Cisco Cyber Threat Defense
Mikhail Rodionov
Business Development Manager
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1. Cisco Cyber Threat Defense
Mikhail Rodionov
Business Development Manager
mrodiono@cisco.com
2. 息 仂仄仗舒仆亳 Cisco 亳 (亳仍亳) 亠亠 亟仂亠仆亳亠 从仂仄仗舒仆亳亳, 2013 亞. 亠 仗舒于舒 亰舒亳亠仆. 2
Discuss the growing security problem customers
are facing that is not addressed by traditional
security products and technologies
Define Ciscos unique approach to this problem
Describe the Cisco Cyber Threat Defense Solution
and explain why Cisco can provide the security
telemetry
Show why the solution provides unique
differentiated value
7. 息 仂仄仗舒仆亳 Cisco 亳 (亳仍亳) 亠亠 亟仂亠仆亳亠 从仂仄仗舒仆亳亳, 2013 亞. 亠 仗舒于舒 亰舒亳亠仆. 7
keep our doors locked to stop good people from coming in
Firewall
IPS
Web Sec
N-AV
Email Sec
Customized Threat Bypasses
Security Gateways
Threat Spreads
Inside Perimeter
Once inside the perimeter, a command and control channel that'll open up
Only the network can have the appropriate level visibility and intelligence
to detect these threats
Servers
8. 息 仂仄仗舒仆亳 Cisco 亳 (亳仍亳) 亠亠 亟仂亠仆亳亠 从仂仄仗舒仆亳亳, 2013 亞. 亠 仗舒于舒 亰舒亳亠仆. 8
Network Reconnaissance Data Leakage
Internally Propagating
Malware
Botnet Command
And Control
9. 息 仂仄仗舒仆亳 Cisco 亳 (亳仍亳) 亠亠 亟仂亠仆亳亠 从仂仄仗舒仆亳亳, 2013 亞. 亠 仗舒于舒 亰舒亳亠仆. 9
Mandiant 2012 survey
Organizations were
compromised ~ 416
days before
attackers were
discovered
In 100% of cases,
the bad guys used
valid credentials
Each incident was
discovered by 3rd
party only
X X X
X O X
X X O
O
10. 息 仂仄仗舒仆亳 Cisco 亳 (亳仍亳) 亠亠 亟仂亠仆亳亠 从仂仄仗舒仆亳亳, 2013 亞. 亠 仗舒于舒 亰舒亳亠仆. 10
What Our Customers are Telling Us:
We assume were already compromised
Over 50% of threats are customized to my environment
We had a single actor gaining access by three different methods all in a
days work
I have enough storage for 30 days, my adversary went to sleep for 31
days. When I increased my storage to 60 days, they figured it out and
changed their attack to match my storage capability
14. Workload
s
Apps /
Services
Infrastruc
ture
public
tenan
hybrid
private
Any-To-Any Network
Gloval and Local
Threat Detection
Blending of Personal
& Business Use
Access Assets through
Multiple Medians Services
Identity Awareness
Sees All Traffic
Routes All Requests
Sources All Data
Controls All Flows
Handles All Devices
Touches All UsersShapes All Streams
Behavioral Analysis
Encryption
Device Visibility Policy Enforcement
Access Control
Threat Defense
18. 息 仂仄仗舒仆亳 Cisco 亳 (亳仍亳) 亠亠 亟仂亠仆亳亠 从仂仄仗舒仆亳亳, 2013 亞. 亠 仗舒于舒 亰舒亳亠仆. 18
Private
Cloud
Hybrid
Cloud
SaaS
ANY DEVICE ANY CLOUD
Secure
Access
Firewall IPS Web
Gateway
Email
Gateway
Policy
VPN
Data
Center
Next
Gen
Applia
nce
Cloud
#1 Market Share
Applia
nce
Attach
ed
Applia
nce
Hosted
19. 息 仂仄仗舒仆亳 Cisco 亳 (亳仍亳) 亠亠 亟仂亠仆亳亠 从仂仄仗舒仆亳亳, 2013 亞. 亠 仗舒于舒 亰舒亳亠仆. 19
A
B
C
C
B
A
CA
B
We can see:
- source address,
- destination address,
- number of packets transferred during
that session,
- and a timestamp of the session
21. 息 仂仄仗舒仆亳 Cisco 亳 (亳仍亳) 亠亠 亟仂亠仆亳亠 从仂仄仗舒仆亳亳, 2013 亞. 亠 仗舒于舒 亰舒亳亠仆. 21
