The document discusses 5 signature features of past influenza pandemics that can inform pandemic preparedness planning: 1) a shift in the virus subtype, 2) a shift in the highest death rates to younger populations, 3) successive pandemic waves over multiple years, 4) higher transmissibility than seasonal influenza, and 5) differences in impact across geographic regions. Understanding these features is important for optimizing control strategies, prioritizing vaccine distribution, and emphasizing the need for international collaboration on surveillance, data sharing, and response.
The role of influenza in the epidemiology of pneumoniaJoshua Berus
油
1. The document examines the role of influenza in pneumonia epidemiology using longitudinal influenza and pneumonia incidence data from different time periods and locations in the US.
2. Using a transmission model and likelihood-based inference framework, the analysis found that influenza infection increases an individual's risk of developing pneumonia by around 100-fold, supporting the hypothesis that influenza enhances susceptibility to pneumonia.
3. However, the analysis found no evidence that influenza infection affects the transmission or severity of pneumonia. The consistency of these findings across different datasets and the model's ability to predict pneumonia incidence increases confidence in the conclusion that influenza substantially increases risk of pneumonia for a short period.
Disease Mitigation Measures in the Control of Pandemic InfluenzaSantiago Montiveros
油
This document discusses disease mitigation measures that have been proposed to lessen the impact of an influenza pandemic, including isolation, quarantine, social distancing, and other actions. It reviews the limited evidence on the effectiveness of such measures from past pandemics and studies. While models provide some guidance, they have significant limitations and cannot predict real-world behavioral or economic impacts. Most mitigation measures would be extremely difficult to implement on a large scale for the months-long duration of a pandemic. Decision-makers must consider not just epidemiological impacts but also logistical feasibility, social consequences, and potential unintended economic and political effects of different response strategies.
This document provides an overview of pandemic influenza, including a history of past pandemics such as the 1918 Spanish Flu. It discusses the origins and spread of influenza viruses between animals and humans. The document also summarizes the initial outbreak and spread of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, starting in Mexico and then globally. Key events related to the WHO response and pandemic phases are outlined.
This document discusses influenza pandemic preparedness. It notes that influenza A viruses can undergo major antigenic shifts, causing worldwide pandemics with high morbidity and mortality, such as in 1918, 1957, and 1968. Epidemics are primarily caused by influenza A and B viruses, while pandemics are caused by new influenza A viruses emerging from animal reservoirs. The goals of pandemic preparedness are to reduce morbidity and mortality from influenza, decrease social and economic impacts, and develop coordinated international, national, and local plans that strengthen surveillance, stockpile vaccines and antivirals, optimize health systems and resources, and educate the public and healthcare providers.
The document discusses the threat of pandemic influenza and the need for healthcare systems to prepare for disease outbreaks. It notes that recent outbreaks of avian influenza A(H5N1) are a reminder that a human pandemic could occur at any time, causing major suffering and economic losses. Past pandemics like the 1918 Spanish flu prompted authorities to plan for preparedness, but structured planning is still lacking in many healthcare systems. The ability of influenza viruses to mutate and reassort means a new pandemic strain could emerge.
120 EXPERT Opinions on Coronavirus (COVID-19)- How the Mass Media Exaggerated...Antonio Bernard
油
This document provides over 120 expert opinions from scientists, doctors, and other professionals criticizing the handling of the coronavirus pandemic. Many experts argue that the virus poses a relatively low risk and that measures like lockdowns and business closures are an overreaction that will cause more harm than the virus itself. Other opinions expressed include that the infection fatality rate is much lower than estimates from the WHO, that social distancing has not been shown to be effective, and that the media coverage has caused unnecessary panic.
This presentation is all about this history of influenza in Indiana. Kimberly Brown-Harden put this presentation together. It may be helpful in planning program's for Indiana's Bicentennial.
- The document is a speech by the Secretary of Health and Human Services outlining preparations for an influenza pandemic.
- It discusses the history of past pandemics like the 1918 Spanish Flu that killed 50 million people worldwide.
- The emergence of H5N1 avian flu in 2005 prompted increased preparations, including developing domestic vaccine production capacity, stockpiling antiviral drugs and personal protective equipment, and improving state and local pandemic plans.
- The goal is to have enough pandemic vaccine available for every American within 6 months of a pandemic outbreak.
The document provides information from a presentation on pandemic influenza planning and preparedness. It defines pandemic influenza and describes factors that cause pandemics. It discusses past pandemics like the 1918 Spanish Flu pandemic. It also addresses the current threat of influenza, describing seasonal flu, avian flu, and the possibility of another influenza pandemic.
1. An unexpected epidemic of H1N1 influenza began in Mexico in March 2009, first appearing as influenza-like illnesses in various states. By April 23rd, over 800 cases and 59 deaths had been reported in Mexico City alone.
2. The Mexican government initially said the situation was under control but suddenly closed schools and recommended masks and handwashing on the evening of April 23rd as cases rose rapidly.
3. By April 25th, over 1000 cases and 68 deaths had been reported across Mexico, with the CDC also reporting 20 cases across the US, as the pandemic emerged.
1.SANITATION VS VACCINATION- The History of Infectious DiseasesAntonio Bernard
油
The document discusses the origins of many infectious diseases in humans. It notes that 60% of human infectious diseases originated in animals, and that diseases emerged as early humans increasingly domesticated animals like cows, pigs, chickens, and camels. Close contact between humans and domesticated, disease-carrying animals allowed pathogens to jump species. For example, measles likely emerged from cattle viruses, smallpox from camel viruses, influenza from duck viruses, and whooping cough and typhoid from pig bacteria. It was not until the domestication of these animals that humans were exposed to these diseases.
This document discusses the use of subtractive genomics to identify potential drug targets for pathogenic organisms. Subtractive genomics involves subtracting the sequences between a host and pathogen's proteome to identify proteins essential to the pathogen but not present in the host. This approach has been applied to identify drug targets for multi-drug resistant pathogens like Salmonella typhi and Listeria monocytogenes, as well as pathogens with no existing effective drugs like Leishmania donovani and Clostridium botulinum. Identifying novel drug targets through subtractive genomics can help develop new defenses against antibiotic-resistant pathogens and treat diseases currently lacking effective treatments.
