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RUSI Urban Warfare Conference Session 3 - David Kilcullen

Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies
Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies

Panel discussion on how the urban environment is evolving, implications for urban operations and how future force designs and capabilities must adapt.

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Emerging patterns of adversary urban ops Insights from the NATO Urbanisation Program David Kilcullen 02.2018 djk@cordillera-apps.com
Infrastructure & Governance under stress The City as a System Environmental Degradation Poor Rural Infrastructure Lack of Access to Energy Poverty, hunger, disease Rural Crime and conflict Physical Economic Governmental RAPID, UNPLANNED URBANIZATION driven by: URBAN POVERTY CONFLICT prompted by: ABSENT GOVERNMENT POLITICAL INSTABILITY UNEMPLOYMENT CRIME RURAL HINTERLAND PERI-URBAN ZONE URBAN CORE & CBD TRANSITIONAL ZONE Emigration Shipping Offshore Extractives Trade Smuggling Piracy REMITTANCE system ILLICIT activity LICIT activity Diaspora OFFSHORE (INTERNATIONAL) FLOWS
3 The enemy is not the only threat
The environment for adversaries Western air superiority, but limited weight of allied air power and less capable local ground forces Pervasive electronic surveillance but high traffic volumes High degree of connectivity (cellphones, internet, social media, gaming networks) enabling propaganda and C2 Pervasive smart handheld consumer electronics and support platforms Technological hugging of our systems (Google Earth, GPS) Technical and mechanical skill among urban populations
0.00 20.00 40.00 60.00 80.00 100.00 120.00 140.00 160.00 2000 2012 20,146% 19,280% 278,949% 77% 153% (ITU/ICT, 2013) The connectivity explosion
6 to full-scale Social Netwar?
RUSI Urban Warfare Conference Session 3 - David Kilcullen
Disruptive technology If a commercial product goes through a generation every two years, and the military cycle takes six years per generation, then in twelve years the military product goes from being four times as powerful as the competition to a quarter as powerful Technologies developed for phones fit well with the requirements for small drones. Like phones, drones need miniature cameras, GPS navigation, and data processing power. Both share the same need for minimal size, weight, and power. A drone is simply a smartphone with wings, and the wings are the cheap part. David Hambling, Swarm Troopers, 2015, p4
9 Mosul, Iraq ISIS grenade-carrying drone 02.2017
10 Aleppo, Syria Homemade tank with video- enabled remote weapon station
11
Emerging enemy approaches 1. Actions across the full breadth and depth of an urban/peri-urban/rural nodal matrix (urban centre, belts, exurbs, satellite cities) 2. Leaderless resistance, no brain or HQacephalous swarms, remote or stand-off control nodes, or one-way broadcast of operational guidance 3. Infestation of urban environment (embedded in physical structures, hollow and interior spaces, and populations) 4. Large numbers of small multi-role platforms operating in a dynamic swarm 5. Modular organisations to lowest possible level (combat pairs) 6. Cooperative and remote engagement, through repurposing consumer electronics and industrial capacity 7. Cyber-kinetic opscyber as an adjunct integrated manoeuvre space 8. Improvisable capabilities (eg 3D printing), technological hugging and high latent technological capacity in the population 9. Diaspora linkages and retaliation options, manipulation of social movements and public protests (incl. general strike) 10. No-go and no-see areas, control by interdiction, commuter insurgency, tactical use of terror to shape adversary deployment
Tactics in the urban defence Less focused on area defence of urban areas, more on actively defending surrounding rural zones (belts) Urban center may be economy of force, with main effort withheld and stronger counterattack and QRF operating in belts Little tendency to fight last stand defensive actions: area denial and active (flexible) defence, mobile mesh or network defence Likely to fade away in face of strong attack, then engage in rapid counterattacks using stay-behind groups or multi-planar reinfiltration Active patrollingfighting and recce patrols, raids, use of many small actions to desensitize and shape defenders ahead of major strikes River-borne and seaborne attacks, typically by night and in bad weather
Tele-operated sniper rifle Near Kirkuk 01.2013
Tactics in the urban attack o Reflexive control: place the enemy in a cognitive box o Use of terrorism to manipulate (fix) defender laydown o Multiple small modular fighting groups o Urban, peri-urban and rural networked cells support a conventional manoeuvre force (underground, auxiliary, guerrilla [partisan] and main force) o Urban siege (raid and hold) o Baited ambushes on relief force routes o Sabotage/denial of sea/air points of entry o House bombs, VBIEDs, drone IEDs, artificial bird strike 15
Months of logistic and guerrilla diplomacy preparation. Infil of small urban guerrilla cells (5-15-man teams) to exurbs/outskirts from D-30. Exploitation of Eid festival. Three converging columns simultaneously atk from multiple axes, guerrillas attack key objs from rear. Focus on driving police and ANA to airport, then ambushing relief column.
Hybrid force modular tactical swarm 4-5 technicals, 6-8 dismounts per technical Heavy weapon in fire support or AAA role Fluid light cavalry tactics 2-3 precision indirect fire weapons Captive drones & loitering munitions Cyber capabilities embedded Specialist IED, sniper, anti-armour teams Networked, collaborative or autonomous modes
Urban insurgency & terrorism Multi-path re-infiltration of previously cleared areas Mobile IEDs repositioned by drone Commuter insurgency, urban areas denied not defended Anti-aircraft ambushes Runway and harbour denial operations Snipers, mortars in depth (keyhole shots, observers forward or remotely located using Google Earth/GPS/GLONASS) Anti-tank kill teams working in on armour from flanks Tunneling and placement of IEDs under buildings The tunnel as a network (cf. ATN approach to IEDs) Mounted counterattack in technicals against HQs House bombs, SVBIEDs, IEDs in thick defensive clusters
Armored SVBIED=precision guided missile West of Erbil, Iraq ISIS 8-ton ANFO SVBIED 01.2015
RUSI Urban Warfare Conference Session 3 - David Kilcullen
info@cordillera-apps.com | www.cordillera-apps.com

