1. The document discusses several examples of competition between individuals or groups over resources such as food, mates, and territory.
2. Key concepts discussed include evolutionary stable strategies, the hawk-dove game, ideal free distribution of resources among competitors, producers and scroungers strategies, and alternative mating strategies involving different morphs or behaviors.
3. Alternative strategies can be maintained in a population at an equilibrium, and in some cases strategies may cycle over time, as seen in examples of side-blotched lizards and ruffs.
2. Evolutionaryily Stable Strategy(ESS) ݻ
(Smith & Price, 1973)
A strategy that was adopted by all members of a population,
cannot be bettered by alternative strategy.
ESS
2
4. The stable mixture
V<C
h = the proportion of Hawks in population
H average= -25h + 50 (1-h)
D average= 0 h + 25 (1-h)
h = 1/2 In V<C ? V/C (the stable proportion of Hawks)
If V>C, then Hawk is an ESS!
4
5. Competition by exploitation : the ideal free distribution
The ideal free model ģ (Fretwell, 1972)
YԴSėa
ߵr£wڅ
춸^ٵĵYԴء
Fig. 5.1 The ideal free distribution.
5
11. Fish and Ducks settle in a stable distribution between feeding patches.
Numerical prediction ֵAy
Equal intake prediction zȡAy
Prey risk prediction
CLUAy
11
12. Competing for mates: dung flies
What is the optimum time to spend waiting for
females at each cowpat?
12
15. The ideal free distribution with unequal competitors
2:1
The Competitive unit model
(Parker & Sutherland, 1986)
Hypothesis:
the number of competitive units ,
rather than the number of
individual, is equalized across
patches.
8:4
8:4
Fig. 5.5
15
17. Leaf is not a
homogeneous habitat.
Average success is equal on leaves of different quality,
but individuals near the leaf base do better.
17
18. The economics of resource defence
Economic defendability ĿɷR (Brown, 1964)
Fig. 5.7
18
19. Box 5.1
The Economics of territory defence in the
Golden-Winged sunbird
(Gill & Wolf, 1975)
Metabolic costs
Forage time
Net energy saving
of defending
Extra cost of defence
19
20. The economics of resource defence
Shared resource defence YԴĹͬR
With satellite
NO satellite
With satellite
Fig. 5.8
20
24. Variation could also be maintained in a
population even if there was no difference in
competitive ability between individuals.
24
25. The stable equilibrium frequency
of producers and scroungers
Covered
(Mottley & Giraldeau, 2000)
Uncovered
pridected
stable
equilibrium
25
26. Alternative mating strategies and tactics Ľcg
Strategy
A genetically based decision rule, so differences between
strategies are due to differences in gene.
Tactic
A behaviour pattern played as part of a strategy.
26
27. Conditional strategies with alternative tactics
Natterjack toads:
callers & satellites
(Arak, 1983)
ɱ
callers
satellites
Fig. 5.11
27
28. Satellite males make adaptive choice concerning
which callers to parasitize.
Fig. 5.12
28