1) The document summarizes research on West Nile virus transmission in urban areas like Chicago. It examines the spatial and temporal patterns of human and mosquito infections.
2) A key finding is that around two-thirds of human West Nile virus cases occurred in one type of urban landscape - "post World War II suburbs" with green spaces that provide bird habitats and mosquito breeding sites near homes.
3) The level of West Nile virus amplification in mosquito populations each year can be predicted based on temperature (measured as "degree weeks") and precipitation - hot and dry conditions promote higher transmission while more rain reduces risk. Higher mosquito infection rates from June to mid-July are linked to more human illnesses
H1 n1 influenza a disease information for health professionals lindsey_nejm 2009Ruth Vargas Gonzales
油
1. A novel H1N1 influenza virus emerged in Mexico and the US in April 2009 that was a triple reassortment of human, avian, and swine influenza viruses.
2. Researchers developed PCR tests to identify confirmed cases of the virus and help track the outbreak. Health authorities worldwide are monitoring and trying to control the outbreak.
3. As of early May 2009, the virus was causing mild to moderate illness in most patients. However, some hospitalized patients developed pneumonia or other complications, and two deaths occurred in high-risk patients. The age distribution and symptoms resembled typical seasonal influenza.
This document provides definitions and examples of outbreaks, epidemics, and pandemics throughout history. It defines an outbreak as a sudden increase in disease cases in a specific time and place. An epidemic occurs when there are more cases than normal within a community or region. A pandemic is an epidemic that spreads across multiple continents or worldwide. Several examples of devastating past pandemics are provided, including the Black Death which killed an estimated 75-200 million people in the 14th century, and the 1918 Spanish Flu pandemic which killed 20-50 million people. Causes and death tolls of other pandemics like the Plague of Justinian, cholera, and influenza outbreaks are also summarized.
This document discusses Howard Markel's expertise in the history of epidemics and pandemics. It outlines a 4-act model of how epidemics typically unfold, with act 1 being progressive revelation of the disease, act 2 managing the randomness of spread, act 3 managing public response, and act 4 being subsidence and retrospection. It also lists major themes and factors that shape epidemics, such as how societies understand diseases, economic impacts, media coverage, poverty, quarantines, and amnesia between outbreaks. Specific examples discussed include Markel's op-eds on the early COVID-19 outbreak in China and quarantines, and a quote expressing uncertainty around predicting future pandemics.
This review summarizes evidence on the burden of tuberculosis in populations affected by crises such as armed conflict, displacement, and natural disasters. 51 reports were identified that provided data on tuberculosis notification rates, prevalence, incidence, case fatality ratios, and drug resistance levels among crisis-affected populations. Most studies found elevated notification rates and prevalence compared to reference populations, with incidence and prevalence ratios over 2 in 11 of 15 reports that could make comparisons. Case fatality ratios were generally below 10% and drug resistance levels were usually comparable to background levels, with some exceptions. Analysis of surveillance data from refugee camps also suggested a pattern of excess tuberculosis risk. National tuberculosis notification data analysis found that more intense conflicts were associated with decreases in reported tuberculosis cases
This document discusses emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases. It defines emerging diseases as newly identified infectious agents and re-emerging diseases as previously known agents that are increasing in incidence after being controlled. Factors that contribute to emergence include evolution of pathogens, human behavior and demographics, environmental changes, and weaknesses in public health systems. Examples of emerging diseases discussed are hepatitis C, zoonoses, and pandemic H1N1 influenza. Examples of re-emerging diseases include diphtheria, cholera, plague and dengue fever. Public health responses outlined include surveillance, investigation and control measures, prevention efforts, and global networks like GOARN that facilitate international outbreak response.
This document describes a mathematical model of hepatitis B virus (HBV) transmission applied to the New Zealand Tongan population. The model predicts that with current infant vaccination coverage of 53%, chronic HBV prevalence will plateau at 2% over 250 years. However, 73% vaccination coverage is needed to eliminate HBV long-term. Improving coverage to 85% through targeted vaccination could arrest transmission within a generation and eliminate HBV, similar to outcomes in Taiwan and Alaska with similar policies. Screening and disease management may also help reduce the HBV burden, though its precise impact is hard to quantify. Mathematical models can help evaluate different control strategies for high prevalence populations.
This document discusses R. Edgar Hope-Simpson's proposal from 1981 that seasonal changes in solar radiation explain the seasonality of influenza epidemics. It notes that solar radiation triggers vitamin D production in the skin, and that vitamin D deficiency is common in winter. Vitamin D acts as an immune system modulator and stimulates anti-microbial peptides, suggesting that vitamin D or its deficiency may be the "seasonal stimulus" that influences influenza seasonality. The document reviews evidence that vitamin D supplementation reduces respiratory infections.
This document discusses the importance of global disease surveillance for national security. It notes that while some disease surveillance systems exist, there is no comprehensive international system with leadership over both human and animal diseases. The lack of coordination and data sharing poses challenges. Intentional disease outbreaks also complicate surveillance efforts, as does the increasing threat of emerging zoonotic diseases. The document argues that improving global disease surveillance should be a high priority for national security.
The document discusses the 1918 flu pandemic, which originated from a virus that underwent an antigenic shift allowing it to spread easily between humans. It killed 20-50 million people worldwide and 675,000 in the US. The pandemic occurred in three waves, with a severe second wave in the fall of 1918. Even today, influenza remains a threat as the virus can undergo antigenic drift and shifts, sometimes resulting in new pandemic strains against which humans have little immunity. Monitoring efforts focus on tracking current flu strains and outbreaks.
Microbes and vectors swim in the evolutionary stream, and they swim faster than we do. Bacteria reproduce every 30 minutes. For them, a millennium is compressed into a fortnight. They are fleet afoot, and the pace of our research must keep up with them, or they will overtake us. Microbes were here on earth 2 billion years before humans arrived, learning every trick for survival, and it is likely that they will be here 2 billion years after we depart ......
