Access control regulates operations on protected data and resources. It aims to control what subjects can do to prevent damage. Access control is provided by operating systems and database management systems. It uses reference monitors to grant or deny access requests from subjects for objects based on access control policies and permissions. Access control mechanisms implement the access control function using permissions or subject/object attributes to make access decisions.
This document discusses protection in operating systems. It covers the goals of protection which include ensuring objects are only accessed by allowed processes. Principles of protection include least privilege and need-to-know. Protection domains and access matrices are used to specify allowed access. Implementation options for access matrices include access lists, capability lists, and lock-key systems. Role-based access control and revocation of access rights are also covered. Capability-based systems like Hydra and Cambridge CAP are described. Finally, language-based protection specifies policies through programming languages.
Least privilege, access control, operating system securityG Prachi
Ìý
The document discusses principles of least privilege and access control concepts in operating system security. It defines security goals of confidentiality, integrity and availability known as the CIA triad. The principle of least privilege aims to limit a process's privileges to only those necessary for its execution. Access control concepts include discretionary access control where owners control access, and mandatory access control defined by security labels. A reference monitor provides complete mediation, is tamperproof, and verifiable to securely enforce access policies.
This document discusses various concepts related to protection in operating systems. It covers the goals of protection which include preventing unauthorized access and enforcing access policies. The principle of least privilege is introduced which dictates that users and programs be given only necessary privileges. Access control and its basic terminology like objects, access rights and access control policies are defined. Implementation techniques for access control like access matrix, access control lists, capability lists and language-based approaches are described at a high level. The document provides an overview of key protection concepts in operating systems.
This chapter discusses protection in computer systems. It covers the goals of ensuring only authorized access to resources, the principle of least privilege, using access matrices to define access rights across protection domains, and different methods of implementing and revoking access controls, such as capability-based systems and language-based protections. Protection domains group objects and access rights, while access matrices specify the operations each domain can perform on different objects. Various operating systems implement domains and matrices in different ways to enforce access restrictions.
This chapter discusses protection in computer systems. It covers the goals of ensuring only authorized access to resources, the principle of least privilege, using access matrices to define access rights across protection domains, and different methods of implementing and revoking access controls, such as capability-based systems and language-based protections. Protection domains group objects and access rights, while access matrices specify the operations each domain can perform on different objects. Various operating systems implement domains and matrices in different ways, such as rings in Multics or roles in Solaris.
1. The document discusses access control models and concepts, including the reference monitor model, subjects and objects, access rights, and access control structures like access control matrices, capabilities, and access control lists.
2. Role-based access control (RBAC) is introduced as a model that uses roles as an intermediate access control layer between subjects and objects. Roles are defined by assigning permissions to perform certain procedures on particular types of objects.
3. Other access control concepts covered include security labels and partial orderings to compare sensitivity levels associated with subjects and objects. Lattices provide a mathematical structure to determine the least privileged label for a subject to access multiple objects.
This document discusses various access control models and concepts. It begins by defining access control as the prevention of unauthorized use of resources, controlling who can access a resource, under what conditions, and what they are allowed to do. It then covers different access control models and concepts in detail including access control matrices, access control lists, capabilities, role-based access control (RBAC), mandatory access control (MAC), and separation of duty constraints. RBAC is described as defining roles and associated permissions rather than assigning permissions directly to users. Hierarchical and static/dynamic separation of duty extensions to the core RBAC model are also summarized.
Access control is a collection of methods that enforce confidentiality and integrity by controlling access to resources. It allows only authorized users to access permitted objects like files, devices, or network connections. There are different models of access control, including discretionary access control (DAC) where owners set access rules, mandatory access control (MAC) where rules are based on security labels, and role-based access control (RBAC) where rules are based on user roles. Effective access control requires policies, least privilege, auditing, and technical controls like access control lists that implement the rules.
The document discusses access control, including definitions, principles, policies, requirements, and basic elements. It covers discretionary access control models, protection domains, UNIX file access control using inodes, traditional UNIX controls like setuid and sticky bits, and newer access control lists in UNIX.
SELinux is a method for mandatory access control (MAC) on Linux systems. MAC provides an additional layer of security beyond traditional discretionary access control (DAC) by labeling both subjects like users and objects like files. SELinux policies define which labeled subjects can access which labeled objects. In practice, both DAC and MAC are used together, so even if a SELinux policy allows access, the user still needs the correct file permissions via DAC. When running SELinux, commands like ps -Z and ls -Z can show the security labels on processes and files.
