This document summarizes a simulation of beyond design basis accident (BDBA) scenarios for a BWR3 Mark I nuclear power plant. It describes the plant's safety features for design basis accidents as well as additional beyond DBA features like manual depressurization and alternate water injection sources. It then simulates the progression of a loss of feedwater accident where high and reactor core isolation cooling fail, including a discussion of venting strategies and the potential for containment failure and radioactive release. Emergency water makeup capabilities are also evaluated.
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MAAP4.0.6 Simulation of Beyond DBA BWR3 Mark I rev03
3. BWR3,MarkI DBAFeatures:
ElectricdrivenMainFeedwater,CondensatePumps
2Dieselssupply:4kVpower,480V,250VDC,125VDC
2 Trains Electric Driven LPCI with 2 RHR Heat Exchangers
2TrainsElectricDrivenLPCIwith2RHRHeatExchangers
SafetysystemdesignedforLargeDesignBasesLOCA
LPCIalsohasDrywellandSuppressionPoolSprayFunction
2TrainsElectricDrivenCoreSprayPumps
SafetysystemdesignedforLargeDesignBasesLOCA
1 Train HPCI with suction from CST
1TrainHPCIwithsuctionfromCST
SafetysystemdesignedforSmall/MediumLOCA
AutomaticDepressurizationSystem
S f
SafetysystemdesignedforSmall/MediumLOCAwithHPCIfailure
d i d f S ll/M di LOCA i h HPCI f il
1TrainRCICwithsuctionfromCST
NonSafetysystemdesignedforheatremovalwhenmaincondenser
unavailable
2TrainsHPControlRodDriveHydraulicPumps(~90200gpm) 3
13. 堰庄乙鞄油永姻艶壊壊顎姻艶油檎遺鴛遺油皆霞壊岳艶馨油: Features:
Can inject at full system
Caninjectatfullsystem
press.(1050psia)
~2x105 lbs/hrmakeup
capability(smallerthanHPCI)
Designedtoprovidemakeup
aftershutdownwhenFW
unavailable
CSTiswatersource,Torusis
CST is water source Torus is
alternatewatersource
Canbestartedlocally,run
withoutDCpower
Limitations:
NeedsRPVsupplypress.>
50psig
Needsexhaust(Torus)
press.<75psig
DCpowerneededtoremote
start
t t
WhenTorususedaswater
source,Temperature<200F
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20. LossofFeedwaterwithnoHeatRemoval
InitiallymoreseverethanLossofOffsitePower
Reactortrip,MSIVclosureisDelayed
Rate of initial RPV Level Drop is Faster
RateofinitialRPVLevelDropisFaster
SteamDrivenhighpressuremakeupsources(HPCI,
RCIC)notConsidered
RCIC) not Considered yet
CRDHydraulicmakeupnotconsidered yet
AC/DC power available compressed N2 available
AC/DCpower available,compressedN available
OperatorsfollowEOPsanddepressurizeatTAF
reflooding with LPCI to achieve stable water levels
withLPCItoachievestablewaterlevels
SuppressionPoolCoolingfailsoverlongterm
Drywell Chillers Containment Venting not considered
DrywellChillers,ContainmentVentingnotconsidered
ThisisadominantPRAaccidentsequence 20
33. MitigationStrategy:
MitigationStrategy:Ifunabletovent,howmuch
watermakeupneededtocoolcore?
water makeup needed to cool core?
Matchboiloffduetodecayheat:
WBOIL =QDECAY(26hrs)/h
QDECAY(26hrs)=3.88x107 BTU/hr
h=hsat(1050psia) hCST(80F)~1142.3BTU/lbm
WBOIL =(3.88x107 BTU/hr)/(1142.3BTU/lbm)=34,000lbm/hr
or:=(567lbm/min)(0.016ft3/lbm)=9.07ft3/min
Convertingtogal/min,thisisonly:~67.8gpm
67.8gpm
Recall:CRDmakeupflowtoRPVis:90 200gpm
90 200gpm
1electricCRDpumpcouldeasilykeepthecorecoveredforan
indefiniteperiodoftimeifcontainmentoverpressurefailuredoes
i d fi it i d f ti ifcontainmentoverpressurefailuredoes
if t i t f il d
notimpactCRDpumpoperatingenvironment.
