3. Yeni fikirlerin 端r端n veya s端re巽lere
d旦n端t端r端lmesi
Yeni bulular脹n pazarlanabilir 端r端n
ve hizmet olarak pratik uygulamas脹
Bulu (Invention) 聴novasyon (Innovation)
Bulu vs Yenilik
4. 聴letme i巽i uygulamalarda, iyeri
organizasyonunda veya d脹 ilikilerde yeni veya
旦nemli derecede iyiletirilmi bir 端r端n (mal veya
hizmet), veya s端re巽, yeni bir pazarlama y旦ntemi
ya da yeni bir organizasyonel y旦ntemin
ger巽ekletirilmesidir.
聴novasyon (Yenilik)
Source: Oslo Manual.
11. r端n Yaam S端resi
Yenilik h脹z脹
Yeniliin Riski
T端keticiler
Rekabet
r端nlerin Karma脹kl脹脹
Daha k脹sa
聴vmelenerek art脹yor
Art脹yor
Daha fazlas脹n脹 talep ediyor
Uluslararas脹
Art脹yor
evrenin inovasyon a巽脹s脹ndan deimesi
Yeniliin Maliyeti Art脹yor
12. irket i巽i
gelitirme giderleri
Pazar Geliri
GEL聴RLER
G聴DERLER
Pazar Geliri
KAPALI 聴 MODEL聴
(聴MD聴)
Yeniliin Maliyet ve Getirisi
KAPALI 聴 MODEL聴
(ESK聴)
irket i巽i
gelitirme giderleri
13. Deerli fikir, bilgi ve teknolojiler hem firma i巽inden
hem de firma d脹脹ndan gelmelidir, benzer ekilde
firma i巽erisinde yarat脹lan fikir, bilgi ve teknolojiler de
dier firmalar taraf脹ndan farkl脹 pazarlarda
deerlendirilmelidir.
A巽脹k 聴novasyon
15. irket D脹脹 Bilgi ve Teknoloji Taban脹
Harici bilgi
Denizi
niversiteler
Arat脹rma
Kurumlar脹
Start-Up
.
Tedarik巽iler
M端teriler
Rakipler
16. A巽脹k 聴novasyon Gurusu
2000den fazla k端resel ortakl脹k
D端zinelerce radikal yenilik
H脹zland脹r脹lm脹 Yenilik S端reci
P&G ve ortaklar i巽in artan 端retkenlik
G端nde ortalama 20 yenilik fikri
18. A巽脹k 聴novasyon
D脹ar脹dan 聴巽eriye
A巽脹k 聴novasyon
聴巽eriden D脹ar脹ya
A巽脹k 聴novasyon
Lisans veya Patent Sat脹n Alma
Ortak ArGe
Ortak Giriim
Birleme ve Sat脹n Alma
Lisans veya Patent Hakk脹 Satma
Ortak Giriim
Oul Vermek
A巽脹k 聴novasyon Uygulamalar脹
19. Lisans Hakk脹 Sat脹n Alma
(Licence In)
Avantajlar
Teknolojiye H脹zl脹 Eriim
Maliyet ve Riskin Azalmas脹
Dezavantajlar
D脹ar脹ya Ba脹ml脹l脹k
ekirdek Yeteneklerin Kaybedilmesi
24. Oul Vermek
(Spin-Off)
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Xerox PARC脹n Oul Verdii irketlerin Pazar Deeri
Xerox
Adobe
Documentum
Komag
SynOptics
VLSI
3Com
Doc Sci
File Net
Objectshare
SDLI
Toplam
Kaynak: Chesbrough,2003. Open Innovation, The new imperative for creating and profiting from technology.
25. irket i巽i
gelitirme giderleri
Pazar Geliri Pazar Geliri
irket i巽i ve irket
d脹脹 gelitirme
giderleri
Lisans Sat脹 Geliri
Spin off
Yeni Pazarlar
Yeni
Gelirler
A巽脹k inovasyon nedeni ile oluan
zaman ve para tasarrufu
GEL聴RLER
G聴DERLER
irket i巽i
gelitirme giderleri
Pazar Geliri
Yeni 端r端n ve hizmetler
Birleme ve Sat脹n Alma
KAPALI 聴 MODEL聴
(聴MD聴)
KAPALI 聴 MODEL聴
(ESK聴)
AIK 聴
MODEL聴
Yeniliin Maliyet ve Getirisi
27. Motor Y旦netim Sistemi
Bosch / Almanya
Motor Soutma Mod端l端
Toyo/ Japonya
Klima
Behr/ Almanya
Lastikler
Madra/ Hindistan
Shaft
Sona Koyo/
Hindistan
Koltuklar ve D旦eme
Johnson
Controls/ ABD
Tasar脹m, i巽 dizayn
I.D.E.A/ Italya
Tasar脹m, i巽 dizayn
Trilix/ Hindistan
Tata Nano
28. Farkl脹 Sekt旦rler ile 聴birlikleri
Is脹y脹 belirli
aral脹kta
tutabilen kuma
teknolojisi
束Sal脹kl脹 Uyku損
vadeden yenilik
fikri
Radikal Yenilik
29. Farkl脹 Sekt旦rler ile 聴birlikleri
Gelitirme B端t巽esi: 1.2 milyon TL
Gelitirme S端resi: 8 ay
Lansman: 2013 Nisan
2013 B端y端me: %350
2013 Bayi Say脹s脹 Art脹脹: %300
30. Bilgiyi
Edinme
Bilgi
asimilasyonu
Bilgiyi
Kullanma
Bilgiyi
d旦n端t端rme
Emme Kabiliyeti
(Absorptive Capacity)
irketin faaliyet g旦sterdii
veya ilgili alanlarda, irket
d脹脹nda 端retilen bilgiyi tespit
edebilme ve edinebilme
yetenei.
