Adapting To The Age Of Anonymous
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Joshua Corman gave a presentation about adapting to Anonymous in the age of chaotic actors. He began by providing background on himself and his research interests. He then discussed understanding Anonymous by deconstructing it and looking at its rise, different sects, and levels of involvement. Corman addressed adapting to Anonymous by looking at escalation risks and the need for improved security strategies. He concluded by discussing the possibility of building a better version of Anonymous that is focused on positive goals.
![About Joshua Corman
Director of Security Intelligence for Akamai Technologies
Former Research Director, Enterprise Security [The 451 Group]
Former Principal Security Strategist [IBM ISS]
Industry Experience
Expert Faculty: The Institute for Applied Network Security (IANS)
2009 NetworkWorld Top 10 Tech People to Know
Co-Founder of Rugged Software www.ruggedsoftware.org
Things Ive been researching
Compliance vs Security
Disruptive Security for Disruptive Innovations
Chaotic Actors
Espionage
Security Metrics
2 息2011 Akamai](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/cormansourcebcn2011compressed-111128062643-phpapp01/85/Adapting-To-The-Age-Of-Anonymous-2-320.jpg)
![Anonymous* Unmasked? [*Alleged]
息2011 Akamai](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/cormansourcebcn2011compressed-111128062643-phpapp01/85/Adapting-To-The-Age-Of-Anonymous-13-320.jpg)
Adapting To The Age Of Anonymous
- 1. Adapting to the Age of Anonymous SOURCE Barcelona - November 17, 2011 Joshua Corman Director of Security Intelligence @joshcorman http://cognitivedissidents.wordpress.com/ 息2011 Akamai
- 2. About Joshua Corman Director of Security Intelligence for Akamai Technologies Former Research Director, Enterprise Security [The 451 Group] Former Principal Security Strategist [IBM ISS] Industry Experience Expert Faculty: The Institute for Applied Network Security (IANS) 2009 NetworkWorld Top 10 Tech People to Know Co-Founder of Rugged Software www.ruggedsoftware.org Things Ive been researching Compliance vs Security Disruptive Security for Disruptive Innovations Chaotic Actors Espionage Security Metrics 2 息2011 Akamai
- 3. Agenda Understanding Anonymous in under 7 minutes Deconstructing Anonymous Adapting to Anonymous Building a Better Anonymous? 息2011 Akamai
- 4. Understanding Anonymous: The Rise of the Chaotic Actor Joshua Corman @joshcorman Director of Security Intelligence Akamai Technologies 2011 FlashTalks powered by PechaKucha 息2011 Akamai
- 5. 5 息2011 Akamai
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- 7. Paradox 際際滷/Deliberate Disinformation 息2011 Akamai
- 8. http://www.csoonline.com/article/682511/the-rise-of-the-chaotic-actor-understanding-anonymous-and-ourselves 息2011 Akamai
- 9. Some men just want to see the world burn 9 息2011 Akamai
- 10. Lots & Lots of Anonymous Sects 10 息2011 Akamai
- 11. Your Headline Here (in Title Caps) 11 息2011 Akamai
- 12. You Choose Your Own Level of Involvement 12 息2011 Akamai
- 13. Anonymous* Unmasked? [*Alleged] 息2011 Akamai
- 14. You Choose Your Own Level of Involvement 14 息2011 Akamai
- 15. You Choose Your Own Level of Involvement 15 息2011 Akamai
- 16. Escalation? 16 息2011 Akamai
- 17. Anomalous Anonymous? 17 息2011 Akamai
- 18. False Flags: Adaptive Persistent Adversaries Anonymous is Gods gift to the Chinese CISO 息2011 Akamai
- 19. Cyber-Neo-McCarthyism I am not now nor have I ever been a member of Anonymous. 息2011 Akamai
- 20. Building a Better Anonymous 20 息2011 Akamai
- 21. Building a Better Anonymous 21 息2011 Akamai
- 22. The easy answers Suggested Background 息2011 Akamai
- 23. Joshua Corman @joshcorman 23 息2011 Akamai
- 24. Agenda Understanding Anonymous in under 7 minutes Deconstructing Anonymous Adapting to Anonymous Building a Better Anonymous? 息2011 Akamai
- 25. PANEL: Whoever Fights Monsters 息2011 Akamai
