Planning and Housing
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The document discusses the complexities of planning and housing in London, highlighting the distinction between public 'need' and private 'demand' in development proposals. It critiques current policies that prioritize developer profit over public interest, particularly in the provision of affordable housing and urban design. Additionally, it raises concerns over the exploitation of housing benefit rules by landlords, leading to a proliferation of poor-quality housing accommodations.
![OURCITY.LONDON
NEED VS DEMAND
Whichever level or type of development one is dealing with, a clear distinction is always drawn
between public油"need"油(i.e.油what is in the public planning interest), and private油"demand"油(i.e. what
is in the developers interest by having this particular type of development).
The developers argued that proof of private油"demand"油for exclusive golf facilities equated
to油"need".油This proposition is fallacious. Pure private油"demand"油is antithetical to public油"need",
particularly very exclusive private demand... The more exclusive the development, the less public
need is demonstrated. It is a zero sum game.
- Mr. Justice Haddon-Caves judgement in R (Cherkley Campaign) V Mole Valley District Council and Others
[2013] EWHC 2582 (Admin)](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/cablepresentationshorter-170405212423/85/Planning-and-Housing-3-320.jpg)
Planning and Housing
- 1. OURCITY.LONDON Understanding planning and housing George Turner Investigative Journalist and Campaigner
- 2. OURCITY.LONDON PLANNING By law a local planning authority must grant an application for permission to develop land in line with the statutory development plan The development plan in London is: The National Planning Policy Framework The London Plan The Boroughs Local Plans The goal of the development plan is to meet demonstrated local need
- 3. OURCITY.LONDON NEED VS DEMAND Whichever level or type of development one is dealing with, a clear distinction is always drawn between public油"need"油(i.e.油what is in the public planning interest), and private油"demand"油(i.e. what is in the developers interest by having this particular type of development). The developers argued that proof of private油"demand"油for exclusive golf facilities equated to油"need".油This proposition is fallacious. Pure private油"demand"油is antithetical to public油"need", particularly very exclusive private demand... The more exclusive the development, the less public need is demonstrated. It is a zero sum game. - Mr. Justice Haddon-Caves judgement in R (Cherkley Campaign) V Mole Valley District Council and Others [2013] EWHC 2582 (Admin)
- 4. OURCITY.LONDON PLANNING OBLIGATIONS Local plans contain a number of obligations Affordable Housing Provision of Open Space The Protection of Historic Monuments etc
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- 12. OURCITY.LONDON GOVERNMENT POLICY ON PLANNING AND ECONOMIC VIABILITY To encourage growth, if planning obligations render a development to be so unprofitable that a developer cannot get finance for the scheme, or acquire the land, then the planning obligations must be removed
- 13. OURCITY.LONDON VIABILITY IN PLANNING Introduced by Ken Livingstone in London at the same time as introducing a 50% affordable housing target. Originally targeted at affordable housing obligations, and the goal of the policy was to increase affordable housing obligations. Coalition government increased the scope of the viability policy though the National Planning Policy Framework
- 14. OURCITY.LONDON HOW VIABILITY WORKS Revenues cost = profit Profit must be sufficient to provide: A reasonable return to the land owner A reasonable return to the developer
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- 16. OURCITY.LONDON REVENUES Extremely easy to manipulate based on estimated of future sales values Surveyors will now produce two valuations for potential revenues from a new development
- 17. OURCITY.LONDON THE SHELL CENTER - REVENUES BNP Paribas confidential review of the submitted viability assessment May 2013 Through analysis of the available comparable evidence and their own judgment, Savills and KF have applied average values, on a pounds per square foot basis. Across the entire Development the resultant average value is 贈1,275 per square foot. Knight Frank and Savills confidential presentation to potential Shell Centre investors February 2013 Average Price per square foot 贈1640
- 18. OURCITY.LONDON COSTS There are no benchmarks for maximum acceptable costs Almost any costs can be and will be added to a viability appraisal
- 19. OURCITY.LONDON PROFITS Profit benchmarks manipulated by setting an existing use value which is too high, or by creating unreasonable profit demands from the developer. Battersea Power Station, Earls Court and the Shell Centre all had a minimum profit requirement of 20% on an internal rate of return basis.
- 20. OURCITY.LONDON THE OUTCOMES London currently achieving 13% of new homes as affordable housing. Most boroughs have a target of between 40-50% London losing industrial land at 3* the planned rate causing real problems for workspace New buildings are deficient in terms of basic amenity, such as open space and daylight
- 21. OURCITY.LONDON THE SHELL CENTRE 8 towers packed together in a highly sensitive area Loss of office space 30%+ of building would have inadequate daylight, 40% + inadequate sunlight Apartments 8m away from each other Damage to heritage assets of global importance Loss of 4,500 sqm open space New public square 99.3% overshadowed 10% onsite affordable housing concentrated at the back of the development (all with sub standard daylight)
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- 23. OURCITY.LONDON SECRETARY OF STATE DECISION Inspector concluded that the Shell Centre redevelopment could cause no harm the setting of the WWHS because the development was not in its setting. Inspector also concluded that there was no harm to the setting of any historic assets as a result of development
- 25. OURCITY.LONDON HIGH COURT DECISION Inspector had not expressed himself as well as he should have done with regard to setting of the World Heritage Site, but had clearly considered the issue
- 26. OURCITY.LONDON CONDUCT OF THE PLANNING INSPECTOR I have no doubt that the inspectors conduct was such as to give rise to a real concern that he was unfair to the objectors. He seriously mismanaged his conduct of the inquiry. It may well be that the individual decisions he made were justifiable, but the way in which he made them was unacceptable. Observations which are against a partys interests may be reasonable, but care has to be taken to ensure that they do not give the wrong impression. It is of course essential that parties to an inquiry feel that they have had a fair hearing and that their case has been properly taken into account. That did not happen in this inquiry so far as the claimant is concerned.
- 27. OURCITY.LONDON CONCLUSIONS ON VIABILITY Planning policies are weakly drafted to allow them to be interpreted however the decision maker on the day pleases Culture, and good urban design are being traded off against the short term economic boost of development. This is (unstated) government policy The international market for investment property is causing particular pressure in central London The corruption of the economic viability policy is a key driver
- 28. OURCITY.LONDON THE HOUSING BENEFIT SCAM In 2010 government changed planning rules to allow conversions of single family dwelling into homes in multiple occupation Homes in multiple occupation are shared houses where residents are unrelated, rent rooms and share facilities like a kitchen Housing benefit rates for rooms in HMOs are less than half the rates for 1 bedroom flats
- 29. OURCITY.LONDON THE HOUSING BENEFIT SCAM 2 Landlords have been buying up 2-3 bedroom family homes, and converting them into 6 rooms and a kitchen, they claim they dont need planning permission as they are HMOs. The landlords then let the rooms to the homeless and destitute. The landlords kindly help the tenants fill out their housing benefit claim form, and get them to claim the higher HB rate for a self contained flat. They also get the tenant to request that HB is paid directly to the landlord and not the tenant.
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- 33. OURCITY.LONDON SCALE In London each HB claimant can claim approx. 贈1000 per month. Each home has six rooms generating 6k per month in rent 72k a year. London councils, looking at 6 boroughs, found 3000 properties operating this model
- 34. OURCITY.LONDON THANK YOU QUESTIONS AND DISCUSSION www.ourcity.london george@ourcity.london Twitter - @georgenturner