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34. EvaluationofStationACBlackout
Lossofoffsitepowercauses:LossofFeedwater.Lossof
RecirculationFlow,MSIVclosure,ReactorTrip,Recirc.PumpSeal
Leakage(37 165gpm)likely
g ( gp ) y
Dieselsfail,DCBatteriesbegintodischarge
AllACpoweredequipmentshutsdown
F d t
Feedwaterandcondensatepumps
d d t
DrywellCoolers,roomcooling
LPCI,CoreSpray,CRDpumpscannotbeoperated
HPCI RCIC potentially available provided RPV steam and DC
HPCI,RCICpotentiallyavailableprovidedRPVsteamandDC
availableforstarting,anduntilroomtemperatures>150F
CSTavailableaswatersource
S/ V
S/RVspotentiallyavailabletoblowdownifcontainmentpressure
i ll il bl bl d if i
<75psig,and BOTH:DCpower,compressedN2 available
DieselFirePump(portablepumps)potentiallyavailableuntilout
offuel
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41. Whatislearnedfromallthis:
Ifthereisnocontainmentheatremovalworking,highpressuresteam
drivenpumpswilleventuallyshutdownonbackpressureat~13.9hrs
B tt i ( ith t h
Batteries(withoutchargers)willallbedepletedby~78hrsand
) ill ll b d l t d b ~7 8h d
unavailabletoopenS/RVsorcontainmentventvalves.
Drywelltemperatures>335FchallengeEQlimitforS/RVoperationat
~8hrs
Containmentpressurereaches>56psigforproceduralcontainment
ventingat 15hrsbutthisis7hrs
venting at ~15hrs but this is 7hrs after battery depletion
7hrsafter batterydepletion
VentingatthistimecouldallowlocalmanualrestartingofRCICpumpin
timetorecoverwaterlevelbutthereisnoDCpower
butthereisnoDCpower
M i i i
MaintainingcorecoolingisthusdependentonDCpower
li i h d d DC
InStationACBlackout:containmentventingneedstobeconsideredearlier
topreservecorecoolingoptions.
to preserve core cooling options
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42. Usingtheseinsights:
Simulationstudiesthenperformedonhowtosuccessfullycope
withprolongedSBObutalso:SeismicSBO
p g
Inbothcases:nopossibilityforTorusCooling
nopossibilityforTorusCooling
SeismicSBOdiffersfromSBO:
Offsitepowerrecoverymayrequireweeks vs.hours
PossiblydestroysCST(requiringHPCI,RCICsuctionfromTorus)
ThiscausesmorerapidTorusHeatup
p p
PossiblydestroysDieselFireWatermakeup(buriedpiping,castironpiping
inbuildings)
Successful coping depends on:
Successfulcopingdependson:
GasolinepoweredportableDCbatterychargers(orSecurityDiesel)
Portable,Gasolinepoweredpumps
Aircompressororbottledgassupply
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44. VentContainment,butkeeppressure:15 25psig
(
(IfanyhydrogenwerepresentincontainmentitwouldbeinertedviaexcessNitrogenandlacking
y y g p g g
sufficientOxygentoignite.Thus:wedontwantoutsideatmosphericairenteringcontainment sokeep
pressurized)
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47. Whatislearnedfromallthis:
CurrentguidancetouseHPCIonceandthrottledRCIC:works
works
Alternate means will be needed for DC Battery charging ~5hrs
AlternatemeanswillbeneededforDCBatterycharging 5hrs
VentingContainmentisneededearlier(~8hrs)
VentingContainmentisneededearlier(~8hrs)tomaintainlower
DrywellTemperaturestooperateS/RVsallowingemergencyRPV
depressurization
Earlierventingrequiresdefeating56psigrupturedisk
EmergencyRPVdepressurizationascurrentlyinEOPswillallow
d i i l i ill ll
useofsmallerportablepumps
Successfully executing this long term coping strategy requires
Successfullyexecutingthislongtermcopingstrategyrequires
logistics ofstagedequipment andsupplyofconsumables(fuel
stagedequipment fuel,
compressedgas)
compressedgas
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49. 堰看敬油晦看稼乙油遺温稼油鰻永永油遺看沿艶油
WithoutDecayHeatRemoval?
Without Decay Heat Removal?
Coping time is: time from when heat removal is lost to
Copingtimeis:timefromwhenheatremovalislostto
onsetofseverecoredamage(availablerecoverytime)
Copingtimeconsiders:
Coping time considers
Physicalinertiabuiltintoreactordesignviawaterto
waterto
corepowerratio
Effects of water makeup systems
Effectsofwatermakeupsystems
Effectsofsupportfeatures(DCpower,HVAC)which
enablewatermakeupsystems
enable water makeup systems
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53. BehaviorofWaterafter RCICstops:
AssumeRCICcannotbeoperatedafter8hrs
Pressure~1050psia andconstantduetoreliefvalveoperation
Atconstantpressurewatermasslossstillrelatedtodecayheat
At constant pressure water mass loss still related to decay heat
Ifcoreoutputinitiallyat:Qo~8.13E+9BTU/hr
WhenRCICstops:WRCIC(t)~0.0lbm./hr.
Assumesameinitialwatermassabovecore:MCORE~1.2E+5lbm.
Behaviorofwaterinventorygovernedby:
dM CORE
WLOSS
dt
0.15Qot 0.286
t
M CORE (t ) M CORE (8hrs ) ( )dt
8
h fg
0.15Qo 0.714
M CORE (8hrs ) (t 8hrs 0.714 )
0.714h fg
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