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- 30. Operation Payback (Anonymous Takes Center Stage) August-December 2010 Initial Targets MPAA RIAA Intellectual Property Offices In December, switched to WikiLeaks defense Financial services: PayPal, Mastercard, Visa Public personas: Lieberman, Palin Others: Lawyers, security researchers Stats: 1k-3k attackers in IRC 1500 copies of LOIC in Hivemind (# in IRC/2) 1.5 Gbps peak attack traffic (# in IRC/2) 750 Mbps sustained traffic (# in IRC/4) 息2011 Akamai
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- 34. Discussion 息2011 Akamai
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- 39. http://cognitivedissidents.wordpress.com/2011/11/11/an-anonymous-ink-blot-rorschach/ An Anonymous Ink Blot Rorschach What do you see in the Anonymous Ink Blot ? BRAND POLLUTION 息2011 Akamai
- 40. BRAND POLLUTION 息2011 Akamai
- 41. BRAND POLLUTION 息2011 Akamai
- 42. False Cover: Criminal and State Actors Anonymous is Gods gift to the Chinese CISO 息2011 Akamai
- 43. 息2011 Akamai
- 44. Agenda Understanding Anonymous in under 7 minutes Deconstructing Anonymous Adapting to Anonymous Building a Better Anonymous? 息2011 Akamai
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- 49. DDoS is Legion 74% of surveyed companies experienced one or more DDoS attacks in the past year, 31% of these attacks resulting in service disruption.1 1 Forrester Research 息2011 Akamai
- 50. Some of my data 600 Typical Attack Size: 3-10 Gbps 500 Large Attack Size: 100-200 Gbps 400 Number of Attacks Attacks are originating from all geographies and are moving between geographies 300 during the attack 200 100 0 2009 2010 2011 息2011 Akamai
- 51. July 4th 7th 2009 DDoS Attack 400,000 Korean Bots Attack Key U.S. Government Web Sites Times Above Agency PROTECTED Peak Traffic Normal Traffic U.S. Government Customer 1 124 Gbps 598x U.S. Government Customer 2 32 Gbps 369x U.S. Government Customer 3 9 Gbps 39x U.S. Government Customer 4 9 Gbps 19x U.S. Government Customer 5 2 Gbps 9x U.S. Government Customer 6 1.9 Gbps 6x New U.S. Government Customer 0.7 Gbps SITE DOWN before Akamai 息2011 Akamai
- 52. Agenda Understanding Anonymous in under 7 minutes Deconstructing Anonymous Adapting to Anonymous Building a Better Anonymous? 息2011 Akamai
- 53. Agenda 息2011 Akamai
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- 59. Discussion 息2011 Akamai
- 60. Thank You! Barcelona, November 17, 2011 Joshua Corman @joshcorman http://cognitivedissidents.wordpress.com/ 息2011 Akamai
Editor's Notes
- #6: Rorschach Test: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rorschach_testWe see in Anonymous what we WANT to see.. We project. Our perceptions say more about us than they do about the multitude of subgroups/causes in Anonymous.
- #7: There isnt AN anonymous either there are dozens.It is more of a franchise than an Organization.
- #9: http://www.csoonline.com/article/682511/the-rise-of-the-chaotic-actor-understanding-anonymous-and-ourselves
- #11: Family Tree IMG SOURCE: http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-XS0av6GQlIE/TheLlBBprTI/AAAAAAAAAIU/f6aABTtPyVE/s1600/tree.jpg
- #14: Operation Payback LOIC-ers
- #20: IMG Source: http://eandres.glogster.com/Whitchhunt-/
- #21: IMG SOURCE: http://www.toonpool.com/cartoons/Leviathan_41513#img9Two logical outcomesA Hobbes-ian Leviathan will rise to police the brand borne of necessity and convenienceThe Brand will be contaminated and the MoralAnons will fleeThis is Social Contract Theory 101 stuffHobbes: The State of Nature is a State of WarLocke: The State of Nature is a State of Inconvenience
- #22: IMG SOURCE: http://www.toonpool.com/cartoons/Leviathan_41513#img9Two logical outcomesA Hobbes-ian Leviathan will rise to police the brand borne of necessity and convenienceThe Brand will be contaminated and the MoralAnons will fleeThis is Social Contract Theory 101 stuffHobbes: The State of Nature is a State of WarLocke: The State of Nature is a State of Inconvenience