Protection Domain and Access Matrix Model -Operating SystemLalfakawmaKh
Ìý
This document discusses protection and security in operating systems. It covers authorization, authentication, encryption, and how operating systems control user access to system resources by deciding which users can access which resources. Protection deals with access to system resources and determines which files can be accessed by special users. Protection domains specify the resources a process can access and the operations it can perform on those resources. The access matrix model represents the protection state of a system using a matrix with rows for domains and columns for objects to define the access rights for each domain-object pair.
Authorization is the process of giving someone permission to do or have something.
Table of Content
Introduction Authorization
Common Attacker Testing Authentication
Strategies For Strong Authentication
Access Control
resource security and protection in distributed systemsathiabama40
Ìý
resource security and protection in a distributed operating system is concerned with defending an organization's resources from unauthorized access or modification:
Resource protection
The process of defending an organization's resources and assets from loss or compromise. This includes hardware, software, and data.
Security policies
These determine the security goals of a computer system, such as secrecy, privacy, and authenticity
Document level security is important in search based applications to restrict access to confidential documents. There are two main access control models - discretionary access control (DAC) and non-discretionary access control (role based access control). For DAC, the document owner controls access and late binding with an externalized access control list (ACL) stored as a bit array is efficient for dynamic ACLs. For role based access control, early binding with ACLs stored with document objects works well for static roles and ACLs. Caching and optimized ACL representations are important to minimize security filtering delays during search.
The document discusses security mechanisms in Linux operating systems. It covers access control modules, including audit, access control, and role-based access control modules. It also discusses security models like DAC, MAC, RBAC and how they integrate with the operating system's security tag library and audit log. The principles of least privilege, separation of duties and simplicity are important to the design.
Goals of Protection
Principles of Protection
Domain of Protection
Access Matrix
Implementation of Access Matrix
Access Control
Revocation of Access Rights
Capability-Based Systems
Language-Based Protection
A Novel methodology for handling Document Level Security in Search Based Appl...lucenerevolution
Ìý
Document level security is important in search based applications to restrict access to confidential documents. There are two main access control models - discretionary access control (DAC) and non-discretionary access control. For DAC, the document owner can specify access for each user, while role-based access control uses pre-defined roles. Multiple solutions exist depending on the access control model and how frequently access control lists (ACLs) change. These include early or late binding of ACLs to documents and storing ACLs internally or externally. The optimal solution balances security and search performance.
This document discusses sharing and security controls in Salesforce, including profiles, permission sets, and record-level security. Profiles control object, field, and user permissions, while permission sets can grant additional access. Record-level security can be set at the organization, manual sharing, role hierarchy, and sharing rule levels to determine which users can access individual records.
This document discusses access control mechanisms, specifically access control lists and capability lists. It provides examples of how access control lists work, including default permissions, abbreviations to shorten lists, and how conflicts are handled. It also covers capability lists, how capabilities are implemented using tags or cryptographic tickets, and the challenges of revocation for each method. Maintaining the principle of least privilege is discussed in the context of access control mechanisms.
This document summarizes a presentation on Dataverse permissions and security. It discusses key concepts like environment access, data ownership, security roles for row-level access, business units, teams and users, column-level security profiles, record sharing and access teams, and hierarchical/positional security. The presentation provides examples and explanations of how to configure these different Dataverse security features.
This document discusses operating system controls and security. It covers logon procedures, access tokens, access control lists, and discretionary access privileges that secure the operating system. It also discusses threats like unauthorized access, tampering, and data corruption. Controls include access privileges, password controls, and audit trails. The document also covers database management controls, including access controls like user views and authorization tables, and backup controls like periodic backups, transaction logs, checkpoints, and recovery modules.
The document discusses file system protection and access control. It describes how multi-user systems require mechanisms beyond physical security, like access control lists, to protect files. Access control lists associate users with permitted access levels (read, write, etc.) for each file. While detailed, access lists can become lengthy. Most systems simplify this using the owner, group, and universe classifications with permission bits for each. For example, in Unix systems files have separate permission bits for the owner, group and others which control read, write and execute access. The document also provides examples of access control list usage and management in different operating systems.
This document discusses operating system protection and security. It introduces the access matrix model for representing system protection. The access matrix defines access rights for subjects (domains) to objects. It also discusses principles of protection like least privilege and different approaches to implementing an access matrix like using access lists, capability lists, and lock-key implementations. The goals of protection are to ensure correct access to objects only by allowed processes.
The document discusses access control, including definitions, principles, policies, requirements, and basic elements. It covers discretionary access control models, protection domains, UNIX file access control using inodes, traditional UNIX controls like setuid and sticky bits, and newer access control lists in UNIX.
