What's Our Software Doing With All That User Input
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Demonstrate vulnerabilities due to insufficient input sanitisation. Increase knowledge, awareness and desire to test. Discuss practical techniques and approaches that increase our defences
![Client Side
1.type the characters in
2.[ctrl]+[v] characters in clipboard
3.right click -> Paste](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/userinputsanitisation-130908025523-/85/What-s-Our-Software-Doing-With-All-That-User-Input-20-320.jpg)
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What's Our Software Doing With All That User Input
- 1. Dealing with User Input Securely Kim Carter OWASP Day 2013-09-12
- 2. Demonstrate vulnerabilities Increase knowledge, awareness and desire to test Discuss practical techniques and approaches that increase our defences Agenda
- 3. Why the hacker always has the advantage Learn to enjoy breaking your own software. It'll make you a better developer. Our builders must think like breakers Developers Day Job Write Code Hackers Day Job Break Code
- 4. What does Poor Sanitisation look like?
- 5. OWASP ZAP also has a REST API. Useful for regression test suites If we have time at the end, we'll go over some AJAX XSS
- 6. Quality What is Quality? Do we as builders care? Why we should care
- 8. Quality But increasing quality is expensive right?
- 10. My Philosophy on Quality Everyone on the team needs to be thinking about it. Not just the testers. Reducing faults much earlier in the cycle.
- 11. User Input Sanitisation Strategies All code should be driven by executable specifications. Especially sanitisation logic Based around my following two blog posts http://blog.binarymist.net/2012/11/04/sanitising-user-input-from-browser-part-1/ http://blog.binarymist.net/2012/11/16/sanitising-user-input-from-browser-part-2/ Main components were a WCF service which dished up XSL'd XML as HTML to an existing web app
- 12. User Input Sanitisation Strategies Threat modelling Defence in depth Minimising attack surface Field length validation, incl structured data Parametrised Queries / Prepared Statements Least privilege White lists How to escape untrusted data for the different execution contexts File uploads not covered Why bother with client side Leveraging existing libraries
- 13. Threat modelling Ideally performed at design time Identify the real risks. How? Decomposition Determine entry points, assets, trust levels of users Analyse dependencies Determine & rank threats Determine security controls to prevent threats
- 14. Defence in depth Multiple layers may seem redundant Think of each layer as the only layer Attempt to stop the attack as soon as possible User Interface (Mark-up, JavaScript, CSS) Client Server Comms Server side (internet facing) Back end code Data store
- 15. Minimising attack surface Field length validation (client side)
- 16. Minimising attack surface Field length validation (server side)
- 17. Minimising attack surface Constrain fields to well structured data. Dates, post codes, e-mail addresses, check boxes, radio buttons Minimise free-form text input Hard to create small white lists with free-form
- 18. Parametrised Queries / Prepared Statements Least privilege
- 19. White lists Decide which characters are essential for each input Can now use the HTML5 pattern attribute on input tag. Doesn't cover textareas
- 20. Client Side 1.type the characters in 2.[ctrl]+[v] characters in clipboard 3.right click -> Paste
- 21. Server Side
- 22. Escaping Escape all characters depending on potential execution contexts they may end up in. Even if they are not in your white lists Get away with the following escaping example only if you deal with untrusted data in HTML elements and you're sure your attributes are all quoted Escaping details for additional contexts here: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/XSS_%28Cross_Site_Scripting%29_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet
- 23. Client Side
- 24. Server Side
- 25. Why bother with client side User Experience Server side sanitisation can be a lot slower When an honest user submits their data, they're not going to get server side exceptions due to validation
- 26. Leveraging existing libraries Useful OWASP Encoding Project (Reform library) Supports Perl, Python, PHP, JavaScript, ASP, Java, .NET OWASP Enterprise Security API Not so Useful Microsoft Anti-Cross Site Scripting Library A lot more detail on my blog blog.binarymist.net
- 27. Using: http://google-gruyere.appspot.com/ Stored XSS via AJAX
- 28. When the user clicks refresh button, response looks like In the mark-up the snippet looks like:
- 29. Resources Threat Modelling https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Application_Threat_Modeling https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Threat_Risk_Modeling Cheat Sheets and Check Lists I found helpful https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Input_Validation_Cheat_Sheet https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Validation_Regex_Repository https://www.owasp.org/index.php/XSS_(Cross_Site_Scripting)_Prevention_Cheat https://www.owasp.org/index.php/DOM_based_XSS_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_AJAX_Security_Guidelines