Edinme
irket d脹脹 kaynaklardan
edinilen bilgileri analiz
etme, ileme, yorumlama ve
anlama s端reci.
Asimilasyon
D脹ar脹dan edinilen ve
asimilasyonu tamamlanan
bilginin mevcut bilgi ile
entegrasyonunu
kolaylat脹ran s端re巽ler
gelitirme yetenei.
D旦n端t端rme
irketin, d旦n端端m端
tamamlanan bilgiyi mevcut
yeteneklerini gelitirmek veya
yenilerini yaratmak ad脹na
kullanabilmesi.
Kullanma
#17: P&Gnin sayfas脹ndaki slogan
Hepimizin tek ba脹m脹za yapabileceinden 巽ok daha fazlas脹n脹 birlikte yapabiliriz.
#33: https://adrianfaccio.wordpress.com/2013/05/20/open-innovation-a-case-of-overcoming-the-not-sold-here-syndrome/
Open Innovation a case of overcoming the Not-Sold-HereSyndrome
Posted by Adrian Faccio on May 20, 2013
Posted in: MBA Essays. Tagged: change, management, Open Innovation, smart car. 9 Comments
It can be argued that the Not-Sold-Here Syndrome is perhaps one of the biggest obstacles facing new product development in companies today. Stifling innovation, clipping brilliant new ideas in the bud and restraining progress are just some of the implications of such a mindset. If these prejudices had not been overcome, a number of great products would not have made it off the drawing board. As a case in point is the Smart Car.
Love it or hate, it almost every motorist today has seen an example of the Smart Car on the road. An iconic and extremely fuel efficient two seat micro-car that has come to embody one of the most drastic steps ever taken in automotive history that of a watch manufacturer setting out to revolutionise the world of motoring.
It all started in the 1980s when Nicolas Hayek, the engineer and industrialist who founded the Swiss watch company, had the brilliant idea to develop a new car using the same type of manufacturing strategies and personalization features he had used for the then incredibly fashionable Swatch watches. However he did not have in mind just any type of car; he felt that the car industry had largely ignored a very popular sector that of a small and stylish city car that would have the fuel economy of around 3 litres per 100 kilometres with practicality and safety to match.
Although Swatch Group initially began to develop the car themselves, Nicolas believed that established motor manufacturers would feel threatened by his Swatchmobile, as it was now called, and as a result began to look around for a potential partner. In 1991 an agreement was reached with Volkswagen to share the development of the new project. Not only would this help relieve the cost burden on Swatch but it would also enable the new product to leverage off the automotive manufacturing know-how of Volkswagen as well as eventually benefiting from an established selling and distribution network when the Swatchmobile was eventually brought to market. [1]
Unfortunately this arrangement did not last long. In 1993 a new CEO at Volkswagen brought down the axe on the joint venture in order to develop Volkswagens own subcompact car, the Lupo. This was because it was believed by the powers that be to be a better business proposition, featuring four seats and more cargo room. [1]
Thus left in the lurch, Swatch was forced to look around again for another partner. Rejected by BMW, Fiat, General Motors and Renault, it was eventually Mercedes Benz, (then Daimler-Chrysler) with whom Swatch teamed up. Not only did it prove to be the saving grace of the Swatch project and the partnership that eventually brought the car to market, this partnership was a very drastic move on the part of Mercedes, as the company was traditionally known for its C, E and S class luxury saloons and coupes. As one of the most premium brands on the market, venturing into the sub-city car class could be a rather risky move. One can only think how such an idea was opposed in the companys boardroom by more traditional directors possibly claiming that the car was not one to be sold here.
Never the less, the two companies prevailed and the Smart car took the market by storm in late 1998. Still in production today, albeit in only slightly modified form, its popularity has skyrocketed in the face of rising fuel prices and city traffic jams. Involvement in the project even helped channel Mercedes thinking along the lines of developing the successful A-class which to a degree is a big brother of the tiny Smart. In the end, it proved to be a very smart move by both Swatch and Mercedes.