2. ? Authentication defends the universe of connectivity against
attackers by verifying identities at entry points to manage
security.
? This identification applies to both entities that manipulate
data.
? Communicating entities should identify one another.
? Information exchanged during communication should be
validated as regards its origin, time, content, and so on.
? Therefore, authentication is usually divided into two major
classes:
1.Entity authentication
2.Message authentication.
3. ? Authentication refers to the process to guarantee
that an entity is who it claims to be or that
information has not been changed by an
unauthorized party.
? Classification of authentication based on the
security objective specific to a service
1. Message authentication,
2. Entity authentication,
3. Key authentication,
4. Nonrepudiation, and
5. Access control
4. Authentication - classification
? Message authentication assures the integrity
and origin of the information.
? Synonyms for message authentication:
1. Data integrity preserves the information from
unauthorized alteration
2. Data origin authentication assures the identity
of the data originator;
5. Authentication - classification
? Entity authentication, also named endpoint
authentication or identification, assures both the
identity and the presence of the claimant at the
time of the process.
? The timely verification of one’s identity is either
mutual or unilateral
? Mutual - when both parties (sender and receiver)
are confirmed with each other
? Unilateral - if only one party is assured of the
other’s identity.
6. Authentication - classification
Key authentication
? assures the linkage of an entity and its key(s),
? Key authentication plays a vital role in the
Internet age when users cannot meet face-to-face
to exchange keys or know each other personally
to verify the keys.
? Trusted third parties step in as the certification
authority (CA) - responsible for vouching for the
key’s authenticity, such as binding keys to distinct
individuals, maintaining certificate usage, and
revoking certifications.
7. Authentication - classification
Nonrepudiation
? prevents an entity from denying its previous
action; often, a trusted third party is needed to
resolve a dispute due to an entity denying that it
committed a certain action or no action.
Access control
? following successful entity authentication, posts
selective restrictions on an entity to use
data/resources.
8. Entity authentication Vs Message
authentication
1. Entity authentication in real time: Alice and
Bob, both active in the communication, assure
each other’s identity with no time delay.
2. Message authentication in an elastic time
frame: Alice and Bob exchange messages with
assurance of the integrity and the origin of the
messages even at a later time.
9. Fixed-password
schemes
? are considered as weak authentication
because they are subjected to attacks by
eavesdropping and exhaustive searching.
? Various techniques are applied to fixed-
password schemes to strengthen secrecy. The
password is
– encrypted to make it unintelligible
– salted/augmented with a random string to
increase the complexity of dictionary attack.
10. Authentication and secrecy
? Authentication was intrinsically connected
with secrecy.
? However, authentication does not require
secrecy, as the discovery of hash functions and
digital signatures showed.
11. Symmetric Vs Asymmetric key
encryption
? Symmetric-key encryption is one-key
cryptography with a shared secret key;
? Asymmetric-key encryption is two-key
cryptography with a pair of one public key and
one private key;
? A hash function is unkeyed cryptography with
no key.
12. Hash Function
? A hash function is a one-way function that maps a
binary string of arbitrary length to a binary string
of fixed length, called a hash value, which serves
as a compact representative of the input string.
? Two features that make hash functions useful for
authentication are
1. It is computationally infeasible to find two distinct
inputs with the same hash values, that is, two colliding
inputs x and y such that h(x) = h(y).
2. It is computationally infeasible, given a specific hash
value v, to find an input x with the hash value v, that
is, given v, to preimage x such that h(x) = v.
14. Message authentication
? Hash functions may be used for data integrity to
authenticate messages without keeping the
secrecy of the messages. A typical process of data
integrity with a hash function works as follows:
– Alice computes the hash value corresponding to a
message and then sends the message to Bob, along
with its hash value.
– Bob computes the hash value corresponding to the
received message and compares his computed hash
value with the extracted hash value. The comparison
verifies if the message has been altered or not.
15. Digital Signature
? Hash functions may also be used for digital signatures. A
digital signature binds an entity’s identity to an information
with a tag called the signature. A typical process is shown
here:
– Alice signs a long message by computing its hash value and
then sends the message to Bob along with its hash value,
usually encrypted as her signature.
– Bob receives the message, computes its hash value, and verifies
that the received signature matches the hash value.
? Noncollision property of hash functions prevents Alice
from claiming later to have signed another message
because the signature on one message would not be the
same as that on another.
16. Entity Authentication
? Using a one-way (nonreversible) function of
the shared key and the challenge,
– a claimant proves its knowledge of the shared key
by providing a verifier with the hash value rather
than the key, and
– the verifier can check if the delivered hash value
matches the computed hash value to assure the
claimant’s identity.
? The challenge is to prevent replay attacks.
18. Parties in entity authentication
? Claimant (prover): An entity that declares its
identity as a message, often in response to an
earlier message as challenge–response protocols,
to demonstrate that it is the genuine entity.
? Verifier: Another entity that corroborates that
the identity of the claimant is indeed as declared
by checking the correctness of the message,
thereby preventing impersonation.
? Trusted third party: An entity that mediates
between two parties to offer an identity
verification service as a trusted authority.