SELinux is a method for mandatory access control (MAC) on Linux systems. MAC provides an additional layer of security beyond traditional discretionary access control (DAC) by labeling both subjects like users and objects like files. SELinux policies define which labeled subjects can access which labeled objects. In practice, both DAC and MAC are used together, so even if a SELinux policy allows access, the user still needs the correct file permissions via DAC. When running SELinux, commands like ps -Z and ls -Z can show the security labels on processes and files.
Protection Domain and Access Matrix Model -Operating SystemLalfakawmaKh
Ìý
This document discusses protection and security in operating systems. It covers authorization, authentication, encryption, and how operating systems control user access to system resources by deciding which users can access which resources. Protection deals with access to system resources and determines which files can be accessed by special users. Protection domains specify the resources a process can access and the operations it can perform on those resources. The access matrix model represents the protection state of a system using a matrix with rows for domains and columns for objects to define the access rights for each domain-object pair.
Authorization is the process of giving someone permission to do or have something.
Table of Content
Introduction Authorization
Common Attacker Testing Authentication
Strategies For Strong Authentication
Access Control
resource security and protection in distributed systemsathiabama40
Ìý
resource security and protection in a distributed operating system is concerned with defending an organization's resources from unauthorized access or modification:
Resource protection
The process of defending an organization's resources and assets from loss or compromise. This includes hardware, software, and data.
Security policies
These determine the security goals of a computer system, such as secrecy, privacy, and authenticity
Document level security is important in search based applications to restrict access to confidential documents. There are two main access control models - discretionary access control (DAC) and non-discretionary access control (role based access control). For DAC, the document owner controls access and late binding with an externalized access control list (ACL) stored as a bit array is efficient for dynamic ACLs. For role based access control, early binding with ACLs stored with document objects works well for static roles and ACLs. Caching and optimized ACL representations are important to minimize security filtering delays during search.
The document discusses security mechanisms in Linux operating systems. It covers access control modules, including audit, access control, and role-based access control modules. It also discusses security models like DAC, MAC, RBAC and how they integrate with the operating system's security tag library and audit log. The principles of least privilege, separation of duties and simplicity are important to the design.
Goals of Protection
Principles of Protection
Domain of Protection
Access Matrix
Implementation of Access Matrix
Access Control
Revocation of Access Rights
Capability-Based Systems
Language-Based Protection
A Novel methodology for handling Document Level Security in Search Based Appl...lucenerevolution
Ìý
Document level security is important in search based applications to restrict access to confidential documents. There are two main access control models - discretionary access control (DAC) and non-discretionary access control. For DAC, the document owner can specify access for each user, while role-based access control uses pre-defined roles. Multiple solutions exist depending on the access control model and how frequently access control lists (ACLs) change. These include early or late binding of ACLs to documents and storing ACLs internally or externally. The optimal solution balances security and search performance.
This document discusses sharing and security controls in Salesforce, including profiles, permission sets, and record-level security. Profiles control object, field, and user permissions, while permission sets can grant additional access. Record-level security can be set at the organization, manual sharing, role hierarchy, and sharing rule levels to determine which users can access individual records.
This document discusses access control mechanisms, specifically access control lists and capability lists. It provides examples of how access control lists work, including default permissions, abbreviations to shorten lists, and how conflicts are handled. It also covers capability lists, how capabilities are implemented using tags or cryptographic tickets, and the challenges of revocation for each method. Maintaining the principle of least privilege is discussed in the context of access control mechanisms.
This document summarizes a presentation on Dataverse permissions and security. It discusses key concepts like environment access, data ownership, security roles for row-level access, business units, teams and users, column-level security profiles, record sharing and access teams, and hierarchical/positional security. The presentation provides examples and explanations of how to configure these different Dataverse security features.
This document discusses operating system controls and security. It covers logon procedures, access tokens, access control lists, and discretionary access privileges that secure the operating system. It also discusses threats like unauthorized access, tampering, and data corruption. Controls include access privileges, password controls, and audit trails. The document also covers database management controls, including access controls like user views and authorization tables, and backup controls like periodic backups, transaction logs, checkpoints, and recovery modules.
The document discusses file system protection and access control. It describes how multi-user systems require mechanisms beyond physical security, like access control lists, to protect files. Access control lists associate users with permitted access levels (read, write, etc.) for each file. While detailed, access lists can become lengthy. Most systems simplify this using the owner, group, and universe classifications with permission bits for each. For example, in Unix systems files have separate permission bits for the owner, group and others which control read, write and execute access. The document also provides examples of access control list usage and management in different operating systems.
