際際滷

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By
Joseph S. Miller
      EDA, Inc
Introduction
 Over 35 Years in the Nuclear Power Industry
 MS Nuclear, BS Mechanical, BS Industrial
 Worked at a BWR Nuclear Power Station for 9 years.
 Responsible for Fuel, safety analyses and PRA.
 Responsible for Nuclear Steam Supply Systems
 Technical Support Manager for Emergency Response
  Organization.
 Supported the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
  in reviewing Nuclear Power Plant Safety Systems.
Acknowledgements
 Thanks to Japanese Industrial Atomic Forum (JIAF)
 Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO)
 AREVA PowerPoint- The Fukushima Daiichi Incident
   Dr. Matthias Braun
 Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) & Japan
  Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNES) on Plant
  Data
 Lake H. Barrett- Foundation For Nuclear Studies
  Briefing
 General Electric
The Fukushima Daiichi
          Accident

1. What Happened?
2.Plant Designs
3.Accident Progression
4.Spent fuel pools
5.Radiological releases
6.Impact on US
What Happened?
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station  Accident April19 2011
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station  Accident April19 2011
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station  Accident April19 2011
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station  Accident April19 2011
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station  Accident April19 2011
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station  Accident April19 2011
Tsunami Size Was Accident Cause
3/11 15:45 at Fukushima I
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station  Accident April19 2011
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station  Accident April19 2011
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station  Accident April19 2011
Plant Designs - Fukushima Dai-ichi
 Unit 1 is BWR/3
 Units 2-4 are BWR/4
 BWR is a Boiling Water Reactor
 There are 52 Reactors in Japan and 104 Reactors in the
  USA (35 BWRs & 69 PWRs)
 The Fukushima I reactors began operation in the
  1970s so they are all thirty - forty years old.
 They all are early vintage Mark I Containment Designs
Fukushima Dai-ichi Site Reactor and Fuel Specifications
 Fukushima Dai-ichi  Tokyo Electric Power Co.

                                                                      Reactor
                                                         Commercial   Supplier
   Reactor No.          Net MWe          Reactor Model
                                                           Start


      Unit 1               439               BWR-3          3/71        GE
      Unit 2               760               BWR-4          7/74        GE
      Unit 3               760               BWR-4          3/76      Toshiba
      Unit 4               760               BWR-4         10/78       Hitachi
      Unit 5               760               BWR-4          4/78      Toshiba
      Unit 6               1067              BWR-5         10/79        GE
PWR  Pressurized Water Reactor
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station  Accident April19 2011
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station  Accident April19 2011
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station  Accident April19 2011
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station  Accident April19 2011
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station  Accident April19 2011
What happened?
The plant was immediately shut down (scrammed)
when the earthquake first hit. Off-Site power was lost.
Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) started to
provide backup electrical power to the plants backup
cooling system. The backup worked.
All AC power to the station was lost when the Tsunami
flooded the EDGs.
The diesel generators ceased functioning after
approximately one hour due to Tsunami induced
damage.
At that point, the plant experienced a complete
blackout (no AC electric power at all). Commonly
called a Station Blackout.
Operating BWR
When it Started
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station  Accident April19 2011
Containment Isolation
The Tsunami Hits
What happened (cont.)?
Initially the Isolation condenser (IC) for Unit 1, which uses the
condensate as a heat sink, was used to remove the decay heat
from the shutdown reactors. After 1 or 2 hours, the 29,000
gallons of water in the IC is hot, the condensate heat sink was
not available and no heat removal was available for Unit 1.
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system for Units 2 & 3,
which operate on steam from the reactor, were used to cool
reactor core water, however, the batterysupplied control valves
lost DC power after the prolonged use.
DC power from batteries was consumed after approximately
34 hours.
Hours passed as primary water inventory was lost and core
degradation occurred (through some combination of
zirconium oxidation and clad failure).
Isolation Condenser (Unit 1) and RCIC (Units 2 &
3) Were Used to Cool the Plants
RCIC Works for About 8 Hours
RCIC Stops Cooling Plants
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station  Accident April19 2011
What happened?

Hydrogen in reactor building exploded causing it to
collapse around the containment.
The containment around the reactor and RPV were
reported to be intact.
Pressure in the containment drywell rose as wetwell
became hotter.
Hydrogen produced from zirconium oxidation was
vented from the containment into the reactor building.
Fuel in Top of Core is Uncovered
Zr-Water Begins at
What happened?

