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Bluesniff - The Next Wardriving Frontier Bruce Potter <gdead@shmoo.com> Brian Caswell <bmc@shmoo.com>
Bluetooth Basics NOT 802.11!  NOT a relative of 802.11! Cable replacement technology Low power for embedded devices More BT radios than 802.11 radios in existence Phones, headsets, laptops, mice, keyboards Master / Slave architecture
Bluetooth Protocol Uses 2.4 GHz ISM band, same as 802.11b/g Generally low power Class 3 (1mW) for most devices Some Class 1(100mW) devices exist Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum Uses a pre-defined hopping pattern Back in the day, FHSS was a security mechanism Resists interference 1MHz wide, hopping every 625 microseconds
Bluetooth Protocol A real disaster of a protocol stack Heck, the core spec is 1024 pages.. Good reading! Specifies from Layer 1 to Layer 7 High points RF-level sync Inquiry/request Service discovery Low power modes
Bluetooth Security Pairing Using a shared secret (PIN), exchange random number to form key Key used to derive session key for future comms Used for Trusted <-> Trusted comms
Bluetooth Security Authentication / Authorization Per connection AA Per service AA Encryption Ditto Its all OPTIONAL! Left to the developer/user to decide This ends well :(
Bluetooth Profiles Profiles exist to ease interoperability *wink* *wink* Keyboard, file transfer, handsfree (and headset), etc
Bluetooth vs. 802.11b More at stake Compromise 802.11 security = Access to network Compromise BT Security = Gateway directly to App level functionality More personalized information Phone conversations, calendar info, etc Less interesting for Joe 12-pack, more interesting for executives
Discovery of 802.11 Direct Sequence Spread spectrum Transmitters always in the same place in a channel DSSS pretty easy to find Granted, transmitters may be on different channels Cisco - hardware channel switching RF Monitor Prism 2 - firmware channel switching RF Monitor Orinoco - need external channel hopper
Discovery of 802.11 Beacons  Im here every 100ms Can be turned off for cloaking Fools Netstumbler Doesnt fool Kismet or Airsnort Regular traffic Windows boxen are noisy Regardless of OS, generally frequent traffic
Discovery of Bluetooth FHSS harder to find Must align with hopping pattern BT uses 1/2 the normal hop time to Jump Around Still averages 2.5 to 10 secs to find known device Devices can be Discoverable Respond to inquiry requests
Discovery of Bluetooth Devices can also be non-discoverable Must be directly probed by MAC addr Little to no traffic for extended periods of time (esp in low power mode) Cannot easily be listened to b/c receiver cannot sync on hopping pattern Sophisticated RF gear can find and intercept traffic Currently no one can make a standard card do this
Bluetooth Attacks Interception of traffic during pairing Brute force guess the PIN to recover key Know the PIN b/c its imbedded More likely poorly developed software In BT, security is optional  Or simply bad defaults File sharing with no AA/E in discoverable mode was the DEFAULT for my BT driver on my PDA Just like the early days of 802.11b
Bluetooth Tracking Even Class 3 devices can be intercepted at a distance If your phone/PDA/earpiece is BT enabled, attacker can follow you using commodity gear Like your own RFID tag
Bluetooth Wardriving Used to walk around hitting scan button on BT driver UI Does not find non-discoverable devices Needs new tools to catch on Same voyeuristic appeal of 802.11 wardriving As it becomes popular, BT developers and users will get a swift kick in the butt to make things more secure
Redfang Released by @Stake, Spring 2003 Looks for devices that do not want to be discovered Brute forces through MAC addresses attempting to find devices First 3 octets fixed, rotates through last three Can take a long time, since FHSS sync can take ~10 seconds per MAC The only way so far
Bluesniff http://bluesniff.shmoo.com/ Our tool  (heh.. he said tool) Focused on providing a UI Front-end for Redfang Also finds devices in discoverable mode Yes, people leave things to be discovered Making BT wardrivers easier and more efficient will raise awareness of BT security issues
油
油
油
油
Future work Integration with WiFi scanning tools (namely Airsnort) New scanning methods
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Dc 11 Brucepotter