Tuberculosis is caused by the bacterium Mycobacterium tuberculosis. It has infected humans for hundreds of thousands of years and was a major cause of death in the 18th-19th centuries. While vaccines and drugs were developed in the early 20th century, cases began rising again in the 1980s due to factors like HIV/AIDS and immigration from high prevalence countries. M. tuberculosis is spread through airborne droplets when infected people cough, sneeze or speak. It typically infects the lungs but can spread throughout the body. The bacterium is able to survive inside immune cells called macrophages. A proper immune response is needed to contain the infection, involving the activation of macrophages and formation of granulomas. Def
The document discusses the role of the internet and new media during the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic. It notes that while public health authorities prepared extensively, the actual impact of the pandemic was less severe than predicted. The pandemic highlighted issues with conflicting reports from health agencies and the spread of misinformation online. New technologies like social media and disease tracking websites provided more surveillance data but also uncertainty. The convergence of media and entertainment blurred the lines between fact and narrative, challenging public trust in authorities.
Pandemic Response in the Era of Big Data (Prier, 2015)Kyle Prier
油
This document discusses pandemic response in the era of big data by exploring global influenza surveillance and information overload. It summarizes how during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, WHO officials became overwhelmed by the rapid increase in data coming in and resorted to only qualitative indicators from country officials due to insufficient time to analyze the data. This information overload negatively impacted decision making and response efforts. The document then discusses the concepts of information overload, big data, and emerging novel syndromic surveillance systems using social media data like Twitter to monitor influenza trends.
This document analyzes mortality associated with influenza in the state of S達o Paulo, Brazil from 2002 to 2011. It finds that the pre-pandemic years showed a seasonal pattern of increased mortality during the winter linked to increased activity of influenza A(H3N2) viruses, especially in those over 60. The 2009 H1N1 pandemic was associated with higher than average mortality in those aged 5-19 and 20-59. Mortality in those over 60 was lower during the pandemic than previous influenza seasons. The pandemic wave occurred from July to November 2009. Overall mortality during the pandemic was higher than average but similar to severe H3N2 seasons.
This document discusses factors responsible for emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases. It argues that while pathogens, hosts, vectors, and environment have traditionally been seen as the main determinants of infectious disease emergence and transmission, human intervention through progress in science and technology should be considered a fifth key determinant. It provides examples of how various aspects of scientific and technological progress, such as intensive agriculture, antibiotic overuse, bioterrorism, and changes in food processing and transportation, have contributed to disease emergence and spread in recent decades.
The document provides information from a presentation on pandemic influenza planning and preparedness. It defines pandemic influenza and describes factors that cause pandemics. It discusses past pandemics like the 1918 Spanish Flu pandemic. It also addresses the current threat of influenza, describing seasonal flu, avian flu, and the possibility of another influenza pandemic.
1. An unexpected epidemic of H1N1 influenza began in Mexico in March 2009, first appearing as influenza-like illnesses in various states. By April 23rd, over 800 cases and 59 deaths had been reported in Mexico City alone.
2. The Mexican government initially said the situation was under control but suddenly closed schools and recommended masks and handwashing on the evening of April 23rd as cases rose rapidly.
3. By April 25th, over 1000 cases and 68 deaths had been reported across Mexico, with the CDC also reporting 20 cases across the US, as the pandemic emerged.
1.SANITATION VS VACCINATION- The History of Infectious DiseasesAntonio Bernard
油
The document discusses the origins of many infectious diseases in humans. It notes that 60% of human infectious diseases originated in animals, and that diseases emerged as early humans increasingly domesticated animals like cows, pigs, chickens, and camels. Close contact between humans and domesticated, disease-carrying animals allowed pathogens to jump species. For example, measles likely emerged from cattle viruses, smallpox from camel viruses, influenza from duck viruses, and whooping cough and typhoid from pig bacteria. It was not until the domestication of these animals that humans were exposed to these diseases.
This document discusses the use of subtractive genomics to identify potential drug targets for pathogenic organisms. Subtractive genomics involves subtracting the sequences between a host and pathogen's proteome to identify proteins essential to the pathogen but not present in the host. This approach has been applied to identify drug targets for multi-drug resistant pathogens like Salmonella typhi and Listeria monocytogenes, as well as pathogens with no existing effective drugs like Leishmania donovani and Clostridium botulinum. Identifying novel drug targets through subtractive genomics can help develop new defenses against antibiotic-resistant pathogens and treat diseases currently lacking effective treatments.
1) The document summarizes research on West Nile virus transmission in urban areas like Chicago. It examines the spatial and temporal patterns of human and mosquito infections.
2) A key finding is that around two-thirds of human West Nile virus cases occurred in one type of urban landscape - "post World War II suburbs" with green spaces that provide bird habitats and mosquito breeding sites near homes.
3) The level of West Nile virus amplification in mosquito populations each year can be predicted based on temperature (measured as "degree weeks") and precipitation - hot and dry conditions promote higher transmission while more rain reduces risk. Higher mosquito infection rates from June to mid-July are linked to more human illnesses
H1 n1 influenza a disease information for health professionals lindsey_nejm 2009Ruth Vargas Gonzales
油
1. A novel H1N1 influenza virus emerged in Mexico and the US in April 2009 that was a triple reassortment of human, avian, and swine influenza viruses.
2. Researchers developed PCR tests to identify confirmed cases of the virus and help track the outbreak. Health authorities worldwide are monitoring and trying to control the outbreak.
3. As of early May 2009, the virus was causing mild to moderate illness in most patients. However, some hospitalized patients developed pneumonia or other complications, and two deaths occurred in high-risk patients. The age distribution and symptoms resembled typical seasonal influenza.
This document provides definitions and examples of outbreaks, epidemics, and pandemics throughout history. It defines an outbreak as a sudden increase in disease cases in a specific time and place. An epidemic occurs when there are more cases than normal within a community or region. A pandemic is an epidemic that spreads across multiple continents or worldwide. Several examples of devastating past pandemics are provided, including the Black Death which killed an estimated 75-200 million people in the 14th century, and the 1918 Spanish Flu pandemic which killed 20-50 million people. Causes and death tolls of other pandemics like the Plague of Justinian, cholera, and influenza outbreaks are also summarized.
