile-photo-ChrisJohnRiley-48x48.jpg?cb=1523146258 I'm just this guy, you know! c22.cc https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/sectorc22-androidsecurecontainers-141022141354-conversion-gate02-thumbnail.jpg?width=320&height=320&fit=bounds slideshow/mobile-fail-cracking-open-secure-android-containers-sectorca/40607438 Mobile Fail: Cracking ... https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/howdjswork-141009140557-conversion-gate02-thumbnail.jpg?width=320&height=320&fit=bounds slideshow/how-djing-works/40082774 How DJing works https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/chrisjohnriley-defensebynumbers-dc21-130805195639-phpapp02-thumbnail.jpg?width=320&height=320&fit=bounds slideshow/chris-johnriley-defensebynumbersdc21/24958281 Defense by numbers: Ma...