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Ethan S. Burger, GULC ’89
Adjunct Professor
Institute of World Politics
esb34@georgetown.edu
Russian [State] Organized Crime:
Principal or Agent?
Journal of National Security Law & Policy Symposium
February 28, 2018 -- Washington, D.C.

One Way to think about PutinOne Way to think about Putin
 Putin is not all powerful, but the Russian state is highly
centralized.
 Putin has corruptly enriched himself (est. $200
billion+), but he relies on others who have also.
 The Russian elite craves stability and wants to protect
their property (“better a thief than a werewolf”).
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Topics for Another DayTopics for Another Day
 Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s investigations and other Trump-related topics.
 The Post-Westphalia World Order – Russia as a “Criminal State. Consider
“legitimacy” domestically (Constitution) and internationally (Helsinki Accords,
etc.).
 “High-end” Cyber-Criminal Groups (estimated by CSIS to be 20-30 groups), their
modus operandi, as well as their confluence with Russian state bodies and their
officials. Paul Goble’s Model,
 Loosely-disguised mercenaries active in Syria and Ukraine.
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The Sum of Our Fears?The Sum of Our Fears?
Acting alone or at the behest of the Russian Government (including elements thereof),
Russian Organized Crime (ROC) may conceivably:
 obtain weapons of mass destruction (biological, chemical, and nuclear/radioactive
agents) to threaten or cause catastrophic harm;
 provide logistical and other support to terrorists, foreign intelligence services, and
governments;
 conduct cyberattacks to cause significant harm to U.S. persons and critical
infrastructure, or conduct massive financial crimes (e.g., Infrafraud Organization);
 manipulate securities exchanges and perpetrate sophisticated frauds destroying
investor confidence;
 corrupt or seek to corrupt public officials in the United States and elsewhere; and
 conduct special ops using social media to influence opinions and political outcomes
in foreign countries (e.g. Estonia, France, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Sweden
United Kingdom, & U.S., etc.).

In the 1990s, Was thereIn the 1990s, Was there
Too Much Hype about ROC?Too Much Hype about ROC?
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Russian Organized CrimeRussian Organized Crime’s Creation Myth’s Creation Myth
Vory v Zakone (“thieves-in-law”) formed in the Gulag. After 1956, the Soviet
Government released many Vory within the country; crime involving commerce in
retail and luxury goods in USSR increased.
In the 1970s and 80s, Jewish, Armenian, and other nationalities begin to emigrate from
Soviet Union. Among these emigres were some Vory (as well as convicts of other
nationalities/ethnicities) who establish their criminal operations in their new homes.
After the break-up of the Soviet Union, new ‘Russian’ criminal groups emergeds, most
without genuine Vory roots. In the 1990s, discharged military, law enforcement, and
intelligence personnel filled the ranks of ROC groups. These individuals had valuable
skills and felt betrayed by the “system”.
Today, is “ROC” merely a brand or shorthand? Yes and No.
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FBIFBI’s Top Priorities’s Top Priorities
 Protect the United
States from terrorist
attack.
States against foreign
intelligence operations
and espionage.
States against cyber-
based attacks and high-
technology crimes.
 Combat public
corruption at all levels.
 Protect civil rights.
 Combat
transnational/national
criminal organizations
and enterprises.
 Combat major white-
collar crime.
 Combat significant
violent crime.
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RICO-Provided Definition of Criminal Enterprise, (1970),RICO-Provided Definition of Criminal Enterprise, (1970),
at https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/organized-crimeat https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/organized-crime
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Statute defines an enterprise as ‘any
individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group
of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity’.
The FBI defines a “criminal enterprise as a group of individuals with an identified hierarchy,
or comparable structure, engaged in significant criminal activity.”
(https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/organized-crime).
The Continuing Criminal Enterprise Statute defines a criminal enterprise as “any group of six
or more people, where one of the six occupies a position of organizer, a supervisory position,
or any other position of management with respect to the other five, and which generates
substantial income or resources, and is engaged [a series of crimes].”
The FBI notes that “there is no single structure under which international organized crime
groups operate; they vary from hierarchies to clans, networks and cells, and may evolve to
other structures. . . . [ROC is] flexible and adaptive.”

