The map of p-zombies
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My new map is on and it is about p-zombies! No real p-zombies exist in any probable way, but a lot of ideas about them have been suggested. This map is the map of ideas. It may be fun or may be useful. The most useful application of p-zombies research is to determine whether we could loose something important during uploading. We have to solve the problem of consciousness before we will be uploaded. It will be the most stupid end of the world: everybody is alive and happy but everybody is p-zombie. Most ideas here are from Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Lesswrong wiki, Rational wiki, recent post of EY and from works of Chalmers and Dennett. Some ideas are mine. The pdf is here.
The map of p-zombies
- 1. Type Illustrations Description World model in which it is real Representa- tives Assessment of the model 0. Crypro p-zombie My copies which are not me. These copies do have qualia, and the same qialia as me, but they just not me. The idea appears in discussion of personal identity and upload- ing where people claim that a copy could be not equal to the origi- nal. Physicalism must be false, soul or continuity of consciousness must exist as real nature. Can’t be measured by any known methods by definition 1. “Normal” p-zombies A copy of me without any experiences. It is used as an argument against physicalism Physicalism must be false, dualism is true, if it exists Counterarguments: Our ability to speak about consciousness (EY); Physicalsists casual closer of the world 2. Behavioral p-zombie A copy of me which has the same behavior, but different internal mechanisms. Most typical example: a copy of me in a com- puter, after uploading Rationalwiki: “A p-zombie might just be behaviorally indis- tinguishable from a human being. Dissect- ing such a zombie, we might find that it dif- fers completely from a real human being.” Large China room copy of me (prerecorded an- swers to all possible questions) Physicalism doesn’t provide clear answer in this case, as we do not know neural correlate of consciousness Some of such p-zombies must be real, like me in the mirror. 2b. Functional p-zombie “A p-zombie might be functionally equivalent with human beings. That is, such a p-zom- bie might have a brain made of wires and transistors, but those wires and transistors would correspond to the axons and neurons of a human brain, and it would be possible to map one to the other.” RatinalWIKI 2c. Neurological zombie A zombie which is hu- man but is not a copy of any particlar human being which has con- sciousness. “A neurological zombie that has a human brain and is generally physi- ologically indistinguish- able from a human” wiki 3. Inverted qualia zombie A copy of me is con- ceivable with inverted qualia specter. It can’t be measured or expressed in words. Qualia here are like designation of vari- ables in calculations 3a. A subtype here is a copy with completely different qualia 3b. Inverted Earth. All the Earth is mirrored. SEP Light form of epiphenomenalism I am not sure about their possibility 4. Others as zombies Me from the outside viewer position. It is connected with “other minds problem”. I can’t prove that oth- ers have conscious- ness. Metaphysics is impossible in Kantian way. I can’t prove that others have qualia, and have to use analogy, which has limited power to prove. 5. Possible p-zombies Other modal me as p-zombies. For example “possible me” consists of all the same elements as me, but must lack qualia (if modal realism is false and mathematical uni- verse is false) Counterfactual mug- ging thought experi- ment - maybe updated for qualia, if Omega asks possible me if its expected answer is yes. It is more like illustra- tion of idea that some type of p-zombies is possible. 6. Super-zombie Someone, who claim to be more consciousness than me, and to have a kind of (enlighted) ex- periences which I can’t have. I am a zombie from his point of view. Dualism or other idealistic world model Advaita and some types of zen, Zo- gchen and other forms of Bud- dhism Gurdjiev Zen 7. Auto-zombie I think that I have sub- jective experience, but it is only illusion. Nothing like qualia exist Pure physicalism is true. So it is a zombie whp thinks that he is not a zombie, but everybody is zombie So it is a zombie whp thinks that he is not a zombie, but everybody is zombie 7-1 Blocked zombie A normal person whos ability to experience qualia is blocked by so called blockers. This idea is used as an argument to show in- completeness of physi- calism See SEP 8. Philosophical ghosts Pure experience without body “Philip Goff (2010) suggests that this loophole for Russellian versions of physicalism weakens the zombie argument. He recom- mends instead an ar- gument from ghosts: pure subjects of ex- perience without any physical nature.” (SEP) 9. Conceivable zombie Zombie which we could think about. See chapter in SEP. Three levels of pos- sibility: conceivable, self-consistent and possible. 