狠狠撸shows by User: YusukeNarita1 / http://www.slideshare.net/images/logo.gif 狠狠撸shows by User: YusukeNarita1 / Fri, 15 Feb 2019 06:46:17 GMT 狠狠撸Share feed for 狠狠撸shows by User: YusukeNarita1 「エビデンスに基づく政策立案」の伦理と意味 /slideshow/ss-131881642/131881642 jica-190215064617
「根拠にもとづく政策立案」（Evidence-Based Policy Making, 略してEBPM）への声かけが盛んです。 しかし、本当にEBPMを行うべきなのでしょうか？ この講演では「EBPMを行うべきという根拠が実はない三つの理由」についてお話しします。 第一幕：エビデンス作りという名の人体実験 第二幕：EBPMの逆説 第三幕：村上春樹のEBPM批判 これらのEBPM反対論をご説明したあと、反対論を乗り越えEBPMを本当に根拠にもとづくものに脱皮させるための試みについてお話しします。]]>
「根拠にもとづく政策立案」（Evidence-Based Policy Making, 略してEBPM）への声かけが盛んです。 しかし、本当にEBPMを行うべきなのでしょうか？ この講演では「EBPMを行うべきという根拠が実はない三つの理由」についてお話しします。 第一幕：エビデンス作りという名の人体実験 第二幕：EBPMの逆説 第三幕：村上春樹のEBPM批判 これらのEBPM反対論をご説明したあと、反対論を乗り越えEBPMを本当に根拠にもとづくものに脱皮させるための試みについてお話しします。]]> Fri, 15 Feb 2019 06:46:17 GMT /slideshow/ss-131881642/131881642 YusukeNarita1@slideshare.net(YusukeNarita1) 「エビデンスに基づく政策立案」の伦理と意味 YusukeNarita1 「根拠にもとづく政策立案」（Evidence-Based Policy Making, 略してEBPM）への声かけが盛んです。 しかし、本当にEBPMを行うべきなのでしょうか？ この講演では「EBPMを行うべきという根拠が実はない三つの理由」についてお話しします。 第一幕：エビデンス作りという名の人体実験 第二幕：EBPMの逆説 第三幕：村上春樹のEBPM批判 これらのEBPM反対論をご説明したあと、反対論を乗り越えEBPMを本当に根拠にもとづくものに脱皮させるための試みについてお話しします。 <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/jica-190215064617-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&amp;height=120&amp;fit=bounds" /><br> 「根拠にもとづく政策立案」（Evidence-Based Policy Making, 略してEBPM）への声かけが盛んです。 しかし、本当にEBPMを行うべきなのでしょうか？ この講演では「EBPMを行うべきという根拠が実はない三つの理由」についてお話しします。 第一幕：エビデンス作りという名の人体実験 第二幕：EBPMの逆説 第三幕：村上春樹のEBPM批判 これらのEBPM反対論をご説明したあと、反対論を乗り越えEBPMを本当に根拠にもとづくものに脱皮させるための試みについてお話しします。
「エビデンスに基づく政策立案」の伦理と意味 from Yusuke Narita
]]> 735 80 https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/jica-190215064617-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds presentation Black http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/post http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/posted 0 未来の声を闻く：トランプ惫蝉クリントン /slideshow/vs-131880547/131880547 futurejapanese-190215063833
多くの国を絶望的な懸念が覆っている---選挙と政策が高齢者に占拠されているというシルバー民主主義の懸念である。シルバー民主主義打開の手立てとしてよく提案されるのが、若者の声をより反映する選挙制度（たとえば平均余命による票の重みづけ）である。そのような仮想的な選挙制度は選挙結果にどのような影響を与えるだろうか？American National Election Studies (ANES)データを用いた反実仮想シミュレーションの結果、もし平均余命による票の重みづけが行われていたならば、現在の米国大統領はヒラリー·クリントンになっていたという予測を得た。この予測の詳細と限界を説明したのち、将来の展望をお話ししたい。]]>
多くの国を絶望的な懸念が覆っている---選挙と政策が高齢者に占拠されているというシルバー民主主義の懸念である。シルバー民主主義打開の手立てとしてよく提案されるのが、若者の声をより反映する選挙制度（たとえば平均余命による票の重みづけ）である。そのような仮想的な選挙制度は選挙結果にどのような影響を与えるだろうか？American National Election Studies (ANES)データを用いた反実仮想シミュレーションの結果、もし平均余命による票の重みづけが行われていたならば、現在の米国大統領はヒラリー·クリントンになっていたという予測を得た。この予測の詳細と限界を説明したのち、将来の展望をお話ししたい。]]> Fri, 15 Feb 2019 06:38:33 GMT /slideshow/vs-131880547/131880547 YusukeNarita1@slideshare.net(YusukeNarita1) 未来の声を闻く：トランプ惫蝉クリントン YusukeNarita1 多くの国を絶望的な懸念が覆っている---選挙と政策が高齢者に占拠されているというシルバー民主主義の懸念である。シルバー民主主義打開の手立てとしてよく提案されるのが、若者の声をより反映する選挙制度（たとえば平均余命による票の重みづけ）である。そのような仮想的な選挙制度は選挙結果にどのような影響を与えるだろうか？American National Election Studies (ANES)データを用いた反実仮想シミュレーションの結果、もし平均余命による票の重みづけが行われていたならば、現在の米国大統領はヒラリー·クリントンになっていたという予測を得た。この予測の詳細と限界を説明したのち、将来の展望をお話ししたい。 <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/futurejapanese-190215063833-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&amp;height=120&amp;fit=bounds" /><br> 多くの国を絶望的な懸念が覆っている---選挙と政策が高齢者に占拠されているというシルバー民主主義の懸念である。シルバー民主主義打開の手立てとしてよく提案されるのが、若者の声をより反映する選挙制度（たとえば平均余命による票の重みづけ）である。そのような仮想的な選挙制度は選挙結果にどのような影響を与えるだろうか？American National Election Studies (ANES)データを用いた反実仮想シミュレーションの結果、もし平均余命による票の重みづけが行われていたならば、現在の米国大統領はヒラリー·クリントンになっていたという予測を得た。この予測の詳細と限界を説明したのち、将来の展望をお話ししたい。
未来の声を闻く：トランプ惫蝉クリントン from Yusuke Narita