Sampled Net Flow
Incomplete Visibility
Less than 5% of traffic
used to generate NetFlow
telemetry
Insufficient telemetry for
threat detection
Full Unsampled Net Flow
No Blind Spots
All traffic is used to
generate NetFlow telemetry
Pre-requisite for effective
threat detection
Only a Cisco Catalyst Switch Can Deliver Unsampled NetFlow at Line-
Rate Without Any Data Plane Performance Impact
24. 息 仂仄仗舒仆亳 Cisco 亳 (亳仍亳) 亠亠 亟仂亠仆亳亠 从仂仄仗舒仆亳亳, 2013 亞. 亠 仗舒于舒 亰舒亳亠仆. 24
The most complex,
custom-written,
dangerous security
threats (e.g. APTs)
Threats that lurk in
networks for months or
years stealing vital
information and
disrupting operations
Data leakage
Network
reconnaissance
Network interior
malware
proliferation
Command and
control traffic
Cisco Cyber Threat
Defense (CTD) focuses on:
Focus of this class of threats
and Cisco CTD use cases:
27. 息 仂仄仗舒仆亳 Cisco 亳 (亳仍亳) 亠亠 亟仂亠仆亳亠 从仂仄仗舒仆亳亳, 2013 亞. 亠 仗舒于舒 亰舒亳亠仆. 27
High Concern Index indicates
a significant number of
suspicious events that deviate
from established baselines
Host
Groups
Host CI CI% Alarms Alerts
Desktops 10.10.101.118 338,137,280 8,656
%
High Concern
index
Ping, Ping_Scan,
TCP_Scan
Monitor and baseline activity for a host and within host
groups.
28. 息 仂仄仗舒仆亳 Cisco 亳 (亳仍亳) 亠亠 亟仂亠仆亳亠 从仂仄仗舒仆亳亳, 2013 亞. 亠 仗舒于舒 亰舒亳亠仆. 28
Whats about
10.10.101.89?
Policy Start
Active time
Alarm Source Source Host
Groups
Target Details
Desktops
& Trusted
Wireless
Jan 3, 2013 Suspect Data
Loss
10.10.101.89 Atlanta,
Desktops
Multiple Hosts Observed 4.82 Gbytes.
Policy maximum allows up
to 500Mbytes.
30. 息 仂仄仗舒仆亳 Cisco 亳 (亳仍亳) 亠亠 亟仂亠仆亳亠 从仂仄仗舒仆亳亳, 2013 亞. 亠 仗舒于舒 亰舒亳亠仆. 30
C
I2 I4
A
Local
intelligence
Who
What
How
Where
When
From your network
Cisco Security
Intelligence
Operations
From Ciscos global
threat analysis system
亠仗舒亳
亰舒亳仄仂-
亟亠亶于亳
APP 亳仍仂亢亠仆亳
URL 弌舒亶
SecurityIntelligenceOperations
31. 息 仂仄仗舒仆亳 Cisco 亳 (亳仍亳) 亠亠 亟仂亠仆亳亠 从仂仄仗舒仆亳亳, 2013 亞. 亠 仗舒于舒 亰舒亳亠仆. 31
Users/Devices Cisco
Identity
Services
Engine
(ISE)
Network Based
Application
Recognition
(NBAR)
NetFlow
Secure
Event
Logging
(NSEL)
Link flows with
user identity
Dig out key
application information
from a stream
while data
flows through it
A special form of
log event
helps identify
accepted and rejected
connections
32. 息 仂仄仗舒仆亳 Cisco 亳 (亳仍亳) 亠亠 亟仂亠仆亳亠 从仂仄仗舒仆亳亳, 2013 亞. 亠 仗舒于舒 亰舒亳亠仆. 32
Policy Start
Active
Time
Alarm Source Source
Host
Groups
Source
User Name
Device
Type
Target
Deskto
ps &
Trusted
Wireles
s
Jan 3,
2013
Suspect
Data Loss
10.10.101
.89
Atlanta,
Desktops
John
Chambers
Apple-
iPad
Multiple
Hosts
Attribute flows and behaviors to a user and device
33. 息 仂仄仗舒仆亳 Cisco 亳 (亳仍亳) 亠亠 亟仂亠仆亳亠 从仂仄仗舒仆亳亳, 2013 亞. 亠 仗舒于舒 亰舒亳亠仆. 33
Flow Action field can provide additional context
State-based NSEL reporting is taken into consideration in
StealthWatchs behavioral analysis
Concern Index points accumulated for Flow Denied events
36. 息 仂仄仗舒仆亳 Cisco 亳 (亳仍亳) 亠亠 亟仂亠仆亳亠 从仂仄仗舒仆亳亳, 2013 亞. 亠 仗舒于舒 亰舒亳亠仆. 36
Devices Access
Catalyst速 3750-X
BranchCampus
Catalyst速 3560-X
Catalyst速 4500