This document discusses Howard Markel's expertise in the history of epidemics and pandemics. It outlines a 4-act model of how epidemics typically unfold, with act 1 being progressive revelation of the disease, act 2 managing the randomness of spread, act 3 managing public response, and act 4 being subsidence and retrospection. It also lists major themes and factors that shape epidemics, such as how societies understand diseases, economic impacts, media coverage, poverty, quarantines, and amnesia between outbreaks. Specific examples discussed include Markel's op-eds on the early COVID-19 outbreak in China and quarantines, and a quote expressing uncertainty around predicting future pandemics.
This review summarizes evidence on the burden of tuberculosis in populations affected by crises such as armed conflict, displacement, and natural disasters. 51 reports were identified that provided data on tuberculosis notification rates, prevalence, incidence, case fatality ratios, and drug resistance levels among crisis-affected populations. Most studies found elevated notification rates and prevalence compared to reference populations, with incidence and prevalence ratios over 2 in 11 of 15 reports that could make comparisons. Case fatality ratios were generally below 10% and drug resistance levels were usually comparable to background levels, with some exceptions. Analysis of surveillance data from refugee camps also suggested a pattern of excess tuberculosis risk. National tuberculosis notification data analysis found that more intense conflicts were associated with decreases in reported tuberculosis cases
This document discusses emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases. It defines emerging diseases as newly identified infectious agents and re-emerging diseases as previously known agents that are increasing in incidence after being controlled. Factors that contribute to emergence include evolution of pathogens, human behavior and demographics, environmental changes, and weaknesses in public health systems. Examples of emerging diseases discussed are hepatitis C, zoonoses, and pandemic H1N1 influenza. Examples of re-emerging diseases include diphtheria, cholera, plague and dengue fever. Public health responses outlined include surveillance, investigation and control measures, prevention efforts, and global networks like GOARN that facilitate international outbreak response.
This document describes a mathematical model of hepatitis B virus (HBV) transmission applied to the New Zealand Tongan population. The model predicts that with current infant vaccination coverage of 53%, chronic HBV prevalence will plateau at 2% over 250 years. However, 73% vaccination coverage is needed to eliminate HBV long-term. Improving coverage to 85% through targeted vaccination could arrest transmission within a generation and eliminate HBV, similar to outcomes in Taiwan and Alaska with similar policies. Screening and disease management may also help reduce the HBV burden, though its precise impact is hard to quantify. Mathematical models can help evaluate different control strategies for high prevalence populations.
This document discusses R. Edgar Hope-Simpson's proposal from 1981 that seasonal changes in solar radiation explain the seasonality of influenza epidemics. It notes that solar radiation triggers vitamin D production in the skin, and that vitamin D deficiency is common in winter. Vitamin D acts as an immune system modulator and stimulates anti-microbial peptides, suggesting that vitamin D or its deficiency may be the "seasonal stimulus" that influences influenza seasonality. The document reviews evidence that vitamin D supplementation reduces respiratory infections.
This document discusses the importance of global disease surveillance for national security. It notes that while some disease surveillance systems exist, there is no comprehensive international system with leadership over both human and animal diseases. The lack of coordination and data sharing poses challenges. Intentional disease outbreaks also complicate surveillance efforts, as does the increasing threat of emerging zoonotic diseases. The document argues that improving global disease surveillance should be a high priority for national security.
The document discusses the 1918 flu pandemic, which originated from a virus that underwent an antigenic shift allowing it to spread easily between humans. It killed 20-50 million people worldwide and 675,000 in the US. The pandemic occurred in three waves, with a severe second wave in the fall of 1918. Even today, influenza remains a threat as the virus can undergo antigenic drift and shifts, sometimes resulting in new pandemic strains against which humans have little immunity. Monitoring efforts focus on tracking current flu strains and outbreaks.
Microbes and vectors swim in the evolutionary stream, and they swim faster than we do. Bacteria reproduce every 30 minutes. For them, a millennium is compressed into a fortnight. They are fleet afoot, and the pace of our research must keep up with them, or they will overtake us. Microbes were here on earth 2 billion years before humans arrived, learning every trick for survival, and it is likely that they will be here 2 billion years after we depart ......
Tuberculosis is caused by the bacterium Mycobacterium tuberculosis. It has infected humans for hundreds of thousands of years and was a major cause of death in the 18th-19th centuries. While vaccines and drugs were developed in the early 20th century, cases began rising again in the 1980s due to factors like HIV/AIDS and immigration from high prevalence countries. M. tuberculosis is spread through airborne droplets when infected people cough, sneeze or speak. It typically infects the lungs but can spread throughout the body. The bacterium is able to survive inside immune cells called macrophages. A proper immune response is needed to contain the infection, involving the activation of macrophages and formation of granulomas. Def
The document discusses the role of the internet and new media during the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic. It notes that while public health authorities prepared extensively, the actual impact of the pandemic was less severe than predicted. The pandemic highlighted issues with conflicting reports from health agencies and the spread of misinformation online. New technologies like social media and disease tracking websites provided more surveillance data but also uncertainty. The convergence of media and entertainment blurred the lines between fact and narrative, challenging public trust in authorities.
Pandemic Response in the Era of Big Data (Prier, 2015)Kyle Prier
油
This document discusses pandemic response in the era of big data by exploring global influenza surveillance and information overload. It summarizes how during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, WHO officials became overwhelmed by the rapid increase in data coming in and resorted to only qualitative indicators from country officials due to insufficient time to analyze the data. This information overload negatively impacted decision making and response efforts. The document then discusses the concepts of information overload, big data, and emerging novel syndromic surveillance systems using social media data like Twitter to monitor influenza trends.
