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ENGINEERS
RESPONSIBILITY
FOR
SAFETY
FOCUS
SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER
THREE MILE ISLAND ACCDENT
BHOPAL GAS TRAGEDY
UPHAAR CINEMA TRAGEDY
SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER
On January 28, 1986, the NASA shuttle
orbiter mission STS-51-L and the tenth
flight of Space Shuttle Challenger (OV-
99) broke apart 73 seconds into its flight,
killing all seven crew members, which
consisted of five NASA astronauts and
two payload specialists.
The spacecraft disintegrated over the Atlantic Ocean, off the coast of Cape
Canaveral, Florida, at 11:39EST (16:39 UTC). Disintegration of the vehicle
began after an O-ring seal in its right solid rocket booster failed at liftoff.
WHAT WENT WRONG ???
Engineers responsibility for safety
CAUSES FOR THE DESTRUCTION
The temperature was below freezing
on the morning of January 28, 1986,
when the Challenger prepared for its
tenth launch.
Failing of primary O-rings: The O-
rings were never tested in extreme
cold. On the morning of the launch,
the cold rubber became stiff, failing to
fully seal the joint.
Delays in launches
The first delay of the Challenger mission was due to a
weather front expected to move into the area, bringing
rain and cold temperatures.
The second launch delay was caused by a defective micro
switch in the hatch locking mechanism and by problems
in removing the hatch handle.
Pressure to launch
NASA managers were anxious to launch the Challenger
for several reasons, including economic considerations,
political pressures, and scheduling backlogs.
How could this be saved ???
The Challenger disaster presents several issues that
are relevant to engineers.
One of the most important is engineers who are placed
in management positions. It is important that these
managers not ignore their own engineering experience, or
the expertise of their subordinate engineers. They should
keep this in mind when making any sort of decision that
involves an understanding of technical matters.
Another issue is the fact that managers encouraged
launching due to the fact that there was insufficient low-
temperature data.
As engineers test designs for ever-increasing speeds,
loads, capacities and the like, they must always be aware
of their obligation to society to protect the public welfare.
After all, the public has provided engineers, through the
tax base, with the means for obtaining an education and,
through legislation, the means to license and regulate
themselves. In return, engineers have a responsibility to
protect the safety and well-being of the public in all of
their professional efforts.
THREE MILE ISLAND ACCIDENT
The Three Mile Island
accident occurred on
March 28, 1979, in reactor
number 2 of Three Mile
Island Nuclear Generating
Station (TMI-2) in
Dauphin County,
Pennsylvania, United
States, near Harrisburg.
It was the most significant accident in U.S. commercial
nuclear power plant history. The incident was rated a five on
the seven-point International Nuclear Event Scale: Accident
with wider consequences.
WHAT WENT WRONG ???
Minor malfunction caused the second reactor to
shut down immediately.
A relief valve was supposed to close, but it did not,
contrary to what the instrumentation showed.
Operators struggled to determined the problem
and an appropriate solution.
After almost 16 hours and the collaboration of 60
or more people, the situation was under control.
CAUSES FOR THE DESTRUCTION
The accident began with failures in the non-nuclear
secondary system, followed by a stuck-open pilot-operated
relief valve in the primary system, which allowed large
amounts of nuclear reactor coolant to escape.
The mechanical failures were compounded by the initial
failure of plant operators to recognize the situation as a loss-
of-coolant accident due to inadequate training and human
factors, such as human-computer interaction design
oversights relating to ambiguous control room indicators in
the power plant's user interface.
How could this be saved ???
Critical human factors and user interface engineering
problems were revealed in the investigation of the reactor
control system's user interface. Despite the valve being
stuck open, a light on the control panel ostensibly indicated that the
valve was closed. As a result, the operators
did not correctly diagnose the problem for several hours.
The operators had not been trained to understand the ambiguous
nature of the pilot-operated relief valve indicator and to look for
alternative confirmation that the main relief valve was closed.
The problem was not correctly diagnosed until a fresh shift came in
who did not have the mindset of the first shift of operators. By this
time major damage had occurred.
BHOPAL GAS TRAGEDY
Over 500,000 people were exposed to methyl isocyanate
(MIC) gas and other chemicals. The highly toxic substance
made its way into and around the shanty towns located near
the plant.
Bhopal gas tragedy, was a gas
leak incident in India, considered the
world's worst industrial disaster.
It occurred on the night of 23
December 1984 at the Union Carbide
India Limited (UCIL) pesticide plant
in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh.
WHAT WENT WRONG ???
Most of the plant's MIC related safety systems were
not functioning and many valves and lines were in poor
condition.
Several vent gas scrubbers had been out of service as
well as the steam boiler, intended to clean the pipes.
A connecting pipe was removed from the flare tower
for maintenance purpose, which was used for burn off
gases.