Catalyst速 4500
Access Point
Access Point
Distribution
Catalyst速
3750-X
Stack
WLC
Catalyst
速 6500
Edge
Site-
to-
Site
VPN
ASA
ISR
Catalyst
速 6500
Remote
Access
Cisco
ISE
Management
StealthWatch
Management
Console
StealthWatch
FlowCollector
NetFlow
Capable
Correlate and
display Flow and
Identity Info
Cisco TrustSec:
Access Control,
Profiling and
Posture
NetFlow
Identity
AAA services,
profiling and posture
assessment
Collect and
analyze NetFlow
Records
Scalable
NetFlow
Infrastructure
3
37. 息 仂仄仗舒仆亳 Cisco 亳 (亳仍亳) 亠亠 亟仂亠仆亳亠 从仂仄仗舒仆亳亳, 2013 亞. 亠 仗舒于舒 亰舒亳亠仆. 37
CRISIS REGION
ImpacttotheBusiness($)
Time
credit card data
compromised
*
attack
identified
*
vulnerability
closed
*
CRISIS REGION
Security Problems
Worm outbreaks can impact
revenue by up to $250k per
hour. StealthWatch pays for
itself in 30 minutes.
F500 Media Conglomerate
attack
onset
*
StealthWatch
Reduces
MTTK
*attack
thwarted
*early
warning
*attack
identified
*
vulnerability
closed
Company with
StealthWatch
Company with
Legacy
Monitoring Tools
39. 息 仂仄仗舒仆亳 Cisco 亳 (亳仍亳) 亠亠 亟仂亠仆亳亠 从仂仄仗舒仆亳亳, 2013 亞. 亠 仗舒于舒 亰舒亳亠仆. 39
CEC website: wwwin.cisco.com/stg/cyber/
For EBC/TDM decks, design and how-to guides, and training VoD links
CCO website: www.cisco.com/go/threatdefense/
Customer-facing versions of the DIG and how-to guides (Note: Need to scroll
about halfway down the page)
Cyber Threat Defense area on Highwire
For training decks, VMware images, other demo supporting information
Demo pods available via http://securitytme.cisco.com
Aliases: cyber-pm and cyber-tm
41. 息 仂仄仗舒仆亳 Cisco 亳 (亳仍亳) 亠亠 亟仂亠仆亳亠 从仂仄仗舒仆亳亳, 2013 亞. 亠 仗舒于舒 亰舒亳亠仆. 46
Identifying BotNet Command & Control Activity. BotNets are
implanted in the enterprise to execute commands from their Bot
herders to send SPAM, Denial of Service attacks, or other
malicious acts.
Revealing Data Loss. Code can be hidden in the enterprise to
export of sensitive information back to the attacker. This Data
Leakage may occur rapidly or over time.
Detecting Sophisticated and Persistent Threats. Malware that
makes it past perimeter security can remain in the enterprise
waiting to strike as lurking threats. These may be zero day threats
that do not yet have an antivirus signature or be hard to detect for
other reasons.
Finding Internally Spread Malware. Network interior malware
proliferation can occur across hosts for the purpose gathering
security reconnaissance data, data exfiltration or network
backdoors.
Uncovering Network Reconnaissance. Some attacks will probe
the network looking for attack vectors to be utilized by custom-
crafted cyber threats.
42. 息 仂仄仗舒仆亳 Cisco 亳 (亳仍亳) 亠亠 亟仂亠仆亳亠 从仂仄仗舒仆亳亳, 2013 亞. 亠 仗舒于舒 亰舒亳亠仆. 47
Devic
es
Internal Network
Use NetFlow Data to
Extend Visibility to the
Access Layer
Unify Into a Single Pane
of Glass for Detection,
Investigation and
Reporting
Enrich Flow Data With
Identity, Events and
Application to Create
Context
WHO
WHAT
WHERE
WHEN
HOW
Hardware-
enabled
NetFlow
Switch
Cisco ISE
Cisco ISR G2
+ NBAR
Cisco ASA +
NSEL
Cont
ext