FRONT-END DI COMUNICAZIONE PER RETI DI APPARATI DI TELEGESTIONE SOFREL.
SOFREL FR4000 soddisfa con efficacia le esigenze di apertura delle reti di telegestione verso i supervisori industriali o i sistemi centrali sviluppati dai gestori. Posto al centro del sistema, FR4000 centralizza integralmente le comunicazioni degli apparati di telegestione SOFREL e trasmette i dati grazie alla connessione Ethernet (protocollo LACBUS-PC) verso i supervisori dei gestori.
Questa soluzione di scambio dati si utilizza sia con reti su APN privato, fornendo una barriera di sicurezza 100% impenetrabile, sbarrando ogni intrusione allinterno della rete di telegestione, sia con reti su APN pubblico. In questo caso, un software SG4000 sar necessario per proteggere le trasmissioni dei dati in rete sullAPN pubblico.
Nagios in alta affidabilit con strumenti open sourceBabel
油
Alta Disponibilit dei servizi, strumenti di monitoraggio, ridondanza fisica e logica delle componenti. Sono questi argomenti cruciali per tutti coloro che all'interno di una attivit Data Center sono impegnati nella gestione di servizi Mission Critical.
In questa guida il TechAdvisor Gianpaolo Buono illustra i principi attraverso i quali poter procedere alla configurazione in alta affidabilit di un sistema di monitoraggio basato su componenti Open Source.
SELTA sviluppa e commercializza soluzioni per le reti d'accesso di Operatori Telco e Service Provider. Con le proprie innovazioni tecnologiche, SELTA supporta gli operatori nell'ammodernamento delle infrastrutture di rete che sono sempre pi湛 orientate al Service Delivery con una crescente richiesta di banda
This document explores the Huawei HG8010H GPON ONT device. It provides details on the device's specifications, firmware, and methods for accessing the shell and measuring optical power levels. It also discusses using the device for routing by creating a PPPoE interface and starting pppd services. Questions are posed about why received optical power levels fluctuate and whether temperature directly influences them.
The document summarizes an experiment conducted to test how networks respond to hijacked BGP routes announced at various internet exchanges. The experimenter borrowed an unused IP range from an accomplice network and announced it to peer networks to see how many would accept the hijacked route. The results found that a concerning number of peers at several major internet exchanges would accept the hijacked routes, highlighting the need for improved routing security practices.
This document discusses how a state-encouraged BGP hijacking occurred in 2013 when an Italian law enforcement agency asked an internet company to hijack the IP addresses of a Russian proxy server provider in order to resolve technical issues that were preventing the agency from accessing surveillance data. The company complied and propagated the hijacked routes globally instead of limiting it locally, constituting an unprecedented breach of trust that violated peering agreements and transit provider policies. The document analyzes BGP data and routing tables to verify the hijacking occurred as requested by the law enforcement agency.
This document summarizes internet peering in Italy, including:
- The major internet exchanges are MIX-IT in Milan, NAMEX in Rome, and TOP-IX in Turin, handling a total of around 250Gbps of traffic.
- Private interconnections predominantly occur in datacenters in Milan, especially the Avalon room.
- The largest access networks, including Telecom Italia, Wind, Fastweb, and Vodafone, control over 90% of the fixed line access market.
- In 2013, Telecom Italia largely withdrew from settlement-free peering with other Italian networks, negatively impacting connectivity for their customers.
This document discusses RPSL and the rpsltool software. It provides an overview of RPSL, explaining that it is a complex language for describing routing policies but is rarely implemented in full. It then describes rpsltool, which was created as a simpler alternative to generate BGP configurations from RPSL data. The document demonstrates how to configure peers and templates in rpsltool and discusses best practices for maintaining RPSL objects.
This document explores the Huawei HG8010H GPON ONT device. It provides details on the device's specifications, firmware, and methods for accessing the shell and measuring optical power levels. It also discusses using the device for routing by creating a PPPoE interface and starting pppd services. Questions are posed about why received optical power levels fluctuate and whether temperature directly influences them.
The document summarizes an experiment conducted to test how networks respond to hijacked BGP routes announced at various internet exchanges. The experimenter borrowed an unused IP range from an accomplice network and announced it to peer networks to see how many would accept the hijacked route. The results found that a concerning number of peers at several major internet exchanges would accept the hijacked routes, highlighting the need for improved routing security practices.
