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Editor's Notes

• #2: The idea of virtue and character in social work can seem rather quantly old fashioned, and talk of morality can seem something more closesely associated with the philanthropic and evangeliststs Victorian origins of social work than with its modern identity. Modern soicla work is sometime presentedd as a professionl technical ration al practice guided by poloiyc and procideure and bounded with ehticak codes and codes of conduct.We do not propose to argue against regulation or the codification of corretbehaviour, Rather we want to argue that althouhg necessary this is insufuuficuent to ensuring that social workers practice well.Rather than assuming the moral philosophy is some sort of qaunt intellectual excerecise we want to argue that virtue, and bing of good character is at the heart of social work, that social work is a moral practice, and that contromorary social workers need to be ethicall fluent as much as, if not more than, evidnce informed.In partocular we eill argue that virtue ethics, the ethics of care, and values inherent in indigenous practice can all contribute to ensuring an We are niot so intertest in the batsractarguemtn about the merits of differtntethicl frameworks as we are in refdlecting on how best to iculcat ethical fluence and ethical practoce in the social workers and in social work work places. For it in these areas where ethical intervention are requied.
• #4: Deontological ethics (Kant) categorical imperativeIn other words, when a social worker respects the client, she does this because it is the right thing to do in terms of her professional values and code of ethicsLikewise, with the rule or principle of confidentiality, the social worker’s duty to the client provides the motive to act as this ule requires. The object of the action is to keep the client’s confidence: her motive—reason—to maintain confidentiality accords with the rule that requires her to do so. Hence, this form of ethics is primarily concerned with finding objective moral rules and principles that apply to all people everywhere. Much attention is then focused on devising codes of ethics and ethical decision-making frameworks to guide ethical practice, Deontological approaches create a logic whereby professionals are duty-bound to follow their ethical code and where ethical practice without guiding principles is inconceivable. There is an ‘anti-ethical’ tendency in the translation of principles into codes used to regulate practitioner behaviour, since they force practitioners into a narrowly prescriptive approach with little space for professional autonomyConsequentialist ethics (Mill) utilitarianism, Virtue ethicsPerhaps morality is not about conforming to rules, but more about being trained to see problematic situations in a moral way. Moralityif our thesis that Maori ethics is a virtue ethics is correct, then we should expect the Maori view of the self to be appropriately nonindividualistic and narrative-based. And in fact this is exactly what we find to be true of Maori thought. For example, the traditional Maori view of the self is quite startlingly nonindividualistic, to the point where what we would think of as an individual is identified with the kinship group. This unity is expressed in Maori by the use of the personal pronoun "1" (au) to refer to either the individual or the tribe.Firstly, the valued character traits are taught through stories which provide exemplars of the virtues. This is natural to a character- based virtue ethic, for according to such a view moral development cannot be adequately fostered by the inculcation of mere rules and principles; rather it requires the conscious imitation of virtuous people narrative itself arguably provides a means of expressing important moral truths inaccessible to us in other forms. For certain types of human understanding are irreducibly narrative in form and call for a literary discourse that acknowledges thisa virtue-centered morality requires a moral community which conceives of its life as a shared project Not the aristotlein city stay or an iwi but a professional communitty of practice
• #5: What is virtue ethics? The usual short answer is that it is an ethics of being, rather than an ethics of doing. The usual paradigm offered is the ethics of Aristotle. In such a context Aristotelian ethics is often supposed to represent the model for a type of normative ethical theory distinct from deontological and consequentialist theories. These latter theories are built on rules of conduct and make morality a matter of how we ought to act. As such they give primacy to duty-centered judgments which assert that an action is right, wrong, obligatory, and so forth. But this sort of narrow concentration on rules of conduct fails to do justice to a whole class of familiar moral phenomena: in particular, character- centered moral judgments which assert that a person or a character is good or bad, virtuous or vicious, admirable or despicable, and so forth. Aristotlefor Aristotelian ethics is agent-centered rather than act- centered. It is fundamentally concerned with what sort of person one ought to be, what sort of life one ought to live, rather than with what acts one ought to perform. To this end Aristotle gives us a list of the virtues, those character traits or dispositions which would enable a person to flourish in a well-run state.mere set of rules cannot capture the complexity of the ethical life, and hence moral education cannot proceed by providing a set of rules. Rather we learn how to be virtuous by imitating virtuous people. (Both Maori ethics and Aristotelian ethics, then, associate the good life with the cultivation of a certain excellence of character. Moreover, they both identify human excellence or virtue with being "natural", fulfilling one's function. Interestingly,To possess an Aristotelian good character, then, you have to be an aristocratic, superbly endowed Greek male.Thus far we have considered the virtues (in roughly Aristotelian fashion) as character traits or dispositions which promote human flourishing. But if, plausibly enough, we think of (at least some of) them as being abilities or powers of an agent, then there seems no reason why mane itself cannot count as a virtue.Arete| excellence or virtuePhronesis| practical wisdomEudaimonia| flourishing
• #6: AttentivenessResponsibilityCompetenceResponsiveness
• #7: In their article exploring the relationship between mainstream social work practice and indigenous knowledge, Munford and Sanders (2011) identify five sets of constructs from TeAoMāori (the Māori world) that are used in social work practice not only to ensure that social work is culturally responsive to Māori, but also to enrich mainstream practice. These constructs, they argue,‘bring a rich and nuanceddepth to the ways in which social work practice is constructed’ (pp 63-4) and are relevant to social work practice in New Zealand and internationally.The constructs are core values in TeAoMāori and can be considered as virtues that should are at the heart of a holistic, strengths based approach to social workKaupapa – a process of thinking about what we value and what informs our practice – connected to mana, wairuatanga, whanau and whakapapa. Linked to phronesis.Tikanga/kawa– adhering to customary practice and right actions.Ako–reciprocal relationship between teacher and leaner, every person is a learner and a teacher. Disrupts traditional notion of professional expertise, clients are experts in their own experiences. Creates spaces where diverse voices can be heard.Homaikitetangata, tekanohikitekanohi– honestly facing each other, a mana enhancing practice. Used in family group conferencing also in NGOs negotiating contracts with the crown. Honest, respectful confrontation that honours the relationship.Manaakitanga– proactively and tangibly offering care and support. Ensuring people are welcomed and have a safe place to stand. Linked to ethics of care.We argue that these are not simply interesting indigenous concepts, they represent practices of virtuous social workers.
• #8: What does any of this have to do with education. Gromvirtu ethics we can take the idea that virtue is developed by example and through narrative, stories of the viruousFrom Moore ehtics to as a form of virtue ethcis we take the impoortance of narrative and of beloning to a communityIn the case of social work the community isn’t the greek city-state, or an Iwe\i (unles you are an Iwi based practitioner) bit the profesional community: the learnig community in the education but more important the professional community in a ethical workplace.Here we argue that ethical fliency needs to be brought to the fore. Ethical practice is chhalenign in cashstarpped neo-liberal beurocracies, but nit impossoible.At the very least, at the level of the team, front-line manager can and should promote ethical fluency buy, for example:The cinceot of Ako too makes it clear that learning from ethical issues is a reciprocal activity. There are no absolute answers juts ethically informed choices.Case-based learningEthical think-aloudsGroup supervisionModellinggood practiceCase discussion and reviewLaw and ethical decision makingTeam ethical review