This document discusses operating system protection and security. It introduces the access matrix model for representing system protection. The access matrix defines access rights for subjects (domains) to objects. It also discusses principles of protection like least privilege and different approaches to implementing an access matrix like using access lists, capability lists, and lock-key implementations. The goals of protection are to ensure correct access to objects only by allowed processes.
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Historical instances like the 1938 FD&C Act and the Generic Drug Scandals underscore how crisis-triggered reforms often fail to address the fundamental issues, perpetuating inefficiencies and hazards.
The narrative advocates a shift from reactive crisis management to proactive, adaptable systems prioritizing continuous enhancement. Key hurdles involve challenging outdated assumptions regarding bioavailability, inadequately funded research ventures, and the impact of vague language in regulatory frameworks.
The rise of large language models (LLMs) presents promising solutions, albeit with accompanying risks necessitating thorough validation and seamless integration.
Tackling these blind spots demands a holistic approach, embracing adaptive learning and a steadfast commitment to self-improvement. By nurturing curiosity, refining regulatory terminology, and judiciously harnessing new technologies, the pharmaceutical sector can progress towards better public health service delivery and ensure the safety, efficacy, and real-world impact of drug products.
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APM People Interest Network Conference 2025
-Autonomy, Teams and Tension: Projects under stress
-Tim Lyons
-The neurological levels of
team-working: Harmony and tensions
With a background in projects spanning more than 40 years, Tim Lyons specialised in the delivery of large, complex, multi-disciplinary programmes for clients including Crossrail, Network Rail, ExxonMobil, Siemens and in patent development. His first career was in broadcasting, where he designed and built commercial radio station studios in Manchester, Cardiff and Bristol, also working as a presenter and programme producer. Tim now writes and presents extensively on matters relating to the human and neurological aspects of projects, including communication, ethics and coaching. He holds a Master’s degree in NLP, is an NLP Master Practitioner and International Coach. He is the Deputy Lead for APM’s People Interest Network.
Session | The Neurological Levels of Team-working: Harmony and Tensions
Understanding how teams really work at conscious and unconscious levels is critical to a harmonious workplace. This session uncovers what those levels are, how to use them to detect and avoid tensions and how to smooth the management of change by checking you have considered all of them.
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Research & Research Methods: Basic Concepts and Types.pptxDr. Sarita Anand
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access-control-basics-murat-kantarcioglu.pdf
1. UT DALLAS
UT DALLAS Erik Jonsson School of Engineering & Computer Science
FEARLESS engineering
Access Control
Basics
Murat Kantarcioglu
2. FEARLESS engineering
Access Control - basic concepts
• An access control system regulates the operations
that can be executed on data and resources to be
protected
• Its goal is to control operations executed by subjects
in order to prevent actions that could damage data
and resources
• Access control is typically provided as part of the
operating system and of the database management
system (DBMS)
3. FEARLESS engineering
Access Control - basic concepts
Subject Access
request
Reference
monitor
Object
• The very nature of access control suggests that there is an active
subject requiring access to a passive object to perform some
specific access operation.
• A reference monitor grants or denies access
• This fundamental and simple notion of access control is due to
Lampson
------------------
B. Lampson. Protection. ACM Operating System Reviews, 8, 1974.
4. FEARLESS engineering
Access Control Mechanism
• It is typically a software system implementing the
access control function
• It is usually part of other systems
• The access control mechanism uses some access
control policies to decide whether to grant or deny a
subject access to a requested resource
• We will refer to an access control system as system
comprising an access control mechanism and all
information required to take access control decisions
(for example, access permissions)
5. FEARLESS engineering
Object
• Anything that holds data, such as relations, directories,
interprocess messages, network packets, I/O devices, or
physical media
• We often refer to objects, controlled by the access
control system, as protection objects
• Note that not all resources managed by a system
need to be protected
6. FEARLESS engineering
Subject
• An abstraction of any active entity that performs
computation in the system
• Subjects can be classified into:
– users -- single individuals connecting to the system
– groups -- sets of users
– roles -- named collections of privileges / functional entities
within the organization
– processes -- executing programs on behalf of users
• Relations may exist among the various types of
subject
7. FEARLESS engineering
Access Operations - Access Modes
• Operations that a subject can exercise on the protected objects in
the system
• Each type of operation corresponds to an access mode
• The basic idea is that several different types of operation may be
executed on a given type of object; the access control system
must be able to control the specific type of operation
• The most simple example of access modes is:
– read look at the contents of an object
– write change the contents of an object
• In reality, there is a large variety of access modes
• The access modes supported by an access control mechanism
depend on the resources to be protected (read, write, execute,
select, insert, update, delete, …)
• Often an access control system uses modes with the same name
for different types of object; the same mode can correspond to
different operations when applied to different objects
8. FEARLESS engineering
Access Operations - Access Modes
An example
• Unix operating system
– Access modes defined for files
• read: reading from a file
• write: writing to a file
• execute: executing a (program) file
– Access models defined for directories
• read: list a directory contents
• write: create or rename a file in a directory
• execute: search a directory
9. FEARLESS engineering
Access Operations
Access Permissions and Attributes
• How does the reference monitor decides whether to
give access or not?