19. Objectives of entity authentication
? Conclusive: The outcome of entity authentication is either
completion with acceptance of the claimant’s identity as
authentic or termination as rejection.
? Transferability: Identification is not transferable so as not to
allow a verifier reuse an identification exchange with a
claimant to impersonate the claimant to a third party.
? Impersonation: No entity can impersonate a claimant.
20. Factors of entity authentication
? Something known: The claimant demonstrates the
knowledge of a secret by such means as passwords, personal
identification numbers (PINs), shared secret keys, or private
keys.
? Something possessed: The claimant typically presents a
physical token functioning as a passport. Examples are
magnetic-stripe cards, smart cards, and smartphones to
provide time-variant passwords.
? Something inherent: The claimant provides the biometrics
inherited in human physical characteristics and involuntary
actions. Examples are fingerprints, retinal patterns, walking
gait, and dynamic keyboarding characteristics. These
techniques have now been extended beyond authentication
of human individuals to device fingerprints.
21. Levels of entity authentication
? Strong authentication: Entity authentication techniques
using at least two factors are called strong authentication.
Challenge–response protocols are strong authentication, in
which a claimant proves its identity to a verifier by
demonstrating knowledge of a secret known to be
associated with the claimant, without revealing the secret
itself to the verifier during protocol execution.
? Weak authentication: Entity authentication schemes are
considered weak if previously unknown parties verify their
identities without involving trusted third parties.
? Zero-knowledge (ZK) authentication: Authentication
protocols based on zero knowledge do not reveal any
partial information at execution.
22. Challenge-response authentication
? is a group or family of protocols characterized by one entity sending a challenge to
another entity. The second entity must respond with the appropriate answer to be
authenticated.
? Examples:
– Password authentication: The challenge is from a server asking the client for a password to
authenticate the client's identity so that the client can be served.
– Most smart card systems use challenge-response authentication. These systems require at
least two things for authentication and entry: the smart card and the user’s password.
– CAPTCHA, a form of reverse-Turing test for the system to determine if the client is a human or
not. This is used to prevent spam and auto-registration of new accounts for a website or
email.
– Biometric systems are another form of challenge-response authentication.
? In cryptography,
– zero-knowledge password proof and key agreement systems such as secure remote password,
– CRAM-MD5 and secure shell's challenge-response system based on RSA
are considered to be very sophisticated challenge-response algorithms.
24. Objective
? To remove errant nodes from VANET.
? Node-eviction schemes accompany
authentication mechanisms in network
security
25. Node-eviction schemes
Vote:
? Local eviction of attackers by voting evaluators
(LEAVE) protocol.
? The CA collects accusations from different nodes
that have witnessed a node’s misbehavior and,
on reaching a threshold, revokes the node being
accused.
? Vote schemes equip individuals with a rapid
reaction and self-protection.
? However, voting becomes an injustice when there
exist more deceptive nodes than honest ones.
26. Node-eviction schemes
Police:
? The police class is effective for revocation in
transportation, but largely unexplored in VANET.
? A special vehicle, such as a police car, patrols the
network of roads and revokes any misbehaving
nodes immediately on detection.
? This class is accurate, as the evidence is first
hand, but its speed depends on the chance of a
node being caught, though the eviction is made
instantly.
27. Node-eviction schemes
Abstinence:
? At the extreme of reputation schemes, the abstinence
class keeps its ratings of others to itself.
? On experiencing a bad node’s misbehavior, the node
takes a passive role of staying away from the bad node
but provides no reporting, expecting other nodes to
eventually remove the bad node from the network.
? Each node can take one of the three actions in a
revocation process: abstain, vote, or commit suicide.
28. ? Various factors affect the performance of
node-eviction schemes:
? The topology of roads, spread of RSUs, speed
of vehicles, drivers’ behavior, and number of
malicious nodes are just some examples.
29. Simulation
? Node eviction scheme is simulated using
Recursive porous agent simulation toolkit
(Repast).
? It separates the malicious nodes from the
honest nodes between the two network
classes.
30. ? The simulation scenario consists of a circular
road setup in the grid, where vehicles at
different speeds cycle around the road and
communicate with one another or the RSU
when in close proximity.
? The RSU relays information to the CA. The
behavior of the system components is
dependent on the scheme used.
31. ? Node eviction process separates all nodes into
two subnets: Subnet I and Subnet II.
? A node, which is good or bad, initially joins any of
the two subnets by convenience.
? A state transition occurs when a node moves
from Subnet I to Subnet II, or vice versa.
? Subnet I or Subnet II will finally converge into the
same kind of nodes, i.e., good or bad only in each
subnet.
? Each node maintains a List of other nodes Valid
Certificates (LVC).
32. ? The vote class performed the best in terms of average vulnerability
time, because every incident triggers segregation, and only half of
the population is required to vote a node out by our setting the
threshold at 0.5.
? The police class took second place, since it segregated a bad node
once the police catches a node sending a rogue message.
? The abstinence class performs the worst, since a bad node is moved
to Subnet II only if all nodes remove it from their LVC.