10-1. Pseudo zombie or troll zombie A person who has consciousness but claim that he does not have it or doesn’t have qualia. He is either uneducat- ed (don’t know where to look), or real zom- bie, or troll-zombie 10-2 Masked zombie A person who doesn’t have consciousness but claim that he has it or has qualia, and con- sciously lying. 10-3. True zombie A person without qual- ia who claims that he don’t have qualia 10-4. Not zombie A person who has qualia and claims to have them 11. Nonhuman p-zombies It could be AIs or aliens or animals Non human who claims that he has experienc- es Non human who claim that he has not qualia and consciousness 12. Incomprehensible zombie A mind about which we can’t know if he is zombie or not. In fact all other minds. 13. Image-based zombie Videorecording or mir- ror reflection of a per- son 14. China room thought experiment, GLUT- p-zombie A Big China room which consists of re- cording of all possible answers of a person. If such recording was made from actual per- son, it is zombie now, but it wasn’t in the moment of recording 15. Fading qualia zombie A mind who’s experi- ences gradually dimin- ish in “brightness”. It was suggested as thought experiment by Chalmers and was prove to be impossible Chalmers 16 Dancing qualia This zombie has bio- logical part which could be replaced by com- puter part by a switch. Chalmers link 17. Blinking zombie A mind who’s stream of consciousness is constantly interrupted, so it consists of slices, but is not continuous. It may be used to proved that continuity of consciousness if not important. A copy with absent slices is used in Per- mutation city by Egan to prove the flux uni- verse. 19. Non existence 19a A person or world that has neither body, no experiences. 19b Logically Impossible mind 20. Anti Zombie ‘...”anti-zombies’ — duplicates of ourselves made conscious by the purely physical facts (Frankish 2007) — also seem conceiv- able. So we have a parallel argument: (1*) anti-zombies are conceivable; (2) what- ever is conceivable is possible; (3*) there- fore anti-zombies are possible. But (3) and (3*) cannot both be true, since if the pure- ly physical facts about anti-zombies make them conscious, then the exactly similar physical facts about zombies make them conscious too, and they are not zom- bies after all (Frankish 2007; Marton 1998; Sturgeon 2000, pp. ) 21 Boltzmann brains The brains which appear from vac- uum fluctuations or, orginally, from termal fluc- tuations 22 Flux universe mind The idea is from Per- mutaton city be Egan. Flux mind consists of actually existing at- oms, but they are tak- en in complex non nat- ural order Possible variant is Casual flux mind: an observer-moment which results from complex but random casual interaction of atoms in a stone. Observer-moment in different universes. One the same observer moment could happen by many different ca- sual ways, which re- sults in flux universe 23 Brain in vat Thought experiment about simulated world An observer is real but the world around him is like a zombie 24. Schroedinger mind This is a mind of a Schroedinger’s cat. The idea is used in “many minds” inter- pretation of the quan- tum mechanics wiki 25. Unconsciousness mind Seems to have behav- ior, but not experiences Examples: Sleepwalking Characters in night dreams Ideomotoric activity 26. Mind of evolution Mind-like process which is using different optimization method than humans to come to seemingly rational constructions Most known type of such optimisation pro- cess is natural selec- tion and genetic algo- rithms Another type is an- thropic principle Other are conceivable 27 Zombie-world: World without any observer The universe without any observers is con- ceivable but is it really possible? Could we say that it exists if it has not any casual connec- tions with any observ- ers 28 Epistemological solipsism Only me have con- sciousness, others are zombies 29 Psychological zombie A mind which is able only to repeat some past activities. May result from some forms of dementia 30 Animal conscious- ness problem The problem of animals qualia: do they feel and what? Does fish feel pain? Do they feel and suffer? We will never know what feels the frog in the pond 31 Paperclip maximizer A mind which is completely controlled by one idea. Like a maniac, or zombie 32. A problem of consciousness of a random computer programm A Q(T) programm must able to determine if an algorithm T has any experineces and which ones. Does it have suffering? What kind of qualia it has? 33 A soulless zombie A soulless zombie that lacks a soul. It may have qualia and experience, but it just lack of soul. 34 A Freewill-less zombie Their behaviour is completely determi- nated by some kind of rule set or algorithm 34a. Epiphenomenal free will, which can’t affect behaviour Free will exist, dualism 35. A сonsciosness-less zombie This type of zomies not only lack qualia, but also other attributes of consciosness as unity, refletivity etc. The map of ideas about philosophical zombies