]]> 438 95 https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/futurejapanese-190215063833-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds presentation Black http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/post http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/posted 0 Toward an Ethical Experiment /slideshow/toward-an-ethical-experiment-120725120/120725120 examslide30min-181025183532
Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs) enroll hundreds of millions of subjects and involve many human lives. To improve subjects’ welfare, I propose an experimental design that (1) produces a Pareto efficient allocation of treatment assignment probabilities, (2) is asymptotically incentive compatible for preference elicitation, and (3) unbiasedly estimates any causal effect estimable with standard RCTs. I quantify these properties by applying my proposal to a water cleaning experiment in Kenya (Kremer et al., 2011). Compared to standard RCTs, my design substantially improves subjects’ predicted well-being while reaching similar treatment effect estimates with similar precision. ]]>
Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs) enroll hundreds of millions of subjects and involve many human lives. To improve subjects’ welfare, I propose an experimental design that (1) produces a Pareto efficient allocation of treatment assignment probabilities, (2) is asymptotically incentive compatible for preference elicitation, and (3) unbiasedly estimates any causal effect estimable with standard RCTs. I quantify these properties by applying my proposal to a water cleaning experiment in Kenya (Kremer et al., 2011). Compared to standard RCTs, my design substantially improves subjects’ predicted well-being while reaching similar treatment effect estimates with similar precision. ]]> Thu, 25 Oct 2018 18:35:32 GMT /slideshow/toward-an-ethical-experiment-120725120/120725120 YusukeNarita1@slideshare.net(YusukeNarita1) Toward an Ethical Experiment YusukeNarita1 Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs) enroll hundreds of millions of subjects and involve many human lives. To improve subjects’ welfare, I propose an experimental design that (1) produces a Pareto efficient allocation of treatment assignment probabilities, (2) is asymptotically incentive compatible for preference elicitation, and (3) unbiasedly estimates any causal effect estimable with standard RCTs. I quantify these properties by applying my proposal to a water cleaning experiment in Kenya (Kremer et al., 2011). Compared to standard RCTs, my design substantially improves subjects’ predicted well-being while reaching similar treatment effect estimates with similar precision. <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/examslide30min-181025183532-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&amp;height=120&amp;fit=bounds" /><br> Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs) enroll hundreds of millions of subjects and involve many human lives. To improve subjects’ welfare, I propose an experimental design that (1) produces a Pareto efficient allocation of treatment assignment probabilities, (2) is asymptotically incentive compatible for preference elicitation, and (3) unbiasedly estimates any causal effect estimable with standard RCTs. I quantify these properties by applying my proposal to a water cleaning experiment in Kenya (Kremer et al., 2011). Compared to standard RCTs, my design substantially improves subjects’ predicted well-being while reaching similar treatment effect estimates with similar precision.