This document analyzes mortality associated with influenza in the state of S達o Paulo, Brazil from 2002 to 2011. It finds that the pre-pandemic years showed a seasonal pattern of increased mortality during the winter linked to increased activity of influenza A(H3N2) viruses, especially in those over 60. The 2009 H1N1 pandemic was associated with higher than average mortality in those aged 5-19 and 20-59. Mortality in those over 60 was lower during the pandemic than previous influenza seasons. The pandemic wave occurred from July to November 2009. Overall mortality during the pandemic was higher than average but similar to severe H3N2 seasons.
This document discusses factors responsible for emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases. It argues that while pathogens, hosts, vectors, and environment have traditionally been seen as the main determinants of infectious disease emergence and transmission, human intervention through progress in science and technology should be considered a fifth key determinant. It provides examples of how various aspects of scientific and technological progress, such as intensive agriculture, antibiotic overuse, bioterrorism, and changes in food processing and transportation, have contributed to disease emergence and spread in recent decades.
Pneumonia is a common respiratory infection that affects the lungs. It is broadly divided into community-acquired pneumonia (CAP) or hospital-acquired pneumonia (HAP). The causative microorganisms differ between CAP and HAP depending on whether the pneumonia was acquired in the community or healthcare setting. Mortality from pneumonia is highest in young children and older adults, and is influenced by treatment setting, age, comorbidities, and the specific type of pneumonia such as CAP or HAP.
Influenza is a contagious respiratory illness caused by influenza viruses. There are three main types of influenza viruses (A, B, C) with Type A causing the most severe illness. Influenza viruses are constantly evolving through antigenic drift and antigenic shift, allowing them to evade host immunity. Vaccines aim to induce antibodies against predicted circulating strains, but the viruses' evolution requires continuous surveillance and vaccine updates. Influenza poses a significant disease burden, with estimated annual deaths ranging from 3,000 to 48,000 in the US alone.
This document provides an overview of essential epidemiology concepts. It defines communicable diseases as those caused by transmission of an infectious agent from person to person, either directly or indirectly through vectors or vehicles. Epidemiology studies the interaction between infectious agents, hosts, and the environment in disease outbreaks. It has helped increase ability to control spread of diseases through surveillance, prevention and treatment. Emerging and reemerging diseases continue to burden health systems, particularly in low-income countries. Epidemics are defined as excess disease cases in a community, while endemic diseases have relatively stable high prevalence in a geographic area or population group.
International Journal of Engineering Research and Applications (IJERA) is an open access online peer reviewed international journal that publishes research and review articles in the fields of Computer Science, Neural Networks, Electrical Engineering, Software Engineering, Information Technology, Mechanical Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Plastic Engineering, Food Technology, Textile Engineering, Nano Technology & science, Power Electronics, Electronics & Communication Engineering, Computational mathematics, Image processing, Civil Engineering, Structural Engineering, Environmental Engineering, VLSI Testing & Low Power VLSI Design etc.
Forecasts for the end of the new coronavirus pandemic in brazil and the worldFernando Alcoforado
油
The document summarizes predictions from universities in Singapore and Minnesota regarding the end of the COVID-19 pandemic in Brazil and worldwide. Researchers in Singapore predict that 97% of the crisis will end by May 30th, 2020 and 100% by December 2nd, 2020. They predict the pandemic will slow in Brazil by June 6th and health will be recovered by September 6th, 2020. Researchers at the University of Minnesota believe the pandemic may involve repetitive waves over 1-2 years or a severe second wave in late 2020, and that 60-70% of the population needs immunity for it to end. Overall predictions vary in optimism, with Singapore's estimates being more optimistic and Minnesota's acknowledging the pandemic may not end soon.
A new planning paradigm Economic Consequences of a Pandemic.pdfLori Head
油
- A new highly pathogenic H5N1 strain of avian influenza is spreading through Asia with a mortality rate of 58%, far higher than typical flu strains. While transmission is currently limited to animal-human, there are concerns it could mutate to spread efficiently human-to-human, causing a global pandemic.
- Even a conservative estimate of 2-7 million deaths worldwide in a best-case pandemic scenario would overwhelm healthcare systems. Worst-case estimates are 180-360 million deaths. This poses severe risks that continuity planners must prepare for.
- Current antiviral treatments may become less effective as the virus shows signs of resistance, and a vaccine would not be widely available for many months after an outbreak begins
1) Tuberculosis is a major cause of death worldwide caused by the bacterium Mycobacterium tuberculosis. It usually affects the lungs but can affect other organs in up to one-third of cases.
2) If properly treated with drugs, tuberculosis is curable in virtually all cases, but if untreated it can be fatal within 5 years in 50-65% of cases. It is transmitted through the airborne spread of droplet nuclei produced by infectious patients.
3) Mycobacterium tuberculosis is an acid-fast, rod-shaped bacterium that is difficult to treat due to its waxy cell wall containing mycolic acids and other lipids.
This document discusses lessons that can be learned from past influenza pandemics and applied to understanding the future course of the COVID-19 pandemic. It outlines three possible scenarios for the future trajectory of COVID-19 based on patterns seen in influenza. Scenario 1 involves repetitive smaller waves over 1-2 years as immunity gradually increases. Scenario 2 consists of a large second peak in cases around 6 months after the first. Scenario 3 follows a seasonal pattern with peaks in winter. The pandemic may last 18-24 months until 60-70% of the population is immune through natural infection or vaccination.
1 Towson University Pandemic Flu Preparedness and Res.docxmercysuttle
油
This document outlines Towson University's pandemic flu preparedness and response plan. It discusses the threat of an avian flu pandemic, noting that the H5N1 virus has already infected humans. The plan prepares for a potential outbreak by outlining assumptions, issues, and public health interventions like social distancing and isolation. It describes progressively closing the university after the WHO declares Phase 6 and the first U.S. case is confirmed. The goal is to protect health and safety by suspending activities and evacuating students in an orderly manner before pandemic flu spreads on campus.
1 Towson University Pandemic Flu Preparedness and Res.docxteresehearn
油
1
Towson University
Pandemic Flu Preparedness and Response Plan
Purpose: To prepare the University for the temporary suspension of normal academic, student
service and administrative functions and the continuation of essential and emergency functions,
with the ultimate goal of protecting the health and safety of the University community during a
flu pandemic.
