This document outlines recommended guidelines for interactions between U.S. armed forces and non-governmental humanitarian organizations (NGHOs) operating in hostile environments. It was developed through a working group facilitated by the U.S. Institute of Peace. The guidelines aim to minimize confusion over roles by distinguishing military from humanitarian activities and preserving NGHO independence. They cover issues like information sharing, coordination, and logistical support in extremis.
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NGO-USG DoD Guidelines 2005
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UN
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for Relations Between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental
Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments
On March 8, 2005, the heads of major U.S. humanitarian
organizations and U.S. civilian and military leaders met at
the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) to launch a discussion on the
challenges posed by operations in combat and other nonper-
missive environments. The Working Group on Civil-Military Re-
lations in Nonpermissive Environments, facilitated by USIP, was
created as a result of this meeting.
InterAction, the umbrella organization for many U.S. NGOs,
has coordinated the non-governmental delegation.
Represen-
tativesfromtheDepartmentofDefense,theJointChiefsofStaff,
the State Department, and the U.S. Agency for International De-
velopment have participated on behalf of the U.S. Government.
Thefollowingguidelinesshouldfacilitateinteractionbetween
U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Organizations
(see Key Terms) belonging to InterAction that are engaged in
humanitarian relief efforts in hostile or potentially hostile en-
vironments. (For the purposes of these guidelines, such orga-
nizations will henceforth be referred to as Non-Governmental
Humanitarian Organizations, or NGHOs.) While the guidelines
were developed between the Department of Defense (DOD)
and InterAction, DOD intends to observe these guidelines in its
dealings with the broader humanitarian assistance community.
These guidelines are not intended to constitute advance en-
dorsement or approval by either party of particular missions
of the other but are premised on a de facto recognition that
U.S. Armed Forces and NGHOs have often occupied the same
operational space in the past and will undoubtedly do so in the
future. When this does occur, both sides will make best efforts
toobservetheseguidelines,recognizingthatoperationalneces-
sity may require deviation from them. When breaks with the
guidelines occur, every effort should be made to explain what
prompted the deviation in order to promote transparency and
avoid distraction from the critical task of providing essential re-
lief to a population in need.
A. For the U.S. Armed Forces, the following guidelines should
be observed consistent with military force protection, mission
accomplishment, and operational requirements:
1. When conducting relief activities, military personnel should
wear uniforms or other distinctive clothing to avoid being mis-
taken for NGHO representatives. U.S. Armed Forces personnel
and units should not display NGHO logos on any military cloth-
ing, vehicles, or equipment. This does not preclude the appro-
priate use of symbols recognized under the law of war, such
as a red cross, when appropriate. U.S. Armed Forces may use
such symbols on military clothing, vehicles, and equipment in
appropriate situations.
2. Visits by U.S. Armed Forces personnel to NGHO sites should be
by prior arrangement.
3. U.S. Armed Forces should respect NGHO views on the bearing
of arms within NGHO sites.
4. U.S. Armed Forces should give NGHOs the option of meeting
with U.S. Armed Forces personnel outside military installations
for information exchanges.
5. U.S. Armed Forces should not describe NGHOs as force mul-
tipliers or partners of the military, or in any other fashion
The InterAction delegation includes CARE, Catholic Relief Services, the
International Medical Corps, the International Rescue Committee, Mercy Corps,
Refugees International, Save the Children, and World Vision.
Recommended Guidelines1
that could compromise their independence and their goal to
be perceived by the population as independent.
6. U.S. Armed Forces personnel and units should avoid interfer-
ing with NGHO relief efforts directed toward segments of the
civilian population that the military may regard as unfriendly.
7. U.S. Armed Forces personnel and units should respect the de-
sire of NGHOs not to serve as implementing partners for the
military in conducting relief activities. However, individual
NGOs may seek to cooperate with the military, in which case
such cooperation will be carried out with due regard to avoid-
ing compromise of the security, safety, and independence of
theNGHOcommunityatlarge,NGHOrepresentatives,orpublic
perceptions of their independence.