Principal Predicate Criminal Acts for RICO StatutePrincipal Predicate Criminal Acts for RICO Statute
(Two required)(Two required)
Bribery
Sports Bribery
Counterfeiting
Embezzlement of Union Funds
Mail Fraud
Wire Fraud
Money Laundering
Obstruction of Justice
Murder for Hire
Drug Trafficking
Prostitution
Sexual Exploitation of Children
Alien Smuggling
Trafficking in Counterfeit Goods
Theft from Interstate Shipment
Interstate Transportation of Stolen Property
And Certain Crimes under State Law
Murder
Kidnapping
Gambling
Arson
Robbery
Bribery
Extortion
Drugs
Not Identified As Such:
Cyber-Crimes
Insider Trading
International Market Manipulations
(e.g., oil, gas, metals, etc.).
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Russian Criminal Code, Article 210. Organization of aRussian Criminal Code, Article 210. Organization of a
Criminal Community (Criminal Organization) andCriminal Community (Criminal Organization) and
Participation Therein (1996)Participation Therein (1996)
1. Creation of a criminal community (criminal organization) for the purpose of joint committing one or several
grave or especially grave crimes or operation of such a community (organization) or of its structural subdivisions,
as well as coordination of criminal actions, establishment of stable relations between various independent
organized groups, development of plans and creation of conditions for committing crimes by such groups or
division of spheres of influence and criminal incomes between them made by a person by way of exerting
influence thereof upon the participants of the organized groups, as well as participation in a meeting of organizers,
heads (leaders) or other representatives of organized groups for the purpose of committing at least one of the cited
crimes . . . .
2. Participation in a criminal community (criminal organization) or in an association of organizers, leaders or other
representatives of organized groups . . . .
3. Acts provided for by the first or second part of this Article, and committed by a person through his/her official
position . . . . (i.e. a corrupt official).
4. The deeds provided for by Part One of this Article which have been made by the person holding the supreme
position in a criminal hierarchy . . . . (i.e. a crime kingpin).
Note. A person who has voluntarily ceased to participate in a criminal community (criminal organization) or a
structural subdivision forming part of it, or in a meeting of organizers, heads (leaders) or other representatives of
organized groups and who has actively contributed to the solution or suppression of these crimes, shall be
released from criminal liability, if his/her actions do not contain formal elements of other crime. According to
1993 MVD Data ROC was responsible for billions of dollars harm, including crimes abroad. Unreliable
estimates: 5.000 groups, 18,000 leaders, 100,000 members. 10

U.S. & Russia CooperationU.S. & Russia Cooperation
in the Organized Crime Area?in the Organized Crime Area?
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United Nations (Palermo) Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto
(2000). Parties shall
 Adopt domestic criminal offences (participation in an organized criminal group, money
laundering, corruption, and obstruction of justice);
 Establish frameworks for extradition, mutual legal assistance, (asset forfeiture), and law
enforcement cooperation; and
 Promotion of training and technical assistance for building or upgrading the necessary capacity
of national authorities.
THERE IS NO EXTADICTION TREATY BEWEEN RUSSIA AND THE U.S.
The Treaty between the U.S. and the Russian Federation on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters
(MLAT) (1999) -- purpose of gathering and exchanging information in an effort to enforce public laws or
criminal laws (not extradition). Consider Snowden & Bout (by Thailand, U.S. declines to extradite him
to Russia.
Note that Spain will extradite a Russian to the U.S. suspected of cybercrimes, but not apparently not to
Russia (e.g.,Piotr Y. Levashov case) See Andrew E. Kramer, “A New Russian Ploy: Competing
Extradition Requests,” December 20, 2017, at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/20/world/europe/russia-
extradition-levashov.html (See also Russian Criminal Code 210, infra).