I. Introduction
The recent reports of a new lethal strain of avian influenza spreading through Asia has raised the
specter of a global flu pandemic on the scale of the 1918 Spanish Flu outbreak. Should this occur,
the impact will be felt throughout the U.S., and ultimately on every campus in Maryland. The
University must prepare itself for this possibility in order to mitigate the impact on our students,
faculty and staff while maintaining University essential functions to the extent feasible.
A. Status of the Avian Flu Pandemic Threat
A flu pandemic is a global disease outbreak. Three conditions are necessary for a flu pandemic to
occur:
1. A novel virus subtype emerges for which people have little or no prior immunity
2. The virus is capable of infecting humans
3. The virus changes and becomes efficient, causing sustained human-to-human
transmission
These conditions permit the disease to spread easily from person-to-person, cause serious illness,
and sweep across countries and around the world in a very short time. Pandemics have occurred
throughout history on a periodic basis. In the last century, there were three influenza pandemics,
in 1918, 1957, and 1968. The deadly 1918 pandemic killed approximately 50 million people
worldwide.
At the present time, the first two of these three conditions have been met.
1. A novel virus subtype, H5N1, has emerged and, despite increased surveillance and large-
scale culling of infected wild and domestic birds, is now persistent (endemic) in the bird
population. The H5N1 virus has raised particular concerns about a potential human
pandemic because it is especially virulent, and it has striking similarities to the deadly
1918 H1N1 flu strain.
2. H5N1 virus has now crossed species and is capable of infecting humans and other
mammals. Since 2003, a growing number of human H5N1 cases have been reported in
Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Indonesia, and Turkey, and more than half of the people
infected with the H5N1 virus have died. While the majority of the human cases thus far
have been caused by exposure to infected poultry, there has been limited human-to-human
spread through extremely close household contact with the- initial case. Most of these
cases were adolescents or young adults, normally the population least at risk of death or
2
serious complications from typical seasonal flu.
3. The third condition for a pandemic efficient, sustained human-to-human transmission -
has not yet occurred. However, there is increasing concern that H5N1 will evolve into a
.
The Importance of Asymptomatic Coronavirus Disease-19 Patients: Never Trust a...asclepiuspdfs
油
The asymptomatic infectious case is a silent client, one of the most complex and damaging types of client: It is someone who does not provide information; of which we have no information. The silent client, as in the asymptomatic infection, can undermine the business by apparently not being able to address the problem. So how do you manage silent clients, asymptomatic cases? Identifying the points where asymptomatic (silent) cases occur and addressing the situation from a comprehensive perspective. This includes: (1) Preventing contagion and interrupting the transmission process immediately after contact with the virus: Test system, trace, and public health measures: Polymerase chain reaction testing on as many people as possible who have been in contact with infected people which allows the isolation of infected and the tracking and quarantine of their contacts; (2) universal public health measures: Wear a mask in public, wash your hands regularly, stay home when sick, keep a physical distance, and avoid meeting people outside of your home; (3) being so strict with negative cases as with positive ones: The consequences of high rates of false negatives are serious because they allow asymptomatic and symptomatic people to transmit diseases; follow-up is recommended, from a clinical point of view epidemiological, as strict to negative cases as to positive ones; (4) trace back the contacts of the positive cases: search the source of a new case, together with the contacts of that person; and (5) massive and opportunistic tests for the detection of general and specific populations: Rapid response tests for coronavirus disease-19 available to everyone, especially those without symptoms, carried out as mass population screening, to certain groups such as health workers and students, as detection opportunistic in the general practitioners consultation, and even self-administered by anyone.
Emerging and re emerging infectious diseasesShaharul Sohan
油
This document discusses emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases. It provides examples of diseases that have emerged in recent decades like Ebola, SARS, and HIV/AIDS. It also gives examples of diseases that were once under control but are re-emerging like tuberculosis, malaria, and cholera. The document explores factors that contribute to disease emergence such as ecological disruption, globalization, and breakdowns in public health infrastructure. It emphasizes that infectious diseases remain a major global health challenge.
This document discusses differences in the spread patterns of various respiratory viruses, including COVID-19, coronaviruses, smallpox, and influenza. It notes that virus size plays a role, with smallpox being larger and spreading mainly through direct contact and droplets, while coronaviruses can spread through airborne transmission as well. Maps and data on outbreaks show that while smallpox took years to spread, COVID-19 increased rapidly in some areas within weeks, indicating differences in transmission. The size of viruses like SARS and influenza fall between smallpox and coronaviruses.
1. Perspective
The NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL of MEDICINE
n engl j med 10.1056/nejmp0903906 1
insights for current and future
planning. Having conducted ar-
cheo-epidemiologic research, we
can clarify certain signature fea-
tures of three previous influenza
pandemics A/H1N1 from 1918
through 1919, A/H2N2 from 1957
through 1963, and A/H3N2 from
1968 through 1970 that should
inform both national plans for
pandemic preparedness and re-
quired international collabora-
tions.
Past pandemics were charac-
terized by a shift in the virus sub-
type, shifts of the highest death
rates to younger populations, suc-
cessive pandemic waves, higher
transmissibility than that of sea-
sonal influenza, and differences
in impact in different geographic
regions. Although influenza pan-
demics are classically defined by
the first of these features, the
other four characteristics are fre-
quently not considered in re-
sponse plans.
Yet the second feature, the
shift in mortality toward younger
age groups, was the most strik-
ing characteristic of the 20th-cen-
tury pandemics.1,2 Exposure to
influenza A/H1 subtypes before
1873 may have offered some pro-
tection to adults over 45 years of
age during the pandemic of 1918
and 1919. A similar mechanism
of antigen recycling might explain
the partial protection against in-
fluenza-related death that was
observed among people over 77
years of age during the 19681970
pandemic a possibility sup-
ported by the prepandemic pres-
ence of antibodies to H3, which
were isolated in people born
before 1892.1 Another possible
mechanism is immune potentia-
tion, leading to an increased like-
lihood of lethal outcomes after
influenza infection in specific age
groups. Still other hypotheses in-
clude the possibility of bacterial
superinfection due to asymmetric
carriage rates, given that higher
rates were found among young
people in 1918 and 1919.1,2 Al-
though the elderly frequently have
the highest death rates during
seasonal epidemics, their relative
sparing during pandemics has
not been generally appreciated.
