This document discusses ontologies in computer science from the perspective of description logics. It begins by defining ontologies in philosophy and computer science. Description logics are introduced as a family of knowledge representation languages used to formally specify ontologies. Description logics allow concepts and roles to be built using constructors like conjunction, disjunction, and quantification. Description logic knowledge bases consist of a TBox containing terminology and an ABox containing facts about individuals. Reasoning tasks like satisfiability can be used to check a knowledge base for internal consistency.
The document discusses the concept of categories from Aristotle through Kant to modern formal semantics. It outlines Kant's view of categories as pure concepts of understanding and describes how formal semantics uses type theory to define semantic categories. It also discusses how natural language expressions are assigned semantic types and how type-shifting operators allow expressions to take on different types depending on context.
This document discusses ontologies in computer science from the perspective of description logics. It begins by defining ontologies in philosophy and computer science. Description logics are introduced as a family of knowledge representation languages used to formally specify ontologies. Description logics allow concepts and roles to be built using constructors like conjunction, disjunction, and quantification. Description logic knowledge bases consist of a TBox containing terminology and an ABox containing facts about individuals. Reasoning tasks like satisfiability can be used to check a knowledge base for internal consistency.
The document discusses the concept of categories from Aristotle through Kant to modern formal semantics. It outlines Kant's view of categories as pure concepts of understanding and describes how formal semantics uses type theory to define semantic categories. It also discusses how natural language expressions are assigned semantic types and how type-shifting operators allow expressions to take on different types depending on context.
This document summarizes a presentation on Nash equilibrium and its application to game theoretic pragmatics. It discusses Grice's cooperative principle and maxims, Nash equilibrium in game theory, and how ambiguity in language can be modeled as a game between speaker and listener with different payoffs for correct and incorrect interpretations. It proposes that Nash equilibrium provides an epistemic interpretation for how conversational participants coordinate to resolve ambiguity based on mutual knowledge of intentions and interpretations.
10. Chomsky (1957).油Syntactic Structure, The Hague: Mouton. Reprint. Berlin and New York (1985). Chomsky (1965).油 Aspects of the Theory of Syntax . Cambridge: The MIT Press Chomsky (1981).油 Lectures on Government and Binding: The Pisa Lectures . Holland: Foris Publications. Reprint. 7th Edition. Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1993 Chomsky (1995).油 The Minimalist Program . Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
11. X-bar theory: XP -> (specifier), X (X -> X, adjunct) X -> X, ( complement...)
50. This hypothesis was con鍖rmed in research on child language learning by Christopher Johnson (Johnson 1999). In a study of the acquisition of the Knowing is seeing metaphor, Johnson found that children 鍖rst learn the literal sense of see as in See doggie and See Daddy. Then they learn cases Johnson referred to as con鍖ations, in which the domains of seeing and knowing are coactive, that is, both are involved, as in sentences such as: See Daddy come in, or See what I spilled. Finally, children learn pure metaphorical cases such as: See what I mean. Johnson has argued that metaphor arises from such con鍖ation, or neural coactivation, in everyday experience of the source and target domains of the metaphor .
55. It not transcendental, because it is not beyond the experience or understanding of any beings. Rather it is a consequence of the experience and understanding of human beings. If "pure form" is not transcendental, and if mathematics is the study of pure form, then mathematics is not transcendental. Mathematics instead is the study of the structures that we use to understand and reason about our experience-structures that are inherent in our preconceptual bodily experience and that we make abstract via metaphor.