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Lessons learned Crimea 2014

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Andrii Ryzhenko
Andrii Ryzhenko

The document outlines 13 lessons learned from Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014. It analyzes weaknesses in Ukraine's military including centralized decision making, passive command and control, overbearing bureaucracy, flawed human resource policies, poor intelligence sharing, territorial recruiting practices, lack of critical infrastructure security, unsecure military installations, outdated equipment, classic warfare training, inability to confront pro-Russian civilians, and support for annexation from the Russian Orthodox Church. Remedial actions are proposed such as decentralized decision making, independent thinking, social policies for military families, procurement of modern equipment, and training for hybrid warfare scenarios.

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Lessons Learned Crimea 2014 # Lesson Comment Remedial action 1 Psychological conditioning and Ideology Ukrainian military were trained to see Russians as friends and brothers. Russians used it to accomplish mission of Crimea annexation. Ideology of fellowship and bureaucratic thinking created inability to think or act Education and training system that teaches people to be open minded and make their own decision based upon democratic values and situation of the time, not indoctrination, rules and dogma 2 Decision making Centralized C2 negatively affected decision making, losing time waiting for orders instead of delivering a prompt response Decentralized decision making, Delegation of authority to junior commanders. Basing training and exercises on decision making activities not only upon skills and rehearsals 3 Passive Command and Control UKR military trained to act after receiving order rather than reacting when the situation requires. With lack of strategic leadership it wasn’t possible to react promptly on operational and tactical level Training ability to act independently, changes in HR, education systems and policies Strategic (operational) leadership course needed urgently for senior leaders 4 Overbearing Working Mentality Overchecking and overcontrol in system of managing defense and security didn’t work and had damage effect on the morale and ability of commanders to act. Excessive Paperwork and hours worked for no reason create an unhealthy and unproductive environment Simplify verification system, delegate authority, and educate responsibility. Documents (Laws) must reflect common sense and may be
Officers have no energy to change gear for war. changed if needed. 5 Human resource system UKR military promotion system has been based on the ability to ?follow rules? principle rather than promoting strong leaders, risk takers and independent thinkers. There were not commanders who were incapable to make combat decisions on their own. Introduce new mentality, HR policy, operational design methodology and brain storming tools 6 Intelligence Our intelligence has been systematically used as a tool of power rather than tool of operations. Deliberately withholding access to strategic warning information to all level of C2 stopped common sense thinking. Misinterpretation of obvious information when intervention started. Understanding that Intel is an operational tool, Intel Info must be accessible to all levels, minimize items considered as secrets. Creation of unit analyzing combat experience and situational centres 7 Territorial recruiting and social policy for military Military in Crimea were mostly recruited from Crimea and were not able to fight with the pro-Russian population. Most of them (up to 80%) didn’t stay loyal to Ukraine. Lack of trusted and reliable social (particularly in housing) policy for Ukrainian military also affected their decision to stay within Crimea rather than to move to continental Ukraine Only branch at Navy HQ completely moved out of Crimea was MILCOOP branch who all spoke English. Recruiting must be from other areas (extra-territorial) principle. Social policy for military to be totally reviewed: maximum monetization and affordable loans for housing. 8 Lack of security of critical infrastructure (Government buildings, airports, energy suppliers, transportation, TV and communication) Existing protection plan wasn’t activated because of Crimean security service and police treason. Military as supportive agency wasn’t activated and didn’t take a lead in crisis situation because of a gap in legislation. Security plan to be reviewed in order be activated promptly before danger in place. Leading authority is not to be strictly fixed from definite agency. New clear Law Enforcement
ROE for COIN to be designed and activated. 9 Unsecure location of military installations Many military HQs and units located within civilian infrastructure, neglecting secure perimeter, autonomous energy and water supply requirements and other measures of physical security. These resulted that most of the military installations became insecure and vulnerable, particularly during hybrid warfare. Physical and material security to be primary requirements during selection of military units location. 10 Equipment (uniform, aircraft, warships) Worn out and old fashioned, not durable, uncomfortable to use. Lack of modern intelligence collection, communication, targeting and EW equipment. Procurement of new and modern equipment, including personal equipment. 11 Training Classic Soviet Style warfare training (no hybrid), old fashioned, insufficient resources (fuel, spare parts) Allocate sufficient resources, change methodologies to include asymmetric warfare PSYOPS, INFOOPS 12 Using ethnical (Russians and pro-Russian Ukrainians) civilians as manpower for paramilitary forces in Crimea Psychological and mental unpreparedness of Ukrainian military to confront (use the force) with (against) formal civilians. Special attention of security services to different non- friendly paramilitary organization. Promotion of patriotic organizations. 13 Active support of annexation from Russian Orthodox Church Russian Orthodox Church justified the occupation of Crimea and called for non-resisting actions. Promotion of pro-Ukrainian religious positions. Unity of Ukrainian churches within the military structure.