Advance knowledge of which sub-
populations are most likely to be
at increased risk for death can
shape the optimization of control
strategies.
The third feature, a pattern of
multiple waves, characterized all
The Signature Features of Influenza Pandemics
Implications for Policy
Mark A. Miller, M.D., Cecile Viboud, Ph.D., Marta Balinska, Ph.D., and Lone Simonsen, Ph.D.
Vast amounts of time and resources are being
invested in planning for the next influenza
pandemic, and one may indeed have already be-
gun. Data from past pandemics can provide useful
Copyright 息 2009 Massachusetts Medical Society. All rights reserved.
Downloaded from www.nejm.org on May 18, 2009 . For personal use only. No other uses without permission.
2. PERSPECTIVE
n engl j med 10.1056/nejmp09039062
three 20th-century pandemics,
each of which caused increased
mortality for 2 to 5 years (see
chart).1 The lethal wave in the
autumn of 1918 was preceded
by a first wave in the summer
that led to substantial morbidity
but relatively low mortality in
both the United States and Eu-
rope. Recent studies suggest
that these early mild outbreaks
partially immunized the popula-
tion, decreasing the mortality
impact of the main pandemic
wave in the fall of 1918.2 In the
United States, the 1957 influen-
za A/H2 pandemic had three
waves in the United States, with
notable excess mortality in the
nonsuccessive winter seasons of
1959 and 1962 the latter be-
ing 5 years after the initial
emergence of the pandemic
strain.1 From 1968 through
1970, Eurasia had a mild first
influenza season, with the full
effects on morbidity and mortal-
ity occurring in the second sea-
son of pandemic-virus circula-
tion. The reasons for multiple
waves of varying impact are not
precisely understood, but they
probably include adaptation of
the virus to its new host, demo-
graphic or geographic variation,
seasonality, and the overall im-
munity of the population.1,2 The
occurrence of multiple waves po-
tentially provides time for health
authorities to implement control
strategies for successive waves.
Increased transmissibility of
influenza because of high sus-
ceptibility of the population, the
fourth feature, has also been doc-
umented for all the past pandem-
ics, although estimates of repro-
ductive numbers a measure of
the average number of secondary
infections caused by each indi-
vidual case vary considerably
among studies and pandemics.2,3
Recent studies suggest that dur-
ing the early mild wave of the
19181919 pandemic, the repro-
ductive number (i.e., the number
of new cases attributable to a
The Signature Features of Influenza Pandemics Implications for Policy
3x col
A B 19181919, Copenhagen18891892, London
C D 19681970, England and Wales19571963, United States
AUTHOR:
FIGURE
JOB: ISSUE:
4-C
H/T
RETAKE 1st
2nd
SIZE
ICM
CASE
EMail Line
H/T
Combo
Revised
AUTHOR, PLEASE NOTE:
Figure has been redrawn and type has been reset.
Please check carefully.
REG F
3rd
Enon
ARTIST:
Miller
1 of 1
07-02-09
ts
36101
45%
45%
10%
January1890M
arch
1890June
1890
Septem
ber1890
D
ecem
ber1890M
arch
1891June
1891
Septem
ber1891
D
ecem
ber1891M
arch
1892
60%
35%
5%
January1918
M
arch
1918
July1918
N
ovem
ber1918
M
ay1918
Septem
ber1918
January1919
M
arch
1919
July1919
M
ay1919
Septem
ber1919
28%
29%
43%
April1958
O
ctober1957
April1959
O
ctober1958
O
ctober1959April1960
O
ctober1960April1961
O
ctober1961April1962
O
ctober1962April1963 85%
15%
January1968M
arch
1968M
ay1968
July1968
Septem
ber1968
N
ovem
ber1968
January1969M
arch
1969M
ay1969
PercentageofTotalMortality
perPeriod
PercentageofTotalMortality
perPeriod
PercentageofTotalMortality
perPeriod
PercentageofTotalMortality
perPeriod
Mortality Distributions and Timing of Waves of Previous Influenza Pandemics.
Proportion of the total influenza-associated mortality burden in each wave for each of four previous pandemics is shown above the blue bars.
Mortality waves indicate the timing of the deaths during each pandemic. The 1918 pandemic (Panel B) had a mild first wave during the summer,
followed by two severe waves the following winter. The 1957 pandemic (Panel C) had three winter waves during the first 5 years. The 1968 pan-
demic (Panel D) had a mild first wave in Britain, followed by a severe second wave the following winter. The shaded columns indicate normal
seasonal patterns of influenza.
Copyright 息 2009 Massachusetts Medical Society. All rights reserved.
Downloaded from www.nejm.org on May 18, 2009 . For personal use only. No other uses without permission.
3. n engl j med 10.1056/nejmp0903906
PERSPECTIVE
3
single established case) may have
ranged between 2 and 5,2,3 as
compared with the average of
1.3 for seasonal influenza. Since
models of containment and pan-
demic control assumed lower re-
productive numbers for the cur-
rent epidemic than those that have
been historically observed, they
are likely to be overly optimistic
regarding the success of contain-
ment strategies.
Great heterogeneity among re-
gions in terms of incidence and
mortality is also a characteristic
of pandemics. This variability is
probably explained by the complex
heterogeneity in the degree of im-
munity in local populations to
the circulating influenza strains,
as well as by transmission factors
such as geographic conditions,
social mixing, degree of viral in-
fectiousness, and seasonal forc-
ing (small seasonal changes in
the effective transmission rate).4
The benefits of sharing data on
all these variables provide major
incentives for international col-
laboration.
Although the A/H5N1 influ-
enza subtype has spread to avian
populations in more than 30
countries and infected nearly 400
persons, with a case fatality rate
above 50%, scientists disagree
about its pandemic potential.