Organized Crime and Popular CultureOrganized Crime and Popular Culture
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According to US DoJAccording to US DoJ
Organized Crime Groups in generalOrganized Crime Groups in general
 . . . acquire a controlling interest in enterprises through state tenders
(privatizations), bankruptcy, etc.
 . . . commit violence or other acts which are likely to intimidate, or make actual or
implicit threats to do so;
 . . . exploit differences between countries to further their objectives, enriching their
organization, expanding its power, and/or avoiding detection/apprehension;
 . . . attempt to gain influence in government, politics, and commerce through
corrupt as well as legitimate means and through social media as well as “placing”
their people in government jobs;
 . . . have economic gain as their primary goal, not only from patently illegal
activities but also from investment in legitimate businesses; and
 . . . attempt to insulate both their leadership and membership from detection,
sanction, and/or prosecution through their organizational structure.
See https://www.justice.gov/criminal-ocgs/international-organized-crime
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Technological Advances Have AllowedTechnological Advances Have Allowed
Organized Crime Groups toOrganized Crime Groups to
 . . . commit new type of crimes that they could not accomplish previously (e.g.,
selling Personally Identifiable Information (PII), ransomware, theft of intellectual
property, etc.).
 . . . conduct more effectively traditional criminal activity (e.g., illicit trade in
narcotics, insurance fraud, etc.).
 . . . cooperate with others over long distances and across state borders and
dispose of the proceeds of crime (e.g., money laundering).
Law enforcement may use new technology against organized crime groups, many of
which are likely to lack the sophistication or efficiency to avoid security breaches
(e.g., cybersecurity, communication reliability).
* * * * *
Many cyber-criminals work within small groups that may not qualify as
criminal enterprises (or parts thereof) pursuant to RICO. Small
groups are harder to penetrate. However, can they monetize their
crimes (e.g. sell data stolen), or do they need outside assistance? 14

UNODC Topology for Organized Criminal Group StructuresUNODC Topology for Organized Criminal Group Structures
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/publications/Pilot_survey.pdfhttp://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/publications/Pilot_survey.pdf
Rigid hierarchy – single boss with strong internal discipline within
several divisions.
Devolved hierarchy – regional structures, each with its own hierarchy
and degree of autonomy.
Hierarchical conglomerate – a loose or umbrella association of
otherwise separate organized criminal groups.
Core criminal group – a horizontal structure of core individuals who
describe themselves as working for the same organization.
Organized criminal networks – individuals engaged in criminal
activity in shifting alliances, not necessarily affiliated with any crime
group, but according to skills they possess to carry out the illicit
activity.
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Managing Russian Organized Crime Groups?Managing Russian Organized Crime Groups?
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The ROC Business ModelThe ROC Business Model
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Generalizations Are True Until They Are Not:Generalizations Are True Until They Are Not:
Competing Models of Russian Organized Crime OperationsCompeting Models of Russian Organized Crime Operations
 Created by Russian state bodies or official (authorized or unauthorized)
(e.g. Putin’s Chef Yevgeny Prigozhin).
 State-capture by ROC scenarios (federal, regional, local).
 Forced cooperation by threatening consequences of failing to serve the
interest of state or corrupt individuals and other “contractor” variants (e.g.
hackers must cooperate or else – i.e. jail).
 Co-incidence of interest & nurtured by Russian state body (authorized &
unauthorized) – e.g. Nashi & StopGeorgia. Negotiated “benefits” for
cooperation.
 Degree of “State-Control” vs. “Incomplete State-Supervision” is highly
variable.
 Problems arise due to multiple Russian law enforcement and intelligence
bodies.
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Some Questions For the FutureSome Questions For the Future
 Can ROC find reliable and qualified individuals to fill its ranks in the future?
 Can the Russian authorities control ROC (internationally, domestically)? How is
policy made and executed in this area? How are favored ROC groups protected
from Russian law enforcement (as a matter of policy? Corruption?)?
 What can be done to make U.S. law enforcement more effective against ROC given
limited resources, competing priorities, and obstacles to coordination?
 Can Russian Private Military Companies (PMCs) and organized mercenaries, such
as Wagner deployed in Donbas, Syria and elsewhere, be targeted by foreign
governments without a risk of escalation? Is so-called “plausible deniability”
involving foreign operations aimed at foreign governments or Russian citizens?
 How great is the problem posed to the U.S. by the absence of transparency
regarding ownership of legal entities and what should be done (see Bayrock Group
-- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bayrock_Group)?
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2018 february - gulc symposium -- roc

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