• Main approaches:
– It uses access permissions
• Typical of discretionary access control (DAC) models
– It uses information (often referred to as attributes) concerning
subjects and objects
• Typical of multilevel access control (MAC) models
• More innovative approaches have been developed
where access permissions can be also expressed in
terms of object and subject attributes and even context
parameters
11. FEARLESS engineering
Access Permissions
• Access permissions, also called authorizations, are expressed in
terms of subjects, objects, and access modes
• From a conceptual point of view an access permission is a tuple <s,
o, a> where
– s is a subject
– o is an object
– a is an access mode
It states that subject s has the permission to execute operation a on
object o
We also say that s has access right a on object o
• Example: the access permission <Bob, Read, F1> states that Bob
has the permission to read file F1
12. FEARLESS engineering
Access Permissions
• Subjects, objects, and access modes can be organized into
hierarchies
• The semantics of the hierarchy depends on the domain
• The use of hierarchies has two important advantages:
– It reduces the number of permissions that need to be entered into
the access control system, thus reducing administration costs
– Combined with negative authorizations (to be discussed later on), it
supports the specification of exceptions
15. FEARLESS engineering
Group Hierarchy
group
group member
GROUP MEMBERSHIP
University
CS Dept
Suppose that the group CS department has 200 members and the University group
5000 members; suppose we have the policy that the department calendar can be
read to all members of the University and written only by the members of CS;
these policies can be encoded into two access permissions of the form:
<University, calendar, Read> <CS Dept, calendar, Write>
17. FEARLESS engineering
Groups and Negative Permissions
• Groups can be seen as an intermediate level between
users and objects
• An example of an ideal world where all access
permissions are mediated by groups
g1 g2
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 Users
Groups
Objects
o1 o2 o3 o4 o5 o6
18. FEARLESS engineering
Groups and Negative Permissions
• Often access control policies have special cases where is
proves convenient to give some user a permission for an
object directly or deny a user a permission that it would
normally derive from its membership in some group
• A negative permission specifies an operation that a
subject is not allowed to perform
• Representing negative permissions requires extending our
simple tuple model with an additional component:
<s, o, a, sign> where sign ÃŽ{+, -}
19. FEARLESS engineering
Groups and Negative Permissions
An example in which not all access permissions are
mediated through groups
Users
Groups
Objects
g1
s1 s2 s3
o1 o2 o3 o4 o5
20. FEARLESS engineering
Ownership and Administration
• A key question when dealing with access
control is who specifies which subjects can
access which objects for which operations
• In the case of permissions, this means
specifying which are the subjects that can
enter permissions
21. FEARLESS engineering
Ownership and Administration
Two basic options
• Discretionary approach
– the owner of a resource decrees who is allowed to have
access
– But then: who is the owner of a resource?
• Mandatory approach
– a system-wide policy decrees who is allowed to have access
22. FEARLESS engineering
Access Control Structures
The most well known access control structures for DAC
models are based on the notion of Access Control Matrix.
Let:
- S be a set of subjects
- O be a set of objects
- A be a set of access modes
An access control matrix M on S, O, and A is defined as
M = (Mso)s ∊ S, o ∊ O with Mso ⊂ A
The entry Mso specifies the set of access operations subject
s can perform on object o.
23. FEARLESS engineering
Access Control Structures
Example
{execute, read,
write}
-
{read, write}
Bill
{execute, read}
{execute}
-
Alice
fun.dir
edit.exe
bill.doc
24. FEARLESS engineering
Access Control Structures
Access Control Lists and Capabilities
• Directly implementing access control
matrices is quite inefficient, because in
most cases these matrices are sparse
• Therefore two main implementations have
been developed
– Access control lists
• Used in DBMS and Operating Systems
– Capabilities
25. FEARLESS engineering
Basic Operations in Access Control
• Grant permissions
– Inserting values in the matrix’s entries
• Revoke permissions
– Remove values from the matrix’s entries
• Check permissions
– Verifying whether the entry related to a subject s
and an object o contains a given access mode