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UEFA Financial Fair Play
–
The Curse of Regulation
Holger Preuß
Institute of Sport Science, Johannes Gutenberg-University Mainz, Germany
Kjetil K. Haugen
Department of Economics, Molde University College, Norway
Mathias Schubert

| UEFA Financial Fair Play – The Curse of Regulation
© H. Preuß / K. Haugen / M. Schubert

|1

Outline
1 Situation in European Club Football
2 Financial Fair Play Concept
3 Methodology
4 Selected Results
5 Conclusion


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Revenues of the “big five“ European leagues doubled in the last ten
years from € 4.2bn (2000) to € 8.4bn (2010)
(Deloitte, 2011)
YET: Club spending has increased even more rapidly than revenues
aggregate net losses of € 1.6bn in 2010 for top division clubs
(UEFA, 2012)

Running as “normal“ companies, many top-flight clubs would
already be bankrupt!
(cf. A.T. Kearney, 2010)


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WHY DOES THIS NOT HAPPEN?
“too big to fail“-phenomenon
many loss-making clubs are constantly bailed out by different benefactors:

correlation between sporting success and relative expenses for player
salaries
Sources: Storm, 2012; Szymanski, 2003
Financial Doping:
“financial means not earned by a club directly or indirectly through its
sporting operations or supporter reputation, but rather provided by an
external investor, benefactor or creditor“
(Müller, Lammert & Hovemann, 2012)


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Basic Games Theory: Prisoner‘s Dilemma

http://science.howstuffworks.com/game-theory3.htm


|5


http://ingrimayne.com/econ/IndividualGroup/PrisDilm.html


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In its simplest form the PD is a game described by the payoff matrix:
satisfying the following chain of inequalities:
C

D

C

R, R

S, T

D

T, S

P, P

satisfying the following chain of inequalities:
PD1)T>R>P>S
PD1) T > R > P > S

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/prisoner-dilemma/#Sym2t2PDOrdPay


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Clubs are trapped in Prisoner‘s Dilemma
STRATEGY OF ALL OTHER CLUBS

Expensive Player (Ep)

Cheap Player (Cp)

-

++

--

+

Expensive Player (Ep) p)
Expensive Player (E
MY STRATEGY AS
CLUB

DOMINANT STRATEGY
Cheap Player (Cp)(Cp)
Cheap Player

Rationality trap leads to over-indebtedness of clubs
Source: cf. Haugen & Solberg (2010)


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Aims:
“[…] introduce more discipline and rationality in club football
finances […] to protect the long-term viability and sustainability
of European club football“
(UEFA, 2010)

Core element: break-even requirement
“relevant expenses” of each individual club are not allowed to exceed the club’s
“relevant income”
Basic relevant expenses:
cost of sales, employee benefits, cost of player transfers (not: expenditure on
infrastructure and youth development)
Basic relevant income:
gate receipts, sponsorship, broadcasting rights, commercial activities, profit from
player transfers
monitoring period includes previous three years; acceptable aggregate
deviation of € 5 million

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Game model (basic assumptions):
(1)Two teams (T1 and T2) are engaged in an upcoming match against each other
and have made a player buying decision.
(2)The two teams are assumed to be perfect clones. Hence, the probability of a
victory for any team before the talent acquisition is 1/2.
(3)Both teams can choose from the same two-dimensional strategy space {Ep, Cp}.
Ep means buying an expensive player, while Cp means buying a cheap player.
Buying an expensive player while the other team buys a cheap player leads to a
probability advantage/increase of > 0 of winning the match.
(4)We assume that the “buying markets” of the two teams are non-connected –
the prices of the players (cE, cC) are exogenously given.
(5)The playing strength and price of each of the expensive players and each of the
cheap players are identical (cloned in pairs).
(6)The team winning the single decisive match receives a pay-off of R (common for
both teams), the losing team receives a pay-off of zero.
(7)Teams are assumed profit maximizers, maximizing the expected pay-off.
(8)Simultaneous game with complete information.

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Team 2

Ep
Ep
Team 1

Cp

R - CE
( - [ - ]) R+- CM - CE
(
)R

R - CE R - CE

Cp R - CE
( - ) R - CC

R - CC
( + ) R - CE
( + ) R - CE
( + [ - ]) R – CE R - CC


( - ) R - CC
( - ) R - CC

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the concept comes into force…
Team
Team 2 2

Ep
Ep
Team 1

Ep
Cp

Ep

Mp

( + ) R - CE
( + [ - ]) R – CE R - CC

( + [ - ]) R – CE
Team 1

Cp

( - ) R - CC
( - ) R - CC

R - CE
( - [ - ]) R - CM - CE
( + )R

R - CE R - CE
R - CE
( - ) R - CC

Cp

( + ) R - CE

R - CC

( - ) R - CC

R - CM

Mp

R - CM

( - [ - ]) R - CM

( + ) R - CM

( + ) R - CE
Cp

( - ) R - CC

( - ) R - CC


( + ) R - CM

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R - CC
R - CC

Assumption: clubs try to bypass FFP regulations, resulting in extra cost
Team 2

Ep

Mp

( - [ - ]) R - CM

R - CE Ep

R - CE -

( + [ - ]) R - CE -

( + [ - ]) R - CE Team 1

( - ) R - CC
( + ) R - CE ( - ) R - CC

R - CM

Mp

R - CM

( - [ - ]) R - CM
( + ) R - CE Cp
if

Cp

>

( - ) R - CC
(

)

( + ) R - CM
( + ) R - CM

( - ) R - CC
is satisfied, the clubs will buy
expensive players in equilibrium


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R - CC
R - CC

Strong incentive to bypass the FFP reguations for the clubs due to the
situation of being in a Prisoner‘s Dilemma
Adding to inefficiency through additional costs for clubs (cover-up) and
UEFA (monitoring & enforcing)
Additional costs and risk of conviction might deter smaller clubs with less
financial capabilities from trying to bypass the regulations
Ossifies dominance of rich clubs by enabling financial doping
Competitive Balance on national level decreases
BUT:
long term governance project, initial problems inevitable;
initially the power of sugar daddies and the “total dependency culture”
will be reduced


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Thank you!
Holger Preuß
preuss@uni-mainz.de
Kjetil K. Haugen
kjetil.haugen@himolde.no
Department of Economics, Molde University College, Norway
Mathias Schubert
schubert.m@uni-mainz.de


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