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11
World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact!
Prosunjit Biswas, Ravi Sandhu and Ram Krishnan
University of Texas at San Antonio
Institute for Cyber Security
1st Workshop on Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC 2016)
Label-Based Access Control: An ABAC Model with
Enumerated Authorization Policy
22
World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact!
Outline
Summary
Background & motivation
Enumerated authorization policy ABAC model
Relationship with existing models
Expressive power of LaBAC
Conclusion
33
World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact!
Summary
 We present an enumerated authorization policy ABAC
model and understand its relationship with traditional
access control models.
Background and Motivation
55
World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact!
authorization policy
 Boolean expression
 E.g.: age(u)>18
 Models: ABAC留, HGABAC
 Set of tuples
 {(age(u),19), (age(u),20), .
(age(u),100)} [assuming range
upper bound <=100]
 Models: Policy Machine, 2-
sorted-RBAC
66
World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact!
Logical-formula Auth. Policy
Many ways to set up a policy - Authread
(Authread allows manager to read TS objects from home or office).
77
World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact!
Logical-formula Auth. Policy
Update Authread so that
manager can no longer read TS objects from home
88
World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact!
Enumerated Auth. Policy
Authread  {(mng, home, TS), (mng,office,TS)}
 Auth`read  { (mng, home, TS), (mng,office,TS)}
99
World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact!
Logical formula vs enumerated policy
 Rich & flexible
 Easy to setup
 Concise
 Homogeneous
 Micro policy
 Easy to update
 Difficult to update
 Monolithic
 Heterogeneous
 Large in size
 Difficult to setup
Pros
Cons
Logical formula
authorization policy
Enumerated
authorization policy
LaBAC: Label-Based Access Control
Characteristics
Label vs Attribute
Labels are attributes with tighter semantics
Salient features of LaBAC
Finite domain ABAC
Simple enumerated ABAC model
Family of LaBAC models
LaBAC: Core model
Examples
UL={manager,employee}
OL={TS,S}
Tuple1= (manager,TS)
Policyread = {tuple1, tuple2}
Salient Characteristics:
1. One user and object attribute
2. Atomic valued tuples
3. Tuples represent micro-policies
Figure 1
Figure 2
LaBAC: Hierarchical model
ULH={(manager,employee)}
OLH={(protected, public)}
Policya = {(employee,protected)}
ImpliedPolicya = { (employee, protected), (manager,
proteced), (employee,public), (manager, public}
Examples
Figure 1
Figure 2
LaBAC: Constrained model
uLabel assgn. cons: a user cannot be both manager & director.
Session assgn. cons: at most one value can be activated in a session.
oLabel assgn. cons: A object cannot be both private & public
Policy cons: (employee, TS) can never be used.
Examples
Figure 1
Relationship of LaBAC with other enumerated policy
models
LaBAC equivalent to 2-sorted-RBAC
Figure 1: 2-sorted-RBAC
Figure 2: LaBAC
2-sorted-RBAC vs LaBAC:
1. Use of attributes
2. Separation of object and action
from permission
LaBAC as an instance of Policy Machine
 Policy Machine mini
 Only ASSIGN and ASSOCIATION relation
 Default policy class
 Configuration of LaBAC in Policy Machine mini
Flexibility in expressing traditional models
Expressiveness of LaBAC models
LBAC in LaBAC
LBAC assumptions:
1. Tranquility
2. Object operation: creation only
Micro-policy in LaBAC
Micro-policy in LaBAC
 micro-policy as the smallest unit of administration
 Example of a micro-policy: (manager, TS)
What is next
 Any other form of representation for authorization policy?
 How expressive power of enumerated authorization policy
is compared with that of logical-formula auth. policy?
 What would be the cost of storing large number of
enumerated tuples?
Enumerated authorization policy ABAC (EP-ABAC) model
Enumerated authorization policy ABAC (EP-ABAC) model

More Related Content

Enumerated authorization policy ABAC (EP-ABAC) model

  • 1. 11 World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! Prosunjit Biswas, Ravi Sandhu and Ram Krishnan University of Texas at San Antonio Institute for Cyber Security 1st Workshop on Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC 2016) Label-Based Access Control: An ABAC Model with Enumerated Authorization Policy
  • 2. 22 World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! Outline Summary Background & motivation Enumerated authorization policy ABAC model Relationship with existing models Expressive power of LaBAC Conclusion
  • 3. 33 World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! Summary We present an enumerated authorization policy ABAC model and understand its relationship with traditional access control models.
  • 5. 55 World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! authorization policy Boolean expression E.g.: age(u)>18 Models: ABAC留, HGABAC Set of tuples {(age(u),19), (age(u),20), . (age(u),100)} [assuming range upper bound <=100] Models: Policy Machine, 2- sorted-RBAC
  • 6. 66 World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! Logical-formula Auth. Policy Many ways to set up a policy - Authread (Authread allows manager to read TS objects from home or office).
  • 7. 77 World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! Logical-formula Auth. Policy Update Authread so that manager can no longer read TS objects from home
  • 8. 88 World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! Enumerated Auth. Policy Authread {(mng, home, TS), (mng,office,TS)} Auth`read { (mng, home, TS), (mng,office,TS)}
  • 9. 99 World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! Logical formula vs enumerated policy Rich & flexible Easy to setup Concise Homogeneous Micro policy Easy to update Difficult to update Monolithic Heterogeneous Large in size Difficult to setup Pros Cons Logical formula authorization policy Enumerated authorization policy
  • 11. Characteristics Label vs Attribute Labels are attributes with tighter semantics Salient features of LaBAC Finite domain ABAC Simple enumerated ABAC model
  • 12. Family of LaBAC models
  • 13. LaBAC: Core model Examples UL={manager,employee} OL={TS,S} Tuple1= (manager,TS) Policyread = {tuple1, tuple2} Salient Characteristics: 1. One user and object attribute 2. Atomic valued tuples 3. Tuples represent micro-policies Figure 1 Figure 2
  • 14. LaBAC: Hierarchical model ULH={(manager,employee)} OLH={(protected, public)} Policya = {(employee,protected)} ImpliedPolicya = { (employee, protected), (manager, proteced), (employee,public), (manager, public} Examples Figure 1 Figure 2
  • 15. LaBAC: Constrained model uLabel assgn. cons: a user cannot be both manager & director. Session assgn. cons: at most one value can be activated in a session. oLabel assgn. cons: A object cannot be both private & public Policy cons: (employee, TS) can never be used. Examples Figure 1
  • 16. Relationship of LaBAC with other enumerated policy models
  • 17. LaBAC equivalent to 2-sorted-RBAC Figure 1: 2-sorted-RBAC Figure 2: LaBAC 2-sorted-RBAC vs LaBAC: 1. Use of attributes 2. Separation of object and action from permission
  • 18. LaBAC as an instance of Policy Machine Policy Machine mini Only ASSIGN and ASSOCIATION relation Default policy class Configuration of LaBAC in Policy Machine mini
  • 19. Flexibility in expressing traditional models
  • 21. LBAC in LaBAC LBAC assumptions: 1. Tranquility 2. Object operation: creation only
  • 23. Micro-policy in LaBAC micro-policy as the smallest unit of administration Example of a micro-policy: (manager, TS)
  • 24. What is next Any other form of representation for authorization policy? How expressive power of enumerated authorization policy is compared with that of logical-formula auth. policy? What would be the cost of storing large number of enumerated tuples?