Portable diesel generators were delivered to the plant
site.
AC power was restored allowing for a different backup
pumping system to replace inventory in reactor pressure
vessel (RPV).
The decision was made to inject seawater into the RPV
to continue to the cooling process, another backup
system that was designed into the plant from inception.
Radioactivity releases from operator initiated venting
appear to be decreasing.
Melting of the Fuel
Release of Fission Products
Containment is Last Barrier
Venting the Containment
Unit 1 Primary Containment Pressure
(D/W) & Reactor Pressure (3/11  3/16)
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station  Accident April19 2011
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station  Accident April19 2011
Decay Heat
Hydrogen Explosion Units 1 & 3
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station  Accident April19 2011
Damage to Torus Unit 2
Looking Down Units 3, 2 & 1
Units 4 & 3 Looking Down
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station  Accident April19 2011
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station  Accident April19 2011
Radiation Levels
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station  Accident April19 2011
Fukushima I Fuel Pools
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station  Accident April19 2011
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station  Accident April19 2011
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station  Accident April19 2011
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station  Accident April19 2011
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station  Accident April19 2011
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station  Accident April19 2011
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station  Accident April19 2011
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station  Accident April19 2011
Surry 1 & 2
 Surry Power Station, Unit 1 &2 II PWR-DRYSUB 2,546
  06/25/1968
 Virginia Electric and Power Co. WEST 3LP 05/25/1972
 Surry, VA S&W 12/22/1972 90
 (17 miles NW of Newport News, VA) S&W 03/20/2003
 050-00280 05/25/2032
 www.nrc.gov/info-finder/reactor/sur1.html 94
Current Event -Surry Power Station Shuts Down
After Apparent Tornado Cuts Off-site Electricity

 Apparent tornado damages switchyard adjacent to
  nuclear units
 Loss of Off-Site Power
 Emergency Diesel Generators Activated
 Dominion Virginia Power crews have restored off-
  site power to station
 Back-up diesel generators functioning to
  supplement electrical supply
 Units are in a safe and stable condition
US Reactors
Three Mile Island
March 28, 1979
TMI Core
Configuration
Evening 3/28/1979
Three Mile Island History
 Reactor Scram: 04:00 3/28/79
 Core melt and relocation: ~ 05:00 07:30 3/28/79
 Hydrogen Deflagration: 13:00 3/28/79
 Recirculation Cooling: Late 3/28/79
 Phased Water Processing: 19791993
 Containment Venting 43KCi Kr85: July 1980
 Containment Entry: July 1980
 Reactor Head removed and core melt found: July 1984
 Start Defuel: October 1985
 Shipping Spent Fuel: 19881990
 Finish Defuel: Jan 1990
 Evaporate ~2M gallons Processed Water: 199193
 Cost: ~$1 Billion
Impact on US Reactors
 US has implemented B.5.b requirements in 2008
   Beyond Severe Accident Guidelines
   Onsite high pressure portable pump
   Procedures and appropriate staging areas and
    requirements for fire hoses and equipment on site
   MOUs with fire local fire stations to establish the plant
    as a priority in case of an emergency.
Impact on US Reactor
 Some of the things that should be reviewed
    Review all external events, i.e., fire, flooding, explosions
     and earthquake, to ensure that there is backup
     emergency equipment that can support a station black
     out.
    Review training for extreme station Blackout events and
     procedure.
    Ensure that emergency batteries are qualified for worst
     case events for fl0od, fire, explosions and seismic.
    The portable high pressure pump and associated
     equipment that was required because of B.5.b should be
     housed in a structure that is qualified for worst case fire,
     flood, explosion and seismic events.