This document discusses how a state-encouraged BGP hijacking occurred in 2013 when an Italian law enforcement agency asked an internet company to hijack the IP addresses of a Russian proxy server provider in order to resolve technical issues that were preventing the agency from accessing surveillance data. The company complied and propagated the hijacked routes globally instead of limiting it locally, constituting an unprecedented breach of trust that violated peering agreements and transit provider policies. The document analyzes BGP data and routing tables to verify the hijacking occurred as requested by the law enforcement agency.
This document summarizes internet peering in Italy, including:
- The major internet exchanges are MIX-IT in Milan, NAMEX in Rome, and TOP-IX in Turin, handling a total of around 250Gbps of traffic.
- Private interconnections predominantly occur in datacenters in Milan, especially the Avalon room.
- The largest access networks, including Telecom Italia, Wind, Fastweb, and Vodafone, control over 90% of the fixed line access market.
- In 2013, Telecom Italia largely withdrew from settlement-free peering with other Italian networks, negatively impacting connectivity for their customers.
This document discusses RPSL and the rpsltool software. It provides an overview of RPSL, explaining that it is a complex language for describing routing policies but is rarely implemented in full. It then describes rpsltool, which was created as a simpler alternative to generate BGP configurations from RPSL data. The document demonstrates how to configure peers and templates in rpsltool and discusses best practices for maintaining RPSL objects.
1. AS112 @ ITgate Network
Esperimenti di DNS anycast
Marco dItri
md@linux.it
ITgate Network
Italian Linux Society
AS112 p. 1/2
2. Cosa 竪 AS112?
fornisce il reverse mapping per le reti private
(RFC1918) e link local:
10.0.0.0/8
172.16.0.0/12
192.168.0.0/16
169.254.0.0/16
delegate a server in 192.175.48.0/24
rete annunciata da AS112
AS112 p. 2/2
3. Anycast
Si de鍖nisce anycast la comunicazione tra un
mittente e il pi湛 vicino di un gruppo di diversi
destinatari (in contrapposizione a multicast e
broadcast).
Caratteristiche:
semplice uso di BGP
normali indirizzi IP
limitato a UDP, o quasi
AS112 p. 3/2
4. Anycast (2)
Servizi anycast pi湛 noti:
192.175.48.0/24 (AS112)
192.88.99.1/24 (relay 6to4, RFC3068)
[fk].root-servers.net (solo in
alcuni IX)
secondary.com
. . .
AS112 p. 4/2
5. A cosa serve?
A ridurre il carico sui root server causato da
sistemi operativi buggati e con鍖gurazioni errate.
la zona .arpa 竪 delegata ai root server
non 竪 un servizio critico
竪 una prova generale per la root, aspettando
DNSSEC. . .
AS112 p. 5/2
6. Come si usa?
Accettando lannuncio di 192.175.48.0/24 da
parte di AS112. Usate una istanza vicina al
vostro sito!
Per veri鍖care quale server di AS112 si sta
usando: dig hostname.as112.net any
AS112 p. 6/2
7. Chi lo usa?
Annunciato da inizio marzo:
MIX
TOPIX
Assenti notevoli:
GARR (usa NETNOD, via GEANT)
Interbusiness (usa Port80, via Tiscali al MIX)
AS112 p. 7/2
10. Le zone
10.in-addr.arpa. SOA prisoner.iana.org. ...
NS blackhole-1.iana.org.
NS blackhole-2.iana.org.
$ORIGIN .iana.org.
prisoner A 192.175.48.1
blackhole-1 A 192.175.48.6
blackhole-2 A 192.175.48.42
AS112 p. 10/2
11. Tipi di query
3168203 TKEY (TCP, 9 pacchetti)
1500109 SOA
1405254 PTR
28292 A (prisoner.iana.org)
1439 CNAME (per PTR)
790 NS
110 ANY
8 MX
3 TXT
1 KEY
AS112 p. 11/2
17. Principale colpevole
Windows XP e Windows 2000
timeout ogni 5, 10 e 60 minuti
鍖ood a mezzanotte
per dettagli: articolo KB Q246804
le cache dovrebbero assorbire le query!
I siti che ho contattato non rispondono o sono
reticenti.
AS112 p. 17/2
18. Query strane
鍖ood della stessa. Colpa di 鍖rewall
unidirezionali?
UDP: bad checksum. From
213.21.150.34:721 ...
10 q/d da 193.42.233.75 (INTESA-NET)
query da indirizzi RFC1918
Morale: controllate i vostri 鍖ltri!
ip verify unicast source reachable-via any
AS112 p. 18/2