  • 1. Bluesniff - The Next Wardriving Frontier Bruce Potter <gdead@shmoo.com> Brian Caswell <bmc@shmoo.com>
  • 2. Bluetooth Basics NOT 802.11! NOT a relative of 802.11! Cable replacement technology Low power for embedded devices More BT radios than 802.11 radios in existence Phones, headsets, laptops, mice, keyboards Master / Slave architecture
  • 3. Bluetooth Protocol Uses 2.4 GHz ISM band, same as 802.11b/g Generally low power Class 3 (1mW) for most devices Some Class 1(100mW) devices exist Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum Uses a pre-defined hopping pattern Back in the day, FHSS was a security mechanism Resists interference 1MHz wide, hopping every 625 microseconds
  • 4. Bluetooth Protocol A real disaster of a protocol stack Heck, the core spec is 1024 pages.. Good reading! Specifies from Layer 1 to Layer 7 High points RF-level sync Inquiry/request Service discovery Low power modes
  • 5. Bluetooth Security Pairing Using a shared secret (PIN), exchange random number to form key Key used to derive session key for future comms Used for Trusted <-> Trusted comms
  • 6. Bluetooth Security Authentication / Authorization Per connection AA Per service AA Encryption Ditto Its all OPTIONAL! Left to the developer/user to decide This ends well :(
  • 7. Bluetooth Profiles Profiles exist to ease interoperability *wink* *wink* Keyboard, file transfer, handsfree (and headset), etc
  • 8. Bluetooth vs. 802.11b More at stake Compromise 802.11 security = Access to network Compromise BT Security = Gateway directly to App level functionality More personalized information Phone conversations, calendar info, etc Less interesting for Joe 12-pack, more interesting for executives
  • 9. Discovery of 802.11 Direct Sequence Spread spectrum Transmitters always in the same place in a channel DSSS pretty easy to find Granted, transmitters may be on different channels Cisco - hardware channel switching RF Monitor Prism 2 - firmware channel switching RF Monitor Orinoco - need external channel hopper
  • 10. Discovery of 802.11 Beacons Im here every 100ms Can be turned off for cloaking Fools Netstumbler Doesnt fool Kismet or Airsnort Regular traffic Windows boxen are noisy Regardless of OS, generally frequent traffic
  • 11. Discovery of Bluetooth FHSS harder to find Must align with hopping pattern BT uses 1/2 the normal hop time to Jump Around Still averages 2.5 to 10 secs to find known device Devices can be Discoverable Respond to inquiry requests
  • 12. Discovery of Bluetooth Devices can also be non-discoverable Must be directly probed by MAC addr Little to no traffic for extended periods of time (esp in low power mode) Cannot easily be listened to b/c receiver cannot sync on hopping pattern Sophisticated RF gear can find and intercept traffic Currently no one can make a standard card do this
  • 13. Bluetooth Attacks Interception of traffic during pairing Brute force guess the PIN to recover key Know the PIN b/c its imbedded More likely poorly developed software In BT, security is optional Or simply bad defaults File sharing with no AA/E in discoverable mode was the DEFAULT for my BT driver on my PDA Just like the early days of 802.11b
  • 14. Bluetooth Tracking Even Class 3 devices can be intercepted at a distance If your phone/PDA/earpiece is BT enabled, attacker can follow you using commodity gear Like your own RFID tag
  • 15. Bluetooth Wardriving Used to walk around hitting scan button on BT driver UI Does not find non-discoverable devices Needs new tools to catch on Same voyeuristic appeal of 802.11 wardriving As it becomes popular, BT developers and users will get a swift kick in the butt to make things more secure
  • 16. Redfang Released by @Stake, Spring 2003 Looks for devices that do not want to be discovered Brute forces through MAC addresses attempting to find devices First 3 octets fixed, rotates through last three Can take a long time, since FHSS sync can take ~10 seconds per MAC The only way so far
  • 17. Bluesniff http://bluesniff.shmoo.com/ Our tool (heh.. he said tool) Focused on providing a UI Front-end for Redfang Also finds devices in discoverable mode Yes, people leave things to be discovered Making BT wardrivers easier and more efficient will raise awareness of BT security issues
  • 18.
  • 19.
  • 20.
  • 21.
  • 22. Future work Integration with WiFi scanning tools (namely Airsnort) New scanning methods