Freon system used for cooling liquid MIC was shut
down in June 1984 to save money.
CAUSES FOR THE DESTRUCTION
 The disaster was caused by a potent combination of under-maintained
and decaying facilities, a weak attitude towards safety, and an
undertrained workforce, culminating in worker actions that inadvertently
enabled water to penetrate the MIC tanks in the absence of properly
working safeguards.
The factory was not well equipped to handle the gas created by the
sudden addition of water to the MIC tank. The MIC tank alarms had not
been working for four years and there was only one manual back-up
system, compared to a four-stage system used in the United States.
Underinvestment is cited as contributing to an environment. Attempts
to reduce expenses affected the factory's employees and their
conditions. Subsequent research highlights a gradual deterioration of
safety practices in regard to the MIC, which had become less relevant to
plant operations.
How could this be saved ???
The disaster could be prevented if these steps were not taken.
The use of hazardous chemicals (MIC) instead of less dangerous ones.
Storing these chemicals in large tanks instead of over 200 steel drums.
Possible corroding material in pipelines
Poor maintenance after the plant ceased production in the early 1980s
Failure of several safety systems.
Safety systems shut down to save money - including the MIC tank
refrigeration system which alone would have prevented the disaster.
UPHAAR CINEMA TRAGEDY
The Uphaar Cinema fire, one of the worst fire tragedies in
recent Indian history, occurred on Friday, 13 June 1997 at
Uphaar Cinema, in Green Park, Delhi, during the 3-to-6 pm
screening of the movie Border. Trapped inside, 59 people
died, mostly due to suffocation, and 103 were seriously
injured in the resulting stampede.
WHAT WENT WRONG ???
On 13 June 1997 at about 6.55 a.m. the bigger of the
two installed transformers, which were maintained by
the digital video broadcaster on the ground floor of the
cinema building, caught fire.
These transformers had developed issues repeatedly
but the repairs had not been satisfactory. On the
morning of the incident, another repair had caused
loose connections which led to sparks that brought the
whole hall down.
CAUSES FOR THE DESTRUCTION
Installation and maintenance of the DVA transformer in
violation of Indian Electricity Rules (no periodic maintenance,
no fire extinguishers, no isolation device, haphazard electrical
cables).
No functional public announcement system (no announcement
was made when the fire broke out).
No emergency lights, foot lights, exit lights (The cinema hall
was in pitch darkness when the fire broke out).
Blocked exits (many exit doors  including the one leading to
the terrace  and gates were locked).
How could this be saved ???
This accident could be prevented if :
DVA transformer were properly installed and maintained
Proper announcements were made regarding the setting fire.
Proper entry and emergency exit doors be provided.
Engineers responsibility for safety

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Engineers responsibility for safety

  • 2. FOCUS SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER THREE MILE ISLAND ACCDENT BHOPAL GAS TRAGEDY UPHAAR CINEMA TRAGEDY
  • 3. SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER On January 28, 1986, the NASA shuttle orbiter mission STS-51-L and the tenth flight of Space Shuttle Challenger (OV- 99) broke apart 73 seconds into its flight, killing all seven crew members, which consisted of five NASA astronauts and two payload specialists. The spacecraft disintegrated over the Atlantic Ocean, off the coast of Cape Canaveral, Florida, at 11:39EST (16:39 UTC). Disintegration of the vehicle began after an O-ring seal in its right solid rocket booster failed at liftoff.
  • 6. CAUSES FOR THE DESTRUCTION The temperature was below freezing on the morning of January 28, 1986, when the Challenger prepared for its tenth launch. Failing of primary O-rings: The O- rings were never tested in extreme cold. On the morning of the launch, the cold rubber became stiff, failing to fully seal the joint.
  • 7. Delays in launches The first delay of the Challenger mission was due to a weather front expected to move into the area, bringing rain and cold temperatures. The second launch delay was caused by a defective micro switch in the hatch locking mechanism and by problems in removing the hatch handle. Pressure to launch NASA managers were anxious to launch the Challenger for several reasons, including economic considerations, political pressures, and scheduling backlogs.
  • 8. How could this be saved ??? The Challenger disaster presents several issues that are relevant to engineers. One of the most important is engineers who are placed in management positions. It is important that these managers not ignore their own engineering experience, or the expertise of their subordinate engineers. They should keep this in mind when making any sort of decision that involves an understanding of technical matters. Another issue is the fact that managers encouraged launching due to the fact that there was insufficient low- temperature data.
  • 9. As engineers test designs for ever-increasing speeds, loads, capacities and the like, they must always be aware of their obligation to society to protect the public welfare. After all, the public has provided engineers, through the tax base, with the means for obtaining an education and, through legislation, the means to license and regulate themselves. In return, engineers have a responsibility to protect the safety and well-being of the public in all of their professional efforts.