B. For NGHOs, the following guidelines should be observed:
1. NGHOpersonnelshouldnotwearmilitary-styleclothing.Thisis
not meant to preclude NGHO personnel from wearing protec-
tive gear, such as helmets and protective vests, provided that
such items are distinguishable in color/appearance from U.S.
Armed Forces issue items.
2. NGHO travel in U.S. Armed Forces vehicles should be limited to
liaison personnel to the extent practical.
3. NGHOs should not have facilities co-located with facilities in-
habited by U.S. Armed Forces personnel.
4. NGHOs should use their own logos on clothing, vehicles, and
buildings when security conditions permit.
5. NGHO personnels visits to military facilities/sites should be by
prior arrangement.
6. Except for liaison arrangements detailed in the sections that
follow, NGHOs should minimize their activities at military bases
and with U.S. Armed Forces personnel of a nature that might
compromise their independence.
7. NGHOs may, as a last resort, request military protection for
convoys delivering humanitarian assistance, take advantage
of essential logistics support available only from the military,
or accept evacuation assistance for medical treatment or to
evacuate from a hostile environment. Provision of such mili-
tary support to NGHOs rests solely within the discretion of the
military forces and will not be undertaken if it interferes with
higher priority military activities. Support generally will be
provided on a reimbursable basis in accordance with appli-
cable U.S. law.
C. Recommendations on forms of coordination, to the extent
feasible, that will minimize the risk of confusion between military
and NGHO roles in hostile or potentially hostile environments,
subject to military force protection, mission accomplishment, and
operational requirements are:
1. NGHO liaison officer participation in unclassified security brief-
ings conducted by the U.S. Armed Forces.
2. Unclassified information sharing with the NGHO liaison officer
on security conditions, operational sites, location of mines and
unexploded ordnance, humanitarian activities, and population
movements, insofar as such unclassified information shar-
ing is for the purpose of facilitating humanitarian operations
and the security of staff and local personnel engaged in these
operations.
3. Liaison arrangements with military commands prior to and
during military operations to deconflict military and relief ac-
tivities, including for the purpose of protection of humanitar-
ian installations and personnel and to inform military person-
nel of humanitarian relief objectives, modalities of operation,
G u i d e l i n e s
2. A. Procedures for NGHO/military dialogue during contingency
planning for DOD relief operations in a hostile or potentially hos-
tile environment:
1. NGHOs engaged in humanitarian relief send a small number of
liaison officers to the relevant combatant command for discus-
sions with the contingency planners responsible for designing
relief operations.
2. NGHOs engaged in humanitarian relief assign a small number
of liaison officers to the relevant combatant command (e.g.,
one liaison was stationed at U.S. CENTCOM for 6 of the first 12
months of the war in Afghanistan, and one was in Kuwait City
before U.S. forces entered Iraq in 2003).
3. The relevant military planners, including but not limited to the
Civil Affairs representatives of the relevant commander, meet
with humanitarian relief NGHO liaison officers at a mutually
agreed location.
B. Procedures for NGHOs and the military to access assessments
of humanitarian needs. U.S. military and NGHO representatives
should explore the following:
1. Access to NGHO and military assessments directly from a DOD
or other U.S. Government Web site.
2. Access to NGHO and military assessments through an NGO serv-
ing in a coordination role and identifying a common Web site.
3. Access to NGHO and military assessments through a U.S.
Government or United Nations (UN) Web site.
C. Procedures for NGHO liaison relationships with combat-
ant commands that are engaged in planning for military op-
erations in hostile or potentially hostile environments. (NGHO
liaison personnel are provided by the NGHO community):
1. The NGHO liaison officer should not be physically located with-
in the military headquarters, but if feasible should be close to
it in order to allow for daily contact.
2. The NGHO liaison officer should have appropriate access to
senior-level officers within the combatant commands and be
permitted to meet with them as necessary and feasible.