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Lessons learned Crimea 2014

  • 1. Lessons Learned Crimea 2014 # Lesson Comment Remedial action 1 Psychological conditioning and Ideology Ukrainian military were trained to see Russians as friends and brothers. Russians used it to accomplish mission of Crimea annexation. Ideology of fellowship and bureaucratic thinking created inability to think or act Education and training system that teaches people to be open minded and make their own decision based upon democratic values and situation of the time, not indoctrination, rules and dogma 2 Decision making Centralized C2 negatively affected decision making, losing time waiting for orders instead of delivering a prompt response Decentralized decision making, Delegation of authority to junior commanders. Basing training and exercises on decision making activities not only upon skills and rehearsals 3 Passive Command and Control UKR military trained to act after receiving order rather than reacting when the situation requires. With lack of strategic leadership it wasn’t possible to react promptly on operational and tactical level Training ability to act independently, changes in HR, education systems and policies Strategic (operational) leadership course needed urgently for senior leaders 4 Overbearing Working Mentality Overchecking and overcontrol in system of managing defense and security didn’t work and had damage effect on the morale and ability of commanders to act. Excessive Paperwork and hours worked for no reason create an unhealthy and unproductive environment Simplify verification system, delegate authority, and educate responsibility. Documents (Laws) must reflect common sense and may be
  • 2. Officers have no energy to change gear for war. changed if needed. 5 Human resource system UKR military promotion system has been based on the ability to ?follow rules? principle rather than promoting strong leaders, risk takers and independent thinkers. There were not commanders who were incapable to make combat decisions on their own. Introduce new mentality, HR policy, operational design methodology and brain storming tools 6 Intelligence Our intelligence has been systematically used as a tool of power rather than tool of operations. Deliberately withholding access to strategic warning information to all level of C2 stopped common sense thinking. Misinterpretation of obvious information when intervention started. Understanding that Intel is an operational tool, Intel Info must be accessible to all levels, minimize items considered as secrets. Creation of unit analyzing combat experience and situational centres 7 Territorial recruiting and social policy for military Military in Crimea were mostly recruited from Crimea and were not able to fight with the pro-Russian population. Most of them (up to 80%) didn’t stay loyal to Ukraine. Lack of trusted and reliable social (particularly in housing) policy for Ukrainian military also affected their decision to stay within Crimea rather than to move to continental Ukraine Only branch at Navy HQ completely moved out of Crimea was MILCOOP branch who all spoke English. Recruiting must be from other areas (extra-territorial) principle. Social policy for military to be totally reviewed: maximum monetization and affordable loans for housing. 8 Lack of security of critical infrastructure (Government buildings, airports, energy suppliers, transportation, TV and communication) Existing protection plan wasn’t activated because of Crimean security service and police treason. Military as supportive agency wasn’t activated and didn’t take a lead in crisis situation because of a gap in legislation. Security plan to be reviewed in order be activated promptly before danger in place. Leading authority is not to be strictly fixed from definite agency. New clear Law Enforcement
  • 3. ROE for COIN to be designed and activated. 9 Unsecure location of military installations Many military HQs and units located within civilian infrastructure, neglecting secure perimeter, autonomous energy and water supply requirements and other measures of physical security. These resulted that most of the military installations became insecure and vulnerable, particularly during hybrid warfare. Physical and material security to be primary requirements during selection of military units location. 10 Equipment (uniform, aircraft, warships) Worn out and old fashioned, not durable, uncomfortable to use. Lack of modern intelligence collection, communication, targeting and EW equipment. Procurement of new and modern equipment, including personal equipment. 11 Training Classic Soviet Style warfare training (no hybrid), old fashioned, insufficient resources (fuel, spare parts) Allocate sufficient resources, change methodologies to include asymmetric warfare PSYOPS, INFOOPS 12 Using ethnical (Russians and pro-Russian Ukrainians) civilians as manpower for paramilitary forces in Crimea Psychological and mental unpreparedness of Ukrainian military to confront (use the force) with (against) formal civilians. Special attention of security services to different non- friendly paramilitary organization. Promotion of patriotic organizations. 13 Active support of annexation from Russian Orthodox Church Russian Orthodox Church justified the occupation of Crimea and called for non-resisting actions. Promotion of pro-Ukrainian religious positions. Unity of Ukrainian churches within the military structure.