This document provides an overview of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident that occurred in 2011 following an earthquake and tsunami in Japan. It discusses the plant designs, accident progression, spent fuel pools, radiological releases, and impact on US reactors. Key events included the loss of off-site power and emergency diesel generators due to flooding, melting of reactor cores due to lack of cooling, hydrogen explosions, and venting of radioactive gases. Lessons learned included enhancing backup cooling capabilities and emergency procedures for extreme events.
1 of 72
More Related Content
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Accident April19 2011
2. Introduction
Over 35 Years in the Nuclear Power Industry
MS Nuclear, BS Mechanical, BS Industrial
Worked at a BWR Nuclear Power Station for 9 years.
Responsible for Fuel, safety analyses and PRA.
Responsible for Nuclear Steam Supply Systems
Technical Support Manager for Emergency Response
Organization.
Supported the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
in reviewing Nuclear Power Plant Safety Systems.
3. Acknowledgements
Thanks to Japanese Industrial Atomic Forum (JIAF)
Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO)
AREVA PowerPoint- The Fukushima Daiichi Incident
Dr. Matthias Braun
Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) & Japan
Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNES) on Plant
Data
Lake H. Barrett- Foundation For Nuclear Studies
Briefing
General Electric
4. The Fukushima Daiichi
Accident
1. What Happened?
2.Plant Designs
3.Accident Progression
4.Spent fuel pools
5.Radiological releases
6.Impact on US
16. Plant Designs - Fukushima Dai-ichi
Unit 1 is BWR/3
Units 2-4 are BWR/4
BWR is a Boiling Water Reactor
There are 52 Reactors in Japan and 104 Reactors in the
USA (35 BWRs & 69 PWRs)
The Fukushima I reactors began operation in the
1970s so they are all thirty - forty years old.
They all are early vintage Mark I Containment Designs
17. Fukushima Dai-ichi Site Reactor and Fuel Specifications
Fukushima Dai-ichi Tokyo Electric Power Co.
Reactor
Commercial Supplier
Reactor No. Net MWe Reactor Model
Start
Unit 1 439 BWR-3 3/71 GE
Unit 2 760 BWR-4 7/74 GE
Unit 3 760 BWR-4 3/76 Toshiba
Unit 4 760 BWR-4 10/78 Hitachi
Unit 5 760 BWR-4 4/78 Toshiba
Unit 6 1067 BWR-5 10/79 GE
24. What happened?
The plant was immediately shut down (scrammed)
when the earthquake first hit. Off-Site power was lost.
Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) started to
provide backup electrical power to the plants backup
cooling system. The backup worked.
All AC power to the station was lost when the Tsunami
flooded the EDGs.
The diesel generators ceased functioning after
approximately one hour due to Tsunami induced
damage.
At that point, the plant experienced a complete
blackout (no AC electric power at all). Commonly
called a Station Blackout.
30. What happened (cont.)?
Initially the Isolation condenser (IC) for Unit 1, which uses the
condensate as a heat sink, was used to remove the decay heat
from the shutdown reactors. After 1 or 2 hours, the 29,000
gallons of water in the IC is hot, the condensate heat sink was
not available and no heat removal was available for Unit 1.
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system for Units 2 & 3,
which operate on steam from the reactor, were used to cool
reactor core water, however, the batterysupplied control valves
lost DC power after the prolonged use.
DC power from batteries was consumed after approximately
34 hours.
Hours passed as primary water inventory was lost and core
degradation occurred (through some combination of
zirconium oxidation and clad failure).
35. What happened?
Hydrogen in reactor building exploded causing it to
collapse around the containment.
The containment around the reactor and RPV were
reported to be intact.
Pressure in the containment drywell rose as wetwell
became hotter.
Hydrogen produced from zirconium oxidation was
vented from the containment into the reactor building.
38. What happened?
Portable diesel generators were delivered to the plant
site.
AC power was restored allowing for a different backup
pumping system to replace inventory in reactor pressure
vessel (RPV).
The decision was made to inject seawater into the RPV
to continue to the cooling process, another backup
system that was designed into the plant from inception.
Radioactivity releases from operator initiated venting
appear to be decreasing.
65. Surry 1 & 2
Surry Power Station, Unit 1 &2 II PWR-DRYSUB 2,546
06/25/1968
Virginia Electric and Power Co. WEST 3LP 05/25/1972
Surry, VA S&W 12/22/1972 90
(17 miles NW of Newport News, VA) S&W 03/20/2003
050-00280 05/25/2032
www.nrc.gov/info-finder/reactor/sur1.html 94
66. Current Event -Surry Power Station Shuts Down
After Apparent Tornado Cuts Off-site Electricity
Apparent tornado damages switchyard adjacent to
nuclear units
Loss of Off-Site Power
Emergency Diesel Generators Activated
Dominion Virginia Power crews have restored off-
site power to station
Back-up diesel generators functioning to
supplement electrical supply
Units are in a safe and stable condition
70. Three Mile Island History
Reactor Scram: 04:00 3/28/79
Core melt and relocation: ~ 05:00 07:30 3/28/79
Hydrogen Deflagration: 13:00 3/28/79
Recirculation Cooling: Late 3/28/79
Phased Water Processing: 19791993
Containment Venting 43KCi Kr85: July 1980
Containment Entry: July 1980
Reactor Head removed and core melt found: July 1984
Start Defuel: October 1985
Shipping Spent Fuel: 19881990
Finish Defuel: Jan 1990
Evaporate ~2M gallons Processed Water: 199193
Cost: ~$1 Billion
71. Impact on US Reactors
US has implemented B.5.b requirements in 2008
Beyond Severe Accident Guidelines
Onsite high pressure portable pump
Procedures and appropriate staging areas and
requirements for fire hoses and equipment on site
MOUs with fire local fire stations to establish the plant
as a priority in case of an emergency.
72. Impact on US Reactor
Some of the things that should be reviewed
Review all external events, i.e., fire, flooding, explosions
and earthquake, to ensure that there is backup
emergency equipment that can support a station black
out.
Review training for extreme station Blackout events and
procedure.
Ensure that emergency batteries are qualified for worst
case events for fl0od, fire, explosions and seismic.
The portable high pressure pump and associated
equipment that was required because of B.5.b should be
housed in a structure that is qualified for worst case fire,
flood, explosion and seismic events.