3. There should be a two-way information flow. The NGHO liaison
officer should provide details on NGHO capabilities, infrastruc-
tureifany,plans,concerns,etc.Themilitaryshouldprovideap-
propriate details regarding minefields, unexploded ordnance,
other hazards to NGHOs, access to medical facilities, evacua-
tion plans, etc.
4. The NGHO liaison officer should have the opportunity to brief
militarycommandersonNGHOobjectives,theCodeofConduct
of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Cres-
cent Societies (IFRC) and NGOs Engaged in Disaster Relief, the
United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Guide-
lines, country-specific guidelines based on the IASC Guidelines,
and, if desired, The Sphere Project Humanitarian Charter and
Minimum Standards in Disaster Response. U.S. Armed Forces
personnel should have the opportunity to brief NGHOs, to the
extent appropriate, on U.S. Government and coalition goals
and policies, monitoring principles, applicable laws and rules
of engagement, etc.
5. The NGHO liaison officer could continue as a liaison at higher
headquarters even after a Civil-Military Operations Center
(CMOC) or similar mechanism is established in-country. Once
this occurs, liaison officers of individual NGHOs could begin
coordination in-country through the CMOC for civilmilitary
liaison.
D. Possible organizations that could serve as a bridge between
NGHOs and U.S. Armed Forces in the field2
, e.g., U.S. Agency for
International Developments (USAIDs) Office of Military Affairs,
StateDepartmentsOfficeoftheCoordinatorforReconstructionand
Stabilization (S/CRS), and the UNs Humanitarian Coordinator:
1. If the U.S. Agency for International Development or the State
Departments Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and
Stabilization agree to serve a liaison function, they should be
prepared to work with the broader NGHO community in addi-
tion to U.S. Government implementing partners.
2. The UNs Humanitarian Coordinator or his/her representa-
tive could be a strong candidate to serve as liaison because
he/she normally would be responsible for working with all NG-
HOs and maintaining contact with the host government or a
successor regime.
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs): In wider usage, the
term NGO can be applied to any nonprofit organization that is in-
dependent from government. However, for the purposes of these
guidelines,thetermNGOreferstoaprivate,self-governing,not-for-
profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/
or promoting education, health care, economic development, envi-
ronmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or
encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil
society. (JP 3-08/JP 1-02)
Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations (NGHOs): For
the purposes of these guidelines, NGHOs are organizations belong-
ing to InterAction that are engaged in humanitarian relief efforts in
hostile or potentially hostile environments. NGHOs are a subset of
the broader NGO community.
Independence for NGHOs: Independence is defined in the same
way as it is in the Code of Conduct of the International Federation
of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and NGOs Engaged
in Disaster Relief: Independence is defined as not acting as an in-
strument of government foreign policy. NGHOs are agencies that
act independently from governments. NGHOs therefore, formulate
their own policies and implementation strategies and do not seek
to implement the policy of any government, except insofar as it co-
incides with their own independent policies. To maintain indepen-
dence, NGHOs will never knowinglyor through negligenceallow
themselves, or their employees, to be used to gather information
of a political, military, or economically sensitive nature for govern-
ments or other bodies that may serve purposes other than those
that are strictly humanitarian, nor will they act as instruments of
foreign policy of donor governments.
InterAction: InterAction is the largest coalition of U.S.-based inter-
national development and humanitarian nongovernmental orga-
nizations. With over 165 members operating in every developing
country, InterAction works to overcome poverty, exclusion, and suf-
fering by advancing basic dignity for all.
Recommended Processes2
Key Terms
2
In situations in which there is no actor to serve as a bridge, a U.S. military Civil
Affairs cell could serve as a temporary point-of-contact between NGHOs and
other elements of the U.S. Armed Forces.
and the extent of prospective or ongoing civilian humanitarian
relief efforts.
4. Military provision of assistance to NGHOs for humanitarian
relief activities in extremis when civilian providers are unavail-
able or unable to do so. Such assistance will not be provided if
it interferes with higher priority military activities.
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