Toward an Ethical Experiment from Yusuke Narita
]]> 169 2 https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/examslide30min-181025183532-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds presentation Black http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/post http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/posted 0 Match or Mismatch? Learning and Inertia in School Choice /slideshow/match-or-mismatch-learning-and-inertia-in-school-choice/105983506 mismatchslide45min-180715040544
Centralized matching markets are designed assuming that participants make well-informed choices upfront. However, this paper uses data from NYC’s school choice system to show that families’ choices change after the initial match as they learn about schools. I develop an empirical model of evolving demand for schools under learning, endowment effects in response to prior assignments, and switching costs. These model components are identified by using admissions lotteries and other institutional features. The estimates suggest that there are even more changes in underlying demand than in observed choices, undermining the welfare performance of the initial match. To alleviate the welfare cost of demand changes, I theoretically and empirically investigate dynamic mechanisms that best accommodate choice changes. These mechanisms improve on the existing discretionary reapplication process. In addition, the gains from the mechanisms drastically change depending on the extent of demand-side inertia caused by switching costs. Thus, the gains from a centralized market depend not only on its design but also on demand-side frictions (such as demand changes and inertia).]]>
Centralized matching markets are designed assuming that participants make well-informed choices upfront. However, this paper uses data from NYC’s school choice system to show that families’ choices change after the initial match as they learn about schools. I develop an empirical model of evolving demand for schools under learning, endowment effects in response to prior assignments, and switching costs. These model components are identified by using admissions lotteries and other institutional features. The estimates suggest that there are even more changes in underlying demand than in observed choices, undermining the welfare performance of the initial match. To alleviate the welfare cost of demand changes, I theoretically and empirically investigate dynamic mechanisms that best accommodate choice changes. These mechanisms improve on the existing discretionary reapplication process. In addition, the gains from the mechanisms drastically change depending on the extent of demand-side inertia caused by switching costs. Thus, the gains from a centralized market depend not only on its design but also on demand-side frictions (such as demand changes and inertia).]]> Sun, 15 Jul 2018 04:05:44 GMT /slideshow/match-or-mismatch-learning-and-inertia-in-school-choice/105983506 YusukeNarita1@slideshare.net(YusukeNarita1) Match or Mismatch? Learning and Inertia in School Choice YusukeNarita1 Centralized matching markets are designed assuming that participants make well-informed choices upfront. However, this paper uses data from NYC’s school choice system to show that families’ choices change after the initial match as they learn about schools. I develop an empirical model of evolving demand for schools under learning, endowment effects in response to prior assignments, and switching costs. These model components are identified by using admissions lotteries and other institutional features. The estimates suggest that there are even more changes in underlying demand than in observed choices, undermining the welfare performance of the initial match. To alleviate the welfare cost of demand changes, I theoretically and empirically investigate dynamic mechanisms that best accommodate choice changes. These mechanisms improve on the existing discretionary reapplication process. In addition, the gains from the mechanisms drastically change depending on the extent of demand-side inertia caused by switching costs. Thus, the gains from a centralized market depend not only on its design but also on demand-side frictions (such as demand changes and inertia). <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/mismatchslide45min-180715040544-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&amp;height=120&amp;fit=bounds" /><br> Centralized matching markets are designed assuming that participants make well-informed choices upfront. However, this paper uses data from NYC’s school choice system to show that families’ choices change after the initial match as they learn about schools. I develop an empirical model of evolving demand for schools under learning, endowment effects in response to prior assignments, and switching costs. These model components are identified by using admissions lotteries and other institutional features. The estimates suggest that there are even more changes in underlying demand than in observed choices, undermining the welfare performance of the initial match. To alleviate the welfare cost of demand changes, I theoretically and empirically investigate dynamic mechanisms that best accommodate choice changes. These mechanisms improve on the existing discretionary reapplication process. In addition, the gains from the mechanisms drastically change depending on the extent of demand-side inertia caused by switching costs. Thus, the gains from a centralized market depend not only on its design but also on demand-side frictions (such as demand changes and inertia).