Such a highly pathogenic virus
does not usually adapt well to
its host, since it tends to kill fast-
er than it can be transmitted.
Other avian subtypes are also con-
sidered to be pandemic threats.
Although avian viruses have a
different tropism for respiratory
cellular receptors in birds than
for those in humans, gradual vi-
ral mutations or gene-segment
reassortments in a mammal mix-
ing vessel could result in a novel
viral clade or subtype that spreads
rapidly in a population that has
largely not previously been ex-
posed to it. Such changes may
have occurred in the current
swine H1N1 circulating strain.
The death toll of a future pan-
demic depends not only on the
virulence of the virus in question
but also on the rapidity with
which we are able to introduce
effective preventive and therapeu-
tic measures. Although A/H5N1
has been associated with a cy-
tokine-storm phenomenon rem-
iniscent of that observed in 1918
and 1919, new methods for the
timely manufacture and admin-
istration of antiviral agents and
influenza and pneumococcal vac-
cines could mitigate the effects
of a pandemic.
The evidence of multiple
waves in the 20th-century pan-
demics underlines the impor-
tance of active real-time viral
surveillance on a global scale.
Transnational collaborations are
crucial for the effective exchange
of genomic, clinical, and epide-
miologic data that will make
possible the development of vac-
cines and treatment protocols
and the identification of the best
population-based strategies. Al-
though our ability to produce a
vaccine in sufficient quantities
to cover people who are exposed
in a first pandemic wave is very
limited with todays technology,
an interwave period would pro-
vide time to increase the produc-
tion of biomedical tools and to
vaccinate populations, thereby
mitigating the morbidity and
mortality associated with suc-
cessive and potentially more le-
thal waves. This possibility, too,
is a powerful incentive for inter-
national collaboration, since all
would potentially share the ben-
efits. If an effective vaccine had
been available and used even a
year after the emergence of the
A/H3N2 viruses in 1968, most of
the deaths in Europe and Asia
could probably have been pre-
vented.
The signature pandemic fea-
ture of shifts in age-specific mor-
tality patterns should influence
vaccination priorities.5 Given that
the supplies of vaccine and anti-
viral agents are likely to be con-
strained, the efficient allocation
necessary for reducing mortality
will require consideration of lo-
cal demography, expected shifts
in age-specific incidence, direct
and herd effects of vaccination in
various age groups, and ethical
issues regarding life expectancies
and potential years of life saved
in various groups. The indirect ef-
fects of reducing transmission
also warrant further consider-
ation. The role of preexisting an-
tibodies in the elderly, their re-
duced immune response because
of immune senescence, and great-
er transmission among children
should prompt the targeting of
younger age groups as the sound-
est policy in a 1918-like scenario.
However, these attributes do not
necessarily apply to other pan-
demics to the same extent.5
Nonmedical interventions
primarily social distancing
could be useful in staving off
transmission. Simulation models
suggest that such interventions
would considerably decrease the
incidence of infection only if the
basic reproductive number was
less than 2, a rate that is lower
than that observed in past pan-
demics.3
Though the rapidity of trans-
mission of influenza virus during
pandemics necessitates immedi-
ate action, it can be hoped that
close collaborations and lessons
drawn from previous pandemics
will contribute to reducing na-
tional and global mortality. The
The Signature Features of Influenza Pandemics Implications for Policy
Copyright 息 2009 Massachusetts Medical Society. All rights reserved.
Downloaded from www.nejm.org on May 18, 2009 . For personal use only. No other uses without permission.
4. PERSPECTIVE
n engl j med 10.1056/nejmp09039064
documented relevant signature
features can help health authori-
ties prioritize national strategies
and aid international collabora-
tors in addressing the initial and
successive waves of illnesses and
deaths.
Dr. Miller reports being named on a
pending patent held by the National Insti-
tutes of Health on a novel influenza vaccine;
and Dr. Simonsen, receiving consulting fees
from Merck and research support from Wy-
eth. No other potential conflict of interest
relevant to this article was reported.
Dr. Miller is the associate director for re-
search, Dr. Viboud a staff scientist, and Dr.
Balinska a research associate at the Fogar足
ty International Center of the National Insti-
tutes of Health, Bethesda, MD. Dr. Simon-
sen is an adjunct professor and research
director of the Department of Global Health,
George Washington University School of
Public Health and Health Services, Wash-
ington, DC.
This article (10.1056/NEJMp0903906) was
published at NEJM.org on May 7, 2009.
Simonsen L, Olson DR, Viboud C, et al.1.
Pandemic influenza and mortality: past evi-
dence and projections for the future. In: Kno-
bler SL, Mack A, Mahmoud A, Lemon SM,
eds. The threat of pandemic influenza: are we
ready? Workshop summary. Washington, DC:
National Academies Press, 2005:89-114.
Andreasen V, Viboud C, Simonsen L. Epi-2.
demiologic characterization of the 1918 in-
fluenza pandemic summer wave in Copen-
hagen: implications for pandemic control
strategies. J Infect Dis 2008;197:270-8.
Viboud C, Tam T, Fleming D, Handel A,3.
Miller MA, Simonsen L. Transmissibility
and mortality impact of epidemic and pan-
demic influenza, with emphasis on the un-
usually deadly 1951 epidemic. Vaccine 2006;
24:6701-7.
Richard SA, Sugaya N, Simonsen L, Mill-4.
er MA, Viboud C. A comparative study of
the 1918-1920 influenza pandemic in Japan,
USA and UK: mortality impact and implica-
tions for pandemic planning. Epidemiol In-
fect 2009 February 12:1-11 (Epub ahead of
print).
Miller MA, Viboud C, Olson DR, Grais5.
RF, Rabaa MA, Simonsen L. Prioritization of
influenza pandemic vaccination to minimize
years of life lost. J Infect Dis 2008;198:
305-11.
Copyright 息 2009 Massachusetts Medical Society.
The Signature Features of Influenza Pandemics Implications for Policy
Copyright 息 2009 Massachusetts Medical Society. All rights reserved.
Downloaded from www.nejm.org on May 18, 2009 . For personal use only. No other uses without permission.