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RUSI Urban Warfare Conference Session 3 - David Kilcullen

  • 1. Emerging patterns of adversary urban ops Insights from the NATO Urbanisation Program David Kilcullen 02.2018 djk@cordillera-apps.com
  • 2. Infrastructure & Governance under stress The City as a System Environmental Degradation Poor Rural Infrastructure Lack of Access to Energy Poverty, hunger, disease Rural Crime and conflict Physical Economic Governmental RAPID, UNPLANNED URBANIZATION driven by: URBAN POVERTY CONFLICT prompted by: ABSENT GOVERNMENT POLITICAL INSTABILITY UNEMPLOYMENT CRIME RURAL HINTERLAND PERI-URBAN ZONE URBAN CORE & CBD TRANSITIONAL ZONE Emigration Shipping Offshore Extractives Trade Smuggling Piracy REMITTANCE system ILLICIT activity LICIT activity Diaspora OFFSHORE (INTERNATIONAL) FLOWS
  • 3. 3 The enemy is not the only threat
  • 4. The environment for adversaries Western air superiority, but limited weight of allied air power and less capable local ground forces Pervasive electronic surveillance but high traffic volumes High degree of connectivity (cellphones, internet, social media, gaming networks) enabling propaganda and C2 Pervasive smart handheld consumer electronics and support platforms Technological hugging of our systems (Google Earth, GPS) Technical and mechanical skill among urban populations
  • 8. Disruptive technology If a commercial product goes through a generation every two years, and the military cycle takes six years per generation, then in twelve years the military product goes from being four times as powerful as the competition to a quarter as powerful Technologies developed for phones fit well with the requirements for small drones. Like phones, drones need miniature cameras, GPS navigation, and data processing power. Both share the same need for minimal size, weight, and power. A drone is simply a smartphone with wings, and the wings are the cheap part. David Hambling, Swarm Troopers, 2015, p4
  • 10. 10 Aleppo, Syria Homemade tank with video- enabled remote weapon station
  • 11. 11
  • 12. Emerging enemy approaches 1. Actions across the full breadth and depth of an urban/peri-urban/rural nodal matrix (urban centre, belts, exurbs, satellite cities) 2. Leaderless resistance, no brain or HQacephalous swarms, remote or stand-off control nodes, or one-way broadcast of operational guidance 3. Infestation of urban environment (embedded in physical structures, hollow and interior spaces, and populations) 4. Large numbers of small multi-role platforms operating in a dynamic swarm 5. Modular organisations to lowest possible level (combat pairs) 6. Cooperative and remote engagement, through repurposing consumer electronics and industrial capacity 7. Cyber-kinetic opscyber as an adjunct integrated manoeuvre space 8. Improvisable capabilities (eg 3D printing), technological hugging and high latent technological capacity in the population 9. Diaspora linkages and retaliation options, manipulation of social movements and public protests (incl. general strike) 10. No-go and no-see areas, control by interdiction, commuter insurgency, tactical use of terror to shape adversary deployment
  • 13. Tactics in the urban defence Less focused on area defence of urban areas, more on actively defending surrounding rural zones (belts) Urban center may be economy of force, with main effort withheld and stronger counterattack and QRF operating in belts Little tendency to fight last stand defensive actions: area denial and active (flexible) defence, mobile mesh or network defence Likely to fade away in face of strong attack, then engage in rapid counterattacks using stay-behind groups or multi-planar reinfiltration Active patrollingfighting and recce patrols, raids, use of many small actions to desensitize and shape defenders ahead of major strikes River-borne and seaborne attacks, typically by night and in bad weather
  • 15. Tactics in the urban attack o Reflexive control: place the enemy in a cognitive box o Use of terrorism to manipulate (fix) defender laydown o Multiple small modular fighting groups o Urban, peri-urban and rural networked cells support a conventional manoeuvre force (underground, auxiliary, guerrilla [partisan] and main force) o Urban siege (raid and hold) o Baited ambushes on relief force routes o Sabotage/denial of sea/air points of entry o House bombs, VBIEDs, drone IEDs, artificial bird strike 15
  • 16. Months of logistic and guerrilla diplomacy preparation. Infil of small urban guerrilla cells (5-15-man teams) to exurbs/outskirts from D-30. Exploitation of Eid festival. Three converging columns simultaneously atk from multiple axes, guerrillas attack key objs from rear. Focus on driving police and ANA to airport, then ambushing relief column.
  • 17. Hybrid force modular tactical swarm 4-5 technicals, 6-8 dismounts per technical Heavy weapon in fire support or AAA role Fluid light cavalry tactics 2-3 precision indirect fire weapons Captive drones & loitering munitions Cyber capabilities embedded Specialist IED, sniper, anti-armour teams Networked, collaborative or autonomous modes
  • 18. Urban insurgency & terrorism Multi-path re-infiltration of previously cleared areas Mobile IEDs repositioned by drone Commuter insurgency, urban areas denied not defended Anti-aircraft ambushes Runway and harbour denial operations Snipers, mortars in depth (keyhole shots, observers forward or remotely located using Google Earth/GPS/GLONASS) Anti-tank kill teams working in on armour from flanks Tunneling and placement of IEDs under buildings The tunnel as a network (cf. ATN approach to IEDs) Mounted counterattack in technicals against HQs House bombs, SVBIEDs, IEDs in thick defensive clusters
  • 19. Armored SVBIED=precision guided missile West of Erbil, Iraq ISIS 8-ton ANFO SVBIED 01.2015