More Related Content

Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Accident April19 2011

  • 2. Introduction Over 35 Years in the Nuclear Power Industry MS Nuclear, BS Mechanical, BS Industrial Worked at a BWR Nuclear Power Station for 9 years. Responsible for Fuel, safety analyses and PRA. Responsible for Nuclear Steam Supply Systems Technical Support Manager for Emergency Response Organization. Supported the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in reviewing Nuclear Power Plant Safety Systems.
  • 3. Acknowledgements Thanks to Japanese Industrial Atomic Forum (JIAF) Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) AREVA PowerPoint- The Fukushima Daiichi Incident Dr. Matthias Braun Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) & Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNES) on Plant Data Lake H. Barrett- Foundation For Nuclear Studies Briefing General Electric
  • 4. The Fukushima Daiichi Accident 1. What Happened? 2.Plant Designs 3.Accident Progression 4.Spent fuel pools 5.Radiological releases 6.Impact on US
  • 12. Tsunami Size Was Accident Cause 3/11 15:45 at Fukushima I
  • 16. Plant Designs - Fukushima Dai-ichi Unit 1 is BWR/3 Units 2-4 are BWR/4 BWR is a Boiling Water Reactor There are 52 Reactors in Japan and 104 Reactors in the USA (35 BWRs & 69 PWRs) The Fukushima I reactors began operation in the 1970s so they are all thirty - forty years old. They all are early vintage Mark I Containment Designs
  • 17. Fukushima Dai-ichi Site Reactor and Fuel Specifications Fukushima Dai-ichi Tokyo Electric Power Co. Reactor Commercial Supplier Reactor No. Net MWe Reactor Model Start Unit 1 439 BWR-3 3/71 GE Unit 2 760 BWR-4 7/74 GE Unit 3 760 BWR-4 3/76 Toshiba Unit 4 760 BWR-4 10/78 Hitachi Unit 5 760 BWR-4 4/78 Toshiba Unit 6 1067 BWR-5 10/79 GE
  • 18. PWR Pressurized Water Reactor
  • 24. What happened? The plant was immediately shut down (scrammed) when the earthquake first hit. Off-Site power was lost. Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) started to provide backup electrical power to the plants backup cooling system. The backup worked. All AC power to the station was lost when the Tsunami flooded the EDGs. The diesel generators ceased functioning after approximately one hour due to Tsunami induced damage. At that point, the plant experienced a complete blackout (no AC electric power at all). Commonly called a Station Blackout.
  • 30. What happened (cont.)? Initially the Isolation condenser (IC) for Unit 1, which uses the condensate as a heat sink, was used to remove the decay heat from the shutdown reactors. After 1 or 2 hours, the 29,000 gallons of water in the IC is hot, the condensate heat sink was not available and no heat removal was available for Unit 1. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system for Units 2 & 3, which operate on steam from the reactor, were used to cool reactor core water, however, the batterysupplied control valves lost DC power after the prolonged use. DC power from batteries was consumed after approximately 34 hours. Hours passed as primary water inventory was lost and core degradation occurred (through some combination of zirconium oxidation and clad failure).
  • 31. Isolation Condenser (Unit 1) and RCIC (Units 2 & 3) Were Used to Cool the Plants
  • 32. RCIC Works for About 8 Hours
  • 35. What happened? Hydrogen in reactor building exploded causing it to collapse around the containment. The containment around the reactor and RPV were reported to be intact. Pressure in the containment drywell rose as wetwell became hotter. Hydrogen produced from zirconium oxidation was vented from the containment into the reactor building.
  • 36. Fuel in Top of Core is Uncovered
  • 38. What happened? Portable diesel generators were delivered to the plant site. AC power was restored allowing for a different backup pumping system to replace inventory in reactor pressure vessel (RPV). The decision was made to inject seawater into the RPV to continue to the cooling process, another backup system that was designed into the plant from inception. Radioactivity releases from operator initiated venting appear to be decreasing.
  • 40. Release of Fission Products
  • 43. Unit 1 Primary Containment Pressure (D/W) & Reactor Pressure (3/11 3/16)
  • 49. Damage to Torus Unit 2
  • 50. Looking Down Units 3, 2 & 1
  • 51. Units 4 & 3 Looking Down
  • 65. Surry 1 & 2 Surry Power Station, Unit 1 &2 II PWR-DRYSUB 2,546 06/25/1968 Virginia Electric and Power Co. WEST 3LP 05/25/1972 Surry, VA S&W 12/22/1972 90 (17 miles NW of Newport News, VA) S&W 03/20/2003 050-00280 05/25/2032 www.nrc.gov/info-finder/reactor/sur1.html 94
  • 66. Current Event -Surry Power Station Shuts Down After Apparent Tornado Cuts Off-site Electricity Apparent tornado damages switchyard adjacent to nuclear units Loss of Off-Site Power Emergency Diesel Generators Activated Dominion Virginia Power crews have restored off- site power to station Back-up diesel generators functioning to supplement electrical supply Units are in a safe and stable condition
  • 70. Three Mile Island History Reactor Scram: 04:00 3/28/79 Core melt and relocation: ~ 05:00 07:30 3/28/79 Hydrogen Deflagration: 13:00 3/28/79 Recirculation Cooling: Late 3/28/79 Phased Water Processing: 19791993 Containment Venting 43KCi Kr85: July 1980 Containment Entry: July 1980 Reactor Head removed and core melt found: July 1984 Start Defuel: October 1985 Shipping Spent Fuel: 19881990 Finish Defuel: Jan 1990 Evaporate ~2M gallons Processed Water: 199193 Cost: ~$1 Billion
  • 71. Impact on US Reactors US has implemented B.5.b requirements in 2008 Beyond Severe Accident Guidelines Onsite high pressure portable pump Procedures and appropriate staging areas and requirements for fire hoses and equipment on site MOUs with fire local fire stations to establish the plant as a priority in case of an emergency.
  • 72. Impact on US Reactor Some of the things that should be reviewed Review all external events, i.e., fire, flooding, explosions and earthquake, to ensure that there is backup emergency equipment that can support a station black out. Review training for extreme station Blackout events and procedure. Ensure that emergency batteries are qualified for worst case events for fl0od, fire, explosions and seismic. The portable high pressure pump and associated equipment that was required because of B.5.b should be housed in a structure that is qualified for worst case fire, flood, explosion and seismic events.