Match or Mismatch? Learning and Inertia in School Choice from Yusuke Narita
]]> 210 6 https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/mismatchslide45min-180715040544-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds presentation Black http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/post http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/posted 0 Toward an Ethical Experiment /slideshow/toward-an-ethical-experiment-94349928/94349928 examslide60min-180419144817
Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs) enroll hundreds of millions of subjects and involve many human lives. To improve subjects’ welfare, I propose an alternative design of RCTs that I call Experiment-as-Market (EXAM). EXAM Pareto optimally randomly assigns each treatment to subjects predicted to experience better treatment effects or to subjects with stronger preferences for the treatment. EXAM is also asymptotically incentive compatible for preference elicitation. Finally, EXAM unbiasedly estimates any causal effect estimable with standard RCTs. I quantify the welfare, incentive, and information properties by applying EXAM to a water cleaning experiment in Kenya (Kremer et al., 2011). Compared to standard RCTs, EXAM substantially improves subjects’ predicted well-being while reaching similar treatment effect estimates with similar precision.]]>
Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs) enroll hundreds of millions of subjects and involve many human lives. To improve subjects’ welfare, I propose an alternative design of RCTs that I call Experiment-as-Market (EXAM). EXAM Pareto optimally randomly assigns each treatment to subjects predicted to experience better treatment effects or to subjects with stronger preferences for the treatment. EXAM is also asymptotically incentive compatible for preference elicitation. Finally, EXAM unbiasedly estimates any causal effect estimable with standard RCTs. I quantify the welfare, incentive, and information properties by applying EXAM to a water cleaning experiment in Kenya (Kremer et al., 2011). Compared to standard RCTs, EXAM substantially improves subjects’ predicted well-being while reaching similar treatment effect estimates with similar precision.]]> Thu, 19 Apr 2018 14:48:17 GMT /slideshow/toward-an-ethical-experiment-94349928/94349928 YusukeNarita1@slideshare.net(YusukeNarita1) Toward an Ethical Experiment YusukeNarita1 Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs) enroll hundreds of millions of subjects and involve many human lives. To improve subjects’ welfare, I propose an alternative design of RCTs that I call Experiment-as-Market (EXAM). EXAM Pareto optimally randomly assigns each treatment to subjects predicted to experience better treatment effects or to subjects with stronger preferences for the treatment. EXAM is also asymptotically incentive compatible for preference elicitation. Finally, EXAM unbiasedly estimates any causal effect estimable with standard RCTs. I quantify the welfare, incentive, and information properties by applying EXAM to a water cleaning experiment in Kenya (Kremer et al., 2011). Compared to standard RCTs, EXAM substantially improves subjects’ predicted well-being while reaching similar treatment effect estimates with similar precision. <img style="border:1px solid #C3E6D8;float:right;" alt="" src="https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/examslide60min-180419144817-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&amp;height=120&amp;fit=bounds" /><br> Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs) enroll hundreds of millions of subjects and involve many human lives. To improve subjects’ welfare, I propose an alternative design of RCTs that I call Experiment-as-Market (EXAM). EXAM Pareto optimally randomly assigns each treatment to subjects predicted to experience better treatment effects or to subjects with stronger preferences for the treatment. EXAM is also asymptotically incentive compatible for preference elicitation. Finally, EXAM unbiasedly estimates any causal effect estimable with standard RCTs. I quantify the welfare, incentive, and information properties by applying EXAM to a water cleaning experiment in Kenya (Kremer et al., 2011). Compared to standard RCTs, EXAM substantially improves subjects’ predicted well-being while reaching similar treatment effect estimates with similar precision.
Toward an Ethical Experiment from Yusuke Narita
]]> 526 4 https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/examslide60min-180419144817-thumbnail.jpg?width=120&height=120&fit=bounds presentation Black http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/post http://activitystrea.ms/schema/1.0/posted 0 https://public.slidesharecdn.com/v2/images/profile-picture.png https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/jica-190215064617-thumbnail.jpg?width=320&height=320&fit=bounds slideshow/ss-131881642/131881642 「エビデンスに基づく政策立案」の伦理と意味 https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/futurejapanese-190215063833-thumbnail.jpg?width=320&height=320&fit=bounds slideshow/vs-131880547/131880547 未来の声を闻く：トランプ惫蝉クリントン https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/ss_thumbnails/examslide30min-181025183532-thumbnail.jpg?width=320&height=320&fit=bounds slideshow/toward-an-ethical-experiment-120725120/120725120 Toward an Ethical Expe...