  • 10. THREE MILE ISLAND ACCIDENT The Three Mile Island accident occurred on March 28, 1979, in reactor number 2 of Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station (TMI-2) in Dauphin County, Pennsylvania, United States, near Harrisburg. It was the most significant accident in U.S. commercial nuclear power plant history. The incident was rated a five on the seven-point International Nuclear Event Scale: Accident with wider consequences.
  • 12. Minor malfunction caused the second reactor to shut down immediately. A relief valve was supposed to close, but it did not, contrary to what the instrumentation showed. Operators struggled to determined the problem and an appropriate solution. After almost 16 hours and the collaboration of 60 or more people, the situation was under control.
  • 13. CAUSES FOR THE DESTRUCTION The accident began with failures in the non-nuclear secondary system, followed by a stuck-open pilot-operated relief valve in the primary system, which allowed large amounts of nuclear reactor coolant to escape. The mechanical failures were compounded by the initial failure of plant operators to recognize the situation as a loss- of-coolant accident due to inadequate training and human factors, such as human-computer interaction design oversights relating to ambiguous control room indicators in the power plant's user interface.
  • 14. How could this be saved ??? Critical human factors and user interface engineering problems were revealed in the investigation of the reactor control system's user interface. Despite the valve being stuck open, a light on the control panel ostensibly indicated that the valve was closed. As a result, the operators did not correctly diagnose the problem for several hours. The operators had not been trained to understand the ambiguous nature of the pilot-operated relief valve indicator and to look for alternative confirmation that the main relief valve was closed. The problem was not correctly diagnosed until a fresh shift came in who did not have the mindset of the first shift of operators. By this time major damage had occurred.
  • 15. BHOPAL GAS TRAGEDY Over 500,000 people were exposed to methyl isocyanate (MIC) gas and other chemicals. The highly toxic substance made its way into and around the shanty towns located near the plant. Bhopal gas tragedy, was a gas leak incident in India, considered the world's worst industrial disaster. It occurred on the night of 23 December 1984 at the Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) pesticide plant in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh.
  • 17. Most of the plant's MIC related safety systems were not functioning and many valves and lines were in poor condition. Several vent gas scrubbers had been out of service as well as the steam boiler, intended to clean the pipes. A connecting pipe was removed from the flare tower for maintenance purpose, which was used for burn off gases. Freon system used for cooling liquid MIC was shut down in June 1984 to save money.
  • 18. CAUSES FOR THE DESTRUCTION The disaster was caused by a potent combination of under-maintained and decaying facilities, a weak attitude towards safety, and an undertrained workforce, culminating in worker actions that inadvertently enabled water to penetrate the MIC tanks in the absence of properly working safeguards. The factory was not well equipped to handle the gas created by the sudden addition of water to the MIC tank. The MIC tank alarms had not been working for four years and there was only one manual back-up system, compared to a four-stage system used in the United States. Underinvestment is cited as contributing to an environment. Attempts to reduce expenses affected the factory's employees and their conditions. Subsequent research highlights a gradual deterioration of safety practices in regard to the MIC, which had become less relevant to plant operations.
  • 19. How could this be saved ??? The disaster could be prevented if these steps were not taken. The use of hazardous chemicals (MIC) instead of less dangerous ones. Storing these chemicals in large tanks instead of over 200 steel drums. Possible corroding material in pipelines Poor maintenance after the plant ceased production in the early 1980s Failure of several safety systems. Safety systems shut down to save money - including the MIC tank refrigeration system which alone would have prevented the disaster.
  • 20. UPHAAR CINEMA TRAGEDY The Uphaar Cinema fire, one of the worst fire tragedies in recent Indian history, occurred on Friday, 13 June 1997 at Uphaar Cinema, in Green Park, Delhi, during the 3-to-6 pm screening of the movie Border. Trapped inside, 59 people died, mostly due to suffocation, and 103 were seriously injured in the resulting stampede.
  • 21. WHAT WENT WRONG ??? On 13 June 1997 at about 6.55 a.m. the bigger of the two installed transformers, which were maintained by the digital video broadcaster on the ground floor of the cinema building, caught fire. These transformers had developed issues repeatedly but the repairs had not been satisfactory. On the morning of the incident, another repair had caused loose connections which led to sparks that brought the whole hall down.
  • 22. CAUSES FOR THE DESTRUCTION Installation and maintenance of the DVA transformer in violation of Indian Electricity Rules (no periodic maintenance, no fire extinguishers, no isolation device, haphazard electrical cables). No functional public announcement system (no announcement was made when the fire broke out). No emergency lights, foot lights, exit lights (The cinema hall was in pitch darkness when the fire broke out). Blocked exits (many exit doors including the one leading to the terrace and gates were locked).
  • 23. How could this be saved ??? This accident could be prevented if : DVA transformer were properly installed and maintained Proper announcements were made regarding the setting fire. Proper entry and emergency exit doors be provided.